X-Git-Url: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~mdw/git/tripe/blobdiff_plain/3cdc3f3a27e8c4f4fe692009d868c773d298a68c..13a55605839046f6f42910de713f4a9b6c44dfd4:/keyexch.c diff --git a/keyexch.c b/keyexch.c index 7c0217c5..ea4748e2 100644 --- a/keyexch.c +++ b/keyexch.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void timer(struct timeval *tv, void *v) keyexch *kx = v; kx->f &= ~KXF_TIMER; T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: timer has popped"); ) - kx_start(kx); + kx_start(kx, 0); } /* --- @settimer@ --- * @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static ge *getreply(keyexch *kx, ge *c, mp *ck) G_EXP(gg, y, gg->g, a); ok = G_EQ(gg, y, c); if (!ok) { - a_warn("KX %s bad-expected-reply-log", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END); IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed challenge = %s", gestr(gg, y)); })) @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) /* --- Ensure that we're in a sensible state --- */ if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL) { - a_warn("KX %s unexpected %s", p_name(kx->p), pkname[msg]); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END); goto bad; } @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) (msg >= KX_COOKIE && (hc = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0) || (msg >= KX_CHAL && (ck = buf_getmp(b)) == 0) || BLEFT(b)) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid %s", p_name(kx->p), pkname[msg]); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END); goto bad; } @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) if (!hc && kx->nr >= KX_THRESH) { T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: too many challenges -- sending cookie"); ) - a_warn("KX %s sending-cookie", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", p_name, "sending-cookie", A_END); b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_COOKIE); G_TOBUF(gg, b, kx->c); h = GH_INIT(algs.h); @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) /* --- Discard a packet with an invalid cookie --- */ if (hc && memcmp(hc, kx->hc, algs.hashsz) != 0) { - a_warn("KX %s incorrect cookie", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "incorrect", "cookie", A_END); goto bad; } @@ -727,11 +727,11 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in, if (ck) trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: check value = %s", mpstr(ck)); })) if (memcmp(hc_out, kx->hc, algs.hashsz) != 0) { - a_warn("KX %s incorrect cookie", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "cookie", A_END); goto bad; } if ((kxc = kxc_byhc(kx, hc_in)) == 0) { - a_warn("KX %s unknown-challenge", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unknown-challenge", A_END); goto bad; } @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in, if (!kxc->r) { if (!ck) { - a_warn("KX %s unexpected switch-rq", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "switch-rq", A_END); goto bad; } if ((r = getreply(kx, kxc->c, ck)) == 0) @@ -752,20 +752,20 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in, buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o)); if (ks_decrypt(kxc->ks, ty, b, &bb)) { - a_warn("KX %s decrypt-failed reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "decrypt-failed", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } buf_init(b, BBASE(&bb), BLEN(&bb)); r = G_CREATE(gg); if (G_FROMBUF(gg, b, r)) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: reply = %s", gestr(gg, r)); })) if (!G_EQ(gg, r, kx->rx)) { - a_warn("KX %s incorrect reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } @@ -822,20 +822,20 @@ static int doreply(keyexch *kx, buf *b) kxchal *kxc; if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL && kx->s != KXS_COMMIT) { - a_warn("KX %s unexpected-reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } if ((hc_in = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || (hc_out = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || (ck = buf_getmp(b)) == 0) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } if ((kxc = matchreply(kx, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_REPLY, hc_in, hc_out, ck, b)) == 0) goto bad; if (BLEFT(b)) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END); goto bad; } if (kx->s == KXS_CHAL) { @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static void kxfinish(keyexch *kx) ks_activate(kxc->ks); settimer(kx, ks_tregen(kxc->ks)); kx->s = KXS_SWITCH; - a_notify("KXDONE %s", p_name(kx->p)); + a_notify("KXDONE", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END); p_stats(kx->p)->t_kx = time(0); } @@ -886,21 +886,21 @@ static int doswitch(keyexch *kx, buf *b) if ((hc_in = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || (hc_out = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-rq", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END); goto bad; } if ((kxc = matchreply(kx, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCH, hc_in, hc_out, 0, b)) == 0) goto bad; if ((hswrq = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-rq", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END); goto bad; } IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, { trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: switch request hash", hswrq, algs.hashsz); }) if (memcmp(hswrq, kxc->hswrq_in, algs.hashsz) != 0) { - a_warn("KX %s incorrect switch-rq", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-rq", A_END); goto bad; } switch (kx->s) { @@ -934,18 +934,18 @@ static int doswitchok(keyexch *kx, buf *b) buf bb; if (kx->s < KXS_COMMIT) { - a_warn("KX %s unexpected switch-ok", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "switch-ok", A_END); goto bad; } kxc = kx->r[0]; buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o)); if (ks_decrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCHOK, b, &bb)) { - a_warn("KX %s decrypt-failed switch-ok", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "decrypt-failed", "switch-ok", A_END); goto bad; } buf_init(b, BBASE(&bb), BLEN(&bb)); if ((hswok = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) { - a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-ok", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "invalid", "switch-ok", A_END); goto bad; } IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, { @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ static int doswitchok(keyexch *kx, buf *b) hswok, algs.hashsz); }) if (memcmp(hswok, kxc->hswok_in, algs.hashsz) != 0) { - a_warn("KX %s incorrect switch-ok", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-ok", A_END); goto bad; } if (kx->s < KXS_SWITCH) @@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static int checkpub(keyexch *kx) now = time(0); if (KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->texp_kpub)) { stop(kx); - a_warn("KX %s public-key-expired", p_name(kx->p)); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "public-key-expired", A_END); G_COPY(gg, kx->kpub, gg->i); kx->f &= ~KXF_PUBKEY; return (-1); @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ static int checkpub(keyexch *kx) /* --- @kx_start@ --- * * * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context + * @int forcep@ = nonzero to ignore the quiet timer * * Returns: --- * @@ -1078,16 +1079,16 @@ static int checkpub(keyexch *kx) * this); if no exchange is in progress, one is commenced. */ -void kx_start(keyexch *kx) +void kx_start(keyexch *kx, int forcep) { time_t now = time(0); if (checkpub(kx)) return; - if (!VALIDP(kx, now)) { + if (forcep || !VALIDP(kx, now)) { stop(kx); start(kx, now); - a_notify("KXSTART %s", p_name(kx->p)); + a_notify("KXSTART", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END); } resend(kx); } @@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ void kx_message(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) rc = doswitchok(kx, b); break; default: - a_warn("KX %s unknown-message 0x%02x", p_name(kx->p), msg); + a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unknown-message", "0x%02x", msg, A_END); rc = -1; break; } @@ -1217,7 +1218,7 @@ int kx_init(keyexch *kx, peer *p, keyset **ks) kx->f = KXF_DEAD | KXF_PUBKEY; start(kx, time(0)); resend(kx); - a_notify("KXSTART %s", p_name(kx->p)); + /* Don't notify here: the ADD message hasn't gone out yet. */ return (0); }