}
enum {
+ DENY,
ALLOW,
DUNNO,
- DENY,
};
+static const char *verdict_to_string(int v) {
+ switch (v) {
+
+ case DENY:
+ return "DENY";
+ case ALLOW:
+ return "ALLOW";
+ case DUNNO:
+ return "DUNNO";
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
struct policy_check_filter {
PolicyItemClass class;
- const struct ucred *ucred;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
int message_type;
const char *name;
const char *interface;
break;
case POLICY_ITEM_USER:
- assert(filter->ucred);
-
- if ((streq_ptr(i->name, "*") || (i->uid_valid && i->uid == filter->ucred->uid)))
- return is_permissive(i);
+ if (filter->uid != (uid_t) -1)
+ if ((streq_ptr(i->name, "*") || (i->uid_valid && i->uid == filter->uid)))
+ return is_permissive(i);
break;
case POLICY_ITEM_GROUP:
- assert(filter->ucred);
-
- if ((streq_ptr(i->name, "*") || (i->gid_valid && i->gid == filter->ucred->gid)))
- return is_permissive(i);
+ if (filter->gid != (gid_t) -1)
+ if ((streq_ptr(i->name, "*") || (i->gid_valid && i->gid == filter->gid)))
+ return is_permissive(i);
break;
case POLICY_ITEM_IGNORE:
static int check_policy_items(PolicyItem *items, const struct policy_check_filter *filter) {
PolicyItem *i;
- int r, ret = DUNNO;
+ int verdict = DUNNO;
assert(filter);
/* Check all policies in a set - a broader one might be followed by a more specific one,
* and the order of rules in policy definitions matters */
LIST_FOREACH(items, i, items) {
+ int v;
+
if (i->class != filter->class &&
!(i->class == POLICY_ITEM_OWN_PREFIX && filter->class == POLICY_ITEM_OWN))
continue;
- r = check_policy_item(i, filter);
- if (r != DUNNO)
- ret = r;
+ v = check_policy_item(i, filter);
+ if (v != DUNNO)
+ verdict = v;
}
- return ret;
+ return verdict;
}
static int policy_check(Policy *p, const struct policy_check_filter *filter) {
PolicyItem *items;
- int r;
+ int verdict, v;
assert(p);
assert(filter);
/*
* The policy check is implemented by the following logic:
*
- * 1. Check mandatory items. If the message matches any of these, it is decisive.
- * 2. See if the passed ucred match against the user/group hashmaps. A matching entry is also decisive.
- * 3. Consult the defaults if non of the above matched with a more specific rule.
- * 4. If the message isn't caught be the defaults either, reject it.
+ * 1. Check default items
+ * 2. Check group items
+ * 3. Check user items
+ * 4. Check mandatory items
+ *
+ * Later rules override earlier rules.
*/
- r = check_policy_items(p->mandatory_items, filter);
- if (r != DUNNO)
- return r;
+ verdict = check_policy_items(p->default_items, filter);
- if (filter->ucred) {
- items = hashmap_get(p->user_items, UINT32_TO_PTR(filter->ucred->uid));
+ if (filter->gid != (gid_t) -1) {
+ items = hashmap_get(p->group_items, UINT32_TO_PTR(filter->gid));
if (items) {
- r = check_policy_items(items, filter);
- if (r != DUNNO)
- return r;
+ v = check_policy_items(items, filter);
+ if (v != DUNNO)
+ verdict = v;
}
+ }
- items = hashmap_get(p->group_items, UINT32_TO_PTR(filter->ucred->gid));
+ if (filter->uid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ items = hashmap_get(p->user_items, UINT32_TO_PTR(filter->uid));
if (items) {
- r = check_policy_items(items, filter);
- if (r != DUNNO)
- return r;
+ v = check_policy_items(items, filter);
+ if (v != DUNNO)
+ verdict = v;
}
}
- return check_policy_items(p->default_items, filter);
+ v = check_policy_items(p->mandatory_items, filter);
+ if (v != DUNNO)
+ verdict = v;
+
+ return verdict;
}
-bool policy_check_own(Policy *p, const struct ucred *ucred, const char *name) {
+bool policy_check_own(Policy *p, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const char *name) {
struct policy_check_filter filter = {
.class = POLICY_ITEM_OWN,
- .ucred = ucred,
+ .uid = uid,
+ .gid = gid,
.name = name,
};
- return policy_check(p, &filter) == ALLOW;
+ int verdict;
+
+ assert(p);
+ assert(name);
+
+ verdict = policy_check(p, &filter);
+
+ log_full(LOG_AUTH | (verdict != ALLOW ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG),
+ "Ownership permission check for uid=" UID_FMT " gid=" GID_FMT" name=%s: %s",
+ uid, gid, strna(name), strna(verdict_to_string(verdict)));
+
+ return verdict == ALLOW;
}
-bool policy_check_hello(Policy *p, const struct ucred *ucred) {
+bool policy_check_hello(Policy *p, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
struct policy_check_filter filter = {
- .ucred = ucred,
+ .uid = uid,
+ .gid = gid,
};
- int user, group;
+ int verdict;
+
+ assert(p);
filter.class = POLICY_ITEM_USER;
- user = policy_check(p, &filter);
- if (user == DENY)
- return false;
+ verdict = policy_check(p, &filter);
+
+ if (verdict != DENY) {
+ int v;
- filter.class = POLICY_ITEM_GROUP;
- group = policy_check(p, &filter);
- if (group == DENY)
- return false;
+ filter.class = POLICY_ITEM_GROUP;
+ v = policy_check(p, &filter);
+ if (v != DUNNO)
+ verdict = v;
+ }
- return !(user == DUNNO && group == DUNNO);
+ log_full(LOG_AUTH | (verdict != ALLOW ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG),
+ "Hello permission check for uid=" UID_FMT " gid=" GID_FMT": %s",
+ uid, gid, strna(verdict_to_string(verdict)));
+
+ return verdict == ALLOW;
}
bool policy_check_recv(Policy *p,
- const struct ucred *ucred,
+ uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid,
int message_type,
const char *name,
const char *path,
struct policy_check_filter filter = {
.class = POLICY_ITEM_RECV,
- .ucred = ucred,
+ .uid = uid,
+ .gid = gid,
.message_type = message_type,
.name = name,
.interface = interface,
.member = member,
};
- return policy_check(p, &filter) == ALLOW;
+ int verdict;
+
+ assert(p);
+
+ verdict = policy_check(p, &filter);
+
+ log_full(LOG_AUTH | (verdict != ALLOW ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG),
+ "Recieve permission check for uid=" UID_FMT " gid=" GID_FMT" message=%s name=%s interface=%s path=%s member=%s: %s",
+ uid, gid, bus_message_type_to_string(message_type), strna(name), strna(path), strna(interface), strna(member), strna(verdict_to_string(verdict)));
+
+ return verdict == ALLOW;
}
bool policy_check_send(Policy *p,
- const struct ucred *ucred,
+ uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid,
int message_type,
const char *name,
const char *path,
struct policy_check_filter filter = {
.class = POLICY_ITEM_SEND,
- .ucred = ucred,
+ .uid = uid,
+ .gid = gid,
.message_type = message_type,
.name = name,
.interface = interface,
.member = member,
};
- return policy_check(p, &filter) == ALLOW;
+ int verdict;
+
+ assert(p);
+
+ verdict = policy_check(p, &filter);
+
+ log_full(LOG_AUTH | (verdict != ALLOW ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG),
+ "Send permission check for uid=" UID_FMT " gid=" GID_FMT" message=%s name=%s interface=%s path=%s member=%s: %s",
+ uid, gid, bus_message_type_to_string(message_type), strna(name), strna(path), strna(interface), strna(member), strna(verdict_to_string(verdict)));
+
+ return verdict == ALLOW;
}
int policy_load(Policy *p, char **files) {
printf("%sGroup: %s (%d)\n",
prefix, strna(group), i->gid);
}
+ printf("%s-\n", prefix);
}
}
~ianmdlvl / elogind.git / blobdiff