[exim-config] / base.m4

### -*-m4-*-
###
### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
###
### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
###

###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
###
### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
### (at your option) any later version.
###
### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
### GNU General Public License for more details.
###
### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.

###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Global settings.

SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
trusted_groups = CONF_trusted_groups
prod_requires_admin = false

SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
log_file_path = : syslog
log_selector = \
	+smtp_confirmation \
	+tls_peerdn
log_timezone = true
syslog_duplication = false
syslog_timestamp = false

SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::0

SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
deliver_queue_load_max = 8
queue_only_load = 12
smtp_accept_max = 16
smtp_accept_queue = 32
smtp_accept_reserve = 4
smtp_load_reserve = 10
smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted

SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
host_lookup = *

SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
gecos_name = $1
gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)

SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
received_header_text = Received: \
	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
	     {from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
	     {${if def:sender_ident \
		   {from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
	by $primary_hostname \
	(Exim $version_number)\
	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
	${if def:received_protocol \
	     {with $received_protocol \
	      ${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
	${if def:sender_address \
	     {(envelope-from $sender_address\
	      ${if def:authenticated_id \
		   {; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	id $message_exim_id\
	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}

SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
smtp_return_error_details = true
accept_8bitmime = true

SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
headers_charset = utf-8
qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain

SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d

SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.certlist
tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
			       {match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
			   {CONF_good_ciphers} \
			   {CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Access control lists.

SECTION(global, acl-after)
SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_helo = helo
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
helo:
	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	## it's too blunt a tool.  Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	warn	 set acl_c_helo_warning = false
		!condition = \
			${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
					    {<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
				  {match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
						{localhost : +thishost}}}}
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
				       partial0-lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
				       {${if match_ip \
					     {$sender_host_address} \
					     {<; $value}}}}}}
		!verify = helo
		 set acl_c_helo_warning = true

	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
not_smtp_start:
	## Record the user's name.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_mail = mail
SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
mail:

	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	## add it now.
	warn	 condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
		 add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
			BADHELO \
			Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
			helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
			address=$sender_host_address

	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	accept	 senders = :

	## Ensure that the sender looks valid.
	require	 acl = mail_check_sender

	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	warn	 condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 control = submission

	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	deny	 message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
		!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 hosts = +allnets
		!encrypted = *

	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	require	 acl = mail_check_auth

SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	## And we're done.
	accept

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
mail_check_sender:

	## See whether there's a special exception for this sender domain.
	accept	 senders = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
			     {KV(senders, {$value}{})},
			     {})}

	## Ensure that the sender is routable.  This is important to prevent
	## undeliverable bounces.
	require	 message = Invalid sender; \
			($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = sender

	## We're good, then.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_connect = connect
SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
connect:
SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
	warn	 acl = check_submission

	## Done.
	accept

check_submission:
	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
	accept	!hosts = +thishost
		!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
		 set acl_c_mode = relay

	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	warn	 set acl_c_mode = submission

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
rcpt:

	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	## isn't in one of our known domains.
	require	 message = Relaying not permitted
		 acl = check_relay

	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	require	 message = Invalid recipient \
			($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = recipient

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
check_relay:
	## Accept either if the client is allowed to relay through us, or if
	## we're the correct place to send this mail.

	## Known clients and authenticated users are OK.
	accept	  hosts = CONF_relay_clients
	accept	  authenticated = *

	## Known domains are OK.
	accept	  domains = +public

	## Finally, domains in our table are OK, unless they say they aren't.
	accept	  domains = \
		${if exists{CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf} \
		     {partial0-lsearch;	CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf}}
		  condition = DOMKV(service, {$value}{true})

	## Nope, that's not allowed.
	deny

SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_data = data
SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
data:

SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
expn_vrfy:
	accept	 hosts = +trusted
	deny	 message = Suck it and see

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Verification of sender address.

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
mail_check_auth:

	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	accept	 condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}

	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	## answer.  So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
		 hosts = +thishost
		!authenticated = *
		 condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
		 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## User must be authenticated by now.
	deny	 message = Sender not authenticated
		 condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}

	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	## is allowed to claim.
	deny	 message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
				       lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
				       {${if match_address \
					     {$sender_address} \
					     {+value}}} \
				       {false}}}}
		!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$acl_c_user} \
					    {+dom_users}} \
					  {match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+dom_locals}}}}},
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+user_extaddr}} \
					  {or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
						   {}} \
					       {match_domain \
						 {$sender_address_domain} \
						 {+public}}}}}}})}

	## All done.
	accept

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Common options for forwarding routers.

## We're pretty permissive here.
m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	<:driver = redirect
	modemask = 002
	check_owner = false
	check_group = false
	allow_filter = true
	allow_defer = true
	allow_fail = true
	forbid_blackhole = false
	check_ancestor = true:>)

## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	<:verify_only = true
	user = CONF_filter_user
	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	forbid_filter_perl = true
	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	forbid_filter_run = true
	file_transport = dummy
	directory_transport = dummy
	pipe_transport = dummy
	reply_transport = dummy:>)

## Transports for redirection filters.
m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
	<:file_transport = mailbox
	directory_transport = maildir
	pipe_transport = pipe
	reply_transport = reply:>)

m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
<:$1_vrf:
	$2
	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
$1:
	$2
	verify = no
	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Some standard transports.

m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	<:delivery_date_add = true
	envelope_to_add = true
	return_path_add = true:>)

SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
## A standard transport for remote delivery.  By default, try to do TLS, and
## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
## in plaintext anyway.  But all of this can be overridden from the
## `domains.conf' file.  Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way.  Instead, encode
## it into the transport name.  This is very unpleasant, of course.
smtp:
	driver = smtp
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true

m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
	<:driver = smtp
	hosts_try_auth = *
	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
	hosts_require_auth = \
		${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_require_ciphers = \
		DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
		      {${extract {${expand:$value}} \
				 { good = CONF_good_ciphers \
				   any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
				 {$value} \
				 {${expand:$value}}}} \
		      {CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
smtp_dhbits_1024:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
smtp_dhbits_2048:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)

## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
## authentication.
smtp_local:
	driver = smtp
	hosts_require_tls = *
	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.certlist
	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
				    {$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
				    fail}

## A standard transport for local delivery.
deliver:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /var/mail/$local_part
	group = mail
	mode = 0600
	mode_fail_narrower = false
	USER_DELIVERY

## Transports for user filters.
mailbox:
	driver = appendfile
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

maildir:
	driver = appendfile
	maildir_format = true
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

pipe:
	driver = pipe
	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
		/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
		/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	initgroups = true
	umask = 002
	return_fail_output = true
	log_output = true

## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
dummy:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /dev/null

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Retry configuration.

SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
## Default.
*					* \
	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h

DIVERT(null)
###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------
Commit	Line	Data
185b5456 MW	1	### --m4--
	2	###
	3	### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
	4	###
	5	### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
	6	###
	7
	8	###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
	9	###
	10	### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	11	### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	12	### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
	13	### (at your option) any later version.
	14	###
	15	### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	16	### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	17	### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	18	### GNU General Public License for more details.
	19	###
	20	### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	21	### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
	22	### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
	23
	24	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	25	### Global settings.
	26
	27	SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
b1d083dd	28	admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
e8fc7835	29	trusted_groups = CONF_trusted_groups
185b5456 MW	30	prod_requires_admin = false
	31
	32	SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
	33	log_file_path = : syslog
	34	log_selector = \
	35	+smtp_confirmation \
	36	+tls_peerdn
	37	log_timezone = true
	38	syslog_duplication = false
	39	syslog_timestamp = false
	40
	41	SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
	42	local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
ad4e4191	43	extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::0
185b5456 MW	44
	45	SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
	46	deliver_queue_load_max = 8
	47	queue_only_load = 12
	48	smtp_accept_max = 16
	49	smtp_accept_queue = 32
	50	smtp_accept_reserve = 4
	51	smtp_load_reserve = 10
	52	smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted
	53
	54	SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
	55	host_lookup = *
	56
	57	SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
	58	gecos_name = $1
	59	gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)
	60
	61	SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
	62	received_header_text = Received: \
2cf9db84	63	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
9384ef4f	64	{from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
2cf9db84 MW	65	{${if def:sender_ident \
2cf9db84 MW	66	{from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
185b5456	67	by $primary_hostname \
b92689d6 MW	68	(Exim $version_number)\
b92689d6 MW	69	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
185b5456 MW	70	${if def:received_protocol \
185b5456 MW	71	{with $received_protocol \
b92689d6	72	${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
185b5456	73	${if def:sender_address \
43e6fc69	74	{(envelope-from $sender_address\
185b5456 MW	75	${if def:authenticated_id \
	76	{; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	77	id $message_exim_id\
	78	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}
	79
	80	SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
	81	smtp_return_error_details = true
	82	accept_8bitmime = true
	83
	84	SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
	85	extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
	86	headers_charset = utf-8
	87	qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain
	88
	89	SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
	90	delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d
	91
6aae076f	92	SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
163774f0	93	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.certlist
6aae076f MW	94	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
	95	tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
	96	tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
	97	tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
	98	{match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
	99	{CONF_good_ciphers} \
	100	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
	101	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	102	tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}
	103
185b5456 MW	104	DIVERT(null)
	105	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	106	### Access control lists.
	107
	108	SECTION(global, acl-after)
	109	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	110	acl_smtp_helo = helo
	111	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	112	helo:
fe8f2338 MW	113	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	114	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	115	## it's too blunt a tool. Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	116	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	117	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	118	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	119	warn set acl_c_helo_warning = false
4ff4ad42 MW	120	!condition = \
	121	${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
	122	{<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
	123	{match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
	124	{localhost : +thishost}}}}
fe8f2338 MW	125	!condition = \
	126	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	127	{${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
	128	partial0-lsearch \
	129	{CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	130	{${if match_ip \
	131	{$sender_host_address} \
4587a704	132	{<; $value}}}}}}
fe8f2338 MW	133	!verify = helo
fe8f2338 MW	134	set acl_c_helo_warning = true
185b5456 MW	135
	136	accept
	137
284c9d7e MW	138	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	139	acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
	140	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	141	not_smtp_start:
	142	## Record the user's name.
	143	warn set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
	144
	145	## Done.
	146	accept
	147
185b5456 MW	148	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	149	acl_smtp_mail = mail
	150	SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
	151	mail:
	152
fe8f2338 MW	153	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	154	## add it now.
	155	warn condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
	156	add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
	157	BADHELO \
	158	Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
60c96a7c	159	helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
d70f6d53	160	address=$sender_host_address
fe8f2338	161
185b5456 MW	162	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	163	accept senders = :
	164
5051a30f MW	165	## Ensure that the sender looks valid.
5051a30f MW	166	require acl = mail_check_sender
185b5456 MW	167
	168	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	169	warn condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	170	control = submission
	171
284c9d7e MW	172	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	173	deny message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
	174	!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	175	hosts = +allnets
	176	!encrypted = *
	177
	178	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	179	require acl = mail_check_auth
	180
185b5456 MW	181	SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	182	## And we're done.
	183	accept
	184
5051a30f MW	185	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	186	mail_check_sender:
	187
	188	## See whether there's a special exception for this sender domain.
	189	accept senders = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
	190	{KV(senders, {$value}{})},
	191	{})}
	192
	193	## Ensure that the sender is routable. This is important to prevent
	194	## undeliverable bounces.
	195	require message = Invalid sender; \
	196	($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	197	verify = sender
	198
	199	## We're good, then.
	200	accept
	201
185b5456 MW	202	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	203	acl_smtp_connect = connect
	204	SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
	205	connect:
	206	SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
e12c9586	207	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
185b5456	208	warn acl = check_submission
e12c9586 MW	209
e12c9586 MW	210	## Done.
185b5456 MW	211	accept
	212
	213	check_submission:
	214	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
4ff4ad42	215	accept !hosts = +thishost
185b5456 MW	216	!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
	217	set acl_c_mode = relay
	218
	219	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	220	warn set acl_c_mode = submission
	221
	222	## Done.
	223	accept
	224
	225	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	226	acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
	227	SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
	228	rcpt:
	229
	230	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	231	## isn't in one of our known domains.
e4666f2d MW	232	require message = Relaying not permitted
e4666f2d MW	233	acl = check_relay
185b5456 MW	234
	235	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	236	require message = Invalid recipient \
	237	($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	238	verify = recipient
	239
e4666f2d MW	240	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	241	check_relay:
	242	## Accept either if the client is allowed to relay through us, or if
	243	## we're the correct place to send this mail.
	244
	245	## Known clients and authenticated users are OK.
	246	accept hosts = CONF_relay_clients
	247	accept authenticated = *
	248
	249	## Known domains are OK.
	250	accept domains = +public
	251
	252	## Finally, domains in our table are OK, unless they say they aren't.
	253	accept domains = \
	254	${if exists{CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf} \
	255	{partial0-lsearch; CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf}}
	256	condition = DOMKV(service, {$value}{true})
	257
	258	## Nope, that's not allowed.
	259	deny
	260
185b5456 MW	261	SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	262	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	263	accept
	264
	265	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	266	acl_smtp_data = data
	267	SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
	268	data:
	269
	270	SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	271	accept
	272
	273	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	274	acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
	275	acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
e4fe8925	276	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
185b5456 MW	277	expn_vrfy:
	278	accept hosts = +trusted
	279	deny message = Suck it and see
	280
	281	DIVERT(null)
	282	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
284c9d7e MW	283	### Verification of sender address.
	284
	285	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	286	mail_check_auth:
	287
	288	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	289	accept condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	290
	291	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	292	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	293	## answer. So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	294	warn set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
4ff4ad42	295	hosts = +thishost
284c9d7e	296	!authenticated = *
ff4c943d	297	condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
284c9d7e MW	298	set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
284c9d7e MW	299
ff4c943d	300	## User must be authenticated by now.
284c9d7e	301	deny message = Sender not authenticated
ff4c943d	302	condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}
284c9d7e MW	303
	304	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	305	## is allowed to claim.
	306	deny message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
459abd49 MW	307	!condition = \
	308	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	309	{${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
	310	lsearch \
	311	{CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	312	{${if match_address \
	313	{$sender_address} \
	314	{+value}}} \
	315	{false}}}}
284c9d7e MW	316	!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
	317	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	318	{$acl_c_user} \
	319	{+dom_users}} \
	320	{match_local_part \
	321	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	322	{+dom_locals}}}}},
	323	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	324	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	325	{+user_extaddr}} \
	326	{or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
	327	{}} \
	328	{match_domain \
	329	{$sender_address_domain} \
	330	{+public}}}}}}})}
	331
	332	## All done.
	333	accept
	334
	335	DIVERT(null)
	336	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
185b5456 MW	337	### Common options for forwarding routers.
	338
	339	## We're pretty permissive here.
	340	m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	341	<:driver = redirect
	342	modemask = 002
	343	check_owner = false
	344	check_group = false
	345	allow_filter = true
	346	allow_defer = true
	347	allow_fail = true
	348	forbid_blackhole = false
	349	check_ancestor = true:>)
	350
	351	## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
	352	m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	353	<:verify_only = true
	354	user = CONF_filter_user
	355	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	356	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	357	forbid_filter_perl = true
	358	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	359	forbid_filter_run = true
	360	file_transport = dummy
	361	directory_transport = dummy
	362	pipe_transport = dummy
	363	reply_transport = dummy:>)
	364
	365	## Transports for redirection filters.
	366	m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
7ab75d6f	367	<:file_transport = mailbox
185b5456 MW	368	directory_transport = maildir
	369	pipe_transport = pipe
	370	reply_transport = reply:>)
	371
7ab75d6f MW	372	m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
	373	<:$1_vrf:
	374	$2
	375	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
	376	$1:
	377	$2
	378	verify = no
	379	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)
	380
185b5456 MW	381	DIVERT(null)
	382	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	383	### Some standard transports.
	384
	385	m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	386	<:delivery_date_add = true
	387	envelope_to_add = true
	388	return_path_add = true:>)
	389
	390	SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
fa5a92c6 MW	391	## A standard transport for remote delivery. By default, try to do TLS, and
	392	## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
	393	## in plaintext anyway. But all of this can be overridden from the
beb15dae MW	394	## `domains.conf' file. Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
	395	## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way. Instead, encode
	396	## it into the transport name. This is very unpleasant, of course.
534d411b MW	397	smtp:
	398	driver = smtp
	399	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	400	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	401	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true
	402
beb15dae MW	403	m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
beb15dae MW	404	<:driver = smtp
ae9744ce	405	hosts_try_auth = *
fa5a92c6	406	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
ae9744ce MW	407	hosts_require_auth = \
ae9744ce MW	408	${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
fa5a92c6 MW	409	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	410	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	411	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	412	tls_require_ciphers = \
	413	DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
	414	{${extract {${expand:$value}} \
	415	{ good = CONF_good_ciphers \
	416	any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
	417	{$value} \
	418	{${expand:$value}}}} \
	419	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
beb15dae MW	420	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
beb15dae MW	421	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
beb15dae MW	422	smtp_dhbits_1024:
	423	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
	424	smtp_dhbits_2048:
	425	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)
185b5456 MW	426
	427	## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
	428	## authentication.
	429	smtp_local:
	430	driver = smtp
	431	hosts_require_tls = *
163774f0	432	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.certlist
185b5456 MW	433	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	434	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	435	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
b6d74252	436	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
185b5456 MW	437	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
185b5456 MW	438	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
0bed9b7f	439	{$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
185b5456 MW	440	fail}
	441
	442	## A standard transport for local delivery.
	443	deliver:
	444	driver = appendfile
	445	file = /var/mail/$local_part
8f6af4ae MW	446	group = mail
	447	mode = 0600
	448	mode_fail_narrower = false
185b5456 MW	449	USER_DELIVERY
	450
	451	## Transports for user filters.
	452	mailbox:
	453	driver = appendfile
8f6af4ae	454	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	455	USER_DELIVERY
	456
	457	maildir:
	458	driver = appendfile
	459	maildir_format = true
8f6af4ae	460	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	461	USER_DELIVERY
	462
	463	pipe:
	464	driver = pipe
8f6af4ae MW	465	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
	466	/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
	467	/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	468	initgroups = true
	469	umask = 002
	470	return_fail_output = true
	471	log_output = true
185b5456 MW	472
	473	## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
	474	dummy:
	475	driver = appendfile
	476	file = /dev/null
	477
	478	DIVERT(null)
	479	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	480	### Retry configuration.
	481
	482	SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
	483	## Default.
	484	* * \
	485	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h
	486
	487	DIVERT(null)
	488	###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------