typedef struct kgops {
const char *ty;
- const char *(*loadpriv)(key_data *, group **, mp **, dstr *);
- const char *(*loadpub)(key_data *, group **, ge **, dstr *);
+ int (*loadpriv)(key_data *, group **, mp **, dstr *, dstr *);
+ int (*loadpub)(key_data *, group **, ge **, dstr *, dstr *);
} kgops;
/* --- Diffie-Hellman --- */
-static const char *kgdh_priv(key_data *kd, group **g, mp **x, dstr *t)
+static int kgdh_priv(key_data *kd, group **g, mp **x, dstr *t, dstr *e)
{
key_packstruct kps[DH_PRIVFETCHSZ];
key_packdef *kp;
dh_priv dp;
- const char *e;
int rc;
kp = key_fetchinit(dh_privfetch, kps, &dp);
if ((rc = key_unpack(kp, kd, t)) != 0) {
- e = key_strerror(rc);
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "unpack-failed", "%s", key_strerror(rc), A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
}
*g = group_prime(&dp.dp);
*x = MP_COPY(dp.x);
- e = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto done;
+fail_0:
+ rc = -1;
done:
key_fetchdone(kp);
- return (e);
+ return (rc);
}
-static const char *kgdh_pub(key_data *kd, group **g, ge **p, dstr *t)
+static int kgdh_pub(key_data *kd, group **g, ge **p, dstr *t, dstr *e)
{
key_packstruct kps[DH_PUBFETCHSZ];
key_packdef *kp;
dh_pub dp;
- const char *e;
int rc;
kp = key_fetchinit(dh_pubfetch, kps, &dp);
if ((rc = key_unpack(kp, kd, t)) != 0) {
- e = key_strerror(rc);
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "unpack-failed", "%s", key_strerror(rc), A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
}
*g = group_prime(&dp.dp);
*p = G_CREATE(*g);
if (G_FROMINT(*g, *p, dp.y)) {
- e = "bad public value";
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "bad-public-vector", A_END);
+ goto fail_1;
}
- e = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto done;
+fail_1:
+ G_DESTROY(*g, *p);
+ G_DESTROYGROUP(*g);
+fail_0:
+ rc = -1;
done:
key_fetchdone(kp);
- return (e);
+ return (rc);
}
static const kgops kgdh_ops = { "dh", kgdh_priv, kgdh_pub };
/* --- Elliptic curve --- */
-static const char *kgec_priv(key_data *kd, group **g, mp **x, dstr *t)
+static int kgec_priv(key_data *kd, group **g, mp **x, dstr *t, dstr *e)
{
key_packstruct kps[EC_PRIVFETCHSZ];
key_packdef *kp;
ec_priv ep;
ec_info ei;
- const char *e;
+ const char *err;
int rc;
kp = key_fetchinit(ec_privfetch, kps, &ep);
if ((rc = key_unpack(kp, kd, t)) != 0) {
- e = key_strerror(rc);
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "unpack-failed", "%s", key_strerror(rc), A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
+ }
+ if ((err = ec_getinfo(&ei, ep.cstr)) != 0) {
+ a_format(e, "decode-failed", "%s", err, A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
}
- if ((e = ec_getinfo(&ei, ep.cstr)) != 0)
- goto done;
*g = group_ec(&ei);
*x = MP_COPY(ep.x);
- e = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto done;
+fail_0:
+ rc = -1;
done:
key_fetchdone(kp);
- return (e);
+ return (rc);
}
-static const char *kgec_pub(key_data *kd, group **g, ge **p, dstr *t)
+static int kgec_pub(key_data *kd, group **g, ge **p, dstr *t, dstr *e)
{
key_packstruct kps[EC_PUBFETCHSZ];
key_packdef *kp;
ec_pub ep;
ec_info ei;
- const char *e;
+ const char *err;
int rc;
kp = key_fetchinit(ec_pubfetch, kps, &ep);
if ((rc = key_unpack(kp, kd, t)) != 0) {
- e = key_strerror(rc);
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "unpack-failed", "%s", key_strerror(rc), A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
+ }
+ if ((err = ec_getinfo(&ei, ep.cstr)) != 0) {
+ a_format(e, "decode-failed", "%s", err, A_END);
+ goto fail_0;
}
- if ((e = ec_getinfo(&ei, ep.cstr)) != 0)
- goto done;
*g = group_ec(&ei);
*p = G_CREATE(*g);
if (G_FROMEC(*g, *p, &ep.p)) {
- e = "bad public point";
- goto done;
+ a_format(e, "bad-public-vector", A_END);
+ goto fail_1;
}
- e = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto done;
+fail_1:
+ G_DESTROY(*g, *p);
+ G_DESTROYGROUP(*g);
+fail_0:
+ rc = -1;
done:
key_fetchdone(kp);
- return (e);
+ return (rc);
}
static const kgops kgec_ops = { "ec", kgec_priv, kgec_pub };
/* --- @algs_get@ --- *
*
* Arguments: @algswitch *a@ = where to put the algorithms
- * @key_file *kf@ = key file (for some stupid reason)
+ * @dstr *e@ = where to write errror tokens
+ * @key_file *kf@ = key file
* @key *k@ = key to inspect
*
- * Returns: Null if OK, or an error message.
+ * Returns: Zero if OK; nonzero on error.
*
* Use: Extracts an algorithm choice from a key.
*/
-static const char *algs_get(algswitch *a, key_file *kf, key *k)
+static int algs_get(algswitch *a, dstr *e, key_file *kf, key *k)
{
const char *p;
- char *q;
+ char *q, *qq;
dstr d = DSTR_INIT;
- const char *e;
+ int rc = -1;
-#define FAIL(msg) do { e = msg; goto done; } while (0)
+ /* --- Symmetric encryption for bulk data --- */
- if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "cipher")) == 0)
- p = "blowfish-cbc";
- if ((a->c = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0)
- FAIL("unknown-cipher");
+ if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "cipher")) == 0) p = "blowfish-cbc";
+ if ((a->c = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "unknown-cipher", "%s", p, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* --- Hash function --- */
+
+ if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "hash")) == 0) p = "rmd160";
+ if ((a->h = ghash_byname(p)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "unknown-hash", "%s", p, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
- if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "hash")) == 0)
- p = "rmd160";
- if ((a->h = ghash_byname(p)) == 0)
- FAIL("unknown-hash");
+ /* --- Symmetric encryption for key derivation --- */
if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "mgf")) == 0) {
dstr_reset(&d);
dstr_putf(&d, "%s-mgf", a->h->name);
p = d.buf;
}
- if ((a->mgf = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0)
- FAIL("unknown-mgf-cipher");
+ if ((a->mgf = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "unknown-mgf-cipher", "%s", p, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* --- Message authentication for bulk data --- */
if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "mac")) != 0) {
dstr_reset(&d);
dstr_puts(&d, p);
if ((q = strchr(d.buf, '/')) != 0)
*q++ = 0;
- if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0)
- FAIL("unknown-mac");
+ if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "unknown-mac", "%s", d.buf, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
if (!q)
a->tagsz = a->m->hashsz;
else {
- unsigned long n = strtoul(q, &q, 0);
- if (*q) FAIL("bad-tag-length-string");
- if (n%8 || n > ~(size_t)0) FAIL("bad-tag-length");
+ unsigned long n = strtoul(q, &qq, 0);
+ if (*qq) {
+ a_format(e, "bad-tag-length-string", "%s", q, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (n%8 || n/8 > a->m->hashsz) {
+ a_format(e, "bad-tag-length", "%lu", n, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
a->tagsz = n/8;
}
} else {
dstr_reset(&d);
dstr_putf(&d, "%s-hmac", a->h->name);
- if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0)
- FAIL("no-hmac-for-hash");
+ if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "no-hmac-for-hash", "%s", a->h->name, A_END);
+ goto done;
+ }
a->tagsz = a->h->hashsz/2;
}
- e = 0;
+ rc = 0;
done:
dstr_destroy(&d);
- return (e);
+ return (rc);
}
/* --- @algs_check@ --- *
*
* Arguments: @algswitch *a@ = a choice of algorithms
+ * @dstr *e@ = where to write error tokens
* @const group *g@ = the group we're working in
*
- * Returns: Null if OK, or an error message.
+ * Returns: Zero if OK; nonzero on error.
*
* Use: Checks an algorithm choice for sensibleness. This also
* derives some useful information from the choices, and you
* for use by @keyset@ functions.
*/
-static const char *algs_check(algswitch *a, const group *g)
+static int algs_check(algswitch *a, dstr *e, const group *g)
{
/* --- Derive the key sizes --- *
*
*/
a->hashsz = a->h->hashsz;
- if ((a->cksz = keysz(a->hashsz, a->c->keysz)) == 0)
- return ("no key size found for cipher");
- if ((a->mksz = keysz(a->hashsz, a->m->keysz)) == 0)
- return ("no key size found for MAC");
+ if ((a->cksz = keysz(a->hashsz, a->c->keysz)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "cipher", "%s", a->c->name,
+ "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)a->hashsz,
+ A_END);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((a->mksz = keysz(a->hashsz, a->m->keysz)) == 0) {
+ a_format(e, "mac", "%s", a->m->name,
+ "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)a->hashsz,
+ A_END);
+ return (-1);
+ }
/* --- Derive the data limit --- */
if (a->c->blksz < 16) a->expsz = MEG(64);
else a->expsz = MEG(2048);
- /* --- Ensure that the tag size is sane --- */
-
- if (a->tagsz > a->m->hashsz) return ("tag length too large");
-
/* --- Ensure the MGF accepts hashes as keys --- */
- if (keysz(a->hashsz, a->mgf->keysz) != a->hashsz)
- return ("MGF not suitable -- restrictive key schedule");
+ if (keysz(a->hashsz, a->mgf->keysz) != a->hashsz) {
+ a_format(e, "mgf", "%s", a->mgf->name,
+ "restrictive-key-schedule",
+ A_END);
+ return (-1);
+ }
/* --- All ship-shape and Bristol-fashion --- */
* Arguments: @const char *file@ = name of the file
* @int line@ = line number in file
* @const char *msg@ = error message
- * @void *p@ = argument pointer
+ * @void *p@ = argument pointer (indicates which keyring)
*
* Returns: ---
*
static void keymoan(const char *file, int line, const char *msg, void *p)
{
- a_warn("KEYMGMT",
- "key-file-error",
- "%s:%i", file, line,
- "%s", msg,
- A_END);
+ const char *kind = p;
+
+ if (!line) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "%s-keyring", kind, "%s", file,
+ "io-error", "?ERRNO", A_END);
+ } else {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "%s-keyring", kind, "%s", file, "line", "%d", line,
+ "%s", msg, A_END);
+ }
}
/* --- @keykg@ --- *
* Use: Loads the private key from its keyfile.
*/
-static int loadpriv(dstr *d)
+static int loadpriv(void)
{
key_file kf;
key *k;
key_data **kd;
dstr t = DSTR_INIT;
+ dstr e = DSTR_INIT;
group *g = 0;
mp *x = 0;
int rc = -1;
const kgops *ko;
- const char *e, *tag, *ty;
+ const char *err, *tag, *ty;
algswitch a;
/* --- Open the private key file --- */
- if (key_open(&kf, kr_priv, KOPEN_READ, keymoan, 0)) {
- dstr_putf(d, "error reading private keyring `%s': %s",
- kr_priv, strerror(errno));
+ if (key_open(&kf, kr_priv, KOPEN_READ, keymoan, "private"))
goto done_0;
- }
/* --- Find the private key --- */
key_qtag(&kf, tag = tag_priv, &t, &k, &kd) :
key_qtag(&kf, tag = "tripe", &t, &k, &kd) &&
key_qtag(&kf, tag = "tripe-dh", &t, &k, &kd)) {
- dstr_putf(d, "private key `%s' not found in keyring `%s'", tag, kr_priv);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring", "%s", kr_priv,
+ "key-not-found", "%s", tag, A_END);
goto done_1;
}
/* --- Look up the key type in the table --- */
if ((ko = keykg(&kf, k, &ty)) == 0) {
- dstr_putf(d, "private key `%s' has unknown type `%s'", t.buf, ty);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_priv, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "unknown-group-type", "%s", ty, A_END);
goto done_1;
}
/* --- Load the key --- */
- if ((e = ko->loadpriv(*kd, &g, &x, &t)) != 0) {
- dstr_putf(d, "error reading private key `%s': %s", t.buf, e);
+ if (ko->loadpriv(*kd, &g, &x, &t, &e)) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_priv, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "*%s", e.buf, A_END);
goto done_1;
}
/* --- Check that the key is sensible --- */
- if ((e = G_CHECK(g, &rand_global)) != 0) {
- dstr_putf(d, "bad group in private key `%s': %s", t.buf, e);
+ if ((err = G_CHECK(g, &rand_global)) != 0) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_priv, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "bad-group", "%s", err, A_END);
goto done_1;
}
/* --- Collect the algorithms --- */
- if ((e = algs_get(&a, &kf, k)) != 0 ||
- (e = algs_check(&a, g)) != 0) {
- dstr_putf(d, "bad symmetric algorithm selection in private key `%s': %s",
- t.buf, e);
+ if (algs_get(&a, &e, &kf, k) ||
+ algs_check(&a, &e, g)) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_priv, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "*%s", e.buf, A_END);
goto done_1;
}
if (gg) {
if (!group_samep(g, gg)) {
- dstr_putf(d, "private key `%s' has different group", t.buf);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "private-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_priv, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "changed-group", A_END);
goto done_1;
}
G_DESTROYGROUP(gg);
key_close(&kf);
done_0:
dstr_destroy(&t);
+ dstr_destroy(&e);
if (x) mp_drop(x);
if (g) G_DESTROYGROUP(g);
return (rc);
* Use: Reloads the public keyring.
*/
-static int loadpub(dstr *d)
+static int loadpub(void)
{
key_file *kf = CREATE(key_file);
- if (key_open(kf, kr_pub, KOPEN_READ, keymoan, 0)) {
- dstr_putf(d, "error reading public keyring `%s': %s",
- kr_pub, strerror(errno));
+ if (key_open(kf, kr_pub, KOPEN_READ, keymoan, "public")) {
DESTROY(kf);
return (-1);
}
int km_reload(void)
{
- dstr d = DSTR_INIT;
key_file *kf;
int reload = 0;
if (fwatch_update(&w_priv, kr_priv)) {
T( trace(T_KEYMGMT, "keymgmt: private keyring updated: reloading..."); )
- DRESET(&d);
- if (loadpriv(&d))
- a_warn("KEYMGMT", "bad-private-key", "%s", d.buf, A_END);
- else
+ if (!loadpriv())
reload = 1;
}
if (fwatch_update(&w_pub, kr_pub)) {
T( trace(T_KEYMGMT, "keymgmt: public keyring updated: reloading..."); )
kf = kf_pub;
- DRESET(&d);
- if (loadpub(&d))
- a_warn("KEYMGMT", "bad-public-keyring", "%s", d.buf, A_END);
- else {
+ if (!loadpub()) {
reload = 1;
key_close(kf);
DESTROY(kf);
void km_init(const char *priv, const char *pub, const char *tag)
{
- dstr d = DSTR_INIT;
const gchash *const *hh;
kr_priv = priv;
}
}
- DRESET(&d);
- if (loadpriv(&d))
- die(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s", d.buf);
- if (loadpub(&d))
- die(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s", d.buf);
+ if (loadpriv() || loadpub())
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* --- @km_getpubkey@ --- *
key *k;
key_data **kd;
dstr t = DSTR_INIT;
+ dstr e = DSTR_INIT;
const kgops *ko;
- const char *e, *ty;
+ const char *ty;
group *g = 0;
ge *p = 0;
algswitch a;
/* --- Find the key --- */
if (key_qtag(kf_pub, tag, &t, &k, &kd)) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-key", "%s", tag, "not-found", A_END);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring", "%s", kr_pub,
+ "key-not-found", "%s", tag, A_END);
goto done;
}
/* --- Look up the key type in the table --- */
if ((ko = keykg(kf_pub, k, &ty)) == 0) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT",
- "public-key", "%s", t.buf,
- "unknown-type", "%s", ty,
- A_END);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "unknown-group-type", "%s", ty, A_END);
goto done;
}
/* --- Load the key --- */
- if ((e = ko->loadpub(*kd, &g, &p, &t)) != 0) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-key", "%s", t.buf, "bad", "%s", e, A_END);
+ if (ko->loadpub(*kd, &g, &p, &t, &e)) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "*%s", e.buf, A_END);
goto done;
}
*/
if (!group_samep(gg, g)) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-key", "%s", t.buf, "incorrect-group", A_END);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "*%s", e.buf, A_END);
goto done;
}
/* --- Check the public group element --- */
if (group_check(gg, p)) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT",
- "public-key", "%s", t.buf,
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
"bad-public-group-element",
A_END);
goto done;
/* --- Check the algorithms --- */
- if ((e = algs_get(&a, kf_pub, k)) != 0) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT",
- "public-key", "%s", t.buf,
- "bad-algorithm-selection", e,
- A_END);
+ if (algs_get(&a, &e, kf_pub, k)) {
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "*%s", e.buf, A_END);
goto done;
}
if (!algs_samep(&a, &algs)) {
- a_warn("KEYMGMT",
- "public-key", "%s", t.buf,
- "algorithm-mismatch",
- A_END);
+ a_warn("KEYMGMT", "public-keyring",
+ "%s", kr_pub, "key", "%s", t.buf,
+ "algorithm-mismatch", A_END);
goto done;
}
if (p) G_DESTROY(g, p);
if (g) G_DESTROYGROUP(g);
dstr_destroy(&t);
+ dstr_destroy(&e);
return (rc);
}
Challenge received was old, but maybe not actually a replay. Try again.
.SS "KEYMGMT warnings"
These indicate a problem with the keyring files, or the keys stored in
-them.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT bad-private-key " message
-The private key could not be read, or failed a consistency check. If
-there was a problem with the file, usually there will have been
-.B key-file-error
-warnings before this.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT bad-public-keyring " message
-The public keyring couldn't be read. Usually, there will have been
-.B key-file-error
-warnings before this.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT key-file-error " file ":" line " " message
-Reports a specific error with the named keyring file. This probably
-indicates a bug in
-.BR key (1).
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " " tokens\fR...
-These messages all indicate a problem with the public key named
-.IR tag .
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " algorithm-mismatch"
-The algorithms specified on the public key don't match the ones for our
-private key. All the peers in a network have to use the same
-algorithms.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " bad " message
-The public key couldn't be read, or is invalid.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " bad-public-group-element"
-The public key is invalid. This may indicate a malicious attempt to
-introduce a bogus key.
-.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " bad-algorithm-selection"
-The algorithms listed on the public key couldn't be understood. The
-algorithm selection attributes are probably malformed and need fixing.
+them. The first token is either
+.B private-keyring
+or
+.B public-keyring
+(notated
+.IB which -keyring
+in the descriptions below) indicating which keyring file is problematic,
+and the second token is the filename of the keyring. Frequently a key
+tag may be given next, preceded by the token
+.BR key .
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT public-keyring " file " key " tag " algorithm-mismatch"
+A peer's public key doesn't request the same algorithms as our private
+key.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " bad-tag-length " len
+The key attributes specify the length of MAC tag as
+.I len
+but this is an invalid value \(en either too large or not a multiple of
+eight.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " bad-tag-length-string " str
+The key attributes contain
+.I str
+where a MAC tag length was expected. The key was generated wrongly.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT private-keyring " file " key " tag " changed-group"
+The private keyring has been changed, but the new private key can't be
+used because it uses a different group for Diffie\(enHellman key
+exchange.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " io-error " ecode " " message
+A system error occurred while opening or reading the keyring file.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " unknown-cipher " cipher
+The key specifies the use of an unknown symmetric encryption algorithm
+.IR cipher .
+Maybe the key was generated wrongly, or maybe the version of
+Catacomb installed is too old.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " unknown-group-type " type
+The key specifies the use of a Diffie\(enHellman group of an unknown
+.IR type .
+Maybe the key was generated wrongly, or maybe the version of
+.BR tripe (8)
+is too old.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " unknown-hash " hash
+The key specifies the use of an unknown hash function
+.IR hash .
+Maybe the key was generated wrongly, or maybe the version of Catacomb
+installed is too old.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " unknown-mac " mac
+The key specifies the use of an unknown message authentication code
+.IR mac .
+Maybe the key was generated wrongly, or maybe the version of Catacomb
+installed is too old.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " unknown-mgf-cipher " mgf
+The key specifies the use of an unknown symmetric encryption function
+.I mgf
+for mask generation. Maybe the key was generated wrongly, or maybe the
+version of Catacomb installed is too old.
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " no-hmac-for-hash " hash
+No message authentication code was given explicitly, and there's no
+implementation of HMAC for the selected hash function
+.IR hash .
+.SP
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " " alg " " name " no-key-size " hashsz
+The
+.I alg
+token is either
+.B cipher
+or
+.BR mac .
+The named algorithm requires more key material than the hash function
+can provide. You must change either the hash function, or the cipher or
+MAC.
.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " incorrect-group"
-The public key doesn't use the same group as our private key. All the
-peers in a network have to use the same group.
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key " tag " mgf " mgf " restrictive-key-schedule"
+The cipher selected for mask-generation is unsuitable because it can't
+accept arbitrary-sized keys.
.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " not-found"
-The public key for peer
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " key-not-found " tag
+A key named
.I tag
-wasn't in the public keyring.
+couldn't be found in the keyring.
.SP
-.BI "KEYMGMT public-key " tag " unknown-type"
-The type of the public key isn't understood. Maybe you need to upgrade
-your copy of
-.BR tripe .
-(Even if you do, you'll have to regenerate your keys.)
+.BI "KEYMGMT " which "-keyring " file " line " line " " message
+The contents of the keyring file are invalid. There may well be a bug
+in the
+.BR key (1)
+program.
.SS "KX warnings"
These indicate problems during key-exchange. Many indicate either a bug
in the server (either yours or the remote one), or some kind of attack
~mdw / tripe / commitdiff