initial

diff --git a/amend-propose b/amend-propose
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+
+2. It is not practical for the TC to vote to accept/reject individual
+   amendments to the GR proposal.  The TC would wish to delegate its
+   power to accept amendments, to avoid needing the collection of
+   sponsors for uncontroversial changes.  However the Secretary has
+   advised that this is not constitutionally acceptable.
+
+   Therefore, to achieve roughly the same effect, the TC makes the
+   following promise.  If any TC member gives notice that the TC
+   accepts an amendment, then at least one of the following will
+   happen:
+
+     (a) the TC will use its own power under A.1(1) to arrange that
+         the amendment appears on the GR ballot as an option;
+
+     (b) the TC will use its power under A.1(1) to propose and
+         its power under A.1(2) to accept the amendment, so that
+         the amendment is incorporated in the version voted on; or
+
+     (c) A member of the TC will publicly notify the amendment's
+         proposer that the amendment will not be accepted after all.
+         In this case TC will wait at least 7 more days before calling
+         for a vote, to give time for the amendment's proposer to
+         collect sponsors.
+
+===== TC RESOLUTION ENDS =====

diff --git a/informal-propose b/informal-propose
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+===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+   4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+   General Resolution:
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+   Constitutional Amendment: Permit TC to hold informal private conversations
+
+   On a number of occasions recently, enquirers have emailed TC
+   members' personal addreses to informally seek members' views.  This
+   has worked well; however it is not clear that Constitution permits
+   it.  This situation should be regularised.
+
+   On occasion the TC has been asked to decide on maintainership of
+   packages.  It is very difficult to hold the necessary discussions,
+   which inevitably involve discussion of personalitiees, in public.
+
+   At the moment the TC is unable to take on a mediation role, since
+   mediation necessarily involves each party to a dispute conversing
+   privately with the mediator.  The TC should be able to mediate if
+   the TC, and parties to a dispute, wish it to do so.
+
+   Actual decisionmaking must still place in public of course.
+
+   Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution 6.3 as follows (wdiff -i):
+
+     3. Public [-discussion and-] decision-making.
+
+       [-Discussion,-]
+       Draft resolutions and amendments, and votes by members of the
+       committee, are made public on the Technical Committee public
+       discussion list. There is no separate secretary for the
+       Committee.
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----

diff --git a/numberfix-propose b/numberfix-propose
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+===== TC RESOLUTION STARTS =====
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+   4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+   General Resolution:
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+   Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
+
+   The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
+   This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
+   undesirable.
+
+   Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
+
+    - Increment the section numbers of sections A.2 to A.6;
+    - Renumber the second section A.1 to A.2;
+    - Amend the references into A from elsewhere in the constitution
+      accordingly.  Specifically change the references to A.6 in
+      5.2(7) and 6.1(7) to refer to that section under its new
+      number A.7.
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----

diff --git a/overrule-propose b/overrule-propose
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+=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in 4.2(1)
+   of the Debian Constitution to propose a General Resolution,
+   and according to A.1(1) the TC also proposes an amendment.
+
+   The proposed texts of the two resulting options for the General
+   Resolution are as follows:
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS, COMMON INTRODUCTORY TEXT -----
+
+   Advice to the TC on overruling maintainers
+
+   In the past the Technical Committee have been slow and reluctant
+   to overrule a maintainer unless all the members are absolutely
+   convinced that the maintainer's decision was wrong.
+
+   The TC has sought the views of the Developers.  Accordingly, the
+   Developers advise, in their (non-binding) opinion, that:
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION A -----
+
+   The Technical Committee's approach so far has been correct.
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION OPTION B -----
+
+   Technical Committee members should be willing to vote to overrule if
+   they feel that the maintainer's decision was wrong; the
+   supermajority requirement is sufficient to guard against overruling
+   in questionable cases.
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
+

diff --git a/supermajority-propose b/supermajority-propose
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+=== TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
+
+1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
+   4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
+   General Resolution:
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
+
+   Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix
+
+   Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
+   Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
+
+   Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
+   fencepost error.  In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
+   only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
+   greater than the supermajority ratio.
+
+   In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
+   developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
+   dissenter.  And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
+   dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
+   is no longer possible.
+
+   This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
+   of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
+
+   Therefore, in the Debian Constitution amend A.6(3) as follows:
+
+       3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
+          option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
+          consideration.
+           1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
+              who prefer option A over option B.
+    -      2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
+    -         ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
+    -      3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
+    -         ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+    +      2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
+    +         required majority ratio if:
+    +          (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
+    +          (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
+    +              M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
+
+   The effect is to fix the fencepost bug.  A 1:1 vote will need
+   strictly more in favour than against, but an N:1 vote will need only
+   exactly N:1.  This will also have a (neglible) effect on any General
+   Resolutions requiring supermajorities.
+
+   For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
+   votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
+   Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
+
+   ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----