Is an (inaccurate) national adress database a treat to privacy and sometimes personal security?

[Mary Hawking]

http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2010/12/03/national_addressing_eric_pickles
_ordnance_survey/

 

There was a good deal of discussion when PDS (the Personal Demographics
Service
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/demographics/pds )
was introduced in the NHS on the risks that it could pose to people with
good reason to conceal their addresses and contact details, including groups
such as those with abusive ex-partners or families and anyone with a
connection to Huntingdon Life Sciences. 

There is a means of withholding the demographics which might locate you (see
Access and Security): the back office still holds the details but they are
not displayed.

 

Does anyone know whether there are intended to be facilities for similar
withholding of details in this new database, and do these exist in the
databases (thought by commentators on the article to be highly inaccurate
anyway) to be used to populate the new database, and if so, will they be
carried into the new system?

PDS declarations of "vulnerability" were not carried forward into the
Children's Database, and AFAIAA there were no mechanisms for requesting
withholding of contact details.

 

Mary Hawking

 

 

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