chiark / gitweb /
fix spelling of privilege
authorNis Martensen <nis.martensen@web.de>
Sun, 18 May 2014 13:43:18 +0000 (15:43 +0200)
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Sun, 18 May 2014 15:40:44 +0000 (00:40 +0900)
NEWS
README
man/systemd.exec.xml
src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
src/core/load-fragment.c
src/core/load-fragment.h
src/nspawn/nspawn.c
src/systemctl/systemctl.c
src/timesync/timesyncd.c

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index f90d7f8..cee62b1 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 211:
           directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that
           the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This
           is particularly useful when writing services that drop
-          priviliges using the User= or Group= setting.
+          privileges using the User= or Group= setting.
 
         * The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for
           matching against device group names.
diff --git a/README b/README
index 4e2f996..0031fac 100644 (file)
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ USERS AND GROUPS:
 
         The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and
         group to exist. During execution this network facing service
-        will drop priviliges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
+        will drop privileges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
         assume this uid/gid for security reasons.
 
 WARNINGS:
index 22f0768..3f27d13 100644 (file)
                                 <literal>/</literal>, i.e. must refer
                                 to simple directories to create or
                                 remove. This is particularly useful
-                                for unpriviliges daemons that cannot
+                                for unprivileged daemons that cannot
                                 create runtime directories in
                                 <filename>/run</filename> due to lack
                                 of privileges, and to make sure the
index 21bccbb..4f8a2dd 100644 (file)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ $1.Capabilities,                 config_parse_exec_capabilities,     0,
 $1.SecureBits,                   config_parse_exec_secure_bits,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.CapabilityBoundingSet,        config_parse_bounding_set,          0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop)
 $1.TimerSlackNSec,               config_parse_nsec,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec)
-$1.NoNewPrivileges,              config_parse_no_new_priviliges,     0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
+$1.NoNewPrivileges,              config_parse_no_new_privileges,     0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP',
 `$1.SystemCallFilter,            config_parse_syscall_filter,        0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.SystemCallArchitectures,      config_parse_syscall_archs,         0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs)
index 14c194b..25a3905 100644 (file)
@@ -3029,7 +3029,7 @@ int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(
         return 0;
 }
 
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(
                 const char* unit,
                 const char *filename,
                 unsigned line,
index 242fd27..9ef9caa 100644 (file)
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsign
 int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 
 /* gperf prototypes */
index 6be4dca..9d9238f 100644 (file)
@@ -3057,7 +3057,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 fds = NULL;
 
                 /* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with
-                 * all it needs to do with priviliges. After we got
+                 * all it needs to do with privileges. After we got
                  * the notification we can make the process join its
                  * cgroup which might limit what it can do */
                 eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x);
index 6e98c05..a99759f 100644 (file)
@@ -5923,7 +5923,7 @@ static int systemctl_parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
                 case 'r':
                         if (geteuid() != 0) {
-                                log_error("--recursive requires root priviliges.");
+                                log_error("--recursive requires root privileges.");
                                 return -EPERM;
                         }
 
index 19e6d67..6e63e34 100644 (file)
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int manager_network_monitor_listen(Manager *m) {
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int drop_priviliges(void) {
+static int drop_privileges(void) {
         static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
                 CAP_SYS_TIME,
         };
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int drop_priviliges(void) {
         gid_t gid;
         int r;
 
-        /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilige dropping to PID 1
+        /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
          * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te
          * CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been
          * introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore,
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
         umask(0022);
 
-        r = drop_priviliges();
+        r = drop_privileges();
         if (r < 0)
                 goto out;