1 === TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
3 1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
4 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
7 ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
9 Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix
11 Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
12 Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
14 Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
15 fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
16 only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
17 greater than the supermajority ratio.
19 In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
20 developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
21 dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
22 dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
23 is no longer possible.
25 This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
26 of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
28 Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
30 (i) Replace "majority" with "supermajority" everywhere a ratio
31 other than 1:1 is specified. That is, in
32 4.1(2) -- Developers' power to amend the Constitution
33 4.1(4) -- Developers' power to overrule the TC
34 4.1(5)(3) -- Developers' power to amend Foundation Documents
35 6.1(4) -- TC's power to overrule a Developer (both occurrences)
36 replace the word "majority" with "supermajority".
40 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
41 option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
43 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
44 who prefer option A over option B.
45 - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
46 - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
47 - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
48 - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
49 + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
50 + required majority ratio if both:
51 + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
52 + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
53 + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
55 (iii) In A.3(2) "Voting procedure", delete as follows:
56 2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
57 - Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
58 - have a 1:1 majority requirement.
60 The effect is to fix the fencepost bug, and make the wording
61 consistent, by always referring to "supermajorities" where
62 applicable. A 1:1 vote will need strictly more in favour than
63 against, but an N:1 vote will need only exactly N:1. This will
64 also have a (negligible) effect on any General Resolutions
65 requiring supermajorities.
67 For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
68 votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
69 Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
71 ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----