chiark / gitweb /
fix spelling of privilege
authorNis Martensen <nis.martensen@web.de>
Sun, 18 May 2014 13:43:18 +0000 (15:43 +0200)
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Sun, 18 May 2014 15:40:44 +0000 (00:40 +0900)
NEWS
README
man/systemd.exec.xml
src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
src/core/load-fragment.c
src/core/load-fragment.h
src/nspawn/nspawn.c
src/systemctl/systemctl.c
src/timesync/timesyncd.c

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index f90d7f840c5f58645a7fc0efec93e3cd740592da..cee62b191cb33f85abf2c6a81d8b9009259f0cb6 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 211:
           directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that
           the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This
           is particularly useful when writing services that drop
           directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that
           the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This
           is particularly useful when writing services that drop
-          priviliges using the User= or Group= setting.
+          privileges using the User= or Group= setting.
 
         * The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for
           matching against device group names.
 
         * The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for
           matching against device group names.
diff --git a/README b/README
index 4e2f996c5e40108dad4f78c9e3012ef3ff0f092c..0031facf4625856a7114fb33474688826198d60c 100644 (file)
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ USERS AND GROUPS:
 
         The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and
         group to exist. During execution this network facing service
 
         The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and
         group to exist. During execution this network facing service
-        will drop priviliges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
+        will drop privileges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
         assume this uid/gid for security reasons.
 
 WARNINGS:
         assume this uid/gid for security reasons.
 
 WARNINGS:
index 22f076870f6f777ca3cbedf70e70d24b916c1471..3f27d13c38201471e5ee2f2a9c76ce3eac931d8b 100644 (file)
                                 <literal>/</literal>, i.e. must refer
                                 to simple directories to create or
                                 remove. This is particularly useful
                                 <literal>/</literal>, i.e. must refer
                                 to simple directories to create or
                                 remove. This is particularly useful
-                                for unpriviliges daemons that cannot
+                                for unprivileged daemons that cannot
                                 create runtime directories in
                                 <filename>/run</filename> due to lack
                                 of privileges, and to make sure the
                                 create runtime directories in
                                 <filename>/run</filename> due to lack
                                 of privileges, and to make sure the
index 21bccbb1cdd3d7ccf7e3f2157d68496a5bea09f7..4f8a2ddc1b5ed13a67a8ad46ca33174a099fe88a 100644 (file)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ $1.Capabilities,                 config_parse_exec_capabilities,     0,
 $1.SecureBits,                   config_parse_exec_secure_bits,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.CapabilityBoundingSet,        config_parse_bounding_set,          0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop)
 $1.TimerSlackNSec,               config_parse_nsec,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec)
 $1.SecureBits,                   config_parse_exec_secure_bits,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.CapabilityBoundingSet,        config_parse_bounding_set,          0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop)
 $1.TimerSlackNSec,               config_parse_nsec,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec)
-$1.NoNewPrivileges,              config_parse_no_new_priviliges,     0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
+$1.NoNewPrivileges,              config_parse_no_new_privileges,     0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP',
 `$1.SystemCallFilter,            config_parse_syscall_filter,        0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.SystemCallArchitectures,      config_parse_syscall_archs,         0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs)
 m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP',
 `$1.SystemCallFilter,            config_parse_syscall_filter,        0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context)
 $1.SystemCallArchitectures,      config_parse_syscall_archs,         0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs)
index 14c194bf967bfc91b431bfdb96ec04b2267c5461..25a39055914bf08f2c69e31d1c6d7b80afb53233 100644 (file)
@@ -3029,7 +3029,7 @@ int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(
         return 0;
 }
 
         return 0;
 }
 
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(
                 const char* unit,
                 const char *filename,
                 unsigned line,
                 const char* unit,
                 const char *filename,
                 unsigned line,
index 242fd271b7a74a96c1e68d6654e15349e0de6683..9ef9caa99965c4742b588fb6030bdce5d487eec2 100644 (file)
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsign
 int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 
 /* gperf prototypes */
 int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
 
 /* gperf prototypes */
index 6be4dcae591d61f2c13f73f92bec8935e58ac83f..9d9238fdb51b191d45ce6b3b3c6ff7874d013834 100644 (file)
@@ -3057,7 +3057,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 fds = NULL;
 
                 /* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with
                 fds = NULL;
 
                 /* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with
-                 * all it needs to do with priviliges. After we got
+                 * all it needs to do with privileges. After we got
                  * the notification we can make the process join its
                  * cgroup which might limit what it can do */
                 eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x);
                  * the notification we can make the process join its
                  * cgroup which might limit what it can do */
                 eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x);
index 6e98c05152dfaaadc01920e18db5b79c82e5403e..a99759f2dda471c760457d3d7eec83116ca08d18 100644 (file)
@@ -5923,7 +5923,7 @@ static int systemctl_parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
                 case 'r':
                         if (geteuid() != 0) {
 
                 case 'r':
                         if (geteuid() != 0) {
-                                log_error("--recursive requires root priviliges.");
+                                log_error("--recursive requires root privileges.");
                                 return -EPERM;
                         }
 
                                 return -EPERM;
                         }
 
index 19e6d67c63d6203c9221455420852b3eb5ce97cc..6e63e34d876a30fa0d7ae39ecb12e3c0c7073ca6 100644 (file)
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int manager_network_monitor_listen(Manager *m) {
         return 0;
 }
 
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int drop_priviliges(void) {
+static int drop_privileges(void) {
         static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
                 CAP_SYS_TIME,
         };
         static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
                 CAP_SYS_TIME,
         };
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int drop_priviliges(void) {
         gid_t gid;
         int r;
 
         gid_t gid;
         int r;
 
-        /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilige dropping to PID 1
+        /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
          * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te
          * CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been
          * introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore,
          * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te
          * CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been
          * introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore,
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
         umask(0022);
 
 
         umask(0022);
 
-        r = drop_priviliges();
+        r = drop_privileges();
         if (r < 0)
                 goto out;
 
         if (r < 0)
                 goto out;