-/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/
-
/***
This file is part of systemd.
***/
#include <endian.h>
+#include <poll.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <poll.h>
-#include "util.h"
-#include "macro.h"
-#include "missing.h"
-#include "utf8.h"
+#include "sd-bus.h"
#include "sd-daemon.h"
-#include "formats-util.h"
-#include "sd-bus.h"
-#include "bus-socket.h"
+#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "bus-internal.h"
#include "bus-message.h"
+#include "bus-socket.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "formats-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "missing.h"
+#include "selinux-util.h"
+#include "signal-util.h"
+#include "stdio-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+#include "util.h"
#define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
i->iov_base = NULL;
i->iov_len = 0;
- (*idx) ++;
+ (*idx)++;
}
}
/* We expect two response lines: "OK" and possibly
* "AGREE_UNIX_FD" */
- e = memmem(b->rbuffer, b->rbuffer_size, "\r\n", 2);
+ e = memmem_safe(b->rbuffer, b->rbuffer_size, "\r\n", 2);
if (!e)
return 0;
peer.bytes[i/2] = ((uint8_t) x << 4 | (uint8_t) y);
}
- if (!sd_id128_equal(b->server_id, SD_ID128_NULL) &&
+ if (!sd_id128_is_null(b->server_id) &&
!sd_id128_equal(b->server_id, peer))
return -EPERM;
static int verify_anonymous_token(sd_bus *b, const char *p, size_t l) {
_cleanup_free_ char *token = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
if (!b->anonymous_auth)
return 0;
if (l % 2 != 0)
return 0;
- token = unhexmem(p, l);
- if (!token)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (memchr(token, 0, l/2))
+ r = unhexmem(p, l, (void **) &token, &len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (memchr(token, 0, len))
return 0;
return !!utf8_is_valid(token);
static int verify_external_token(sd_bus *b, const char *p, size_t l) {
_cleanup_free_ char *token = NULL;
+ size_t len;
uid_t u;
int r;
if (l % 2 != 0)
return 0;
- token = unhexmem(p, l);
- if (!token)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = unhexmem(p, l, (void**) &token, &len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return 0;
- if (memchr(token, 0, l/2))
+ if (memchr(token, 0, len))
return 0;
r = parse_uid(token, &u);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(p, b->auth_iovec[0].iov_base, b->auth_iovec[0].iov_len);
+ memcpy_safe(p, b->auth_iovec[0].iov_base, b->auth_iovec[0].iov_len);
memcpy(p + b->auth_iovec[0].iov_len, t, l);
b->auth_iovec[0].iov_base = p;
static int bus_socket_read_auth(sd_bus *b) {
struct msghdr mh;
- struct iovec iov;
+ struct iovec iov = {};
size_t n;
ssize_t k;
int r;
void *p;
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsghdr;
- uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * BUS_FDS_MAX) +
- CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) +
- CMSG_SPACE(NAME_MAX)]; /*selinux label */
+ uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * BUS_FDS_MAX)];
} control;
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
bool handle_cmsg = false;
assert(b);
b->rbuffer = p;
- zero(iov);
iov.iov_base = (uint8_t*) b->rbuffer + b->rbuffer_size;
iov.iov_len = n - b->rbuffer_size;
b->rbuffer_size += k;
if (handle_cmsg) {
- for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&mh); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&mh, cmsg)) {
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+
+ CMSG_FOREACH(cmsg, &mh)
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
int j;
j = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(int);
close_many((int*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg), j);
return -EIO;
-
- } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
- cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS &&
- cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred))) {
-
- /* Ignore bogus data, which we might
- * get on socketpair() sockets */
- if (((struct ucred*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg))->pid != 0) {
- memcpy(&b->ucred, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
- b->ucred_valid = true;
- }
-
- } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
- cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
-
- size_t l;
-
- l = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0);
- if (l > 0) {
- memcpy(&b->label, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), l);
- b->label[l] = 0;
- }
- }
- }
+ } else
+ log_debug("Got unexpected auxiliary data with level=%d and type=%d",
+ cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type);
}
r = bus_socket_auth_verify(b);
}
void bus_socket_setup(sd_bus *b) {
- int enable;
-
assert(b);
- /* Enable SO_PASSCRED + SO_PASSEC. We try this on any
- * socket, just in case. */
- enable = !b->bus_client;
- (void) setsockopt(b->input_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &enable, sizeof(enable));
-
- enable = !b->bus_client && (b->attach_flags & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL);
- (void) setsockopt(b->input_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &enable, sizeof(enable));
-
/* Increase the buffers to 8 MB */
fd_inc_rcvbuf(b->input_fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
fd_inc_sndbuf(b->output_fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
}
static void bus_get_peercred(sd_bus *b) {
+ int r;
+
assert(b);
/* Get the peer for socketpair() sockets */
b->ucred_valid = getpeercred(b->input_fd, &b->ucred) >= 0;
+
+ /* Get the SELinux context of the peer */
+ if (mac_selinux_have()) {
+ r = getpeersec(b->input_fd, &b->label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine peer security context: %m");
+ }
}
static int bus_socket_start_auth_client(sd_bus *b) {
if (pid == 0) {
/* Child */
- reset_all_signal_handlers();
+ (void) reset_all_signal_handlers();
+ (void) reset_signal_mask();
close_all_fds(s+1, 1);
n = m->n_iovec * sizeof(struct iovec);
iov = alloca(n);
- memcpy(iov, m->iovec, n);
+ memcpy_safe(iov, m->iovec, n);
j = 0;
iovec_advance(iov, &j, *idx);
if (bus->prefer_writev)
k = writev(bus->output_fd, iov, m->n_iovec);
else {
- struct msghdr mh;
- zero(mh);
+ struct msghdr mh = {
+ .msg_iov = iov,
+ .msg_iovlen = m->n_iovec,
+ };
if (m->n_fds > 0) {
struct cmsghdr *control;
- control = alloca(CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * m->n_fds));
- mh.msg_control = control;
+ mh.msg_control = control = alloca(CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * m->n_fds));
+ mh.msg_controllen = control->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int) * m->n_fds);
control->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
control->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
- mh.msg_controllen = control->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int) * m->n_fds);
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(control), m->fds, sizeof(int) * m->n_fds);
}
- mh.msg_iov = iov;
- mh.msg_iovlen = m->n_iovec;
-
k = sendmsg(bus->output_fd, &mh, MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (k < 0 && errno == ENOTSOCK) {
bus->prefer_writev = true;
r = bus_message_from_malloc(bus,
bus->rbuffer, size,
bus->fds, bus->n_fds,
- !bus->bus_client && bus->ucred_valid ? &bus->ucred : NULL,
- !bus->bus_client && bus->label[0] ? bus->label : NULL,
+ NULL,
&t);
if (r < 0) {
free(b);
int bus_socket_read_message(sd_bus *bus) {
struct msghdr mh;
- struct iovec iov;
+ struct iovec iov = {};
ssize_t k;
size_t need;
int r;
void *b;
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsghdr;
- uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * BUS_FDS_MAX) +
- CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) +
- CMSG_SPACE(NAME_MAX)]; /*selinux label */
+ uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * BUS_FDS_MAX)];
} control;
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
bool handle_cmsg = false;
assert(bus);
bus->rbuffer = b;
- zero(iov);
iov.iov_base = (uint8_t*) bus->rbuffer + bus->rbuffer_size;
iov.iov_len = need - bus->rbuffer_size;
bus->rbuffer_size += k;
if (handle_cmsg) {
- for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&mh); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&mh, cmsg)) {
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+
+ CMSG_FOREACH(cmsg, &mh)
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
int n, *f;
return -EIO;
}
- f = realloc(bus->fds, sizeof(int) + (bus->n_fds + n));
+ f = realloc(bus->fds, sizeof(int) * (bus->n_fds + n));
if (!f) {
close_many((int*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg), n);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- memcpy(f + bus->n_fds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), n * sizeof(int));
+ memcpy_safe(f + bus->n_fds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), n * sizeof(int));
bus->fds = f;
bus->n_fds += n;
- } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
- cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS &&
- cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred))) {
-
- /* Ignore bogus data, which we might
- * get on socketpair() sockets */
- if (((struct ucred*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg))->pid != 0) {
- memcpy(&bus->ucred, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
- bus->ucred_valid = true;
- }
-
- } else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
- cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
-
- size_t l;
- l = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0);
- if (l > 0) {
- memcpy(&bus->label, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), l);
- bus->label[l] = 0;
- }
- }
- }
+ } else
+ log_debug("Got unexpected auxiliary data with level=%d and type=%d",
+ cmsg->cmsg_level, cmsg->cmsg_type);
}
r = bus_socket_read_message_need(bus, &need);