Cost of traffic data access?

[Peter Fairbrother]

Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <4C671243.8080001 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother

>> But all that doesn't matter.
>> 
>> Any one of several thousand designated persons (there are 1,715 
>> designated Policemen alone, plus people from the army, navy, mi5,
>> mi6, gchq etc) can serve an ISP a notice demanding the next month's
>> data - the only question is cost.
> 
> No, there are also tests of proportionality and "practicability"

Out of 2,000+ people, isn't at least one of them going to think that
potentially catching 20 pedophiles or stopping a bombing is more
important than collecting some traffic data from people who are trying
to hide it?

It's a common belief among coppers that they have the right to see comms
data,and people who are trying to hide must be up to no good.

As for practicability, I'm told "it would only take a couple of commands
and a daily email if the Isp has IPFIX  installed, which most do, as
it's the industry standard." Replaced NetFlow apparently.


> I see another "what is interception" debate breaking out here.


Nope. It's not interception. Maybe it should be, but it isn't.


-- Peter F

ps relevant bits from the CoP:
http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/general-publications/ripa-cop/acquisition-disclosure-cop?view=Binary

I doubt this would stop many coppers,and especially not GCHQ etc.

2.5 The designated person must believe that the conduct required by
any authorisation or notice is necessary. He or she must also believe
that conduct to be proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by
obtaining the specified communication data – that the conduct is no
more than is required in the circumstances. This involves balancing
the extent of the intrusiveness of the interference with an individual’s
right of respect for their private life against a specific benefit to
the investigation or operation being undertaken by a relevant public
authority in the public interest.

2.6 Consideration must also be given to any actual or potential
infringement of the privacy of individuals who are not the subject of
the investigation or operation. An application for the acquisition of
communications data should draw attention to any circumstances
which give rise to a meaningful degree of collateral intrusion.

2.7 Taking all these considerations into account in a particular case,
an interference with the right to respect of individual privacy may
still not be justified because the adverse impact on the privacy of an
individual or group of individuals is too severe.

2.8 Any conduct that is excessive in the circumstances of both the
interference and the aim of the investigation or operation, or is in any
way arbitrary will not be proportionate.