Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
prunesquallor at proproco.co.uk
Fri Dec 23 00:18:08 GMT 2011
Confused of Horsham:
As I understand it, between block cyphers/stream cyphers/PRNGs (all of which
seem to be different facets of the same thing) there is a wide range of
systems that can extremely efficiently produce a 'random' sequence of bits,
to any arbitrary level of 'randomness'.
Why would anyone use RSA to generate a random bit stream? Its asymmetry
gives benefits, but it's terribly inefficient. That's why it tends to be
used as a key exchange protocol, not a data encryption one.
Happy to learn,
From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk
[mailto:ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of John Young
Sent: 22 December 2011 10:17 PM
To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
Subject: Re: Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
The article source responds:
PRNG means Pseudo-Random Number Generator. Other sources that discuss GPS
say simply "RNG". Another way of being equally ambiguous would be to call
it a "keystream."
Any cryptosystem can be used as a source PRNG. The PRNG for M-code GPS is
RSA, tell this cryptographer that. RSA is the RNG keystream, GPS data is
the plaintext, and the M code signal is the ciphertext. To turn the M code
ciphertext into GPS plaintext you need to replicate independently the same
RNG sequence used by the satellite to derive the GPS plaintext, to do this
you use RSA in either symmetric or asymmetric mode (as per red-key or
black-key M-code modes, respectively).
At 09:04 PM 12/22/2011 +0000, you wrote:
>I do wish people would check their facts sometimes. The linked article
>asserts that "GPS (M-code) is protected against spoofing by the RSA
>cipher" - it is not, it's protected by a keyed PRNG. You don't have to
>be an ace cryptologist to figure this out, you just need to look up
>"GPS signal" on Wikipedia.
>On 22 Dec 2011, at 16:33, John Young wrote:
>> Iran GPS Spoofing and the RSA Cipher
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