Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
brg at gladman.plus.com
Fri Dec 23 08:03:51 GMT 2011
From: John Brazier
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 12:18 AM
To: 'UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group'
Subject: RE: Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
Confused of Horsham:
As I understand it, between block cyphers/stream cyphers/PRNGs (all of which
seem to be different facets of the same thing) there is a wide range of
systems that can extremely efficiently produce a 'random' sequence of bits,
to any arbitrary level of 'randomness'.
Why would anyone use RSA to generate a random bit stream? Its asymmetry
gives benefits, but it's terribly inefficient. That's why it tends to be
used as a key exchange protocol, not a data encryption one.
I am NOT going to argue that this is the reason for using an RSA based
keystream generator in this particular application but one potential
advantage of such generators (see, for example, the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS)
generator) is that the n'th bit in the keystream can be calculated without
having to run the generator up to this point.
If a key stream generator is going to be run for a very long time without
any re-initialisation and an approximate count of the current bit number is
known, a resynchronisation can be established by calculating a sequence
around this bit number and then locating this sequence in the stream to get
an accurate bit number.
Happy to learn,
From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk
[mailto:ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of John Young
Sent: 22 December 2011 10:17 PM
To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
Subject: Re: Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
The article source responds:
PRNG means Pseudo-Random Number Generator. Other sources that discuss GPS
say simply "RNG". Another way of being equally ambiguous would be to call
it a "keystream."
Any cryptosystem can be used as a source PRNG. The PRNG for M-code GPS is
RSA, tell this cryptographer that. RSA is the RNG keystream, GPS data is
the plaintext, and the M code signal is the ciphertext. To turn the M code
ciphertext into GPS plaintext you need to replicate independently the same
RNG sequence used by the satellite to derive the GPS plaintext, to do this
you use RSA in either symmetric or asymmetric mode (as per red-key or
black-key M-code modes, respectively).
At 09:04 PM 12/22/2011 +0000, you wrote:
>I do wish people would check their facts sometimes. The linked article
>asserts that "GPS (M-code) is protected against spoofing by the RSA
>cipher" - it is not, it's protected by a keyed PRNG. You don't have to
>be an ace cryptologist to figure this out, you just need to look up
>"GPS signal" on Wikipedia.
>On 22 Dec 2011, at 16:33, John Young wrote:
>> Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
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