bus: properly unmap mapped area

[elogind.git] / src / cryptsetup / cryptsetup.c

diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
index d5dc2335c8994e8d9b62c7fc5c5cd6f18691923e..347394db8ea802001e21e4daa5a86d48e52f96d3 100644 (file)
--- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static unsigned opt_tries = 0;
 static bool opt_readonly = false;
 static bool opt_verify = false;
 static bool opt_discards = false;
-static usec_t opt_timeout = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USEC;
+static usec_t opt_timeout = 0;
 
 /* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
 
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
                 opt_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
         else if (startswith(option, "timeout=")) {
 
-                if (parse_usec(option+8, &opt_timeout) < 0) {
+                if (parse_sec(option+8, &opt_timeout) < 0) {
                         log_error("timeout= parse failure, ignoring.");
                         return 0;
                 }
@@ -461,10 +461,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                                 k = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL);
 
                         if ((!opt_type && k < 0) || streq_ptr(opt_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
-                                struct crypt_params_plain params;
-
-                                zero(params);
-                                params.hash = hash;
+                                struct crypt_params_plain params = { .hash = hash };
 
                                 /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads
                                 * from keyfile to key length, and
@@ -500,10 +497,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                                  crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
                                  argv[3]);
 
-                        if (key_file)
-                                k = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, argv[2], CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key_file, opt_keyfile_size,
-                                            opt_keyfile_offset, flags);
-                        else {
+                        if (key_file) {
+                                struct stat st;
+
+                                /* Ideally we'd do this on the open
+                                 * fd, but since this is just a
+                                 * warning it's OK to do this in two
+                                 * steps */
+                                if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && (st.st_mode & 0005))
+                                        log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. That's certainly not a good idea.", key_file);
+
+                                k = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(
+                                                cd, argv[2], CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key_file, opt_keyfile_size,
+                                                opt_keyfile_offset, flags);
+                                if (k < 0) {
+                                        log_error("Failed to activate with key file '%s': %s", key_file, strerror(-k));
+                                        key_file = NULL;
+                                        continue;
+                                }
+                        } else {
                                 char **p;
 
                                 STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {