From: Nis Martensen Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 13:43:18 +0000 (+0200) Subject: fix spelling of privilege X-Git-Tag: v213~96 X-Git-Url: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?p=elogind.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=f1721625e7145977ba705e169580f2eb0002600c fix spelling of privilege --- diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index f90d7f840..cee62b191 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 211: directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This is particularly useful when writing services that drop - priviliges using the User= or Group= setting. + privileges using the User= or Group= setting. * The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for matching against device group names. diff --git a/README b/README index 4e2f996c5..0031facf4 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ USERS AND GROUPS: The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and group to exist. During execution this network facing service - will drop priviliges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and + will drop privileges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and assume this uid/gid for security reasons. WARNINGS: diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 22f076870..3f27d13c3 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ /, i.e. must refer to simple directories to create or remove. This is particularly useful - for unpriviliges daemons that cannot + for unprivileged daemons that cannot create runtime directories in /run due to lack of privileges, and to make sure the diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 index 21bccbb1c..4f8a2ddc1 100644 --- a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 +++ b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ $1.Capabilities, config_parse_exec_capabilities, 0, $1.SecureBits, config_parse_exec_secure_bits, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context) $1.CapabilityBoundingSet, config_parse_bounding_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop) $1.TimerSlackNSec, config_parse_nsec, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec) -$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_priviliges, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context) +$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_privileges, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context) m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP', `$1.SystemCallFilter, config_parse_syscall_filter, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context) $1.SystemCallArchitectures, config_parse_syscall_archs, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs) diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c index 14c194bf9..25a390559 100644 --- a/src/core/load-fragment.c +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c @@ -3029,7 +3029,7 @@ int config_parse_namespace_path_strv( return 0; } -int config_parse_no_new_priviliges( +int config_parse_no_new_privileges( const char* unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.h b/src/core/load-fragment.h index 242fd271b..9ef9caa99 100644 --- a/src/core/load-fragment.h +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsign int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); -int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); +int config_parse_no_new_privileges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata); /* gperf prototypes */ diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c index 6be4dcae5..9d9238fdb 100644 --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c @@ -3057,7 +3057,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { fds = NULL; /* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with - * all it needs to do with priviliges. After we got + * all it needs to do with privileges. After we got * the notification we can make the process join its * cgroup which might limit what it can do */ eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x); diff --git a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c index 6e98c0515..a99759f2d 100644 --- a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c +++ b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c @@ -5923,7 +5923,7 @@ static int systemctl_parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { case 'r': if (geteuid() != 0) { - log_error("--recursive requires root priviliges."); + log_error("--recursive requires root privileges."); return -EPERM; } diff --git a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c index 19e6d67c6..6e63e34d8 100644 --- a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c +++ b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int manager_network_monitor_listen(Manager *m) { return 0; } -static int drop_priviliges(void) { +static int drop_privileges(void) { static const cap_value_t bits[] = { CAP_SYS_TIME, }; @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int drop_priviliges(void) { gid_t gid; int r; - /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilige dropping to PID 1 + /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1 * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te * CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been * introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore, @@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { umask(0022); - r = drop_priviliges(); + r = drop_privileges(); if (r < 0) goto out;