sorry, but ...
Roland Perry
lists at internetpolicyagency.com
Wed Aug 1 15:44:08 BST 2012
In article <50185620.5000307 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>>RIPA 1(1) says: "... at any place in the United Kingdom, any
>> communication in the course of its transmission..."
>>
>> Which is one of several references to "course of its transmission"
>> indicating that this is a continuous (flowing) process.
>
>Err, while I do not think you can intercept at each and every switch in
>the network, I have to disagree a little on point - there is little I
>can see in RIPA which implies or involves flowing, except between two
>places.
Where do communications flow, if not between two places. Or are you
becoming more alert to the one-to-many issue?
>A switch is a place - intercepting the wires between switches is not
>the same as intercepting at a switch after the switch has received the
>message and before it sends it on again.
Switches aren't generally store and forward, they deal in flows.
>What RIPA does talk about is the sender and the intended recipient of a
>communication, and more, that those are the relevant places - and I
>take that to mean at the level of eg the person who sends an email, and
>the person who it is meant for, rather than eg the network or physical
>or even application layers.
If I send an email to ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk who is the
intended recipient? Surely not just you.
>>> And clearing up the stored comms NTL vs Ipswich question would be good
>>> too - the Police need a warrant from the HS to intercept telephone
>>> calls, but not to intercept email? Where's the sense in that?
>>
>> I continue to think that the decision in NTL was flawed. Remember that
>> it wasn't about intercepting emails as such, but revolved around a
>> provision enabling a "preservation order" [my words] for evidence that
>> was likely to be destroyed before that evidence could be obtained with a
>> production order.
>
>That was the immediate issue, perhaps, though imo focussing on it is a
>bit of a red herring - the wider issue was whether the Police could in
>effect intercept communications in transit in a public telecoms system
>if they were emails, because they were stored in transit, but they
>couldn't intercept such comms if they were not stored eg telephone calls.
>
>And that was why the decision was wrong imo, apart from being arbitrary
>and making-up-law-on-the-fly-ish - the general protection against
>interception of communications without a warrant signed by a Minister
>was lost for email; and there is nothing I can find in PACE which
>directly allowed the Police to demand stored emails from CSPs.
They can request production orders, which can demand stored emails.
>[1] I guess that a message left in Facebook is a stored communication.
Yes, very likely.
> If the Police etc have some power, perhaps under PACE a la NTL, to
>obtain such stored messages without it contravening the
>anti-interception provisions of RIPA,
Their production orders may not work if served on Facebook, wherever
they are (not in the UK, I assume).
>could they just intercept all the Facebook traffic and filter out
>everything which will not be a stored communication (ie Facebook
>housekeeping traffic - oops that's mostly traffic data so they can get
>that too) in order to obtain the stored comms under a PACE warrant?
>
>Can't see why not ...
No, you can't intercept everything just in case, and "sort it out
later", that's the whole point.
--
Roland Perry
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