Is an (inaccurate) national address database a threat to privacy and sometimes personal security?
pwt at iosis.co.uk
Mon Dec 6 09:33:00 GMT 2010
Just as a little aside, my local NHS Health Centre has the wrong
spelling for the name of the street where I live, and told me that they
were not able to correct it...
(Mary, I think I have correctly adjusted the title of your post.)
On 06/12/2010 08:53, Mary Hawking wrote:
> There was a good deal of discussion when PDS (the Personal
> Demographics Service
> ) was introduced in the NHS on the risks that it could pose to people
> with good reason to conceal their addresses and contact details,
> including groups such as those with abusive ex-partners or families
> and anyone with a connection to Huntingdon Life Sciences.
> There is a means of withholding the demographics which might locate
> you (see Access and Security): the back office still holds the details
> but they are not displayed.
> Does anyone know whether there are intended to be facilities for
> similar withholding of details in this new database, and do these
> exist in the databases (thought by commentators on the article to be
> highly inaccurate anyway) to be used to populate the new database, and
> if so, will they be carried into the new system?
> PDS declarations of “vulnerability” were not carried forward into the
> Children’s Database, and AFAIAA there were no mechanisms for
> requesting withholding of contact details.
> //Mary Hawking//
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