Definitions:
-A is the originating gateway machine
-B is the destination gateway machine
+A is the originating gateway machine name
+B is the destination gateway machine name
+A+ and B+ are the names with optional additional data, see below
PK_A is the public RSA key of A
PK_B is the public RSA key of B
PK_A^-1 is the private RSA key of A
Note that 'i' may be re-used from one session to the next, whereas 'n'
is always fresh.
-The protocol version selection stuff is not yet implemented: I'm not
-yet convinced it's a good idea. Instead, the initiator could try
-using its preferred protocol (which starts with a different magic
-number) and fall back if there's no reply.
+The optional additional data after the sender's name consists of some
+initial subset of the following list of items:
+ * A 32-bit integer with a set of capability flags, representing the
+ abilities of the sender.
+ * More data which is yet to be defined and which must be ignored
+ by receivers.
+The optional additional data after the receiver's name is not
+currently used. If any is seen, it must be ignored.
+
+Capability flag bits must be in one the following two categories:
+
+1. Early capability flags must be advertised in MSG1 or MSG2, as
+ applicable. If MSG3 or MSG4 advertise any "early" capability bits,
+ MSG1 or MSG3 (as applicable) must have advertised them too. Sadly,
+ advertising an early capability flag will produce MSG1s which are
+ not understood by versions of secnet which predate the capability
+ mechanism.
+
+2. Late capability flags are advertised in MSG2 or MSG3, as
+ applicable. They may also appear in MSG1, but this is not
+ guaranteed. MSG4 must advertise the same set as MSG2.
+
+No capability flags are currently defined. Unknown capability flags
+should be treated as late ones.
+
Messages:
-1) A->B: *,iA,msg1,A,B,protorange-A,nA
+1) A->B: *,iA,msg1,A+,B+,nA
+
+i* must be encoded as 0. (However, it is permitted for a site to use
+zero as its "index" for another site.)
-2) B->A: iA,iB,msg2,B,A,chosen-protocol,nB,nA
+2) B->A: iA,iB,msg2,B+,A+,nB,nA
(The order of B and A reverses in alternate messages so that the same
code can be used to construct them...)
-3) A->B: {iB,iA,msg3,A,B,protorange-A,chosen-protocol,nA,nB,g^x mod m}_PK_A^-1
+3) A->B: {iB,iA,msg3,A+,B+,nA,nB,g^x mod m}_PK_A^-1
If message 1 was a replay then A will not generate message 3, because
it doesn't recognise nA.
If message 2 was from an attacker then B will not generate message 4,
because it doesn't recognise nB.
-If an attacker is trying to manipulate the chosen protocol, B can spot
-this when it sees A's message 3.
-
-4) B->A: {iA,iB,msg4,B,A,protorange-B,chosen-protocol,nB,nA,g^y mod m}_PK_B^-1
+4) B->A: {iA,iB,msg4,B+,A+,nB,nA,g^y mod m}_PK_B^-1
At this point, A and B share a key, k. B must keep retransmitting
message 4 until it receives a packet encrypted using key k.
-A can abandon the exchange if the chosen protocol is not the one that
-it would have chosen knowing the acceptable protocol ranges of A and
-B.
-
5) A: iB,iA,msg5,(ping/msg5)_k
6) B: iA,iB,msg6,(pong/msg6)_k
~ian / secnet.git / blobdiff