keyexch, keymgmt: Include the peer's public key in the check hash.

This turns out to be necessary for security: otherwise an adversary can
cross over two sessions, which is probably undesirable.  This also
requires that we know our own public key, which was previously
unnecessary.

Except for session-ids (we don't care if two `sessions' with the same
peer get crossed over, because we don't distinguish them anyway), the
protocol now matches the one described and proved secure in the crypto
paper.

diff --git a/keyexch.c b/keyexch.c
index 80e0132a3bf9c69ccd86ca28325be7a39eba6957..f6786e0928b54dd7862f4686d8f9b034655f3645 100644 (file)
--- a/keyexch.c
+++ b/keyexch.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
  *
  * %$r_A = g^{\rho_A}$%                        Alice's challenge
  * %$c_A = H(\cookie{cookie}, r_A)$%   Alice's cookie
  *
  * %$r_A = g^{\rho_A}$%                        Alice's challenge
  * %$c_A = H(\cookie{cookie}, r_A)$%   Alice's cookie

- * %$v_A = \rho_A \xor H(\cookie{expected-reply}, r_A, r_B, b^{\rho_A})$%
+ * %$v_A = \rho_A \xor H(\cookie{expected-reply}, a, r_A, r_B, b^{\rho_A})$%

  *                                     Alice's challenge check value
  * %$r_B^\alpha = a^{\rho_B}$%         Alice's reply
  * %$K = r_B^{\rho_A} = r_B^{\rho_A} = g^{\rho_A\rho_B}$%
  *                                     Alice's challenge check value
  * %$r_B^\alpha = a^{\rho_B}$%         Alice's reply
  * %$K = r_B^{\rho_A} = r_B^{\rho_A} = g^{\rho_A\rho_B}$%


@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ static ge *getreply(keyexch *kx, ge *c, mp *ck)
   G_EXP(gg, r, c, kpriv);
   h = GH_INIT(algs.h);
   HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-expected-reply");
   G_EXP(gg, r, c, kpriv);
   h = GH_INIT(algs.h);
   HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-expected-reply");

+  hashge(h, kx->kpub);

   hashge(h, c);
   hashge(h, kx->c);
   hashge(h, r);
   hashge(h, c);
   hashge(h, kx->c);
   hashge(h, r);


@@ -427,8 +428,12 @@ static ge *getreply(keyexch *kx, ge *c, mp *ck)
     trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: recovered log = %s", mpstr(a));
   }))
   GH_DESTROY(h);
     trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: recovered log = %s", mpstr(a));
   }))
   GH_DESTROY(h);

-  G_EXP(gg, y, gg->g, a);
-  ok = G_EQ(gg, y, c);
+  if (MP_CMP(a, >=, gg->r))
+    ok = 0;
+  else{
+    G_EXP(gg, y, gg->g, a);
+    ok = G_EQ(gg, y, c);
+  }

   if (!ok) {
     a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END);
     IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
   if (!ok) {
     a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END);
     IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {


@@ -553,6 +558,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
 
     h = GH_INIT(algs.h);
     HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-expected-reply");
 
     h = GH_INIT(algs.h);
     HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-expected-reply");

+    hashge(h, kpub);

     hashge(h, kx->c);
     hashge(h, kxc->c);
     hashge(h, kx->rx);
     hashge(h, kx->c);
     hashge(h, kxc->c);
     hashge(h, kx->rx);

diff --git a/keymgmt.c b/keymgmt.c
index 7163ddda5cd09720af6e4c15365ba0e81898972f..f645d1565a1de17fe7bbbb5374ae27b2513f8f36 100644 (file)
--- a/keymgmt.c
+++ b/keymgmt.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 
 group *gg;
 mp *kpriv;
 
 group *gg;
 mp *kpriv;

+ge *kpub;

 algswitch algs;
 
 /*----- Static variables --------------------------------------------------*/
 algswitch algs;
 
 /*----- Static variables --------------------------------------------------*/


@@ -398,6 +399,11 @@ tymatch:;
   if (kpriv)
     mp_drop(kpriv);
 
   if (kpriv)
     mp_drop(kpriv);
 

+  if (kpub)
+    G_DESTROY(g, kpub);
+  kpub = G_CREATE(g);
+  G_EXP(g, kpub, g->g, x);
+

   /* --- Dump out the group --- */
 
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYMGMT, {
   /* --- Dump out the group --- */
 
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYMGMT, {

diff --git a/tripe.h b/tripe.h
index 25255f321a3b0d7b4be556ef9867c97aecb3a048..5f62f16dbf51be863d9a7d18006cb5e226e44881 100644 (file)
--- a/tripe.h
+++ b/tripe.h
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ typedef struct admin {
 extern sel_state sel;                  /* Global I/O event state */
 extern group *gg;                      /* The group we work in */
 extern mp *kpriv;                      /* Our private key */
 extern sel_state sel;                  /* Global I/O event state */
 extern group *gg;                      /* The group we work in */
 extern mp *kpriv;                      /* Our private key */

+extern ge *kpub;                       /* Our public key */

 extern octet buf_i[PKBUFSZ], buf_o[PKBUFSZ], buf_t[PKBUFSZ];
 extern const tunnel_ops *tunnels[];    /* Table of tunnels (0-term) */
 extern const tunnel_ops *tun_default;  /* Default tunnel to use */
 extern octet buf_i[PKBUFSZ], buf_o[PKBUFSZ], buf_t[PKBUFSZ];
 extern const tunnel_ops *tunnels[];    /* Table of tunnels (0-term) */
 extern const tunnel_ops *tun_default;  /* Default tunnel to use */