1 === TC RESOLUTION STARTS ===
3 1. The Debian Technical Committee hereby exercises its power in
4 4.2(1) of the Debian Constitution to propose the following
7 ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
9 Constitutional Amendment- TC Supermajority Fix
11 Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
12 Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
14 Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
15 fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
16 only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
17 greater than the supermajority ratio.
19 In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
20 developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
21 dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
22 dissenters could be overruled by all 6 remaining members; now that
23 is no longer possible.
25 This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
26 of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
28 Therefore, in the Debian Constitution amend A.6(3) as follows:
30 3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
31 option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
33 1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
34 who prefer option A over option B.
35 - 2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
36 - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
37 - 3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
38 - ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
39 + 2. An option A defeats the default option D by its
40 + required majority ratio if:
41 + (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
42 + (b) if a supermajority of N:M is required for A,
43 + M * V(A,D) is greater than or equal to N * V(D,A).
45 The effect is to fix the fencepost bug. A 1:1 vote will need
46 strictly more in favour than against, but an N:1 vote will need only
47 exactly N:1. This will also have a (neglible) effect on any General
48 Resolutions requiring supermajorities.
50 For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
51 votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
52 Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
54 ----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----