tripe-admin manpage: Generate a command and message summary.

[tripe] / keyexch.c

diff --git a/keyexch.c b/keyexch.c
index e62809ef680771b8848ee5d4e3e745b80a54dd1f..ea4748e2956ddeaafbbcc0f4d85a83395ebe6d28 100644 (file)
--- a/keyexch.c
+++ b/keyexch.c
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static ge *getreply(keyexch *kx, ge *c, mp *ck)
   G_EXP(gg, y, gg->g, a);
   ok = G_EQ(gg, y, c);
   if (!ok) {
-    a_warn("KX %s bad-expected-reply-log", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END);
     IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
       trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed challenge = %s", gestr(gg, y));
     }))
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
   /* --- Ensure that we're in a sensible state --- */
 
   if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL) {
-    a_warn("KX %s unexpected %s", p_name(kx->p), pkname[msg]);
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
       (msg >= KX_COOKIE && (hc = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0) ||
       (msg >= KX_CHAL && (ck = buf_getmp(b)) == 0) ||
       BLEFT(b)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid %s", p_name(kx->p), pkname[msg]);
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
 
   if (!hc && kx->nr >= KX_THRESH) {
     T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: too many challenges -- sending cookie"); )
-    a_warn("KX %s sending-cookie", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", p_name, "sending-cookie", A_END);
     b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_COOKIE);
     G_TOBUF(gg, b, kx->c);
     h = GH_INIT(algs.h);
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
   /* --- Discard a packet with an invalid cookie --- */
 
   if (hc && memcmp(hc, kx->hc, algs.hashsz) != 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s incorrect cookie", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "incorrect", "cookie", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -727,11 +727,11 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in,
     if (ck) trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: check value = %s", mpstr(ck));
   }))
   if (memcmp(hc_out, kx->hc, algs.hashsz) != 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s incorrect cookie", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "cookie", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if ((kxc = kxc_byhc(kx, hc_in)) == 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s unknown-challenge", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unknown-challenge", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in,
 
   if (!kxc->r) {
     if (!ck) {
-      a_warn("KX %s unexpected switch-rq", p_name(kx->p));
+      a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "switch-rq", A_END);
       goto bad;
     }
     if ((r = getreply(kx, kxc->c, ck)) == 0)
@@ -752,20 +752,20 @@ static kxchal *matchreply(keyexch *kx, unsigned ty, const octet *hc_in,
 
   buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o));
   if (ks_decrypt(kxc->ks, ty, b, &bb)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s decrypt-failed reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "decrypt-failed", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   buf_init(b, BBASE(&bb), BLEN(&bb));
   r = G_CREATE(gg);
   if (G_FROMBUF(gg, b, r)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
     trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: reply = %s", gestr(gg, r));
   }))
   if (!G_EQ(gg, r, kx->rx)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s incorrect reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -822,20 +822,20 @@ static int doreply(keyexch *kx, buf *b)
   kxchal *kxc;
 
   if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL && kx->s != KXS_COMMIT) {
-    a_warn("KX %s unexpected-reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if ((hc_in = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 ||
       (hc_out = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 ||
       (ck = buf_getmp(b)) == 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if ((kxc = matchreply(kx, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_REPLY,
                        hc_in, hc_out, ck, b)) == 0)
     goto bad;
   if (BLEFT(b)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid reply", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if (kx->s == KXS_CHAL) {
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static void kxfinish(keyexch *kx)
   ks_activate(kxc->ks);
   settimer(kx, ks_tregen(kxc->ks));
   kx->s = KXS_SWITCH;
-  a_notify("KXDONE %s", p_name(kx->p));
+  a_notify("KXDONE", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END);
   p_stats(kx->p)->t_kx = time(0);
 }
 
@@ -886,21 +886,21 @@ static int doswitch(keyexch *kx, buf *b)
 
   if ((hc_in = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 ||
       (hc_out = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-rq", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if ((kxc = matchreply(kx, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCH,
                        hc_in, hc_out, 0, b)) == 0)
     goto bad;
   if ((hswrq = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-rq", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, {
     trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: switch request hash", hswrq, algs.hashsz);
   })
   if (memcmp(hswrq, kxc->hswrq_in, algs.hashsz) != 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s incorrect switch-rq", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-rq", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   switch (kx->s) {
@@ -934,18 +934,18 @@ static int doswitchok(keyexch *kx, buf *b)
   buf bb;
 
   if (kx->s < KXS_COMMIT) {
-    a_warn("KX %s unexpected switch-ok", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "switch-ok", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   kxc = kx->r[0];
   buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o));
   if (ks_decrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCHOK, b, &bb)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s decrypt-failed switch-ok", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "decrypt-failed", "switch-ok", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   buf_init(b, BBASE(&bb), BLEN(&bb));
   if ((hswok = buf_get(b, algs.hashsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) {
-    a_warn("KX %s invalid switch-ok", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", "invalid", "switch-ok", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, {
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ static int doswitchok(keyexch *kx, buf *b)
                hswok, algs.hashsz);
   })
   if (memcmp(hswok, kxc->hswok_in, algs.hashsz) != 0) {
-    a_warn("KX %s incorrect switch-ok", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-ok", A_END);
     goto bad;
   }
   if (kx->s < KXS_SWITCH)
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static int checkpub(keyexch *kx)
   now = time(0);
   if (KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->texp_kpub)) {
     stop(kx);
-    a_warn("KX %s public-key-expired", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "public-key-expired", A_END);
     G_COPY(gg, kx->kpub, gg->i);
     kx->f &= ~KXF_PUBKEY;
     return (-1);
@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ void kx_start(keyexch *kx, int forcep)
   if (forcep || !VALIDP(kx, now)) {
     stop(kx);
     start(kx, now);
-    a_notify("KXSTART %s", p_name(kx->p));
+    a_notify("KXSTART", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END);
   }
   resend(kx);
 }
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ void kx_message(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
       rc = doswitchok(kx, b);
       break;
     default:
-      a_warn("KX %s unknown-message 0x%02x", p_name(kx->p), msg);
+      a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unknown-message", "0x%02x", msg, A_END);
       rc = -1;
       break;
   }