Is an (inaccurate) national address database a threat to privacy and sometimes personal security?

Peter Tomlinson pwt at
Mon Dec 6 09:33:00 GMT 2010

Just as a little aside, my local NHS Health Centre has the wrong 
spelling for the name of the street where I live, and told me that they 
were not able to correct it...

(Mary, I think I have correctly adjusted the title of your post.)


On 06/12/2010 08:53, Mary Hawking wrote:
> There was a good deal of discussion when PDS (the Personal 
> Demographics Service 
> ) was introduced in the NHS on the risks that it could pose to people 
> with good reason to conceal their addresses and contact details, 
> including groups such as those with abusive ex-partners or families 
> and anyone with a connection to Huntingdon Life Sciences.
> There is a means of withholding the demographics which might locate 
> you (see Access and Security): the back office still holds the details 
> but they are not displayed.
> Does anyone know whether there are intended to be facilities for 
> similar withholding of details in this new database, and do these 
> exist in the databases (thought by commentators on the article to be 
> highly inaccurate anyway) to be used to populate the new database, and 
> if so, will they be carried into the new system?
> PDS declarations of “vulnerability” were not carried forward into the 
> Children’s Database, and AFAIAA there were no mechanisms for 
> requesting withholding of contact details.
> //Mary Hawking//

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