sd-bus: never augment creds when we are operating on remote connections (#6217)

[elogind.git] / src / libelogind / sd-bus / sd-bus.c

diff --git a/src/libelogind/sd-bus/sd-bus.c b/src/libelogind/sd-bus/sd-bus.c
index a4f20ca1eabf4c02c384460872b60f720a9a785b..5df358f5a069356969f1a2945cd3d0d97edac41a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libelogind/sd-bus/sd-bus.c
+++ b/src/libelogind/sd-bus/sd-bus.c
@@ -600,6 +600,8 @@ static int parse_unix_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid) {
                 b->sockaddr_size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 + l;
         }
 
+        b->is_local = true;
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -667,6 +669,8 @@ static int parse_tcp_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid) {
 
         freeaddrinfo(result);
 
+        b->is_local = false;
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -749,6 +753,9 @@ static int parse_exec_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid) {
 
         b->exec_path = path;
         b->exec_argv = argv;
+
+        b->is_local = false;
+
         return 0;
 
 fail:
@@ -792,6 +799,8 @@ static int parse_kernel_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid) {
         b->kernel = path;
         path = NULL;
 
+        b->is_local = true;
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -850,6 +859,7 @@ static int parse_container_unix_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid)
         b->sockaddr.un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
         strncpy(b->sockaddr.un.sun_path, "/var/run/dbus/system_bus_socket", sizeof(b->sockaddr.un.sun_path));
         b->sockaddr_size = SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(b->sockaddr.un);
+        b->is_local = false;
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -910,6 +920,8 @@ static int parse_container_kernel_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
+        b->is_local = false;
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1195,6 +1207,7 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_open(sd_bus **ret) {
         /* We don't know whether the bus is trusted or not, so better
          * be safe, and authenticate everything */
         b->trusted = false;
+        b->is_local = false;
         b->attach_flags |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS | KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS;
         b->creds_mask |= SD_BUS_CREDS_UID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS;
 
@@ -1243,6 +1256,7 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_open_system(sd_bus **ret) {
         b->trusted = false;
         b->attach_flags |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS | KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS;
         b->creds_mask |= SD_BUS_CREDS_UID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS;
+        b->is_local = true;
 
         r = sd_bus_start(b);
         if (r < 0)
@@ -1312,6 +1326,7 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_open_user(sd_bus **ret) {
         /* We don't do any per-method access control on the user
          * bus. */
         b->trusted = true;
+        b->is_local = true;
 
         r = sd_bus_start(b);
         if (r < 0)
@@ -1386,6 +1401,7 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_open_system_remote(sd_bus **ret, const char *host) {
         bus->bus_client = true;
         bus->trusted = false;
         bus->is_system = true;
+        bus->is_local = false;
 
         r = sd_bus_start(bus);
         if (r < 0)
@@ -1435,6 +1451,7 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_open_system_machine(sd_bus **ret, const char *machine) {
         bus->bus_client = true;
         bus->trusted = false;
         bus->is_system = true;
+        bus->is_local = false;
 
         r = sd_bus_start(bus);
         if (r < 0)