[exim-config] / base.m4

### -*-m4-*-
###
### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
###
### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
###

###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
###
### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
### (at your option) any later version.
###
### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
### GNU General Public License for more details.
###
### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.

###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Global settings.

SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
prod_requires_admin = false

SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
log_file_path = : syslog
log_selector = \
	+smtp_confirmation \
	+tls_peerdn
log_timezone = true
syslog_duplication = false
syslog_timestamp = false

SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::

SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
deliver_queue_load_max = 8
queue_only_load = 12
smtp_accept_max = 16
smtp_accept_queue = 32
smtp_accept_reserve = 4
smtp_load_reserve = 10
smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted

SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
host_lookup = *

SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
gecos_name = $1
gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)

SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
received_header_text = Received: \
	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
	     {from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
	     {${if def:sender_ident \
		   {from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
	by $primary_hostname \
	(Exim $version_number)\
	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
	${if def:received_protocol \
	     {with $received_protocol \
	      ${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
	${if def:sender_address \
	     {(envelope-from $sender_address\
	      ${if def:authenticated_id \
		   {; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	id $message_exim_id\
	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}

SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
smtp_return_error_details = true
accept_8bitmime = true

SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
headers_charset = utf-8
qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain

SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d

SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.certlist
tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
			       {match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
			   {CONF_good_ciphers} \
			   {CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Access control lists.

SECTION(global, acl-after)
SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_helo = helo
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
helo:
	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	## it's too blunt a tool.  Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	warn	 set acl_c_helo_warning = false
		!condition = \
			${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
					    {<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
				  {match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
						{localhost : +thishost}}}}
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
				       partial0-lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
				       {${if match_ip \
					     {$sender_host_address} \
					     {<; $value}}}}}}
		!verify = helo
		 set acl_c_helo_warning = true

	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
not_smtp_start:
	## Record the user's name.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_mail = mail
SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
mail:

	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	## add it now.
	warn	 condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
		 add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
			BADHELO \
			Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
			helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
			address=$sender_host_address

	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	accept	 senders = :

	## Ensure that the sender looks valid.
	require	 acl = mail_check_sender

	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	warn	 condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 control = submission

	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	deny	 message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
		!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
		 hosts = +allnets
		!encrypted = *

	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	require	 acl = mail_check_auth

SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	## And we're done.
	accept

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
mail_check_sender:

	## See whether there's a special exception for this sender domain.
	accept	 senders = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
			     {KV(senders, {$value}{})},
			     {})}

	## Ensure that the sender is routable.  This is important to prevent
	## undeliverable bounces.
	require	 message = Invalid sender; \
			($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = sender

	## We're good, then.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_connect = connect
SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
connect:
SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
	warn	 acl = check_submission

	## Done.
	accept

check_submission:
	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
	accept	!hosts = +thishost
		!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
		 set acl_c_mode = relay

	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	warn	 set acl_c_mode = submission

	## Done.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
rcpt:

	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	## isn't in one of our known domains.
	require	 message = Relaying not permitted
		 acl = check_relay

	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	require	 message = Invalid recipient \
			($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
		 verify = recipient

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
check_relay:
	## Accept either if the client is allowed to relay through us, or if
	## we're the correct place to send this mail.

	## Known clients and authenticated users are OK.
	accept	  hosts = CONF_relay_clients
	accept	  authenticated = *

	## Known domains are OK.
	accept	  domains = +public

	## Finally, domains in our table are OK, unless they say they aren't.
	accept	  domains = \
		${if exists{CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf} \
		     {partial0-lsearch;	CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf}}
		  condition = DOMKV(service, {$value}{true})

	## Nope, that's not allowed.
	deny

SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_data = data
SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
data:

SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	accept

SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
expn_vrfy:
	accept	 hosts = +trusted
	deny	 message = Suck it and see

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Verification of sender address.

SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
mail_check_auth:

	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	accept	 condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}

	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	## answer.  So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	warn	 set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
		 hosts = +thishost
		!authenticated = *
		 condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
		 set acl_c_user = $sender_ident

	## User must be authenticated by now.
	deny	 message = Sender not authenticated
		 condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}

	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	## is allowed to claim.
	deny	 message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
		!condition = \
			${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
			     {${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
				       lsearch \
				       {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
				       {${if match_address \
					     {$sender_address} \
					     {+value}}} \
				       {false}}}}
		!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$acl_c_user} \
					    {+dom_users}} \
					  {match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+dom_locals}}}}},
			       {${if and {{match_local_part \
					    {$sender_address_local_part} \
					    {+user_extaddr}} \
					  {or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
						   {}} \
					       {match_domain \
						 {$sender_address_domain} \
						 {+public}}}}}}})}

	## All done.
	accept

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Common options for forwarding routers.

## We're pretty permissive here.
m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	<:driver = redirect
	modemask = 002
	check_owner = false
	check_group = false
	allow_filter = true
	allow_defer = true
	allow_fail = true
	forbid_blackhole = false
	check_ancestor = true:>)

## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	<:verify_only = true
	user = CONF_filter_user
	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	forbid_filter_perl = true
	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	forbid_filter_run = true
	file_transport = dummy
	directory_transport = dummy
	pipe_transport = dummy
	reply_transport = dummy:>)

## Transports for redirection filters.
m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
	<:file_transport = mailbox
	directory_transport = maildir
	pipe_transport = pipe
	reply_transport = reply:>)

m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
<:$1_vrf:
	$2
	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
$1:
	$2
	verify = no
	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Some standard transports.

m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	<:delivery_date_add = true
	envelope_to_add = true
	return_path_add = true:>)

SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
## A standard transport for remote delivery.  By default, try to do TLS, and
## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
## in plaintext anyway.  But all of this can be overridden from the
## `domains.conf' file.  Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way.  Instead, encode
## it into the transport name.  This is very unpleasant, of course.
smtp:
	driver = smtp
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true

m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
	<:driver = smtp
	hosts_try_auth = *
	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
	hosts_require_auth = \
		${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	tls_require_ciphers = \
		DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
		      {${extract {${expand:$value}} \
				 { good = CONF_good_ciphers \
				   any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
				 {$value} \
				 {${expand:$value}}}} \
		      {CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
smtp_dhbits_1024:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
smtp_dhbits_2048:
	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)

## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
## authentication.
smtp_local:
	driver = smtp
	hosts_require_tls = *
	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.certlist
	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
				    {$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
				    fail}

## A standard transport for local delivery.
deliver:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /var/mail/$local_part
	group = mail
	mode = 0600
	mode_fail_narrower = false
	USER_DELIVERY

## Transports for user filters.
mailbox:
	driver = appendfile
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

maildir:
	driver = appendfile
	maildir_format = true
	initgroups = true
	USER_DELIVERY

pipe:
	driver = pipe
	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
		/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
		/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	initgroups = true
	umask = 002
	return_fail_output = true
	log_output = true

## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
dummy:
	driver = appendfile
	file = /dev/null

DIVERT(null)
###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Retry configuration.

SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
## Default.
*					* \
	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h

DIVERT(null)
###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------
Commit	Line	Data
185b5456 MW	1	### --m4--
	2	###
	3	### Basic settings for distorted.org.uk Exim configuration
	4	###
	5	### (c) 2012 Mark Wooding
	6	###
	7
	8	###----- Licensing notice ---------------------------------------------------
	9	###
	10	### This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	11	### it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	12	### the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
	13	### (at your option) any later version.
	14	###
	15	### This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	16	### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	17	### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	18	### GNU General Public License for more details.
	19	###
	20	### You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	21	### along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
	22	### Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
	23
	24	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	25	### Global settings.
	26
	27	SECTION(global, priv)m4_dnl
b1d083dd	28	admin_groups = CONF_admin_groups
185b5456 MW	29	prod_requires_admin = false
	30
	31	SECTION(global, logging)m4_dnl
	32	log_file_path = : syslog
	33	log_selector = \
	34	+smtp_confirmation \
	35	+tls_peerdn
	36	log_timezone = true
	37	syslog_duplication = false
	38	syslog_timestamp = false
	39
	40	SECTION(global, daemon)m4_dnl
	41	local_interfaces = <; CONF_interfaces
	42	extra_local_interfaces = <; 0.0.0.0 ; ::
	43
	44	SECTION(global, resource)m4_dnl
	45	deliver_queue_load_max = 8
	46	queue_only_load = 12
	47	smtp_accept_max = 16
	48	smtp_accept_queue = 32
	49	smtp_accept_reserve = 4
	50	smtp_load_reserve = 10
	51	smtp_reserve_hosts = +trusted
	52
	53	SECTION(global, policy)m4_dnl
	54	host_lookup = *
	55
	56	SECTION(global, users)m4_dnl
	57	gecos_name = $1
	58	gecos_pattern = ([^,:]*)
	59
	60	SECTION(global, incoming)m4_dnl
	61	received_header_text = Received: \
2cf9db84	62	${if def:sender_rcvhost \
9384ef4f	63	{from $sender_rcvhost\n\t} \
2cf9db84 MW	64	{${if def:sender_ident \
2cf9db84 MW	65	{from ${quote_local_part:$sender_ident} }}}}\
185b5456	66	by $primary_hostname \
b92689d6 MW	67	(Exim $version_number)\
b92689d6 MW	68	${if def:tls_cipher {\n\t} { }}\
185b5456 MW	69	${if def:received_protocol \
185b5456 MW	70	{with $received_protocol \
b92689d6	71	${if def:tls_cipher {(cipher=$tls_cipher)}}}}\n\t\
185b5456	72	${if def:sender_address \
43e6fc69	73	{(envelope-from $sender_address\
185b5456 MW	74	${if def:authenticated_id \
	75	{; auth=$authenticated_id}})\n\t}}\
	76	id $message_exim_id\
	77	${if def:received_for {\n\tfor $received_for}}
	78
	79	SECTION(global, smtp)m4_dnl
	80	smtp_return_error_details = true
	81	accept_8bitmime = true
	82
	83	SECTION(global, process)m4_dnl
	84	extract_addresses_remove_arguments = false
	85	headers_charset = utf-8
	86	qualify_domain = CONF_master_domain
	87
	88	SECTION(global, bounce)m4_dnl
	89	delay_warning = 1h : 24h : 2d
	90
6aae076f	91	SECTION(global, tls)m4_dnl
163774f0	92	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.certlist
6aae076f MW	93	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key
	94	tls_advertise_hosts = ${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/server.key} {*}{}}
	95	tls_dhparam = CONF_ca_dir/dh-param-2048.pem
	96	tls_require_ciphers = ${if or {{={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}} \
	97	{match_ip {$sender_host_address}{+trusted}}} \
	98	{CONF_good_ciphers} \
	99	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers}}
	100	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	101	tls_verify_hosts = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission} {} {+allnets}}
	102
185b5456 MW	103	DIVERT(null)
	104	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	105	### Access control lists.
	106
	107	SECTION(global, acl-after)
	108	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	109	acl_smtp_helo = helo
	110	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	111	helo:
fe8f2338 MW	112	## Check that the caller's claimed identity is actually plausible.
	113	## This seems like it's a fairly effective filter on spamminess, but
	114	## it's too blunt a tool. Rather than reject, add a warning header.
	115	## Only we can't do this the easy way, so save it up for use in MAIL.
	116	## Also, we're liable to get a subsequent HELO (e.g., after STARTTLS)
	117	## and we should only care about the most recent one.
	118	warn set acl_c_helo_warning = false
4ff4ad42 MW	119	!condition = \
	120	${if and {{match_ip {$sender_host_address} \
	121	{<; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1}} \
	122	{match_domain {$sender_helo_name} \
	123	{localhost : +thishost}}}}
fe8f2338 MW	124	!condition = \
	125	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	126	{${lookup {$sender_helo_name} \
	127	partial0-lsearch \
	128	{CONF_sysconf_dir/helo.conf} \
	129	{${if match_ip \
	130	{$sender_host_address} \
4587a704	131	{<; $value}}}}}}
fe8f2338 MW	132	!verify = helo
fe8f2338 MW	133	set acl_c_helo_warning = true
185b5456 MW	134
	135	accept
	136
284c9d7e MW	137	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	138	acl_not_smtp_start = not_smtp_start
	139	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	140	not_smtp_start:
	141	## Record the user's name.
	142	warn set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
	143
	144	## Done.
	145	accept
	146
185b5456 MW	147	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	148	acl_smtp_mail = mail
	149	SECTION(acl, mail)m4_dnl
	150	mail:
	151
fe8f2338 MW	152	## If we stashed a warning header about HELO from earlier, we should
	153	## add it now.
	154	warn condition = $acl_c_helo_warning
	155	add_header = :after_received:X-Distorted-Warning: \
	156	BADHELO \
	157	Client's HELO doesn't match its IP address.\n\t\
60c96a7c	158	helo-name=$sender_helo_name \
d70f6d53	159	address=$sender_host_address
fe8f2338	160
185b5456 MW	161	## Always allow the empty sender, so that we can receive bounces.
	162	accept senders = :
	163
5051a30f MW	164	## Ensure that the sender looks valid.
5051a30f MW	165	require acl = mail_check_sender
185b5456 MW	166
	167	## If this is directly from a client then hack on it for a while.
	168	warn condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	169	control = submission
	170
284c9d7e MW	171	## Insist that a local client connect through TLS.
	172	deny message = Hosts within CONF_master_domain must use TLS
	173	!condition = ${if eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	174	hosts = +allnets
	175	!encrypted = *
	176
	177	## Check that a submitted message's sender address is allowable.
	178	require acl = mail_check_auth
	179
185b5456 MW	180	SECTION(acl, mail-tail)m4_dnl
	181	## And we're done.
	182	accept
	183
5051a30f MW	184	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	185	mail_check_sender:
	186
	187	## See whether there's a special exception for this sender domain.
	188	accept senders = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
	189	{KV(senders, {$value}{})},
	190	{})}
	191
	192	## Ensure that the sender is routable. This is important to prevent
	193	## undeliverable bounces.
	194	require message = Invalid sender; \
	195	($sender_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	196	verify = sender
	197
	198	## We're good, then.
	199	accept
	200
185b5456 MW	201	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	202	acl_smtp_connect = connect
	203	SECTION(acl, connect)m4_dnl
	204	connect:
	205	SECTION(acl, connect-tail)m4_dnl
e12c9586	206	## Configure variables according to the submission mode.
185b5456	207	warn acl = check_submission
e12c9586 MW	208
e12c9586 MW	209	## Done.
185b5456 MW	210	accept
	211
	212	check_submission:
	213	## See whether this message needs hacking on.
4ff4ad42	214	accept !hosts = +thishost
185b5456 MW	215	!condition = ${if ={$received_port}{CONF_submission_port}}
	216	set acl_c_mode = relay
	217
	218	## Remember to apply submission controls.
	219	warn set acl_c_mode = submission
	220
	221	## Done.
	222	accept
	223
	224	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	225	acl_smtp_rcpt = rcpt
	226	SECTION(acl, rcpt)m4_dnl
	227	rcpt:
	228
	229	## Reject if the client isn't allowed to relay and the recipient
	230	## isn't in one of our known domains.
e4666f2d MW	231	require message = Relaying not permitted
e4666f2d MW	232	acl = check_relay
185b5456 MW	233
	234	## Ensure that the recipient is routable.
	235	require message = Invalid recipient \
	236	($recipient_verify_failure; $acl_verify_message)
	237	verify = recipient
	238
e4666f2d MW	239	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	240	check_relay:
	241	## Accept either if the client is allowed to relay through us, or if
	242	## we're the correct place to send this mail.
	243
	244	## Known clients and authenticated users are OK.
	245	accept hosts = CONF_relay_clients
	246	accept authenticated = *
	247
	248	## Known domains are OK.
	249	accept domains = +public
	250
	251	## Finally, domains in our table are OK, unless they say they aren't.
	252	accept domains = \
	253	${if exists{CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf} \
	254	{partial0-lsearch; CONF_sysconf_dir/domains.conf}}
	255	condition = DOMKV(service, {$value}{true})
	256
	257	## Nope, that's not allowed.
	258	deny
	259
185b5456 MW	260	SECTION(acl, rcpt-tail)m4_dnl
	261	## Everything checks out OK: let this one go through.
	262	accept
	263
	264	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	265	acl_smtp_data = data
	266	SECTION(acl, data)m4_dnl
	267	data:
	268
	269	SECTION(acl, data-tail)m4_dnl
	270	accept
	271
	272	SECTION(global, acl)m4_dnl
	273	acl_smtp_expn = expn_vrfy
	274	acl_smtp_vrfy = expn_vrfy
e4fe8925	275	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
185b5456 MW	276	expn_vrfy:
	277	accept hosts = +trusted
	278	deny message = Suck it and see
	279
	280	DIVERT(null)
	281	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
284c9d7e MW	282	### Verification of sender address.
	283
	284	SECTION(acl, misc)m4_dnl
	285	mail_check_auth:
	286
	287	## If this isn't a submission then it doesn't need checking.
	288	accept condition = ${if !eq{$acl_c_mode}{submission}}
	289
	290	## If the caller hasn't formally authenticated, but this is a
	291	## loopback connection, then we can trust identd to tell us the right
	292	## answer. So we should stash the right name somewhere consistent.
	293	warn set acl_c_user = $authenticated_id
4ff4ad42	294	hosts = +thishost
284c9d7e	295	!authenticated = *
ff4c943d	296	condition = ${if def:sender_ident}
284c9d7e MW	297	set acl_c_user = $sender_ident
284c9d7e MW	298
ff4c943d	299	## User must be authenticated by now.
284c9d7e	300	deny message = Sender not authenticated
ff4c943d	301	condition = ${if !def:acl_c_user}
284c9d7e MW	302
	303	## Make sure that the local part is one that the authenticated sender
	304	## is allowed to claim.
	305	deny message = Sender address forbidden to calling user
459abd49 MW	306	!condition = \
	307	${if exists {CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	308	{${lookup {$acl_c_user} \
	309	lsearch \
	310	{CONF_sysconf_dir/auth-sender.conf} \
	311	{${if match_address \
	312	{$sender_address} \
	313	{+value}}} \
	314	{false}}}}
284c9d7e MW	315	!condition = ${LOOKUP_DOMAIN($sender_address_domain,
	316	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	317	{$acl_c_user} \
	318	{+dom_users}} \
	319	{match_local_part \
	320	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	321	{+dom_locals}}}}},
	322	{${if and {{match_local_part \
	323	{$sender_address_local_part} \
	324	{+user_extaddr}} \
	325	{or {{eq {$sender_address_domain} \
	326	{}} \
	327	{match_domain \
	328	{$sender_address_domain} \
	329	{+public}}}}}}})}
	330
	331	## All done.
	332	accept
	333
	334	DIVERT(null)
	335	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
185b5456 MW	336	### Common options for forwarding routers.
	337
	338	## We're pretty permissive here.
	339	m4_define(<:FILTER_BASE:>,
	340	<:driver = redirect
	341	modemask = 002
	342	check_owner = false
	343	check_group = false
	344	allow_filter = true
	345	allow_defer = true
	346	allow_fail = true
	347	forbid_blackhole = false
	348	check_ancestor = true:>)
	349
	350	## Common options for forwarding routers at verification time.
	351	m4_define(<:FILTER_VERIFY:>,
	352	<:verify_only = true
	353	user = CONF_filter_user
	354	forbid_filter_dlfunc = true
	355	forbid_filter_logwrite = true
	356	forbid_filter_perl = true
	357	forbid_filter_readsocket = true
	358	forbid_filter_run = true
	359	file_transport = dummy
	360	directory_transport = dummy
	361	pipe_transport = dummy
	362	reply_transport = dummy:>)
	363
	364	## Transports for redirection filters.
	365	m4_define(<:FILTER_TRANSPORTS:>,
7ab75d6f	366	<:file_transport = mailbox
185b5456 MW	367	directory_transport = maildir
	368	pipe_transport = pipe
	369	reply_transport = reply:>)
	370
7ab75d6f MW	371	m4_define(<:FILTER_ROUTER:>,
	372	<:$1_vrf:
	373	$2
	374	FILTER_VERIFY<::>$3
	375	$1:
	376	$2
	377	verify = no
	378	FILTER_TRANSPORTS<::>$4:>)
	379
185b5456 MW	380	DIVERT(null)
	381	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	382	### Some standard transports.
	383
	384	m4_define(<:USER_DELIVERY:>,
	385	<:delivery_date_add = true
	386	envelope_to_add = true
	387	return_path_add = true:>)
	388
	389	SECTION(transports)m4_dnl
fa5a92c6 MW	390	## A standard transport for remote delivery. By default, try to do TLS, and
	391	## don't worry too much if it's not very secure: the alternative is sending
	392	## in plaintext anyway. But all of this can be overridden from the
beb15dae MW	393	## `domains.conf' file. Annoyingly, the `tls_dh_min_bits' setting isn't
	394	## expanded before use, so we can't set it the obvious way. Instead, encode
	395	## it into the transport name. This is very unpleasant, of course.
534d411b MW	396	smtp:
	397	driver = smtp
	398	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_acceptable_ciphers
	399	tls_dh_min_bits = 1020
	400	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true
	401
beb15dae MW	402	m4_define(<:SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS:>,
beb15dae MW	403	<:driver = smtp
ae9744ce	404	hosts_try_auth = *
fa5a92c6	405	hosts_require_tls = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {*}{})
ae9744ce MW	406	hosts_require_auth = \
ae9744ce MW	407	${if bool {DOMKV(require-auth, {$value}{false})} {*}{}}
fa5a92c6 MW	408	tls_certificate = DOMKV(tls-certificate, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	409	tls_privatekey = DOMKV(tls-private-key, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	410	tls_verify_certificates = DOMKV(tls-peer-ca, {${expand:$value}}fail)
	411	tls_require_ciphers = \
	412	DOMKV(tls-ciphers,
	413	{${extract {${expand:$value}} \
	414	{ good = CONF_good_ciphers \
	415	any = CONF_acceptable_ciphers } \
	416	{$value} \
	417	{${expand:$value}}}} \
	418	{CONF_acceptable_ciphers})
beb15dae MW	419	tls_dh_min_bits = $1
beb15dae MW	420	tls_tempfail_tryclear = true:>)m4_dnl
beb15dae MW	421	smtp_dhbits_1024:
	422	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(1020)
	423	smtp_dhbits_2048:
	424	SMTP_TRANS_DHBITS(2046)
185b5456 MW	425
	426	## Transport to a local SMTP server; use TLS and perform client
	427	## authentication.
	428	smtp_local:
	429	driver = smtp
	430	hosts_require_tls = *
163774f0	431	tls_certificate = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.certlist
185b5456 MW	432	tls_privatekey = CONF_sysconf_dir/client.key
	433	tls_verify_certificates = CONF_ca_dir/ca.cert
	434	tls_require_ciphers = CONF_good_ciphers
b6d74252	435	tls_dh_min_bits = 2046
185b5456 MW	436	tls_tempfail_tryclear = false
185b5456 MW	437	authenticated_sender = ${if def:authenticated_id \
0bed9b7f	438	{$authenticated_id@CONF_master_domain} \
185b5456 MW	439	fail}
	440
	441	## A standard transport for local delivery.
	442	deliver:
	443	driver = appendfile
	444	file = /var/mail/$local_part
8f6af4ae MW	445	group = mail
	446	mode = 0600
	447	mode_fail_narrower = false
185b5456 MW	448	USER_DELIVERY
	449
	450	## Transports for user filters.
	451	mailbox:
	452	driver = appendfile
8f6af4ae	453	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	454	USER_DELIVERY
	455
	456	maildir:
	457	driver = appendfile
	458	maildir_format = true
8f6af4ae	459	initgroups = true
185b5456 MW	460	USER_DELIVERY
	461
	462	pipe:
	463	driver = pipe
8f6af4ae MW	464	path = ${if and {{def:home} {exists{$home/bin}}} {$home/bin:} {}}\
	465	/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:\
	466	/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
	467	initgroups = true
	468	umask = 002
	469	return_fail_output = true
	470	log_output = true
185b5456 MW	471
	472	## A special dummy transport for use during address verification.
	473	dummy:
	474	driver = appendfile
	475	file = /dev/null
	476
	477	DIVERT(null)
	478	###--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	479	### Retry configuration.
	480
	481	SECTION(retry, default)m4_dnl
	482	## Default.
	483	* * \
	484	F,2h,15m; G,16h,2h,1.5; F,4d,6h
	485
	486	DIVERT(null)
	487	###----- That's all, folks --------------------------------------------------