chiark / gitweb /
mac: also rename use_{smack,selinux,apparmor}() calls so that they share the new...
[elogind.git] / src / core / execute.c
index 0a5914759f2fae63e510bf6db3a8894293660937..c41aec222de06e3e4eacbbe6aa96aebc8616b309 100644 (file)
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
 #include "af-list.h"
 #include "mkdir.h"
 #include "apparmor-util.h"
+#include "bus-kernel.h"
+#include "label.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
 #include "seccomp-util.h"
@@ -938,7 +940,7 @@ static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
 
-static int apply_seccomp(ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
         uint32_t negative_action, action;
         scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
         Iterator i;
@@ -987,7 +989,7 @@ finish:
         return r;
 }
 
-static int apply_address_families(ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
         scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
         Iterator i;
         int r;
@@ -1236,7 +1238,7 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
         _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
         const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
         unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
-        int dont_close[n_fds + 3];
+        int dont_close[n_fds + 4];
         uid_t uid = (uid_t) -1;
         gid_t gid = (gid_t) -1;
         int i, err;
@@ -1279,6 +1281,8 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
                 memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
                 n_dont_close += n_fds;
         }
+        if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
+                dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
         if (runtime) {
                 if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
                         dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
@@ -1428,6 +1432,18 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
                 }
         }
 
+#ifdef ENABLE_KDBUS
+        if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) {
+                uid_t ep_uid = (uid == (uid_t) -1) ? 0 : uid;
+
+                err = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint);
+                if (err < 0) {
+                        *error = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT;
+                        return err;
+                }
+        }
+#endif
+
 #ifdef HAVE_PAM
         if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && context->pam_name) {
                 err = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid);
@@ -1498,6 +1514,7 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
             !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs) ||
             context->mount_flags != 0 ||
             (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) ||
+            params->bus_endpoint_path ||
             context->private_devices ||
             context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
             context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) {
@@ -1523,11 +1540,15 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
                                 context->inaccessible_dirs,
                                 tmp,
                                 var,
+                                params->bus_endpoint_path,
                                 context->private_devices,
                                 context->protect_home,
                                 context->protect_system,
                                 context->mount_flags);
-                if (err < 0) {
+
+                if (err == -EPERM)
+                        log_warning_unit(params->unit_id, "Failed to set up file system namespace due to lack of privileges. Execution sandbox will not be in effect: %s", strerror(-err));
+                else if (err < 0) {
                         *error = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
                         return err;
                 }
@@ -1563,7 +1584,9 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
         /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
          * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
          * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
-         * and the netns fds we don#t need anymore. */
+         * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
+         * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
+         * now be closed as well. */
         err = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds);
         if (err >= 0)
                 err = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
@@ -1646,21 +1669,39 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
-                if (context->selinux_context && use_selinux()) {
-                        err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context);
-                        if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) {
-                                *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
-                                return err;
+                if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+                        if (context->selinux_context) {
+                                err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context);
+                                if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) {
+                                        *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+                                        return err;
+                                }
+                        }
+
+                        if (params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
+                                _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL;
+
+                                err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, &label);
+                                if (err < 0) {
+                                        *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+                                        return err;
+                                }
+
+                                err = setexeccon(label);
+                                if (err < 0) {
+                                        *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+                                        return err;
+                                }
                         }
                 }
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
-                if (context->apparmor_profile && use_apparmor()) {
+                if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
                         err = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
                         if (err < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
                                 *error = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
-                                return err;
+                                return -errno;
                         }
                 }
 #endif
@@ -1744,7 +1785,7 @@ int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command,
                 n_fds = params->n_fds;
         }
 
-        err = exec_context_load_environment(context, &files_env);
+        err = exec_context_load_environment(context, params->unit_id, &files_env);
         if (err < 0) {
                 log_struct_unit(LOG_ERR,
                            params->unit_id,
@@ -1908,6 +1949,9 @@ void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
 
         strv_free(c->runtime_directory);
         c->runtime_directory = NULL;
+
+        bus_endpoint_free(c->bus_endpoint);
+        c->bus_endpoint = NULL;
 }
 
 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) {
@@ -1970,7 +2014,7 @@ void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) {
         }
 }
 
-int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
+int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, char ***l) {
         char **i, **r = NULL;
 
         assert(c);
@@ -2027,7 +2071,7 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
                         }
                         /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
                         if (p)
-                                p = strv_env_clean_log(p, pglob.gl_pathv[n]);
+                                p = strv_env_clean_log(p, unit_id, pglob.gl_pathv[n]);
 
                         if (r == NULL)
                                 r = p;
@@ -2525,6 +2569,29 @@ int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
         return 0;
 }
 
+int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
+        _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
+        va_list ap;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(c);
+        assert(path);
+
+        va_start(ap, path);
+        l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
+        va_end(ap);
+
+        if (!l)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
 
         if (*rt)