1 /*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/
4 This file is part of systemd.
6 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
8 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
9 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
10 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
11 (at your option) any later version.
13 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
14 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
15 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
16 Lesser General Public License for more details.
18 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
19 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
29 #include <sys/socket.h>
31 #include <sys/prctl.h>
32 #include <linux/sched.h>
33 #include <sys/types.h>
37 #include <sys/mount.h>
39 #include <linux/oom.h>
42 #include <sys/personality.h>
47 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
51 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
59 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
65 #include "capability.h"
68 #include "sd-messages.h"
70 #include "securebits.h"
71 #include "namespace.h"
72 #include "exit-status.h"
74 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
76 #include "path-util.h"
81 #include "selinux-util.h"
82 #include "errno-list.h"
85 #include "apparmor-util.h"
86 #include "smack-util.h"
87 #include "bus-endpoint.h"
92 #include "seccomp-util.h"
95 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
96 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
103 static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
104 int start, restart_from;
109 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
119 for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) {
122 /* Already at right index? */
126 if ((nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i+3)) < 0)
132 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
133 * let's remember that and try again from here */
134 if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0)
138 if (restart_from < 0)
141 start = restart_from;
147 static int flags_fds(const int fds[], unsigned n_fds, bool nonblock) {
156 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
158 for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) {
160 if ((r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock)) < 0)
163 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
164 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
167 if ((r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false)) < 0)
174 _pure_ static const char *tty_path(const ExecContext *context) {
177 if (context->tty_path)
178 return context->tty_path;
180 return "/dev/console";
183 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context) {
186 if (context->tty_vhangup)
187 terminal_vhangup(tty_path(context));
189 if (context->tty_reset)
190 reset_terminal(tty_path(context));
192 if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && context->tty_path)
193 vt_disallocate(context->tty_path);
196 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) {
198 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
199 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
200 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
201 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE;
204 static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) {
209 fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY);
214 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
222 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
223 union sockaddr_union sa = {
224 .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
225 .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
227 uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID;
228 gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID;
231 if (gid != GID_INVALID) {
239 if (uid != UID_INVALID) {
249 r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path));
253 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
254 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
256 if (uid != UID_INVALID)
257 (void) seteuid(olduid);
260 if (gid != GID_INVALID)
261 (void) setegid(oldgid);
266 static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, int nfd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
270 assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX);
274 fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
278 r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid);
282 if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) {
287 fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
297 context->syslog_identifier ? context->syslog_identifier : ident,
299 context->syslog_priority,
300 !!context->syslog_level_prefix,
301 output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
302 output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
303 is_terminal_output(output));
306 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
313 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, mode_t mode, int nfd) {
319 if ((fd = open_terminal(path, mode | O_NOCTTY)) < 0)
323 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
331 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
333 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY ||
334 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ||
335 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL;
338 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
340 if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin)
341 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
343 if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
344 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
349 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) {
351 if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
352 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT;
357 static int setup_input(const ExecContext *context, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
362 i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, apply_tty_stdin);
366 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL:
367 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO);
370 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE:
371 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: {
374 fd = acquire_terminal(tty_path(context),
375 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL,
376 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE,
382 if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
383 r = dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
391 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET:
392 return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
395 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
399 static int setup_output(const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, bool apply_tty_stdin, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
407 i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, apply_tty_stdin);
408 o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
410 if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
412 e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd);
414 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
416 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
417 * the way and are not on a tty */
418 if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
419 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
420 i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL &&
421 !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) &&
425 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
426 if (e == o || e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT)
427 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
431 } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) {
432 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
433 if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input))
434 return open_terminal_as(tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
436 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
437 if (i != EXEC_INPUT_NULL)
438 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
440 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
444 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
445 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
450 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL:
451 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
453 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY:
454 if (is_terminal_input(i))
455 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
457 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
458 return open_terminal_as(tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
460 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG:
461 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE:
462 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG:
463 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE:
464 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL:
465 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE:
466 r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit_id, fileno, uid, gid);
468 log_unit_struct(unit_id,
470 LOG_MESSAGE("Failed to connect %s of %s to the journal socket: %s",
471 fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr",
472 unit_id, strerror(-r)),
475 r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
479 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET:
480 assert(socket_fd >= 0);
481 return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
484 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
488 static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) {
493 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
494 (void) fchown(fd, uid, -1);
495 (void) fchmod(fd, TTY_MODE);
497 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
500 if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & 0777) != TTY_MODE)
506 static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin,
507 int *_saved_stdout) {
508 int fd = -1, saved_stdin, saved_stdout = -1, r;
510 assert(_saved_stdin);
511 assert(_saved_stdout);
513 saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
517 saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
518 if (saved_stdout < 0) {
523 fd = acquire_terminal(
528 DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC);
534 r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid());
538 if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) {
543 if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) {
551 *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin;
552 *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout;
557 safe_close(saved_stdout);
558 safe_close(saved_stdin);
564 _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) {
565 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
570 fd = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
574 va_start(ap, format);
575 vdprintf(fd, format, ap);
581 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin,
587 assert(saved_stdout);
591 if (*saved_stdin >= 0)
592 if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
595 if (*saved_stdout >= 0)
596 if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
599 safe_close(*saved_stdin);
600 safe_close(*saved_stdout);
605 static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) {
606 int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r;
607 _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
609 r = setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
613 line = exec_command_line(argv);
617 r = ask_char(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line);
619 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
624 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext *context, const char *username, gid_t gid) {
625 bool keep_groups = false;
630 /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
631 * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
633 if (context->group || username) {
635 if (context->group) {
636 const char *g = context->group;
638 if ((r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid)) < 0)
642 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
643 if (username && gid != 0) {
644 if (initgroups(username, gid) < 0)
650 /* Second step, set our gids */
651 if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
655 if (context->supplementary_groups) {
660 /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
661 assert_se((ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) > 0);
663 if (!(gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max)))
667 if ((k = getgroups(ngroups_max, gids)) < 0) {
674 STRV_FOREACH(i, context->supplementary_groups) {
677 if (k >= ngroups_max) {
683 r = get_group_creds(&g, gids+k);
692 if (setgroups(k, gids) < 0) {
703 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
706 /* Sets (but doesn't lookup) the uid and make sure we keep the
707 * capabilities while doing so. */
709 if (context->capabilities) {
710 _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
711 static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
712 CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
713 CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
716 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
717 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
718 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
720 int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
722 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb)
723 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
727 /* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce
728 * the capabilities to the minimum we need. */
730 d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
734 if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
735 cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
738 if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
742 /* Third step: actually set the uids */
743 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
746 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
747 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
748 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
749 later. This is done outside of this call. */
756 static int null_conv(
758 const struct pam_message **msg,
759 struct pam_response **resp,
762 /* We don't support conversations */
767 static int setup_pam(
773 int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
775 static const struct pam_conv conv = {
780 pam_handle_t *handle = NULL;
782 int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS;
785 bool close_session = false;
786 pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid;
793 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
794 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
795 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
796 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
797 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
798 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
800 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG)
803 pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle);
804 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
810 pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
811 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
815 pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags);
816 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
819 pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags);
820 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
823 close_session = true;
825 e = pam_getenvlist(handle);
827 pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR;
831 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
833 if (sigemptyset(&ss) < 0 ||
834 sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) < 0 ||
835 sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ss, &old_ss) < 0)
838 parent_pid = getpid();
848 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
851 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
852 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
853 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
855 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
856 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
857 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
858 close_many(fds, n_fds);
860 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
861 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
862 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
863 * to fail to exit normally */
864 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
865 log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
867 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
868 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
869 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
870 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
871 * to do the rest for us. */
872 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0)
875 /* Check if our parent process might already have
877 if (getppid() == parent_pid) {
879 if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) {
886 assert(sig == SIGTERM);
891 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
892 if (getppid() != parent_pid) {
893 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
894 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
901 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
905 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
906 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
909 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
910 if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) < 0)
913 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
914 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
923 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
924 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
925 err = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
927 log_error_errno(errno, "PAM failed: %m");
933 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
935 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
943 kill(pam_pid, SIGTERM);
944 kill(pam_pid, SIGCONT);
951 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
952 char process_name[11];
956 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
957 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
961 rename_process("(...)");
967 /* The end of the process name is usually more
968 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
974 process_name[0] = '(';
975 memcpy(process_name+1, p, l);
976 process_name[1+l] = ')';
977 process_name[1+l+1] = 0;
979 rename_process(process_name);
984 static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
985 uint32_t negative_action, action;
986 scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
993 negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno);
995 seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
999 if (c->syscall_archs) {
1001 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) {
1002 r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1);
1010 r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
1015 action = c->syscall_whitelist ? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW : negative_action;
1016 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) {
1017 r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, 0);
1022 r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
1026 r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
1029 seccomp_release(seccomp);
1033 static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
1034 scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
1040 seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
1044 r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
1048 if (c->address_families_whitelist) {
1049 int af, first = 0, last = 0;
1052 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1053 * families that are out of range and then everything
1054 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1055 * and highest address family in the set. */
1057 SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families, i) {
1058 af = PTR_TO_INT(afp);
1060 if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max())
1063 if (first == 0 || af < first)
1066 if (last == 0 || af > last)
1070 assert((first == 0) == (last == 0));
1074 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1075 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1077 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1085 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1086 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1088 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1091 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first));
1095 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1096 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1098 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1101 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last));
1105 /* Block everything between the first and last
1107 for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) {
1109 if (set_contains(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af)))
1112 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1114 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1117 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af));
1126 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1127 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1130 SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families, i) {
1132 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1134 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1137 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af)));
1143 r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
1147 r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
1150 seccomp_release(seccomp);
1156 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
1160 safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
1161 safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
1163 if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) {
1166 r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC);
1168 if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) {
1169 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1170 write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
1172 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1173 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC);
1176 safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
1180 safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
1183 static int build_environment(
1184 const ExecContext *c,
1186 usec_t watchdog_usec,
1188 const char *username,
1192 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL;
1199 our_env = new0(char*, 10);
1204 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
1206 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1208 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds) < 0)
1210 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1213 if (watchdog_usec > 0) {
1214 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
1216 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1218 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, watchdog_usec) < 0)
1220 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1224 x = strappend("HOME=", home);
1227 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1231 x = strappend("LOGNAME=", username);
1234 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1236 x = strappend("USER=", username);
1239 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1243 x = strappend("SHELL=", shell);
1246 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1249 if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input) ||
1250 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
1251 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
1254 x = strdup(default_term_for_tty(tty_path(c)));
1257 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1260 our_env[n_env++] = NULL;
1261 assert(n_env <= 10);
1269 static int exec_child(
1270 ExecCommand *command,
1271 const ExecContext *context,
1272 const ExecParameters *params,
1273 ExecRuntime *runtime,
1276 int *fds, unsigned n_fds,
1280 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
1281 _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
1282 const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
1283 unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
1284 int dont_close[n_fds + 4];
1285 uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
1286 gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
1292 assert(exit_status);
1294 rename_process_from_path(command->path);
1296 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
1297 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
1298 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
1299 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
1300 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
1301 default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER,
1302 SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1);
1304 if (context->ignore_sigpipe)
1305 ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
1307 r = reset_signal_mask();
1309 *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK;
1313 if (params->idle_pipe)
1314 do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe);
1316 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
1317 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
1323 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
1325 memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
1326 n_dont_close += n_fds;
1328 if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
1329 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
1331 if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
1332 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
1333 if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0)
1334 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1];
1337 r = close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
1339 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
1343 if (!context->same_pgrp)
1345 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID;
1349 exec_context_tty_reset(context);
1351 if (params->confirm_spawn) {
1354 r = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv);
1355 if (r == -ETIMEDOUT)
1356 write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
1358 write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r));
1359 else if (response == 's') {
1360 write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
1361 *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM;
1363 } else if (response == 'n') {
1364 write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
1370 if (context->user) {
1371 username = context->user;
1372 r = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
1374 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
1379 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
1380 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
1382 fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
1384 r = setup_input(context, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
1386 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
1390 r = setup_output(context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid);
1392 *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT;
1396 r = setup_output(context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid);
1398 *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR;
1402 if (params->cgroup_path) {
1403 r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL);
1405 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1410 if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) {
1411 char t[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context->oom_score_adjust)];
1413 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
1414 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
1415 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
1416 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
1418 sprintf(t, "%i", context->oom_score_adjust);
1419 r = write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t);
1420 if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
1422 log_unit_debug_errno(params->unit_id, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1425 *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST;
1430 if (context->nice_set)
1431 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) {
1432 *exit_status = EXIT_NICE;
1436 if (context->cpu_sched_set) {
1437 struct sched_param param = {
1438 .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority,
1441 r = sched_setscheduler(0,
1442 context->cpu_sched_policy |
1443 (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ?
1444 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0),
1447 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER;
1452 if (context->cpuset)
1453 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) {
1454 *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY;
1458 if (context->ioprio_set)
1459 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) {
1460 *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO;
1464 if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
1465 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) {
1466 *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK;
1470 if (context->personality != 0xffffffffUL)
1471 if (personality(context->personality) < 0) {
1472 *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY;
1476 if (context->utmp_id)
1477 utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path);
1479 if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) {
1480 r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid);
1482 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
1488 if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) {
1489 uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid;
1491 r = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint);
1493 *exit_status = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT;
1499 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
1500 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
1501 * user of the new process. */
1502 if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) {
1503 r = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid);
1505 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1510 r = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid);
1512 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1517 if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) {
1520 STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
1521 _cleanup_free_ char *p;
1523 p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
1525 *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
1529 r = mkdir_safe(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid);
1531 *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
1537 if (params->apply_permissions) {
1538 r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
1540 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
1545 umask(context->umask);
1548 if (params->apply_permissions && context->pam_name && username) {
1549 r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds);
1551 *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
1557 if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
1558 r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket);
1560 *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK;
1565 if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) ||
1566 !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) ||
1567 !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs) ||
1568 context->mount_flags != 0 ||
1569 (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) ||
1570 params->bus_endpoint_path ||
1571 context->private_devices ||
1572 context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
1573 context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) {
1575 char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
1577 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
1578 * of the private /tmp, which is
1579 * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
1580 * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
1581 * the one we want to use here. */
1583 if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
1584 if (runtime->tmp_dir)
1585 tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
1586 if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
1587 var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
1590 r = setup_namespace(
1591 context->read_write_dirs,
1592 context->read_only_dirs,
1593 context->inaccessible_dirs,
1596 params->bus_endpoint_path,
1597 context->private_devices,
1598 context->protect_home,
1599 context->protect_system,
1600 context->mount_flags);
1602 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
1603 * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
1604 * silently proceeed. */
1605 if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
1607 log_unit_debug_errno(params->unit_id, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1610 *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
1615 if (params->apply_chroot) {
1616 if (context->root_directory)
1617 if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
1618 *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
1622 if (chdir(context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "/") < 0) {
1623 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
1627 _cleanup_free_ char *d = NULL;
1629 if (asprintf(&d, "%s/%s",
1630 context->root_directory ? context->root_directory : "",
1631 context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "") < 0) {
1632 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1637 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
1643 if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
1644 r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
1646 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
1652 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
1653 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
1654 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
1655 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
1656 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
1657 * now be closed as well. */
1658 r = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds);
1660 r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
1662 r = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking);
1664 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
1668 if (params->apply_permissions) {
1670 for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) {
1671 if (!context->rlimit[i])
1674 if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) {
1675 *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS;
1680 if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop) {
1681 r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set_drop, false);
1683 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
1689 if (context->smack_process_label) {
1690 r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
1692 *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
1698 if (context->user) {
1699 r = enforce_user(context, uid);
1701 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
1706 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
1707 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
1708 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
1709 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
1710 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != context->secure_bits)
1711 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, context->secure_bits) < 0) {
1712 *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS;
1716 if (context->capabilities)
1717 if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) {
1718 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
1722 if (context->no_new_privileges)
1723 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
1724 *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
1729 if (context->address_families_whitelist ||
1730 !set_isempty(context->address_families)) {
1731 r = apply_address_families(context);
1733 *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
1738 if (context->syscall_whitelist ||
1739 !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) ||
1740 !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs)) {
1741 r = apply_seccomp(context);
1743 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
1750 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
1751 char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
1754 r = setexeccon(exec_context);
1756 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
1763 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
1764 if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
1765 r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
1766 if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
1767 *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
1774 r = build_environment(context, n_fds, params->watchdog_usec, home, username, shell, &our_env);
1776 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1780 final_env = strv_env_merge(5,
1781 params->environment,
1783 context->environment,
1788 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1792 final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, final_env);
1794 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1798 final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env);
1800 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG)) {
1801 _cleanup_free_ char *line;
1803 line = exec_command_line(final_argv);
1806 log_unit_struct(params->unit_id,
1808 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
1809 LOG_MESSAGE("Executing: %s", line),
1814 execve(command->path, final_argv, final_env);
1815 *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
1819 int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command,
1820 const ExecContext *context,
1821 const ExecParameters *params,
1822 ExecRuntime *runtime,
1825 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL;
1826 int *fds = NULL; unsigned n_fds = 0;
1827 _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
1836 assert(params->fds || params->n_fds <= 0);
1838 if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET ||
1839 context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET ||
1840 context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) {
1842 if (params->n_fds != 1) {
1843 log_unit_error(params->unit_id, "Got more than one socket.");
1847 socket_fd = params->fds[0];
1851 n_fds = params->n_fds;
1854 r = exec_context_load_environment(context, params->unit_id, &files_env);
1856 return log_unit_error_errno(params->unit_id, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
1858 argv = params->argv ?: command->argv;
1859 line = exec_command_line(argv);
1863 log_unit_struct(params->unit_id,
1865 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
1866 LOG_MESSAGE("About to execute: %s", line),
1870 return log_unit_error_errno(params->unit_id, r, "Failed to fork: %m");
1875 r = exec_child(command,
1886 log_unit_struct(params->unit_id,
1888 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED),
1889 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
1890 LOG_MESSAGE("Failed at step %s spawning %s: %s",
1891 exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD),
1892 command->path, strerror(-r)),
1900 log_unit_debug(params->unit_id, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid);
1902 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
1903 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
1904 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
1905 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
1907 if (params->cgroup_path)
1908 cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, pid);
1910 exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid);
1916 void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) {
1920 c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0);
1921 c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER;
1922 c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO;
1923 c->syslog_level_prefix = true;
1924 c->ignore_sigpipe = true;
1925 c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY;
1926 c->personality = 0xffffffffUL;
1927 c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755;
1930 void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
1935 strv_free(c->environment);
1936 c->environment = NULL;
1938 strv_free(c->environment_files);
1939 c->environment_files = NULL;
1941 for (l = 0; l < ELEMENTSOF(c->rlimit); l++) {
1943 c->rlimit[l] = NULL;
1946 free(c->working_directory);
1947 c->working_directory = NULL;
1948 free(c->root_directory);
1949 c->root_directory = NULL;
1954 free(c->syslog_identifier);
1955 c->syslog_identifier = NULL;
1963 strv_free(c->supplementary_groups);
1964 c->supplementary_groups = NULL;
1969 if (c->capabilities) {
1970 cap_free(c->capabilities);
1971 c->capabilities = NULL;
1974 strv_free(c->read_only_dirs);
1975 c->read_only_dirs = NULL;
1977 strv_free(c->read_write_dirs);
1978 c->read_write_dirs = NULL;
1980 strv_free(c->inaccessible_dirs);
1981 c->inaccessible_dirs = NULL;
1984 CPU_FREE(c->cpuset);
1989 free(c->selinux_context);
1990 c->selinux_context = NULL;
1992 free(c->apparmor_profile);
1993 c->apparmor_profile = NULL;
1995 set_free(c->syscall_filter);
1996 c->syscall_filter = NULL;
1998 set_free(c->syscall_archs);
1999 c->syscall_archs = NULL;
2001 set_free(c->address_families);
2002 c->address_families = NULL;
2004 strv_free(c->runtime_directory);
2005 c->runtime_directory = NULL;
2007 bus_endpoint_free(c->bus_endpoint);
2008 c->bus_endpoint = NULL;
2011 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) {
2016 if (!runtime_prefix)
2019 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->runtime_directory) {
2020 _cleanup_free_ char *p;
2022 p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i, NULL);
2026 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
2027 * sure this is gone when we start the service
2029 rm_rf(p, false, true, false);
2035 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) {
2045 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, unsigned n) {
2048 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
2049 exec_command_done(c+i);
2052 ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) {
2056 LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i);
2057 exec_command_done(i);
2064 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) {
2067 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
2068 c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]);
2071 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo {
2072 const char *unit_id;
2076 static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) {
2077 InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata;
2079 log_unit_error(info->unit_id, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path);
2082 int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, char ***l) {
2083 char **i, **r = NULL;
2088 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) {
2091 bool ignore = false;
2093 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {};
2103 if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) {
2111 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
2113 if (glob(fn, 0, NULL, &pglob) != 0) {
2118 return errno ? -errno : -EINVAL;
2120 count = pglob.gl_pathc;
2128 for (n = 0; n < count; n++) {
2129 k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p);
2137 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
2139 InvalidEnvInfo info = {
2141 .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n]
2144 p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info);
2152 m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p);
2168 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) {
2169 _cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL;
2172 if (startswith(tty, "/dev/"))
2175 /* trivial identity? */
2176 if (streq(tty, "console"))
2179 console = resolve_dev_console(&active);
2180 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
2184 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
2185 return streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty));
2188 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext *ec) {
2189 return (ec->tty_reset || ec->tty_vhangup || ec->tty_vt_disallocate ||
2190 is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) ||
2191 is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) ||
2192 is_terminal_output(ec->std_error)) &&
2193 tty_may_match_dev_console(tty_path(ec));
2196 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) {
2202 fprintf(f, " %s", *g);
2205 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
2212 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2216 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
2217 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
2218 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
2219 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
2220 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
2221 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
2222 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
2223 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
2224 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n",
2226 prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
2227 prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
2228 prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking),
2229 prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
2230 prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
2231 prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
2232 prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home),
2233 prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system),
2234 prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe));
2236 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment)
2237 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
2239 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files)
2240 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e);
2247 if (c->oom_score_adjust_set)
2249 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
2250 prefix, c->oom_score_adjust);
2252 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++)
2254 fprintf(f, "%s%s: "RLIM_FMT"\n",
2255 prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max);
2257 if (c->ioprio_set) {
2258 _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL;
2260 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str);
2262 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
2263 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
2264 prefix, strna(class_str),
2265 prefix, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio));
2268 if (c->cpu_sched_set) {
2269 _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL;
2271 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str);
2273 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
2274 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
2275 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
2276 prefix, strna(policy_str),
2277 prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority,
2278 prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork));
2282 fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix);
2283 for (i = 0; i < c->cpuset_ncpus; i++)
2284 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c->cpuset_ncpus), c->cpuset))
2285 fprintf(f, " %u", i);
2289 if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
2290 fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec);
2293 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
2294 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
2295 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
2296 prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input),
2297 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output),
2298 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error));
2304 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
2305 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
2306 prefix, c->tty_path,
2307 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset),
2308 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup),
2309 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate));
2311 if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
2312 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
2313 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
2314 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2315 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2316 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE ||
2317 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
2318 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
2319 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
2320 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2321 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2322 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) {
2324 _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL;
2326 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str);
2327 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str);
2330 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
2331 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
2332 prefix, strna(fac_str),
2333 prefix, strna(lvl_str));
2336 if (c->capabilities) {
2337 _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t;
2339 t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
2341 fprintf(f, "%sCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, t);
2345 fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
2347 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) ? " keep-caps" : "",
2348 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
2349 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
2350 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
2351 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT) ? " noroot" : "",
2352 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
2354 if (c->capability_bounding_set_drop) {
2356 fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
2358 for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
2359 if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l)))
2360 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
2366 fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user);
2368 fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group);
2370 if (strv_length(c->supplementary_groups) > 0) {
2371 fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix);
2372 strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups);
2377 fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name);
2379 if (strv_length(c->read_write_dirs) > 0) {
2380 fprintf(f, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix);
2381 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_dirs);
2385 if (strv_length(c->read_only_dirs) > 0) {
2386 fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix);
2387 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_dirs);
2391 if (strv_length(c->inaccessible_dirs) > 0) {
2392 fprintf(f, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix);
2393 strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_dirs);
2399 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
2400 prefix, c->utmp_id);
2402 if (c->selinux_context)
2404 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
2405 prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context);
2407 if (c->personality != 0xffffffffUL)
2409 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
2410 prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality)));
2412 if (c->syscall_filter) {
2420 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
2423 if (!c->syscall_whitelist)
2427 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) {
2428 _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
2435 name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1);
2436 fputs(strna(name), f);
2443 if (c->syscall_archs) {
2450 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
2454 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j)
2455 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1)));
2460 if (c->syscall_errno != 0)
2462 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
2463 prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno)));
2465 if (c->apparmor_profile)
2467 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
2468 prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
2471 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) {
2474 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
2475 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
2480 if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0"))
2486 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) {
2491 dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp);
2494 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) {
2497 if (s->pid && s->pid != pid)
2501 dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp);
2507 if (context->utmp_id)
2508 utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status);
2510 exec_context_tty_reset(context);
2514 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2515 char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX];
2523 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2526 "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n",
2529 if (s->start_timestamp.realtime > 0)
2531 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
2532 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime));
2534 if (s->exit_timestamp.realtime > 0)
2536 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
2538 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
2539 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime),
2540 prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code),
2544 char *exec_command_line(char **argv) {
2552 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv)
2555 if (!(n = new(char, k)))
2559 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) {
2566 if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) {
2577 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
2578 * spaces and ticks in them */
2583 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2584 _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL;
2585 const char *prefix2;
2590 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2591 prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t");
2593 cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv);
2595 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
2596 prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM));
2598 exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2);
2601 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2604 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2606 LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c)
2607 exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix);
2610 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) {
2617 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
2618 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end);
2619 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e);
2624 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
2632 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
2653 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
2654 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
2662 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
2668 r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l);
2676 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
2681 *rt = new0(ExecRuntime, 1);
2686 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = -1;
2691 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime **rt, ExecContext *c, const char *id) {
2701 if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp)
2704 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2708 if (c->private_network && (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] < 0) {
2709 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, (*rt)->netns_storage_socket) < 0)
2713 if (c->private_tmp && !(*rt)->tmp_dir) {
2714 r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &(*rt)->tmp_dir, &(*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
2722 ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime *r) {
2724 assert(r->n_ref > 0);
2730 ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *r) {
2735 assert(r->n_ref > 0);
2738 if (r->n_ref <= 0) {
2740 free(r->var_tmp_dir);
2741 safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket);
2748 int exec_runtime_serialize(ExecRuntime *rt, Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
2757 unit_serialize_item(u, f, "tmp-dir", rt->tmp_dir);
2759 if (rt->var_tmp_dir)
2760 unit_serialize_item(u, f, "var-tmp-dir", rt->var_tmp_dir);
2762 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
2765 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]);
2769 unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy);
2772 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) {
2775 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]);
2779 unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy);
2785 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(ExecRuntime **rt, Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
2792 if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) {
2795 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2799 copy = strdup(value);
2803 free((*rt)->tmp_dir);
2804 (*rt)->tmp_dir = copy;
2806 } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) {
2809 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2813 copy = strdup(value);
2817 free((*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
2818 (*rt)->var_tmp_dir = copy;
2820 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) {
2823 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2827 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
2828 log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
2830 safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]);
2831 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
2833 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) {
2836 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2840 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
2841 log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
2843 safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]);
2844 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
2852 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) {
2853 _cleanup_free_ char *path = p;
2855 rm_rf_dangerous(path, false, true, false);
2859 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) {
2865 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
2870 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir);
2872 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir);
2874 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir);
2881 if (rt->var_tmp_dir) {
2882 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir);
2884 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir);
2886 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir);
2887 free(rt->var_tmp_dir);
2890 rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL;
2893 safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket);
2896 static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = {
2897 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null",
2898 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty",
2899 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force",
2900 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail",
2901 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
2904 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput);
2906 static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = {
2907 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit",
2908 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null",
2909 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty",
2910 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog",
2911 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console",
2912 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg",
2913 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console",
2914 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal",
2915 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console",
2916 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
2919 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);