server/keymgmt.c: Add missing comma causing poor error formatting.

[tripe] / server / keyexch.c

diff --git a/server/keyexch.c b/server/keyexch.c
index 2502fa398d797578378448df7578914710d4f034..0c1ed829bddc80a73e09c2a20b6a50f802ec502b 100644 (file)
--- a/server/keyexch.c
+++ b/server/keyexch.c
@@ -125,20 +125,20 @@ static void hashge(ghash *h, group *g, ge *x)
  *             @const octet *k@ = pointer to key material
  *             @size_t ksz@ = size of the key
  *
- * Returns:    Pointer to the output.
+ * Returns:    ---
  *
  * Use:                Masks a multiprecision integer: returns %$x \xor H(k)$%, so
  *             it's a random oracle thing rather than an encryption thing.
+ *             Breaks the output buffer on error.
  */
 
-static octet *mpmask(buf *b, mp *x, size_t n,
-                    const gccipher *mgfc, const octet *k, size_t ksz)
+static void mpmask(buf *b, mp *x, size_t n,
+                  const gccipher *mgfc, const octet *k, size_t ksz)
 {
   gcipher *mgf;
   octet *p;
 
-  if ((p = buf_get(b, n)) == 0)
-    return (0);
+  if ((p = buf_get(b, n)) == 0) return;
   mgf = GC_INIT(mgfc, k, ksz);
   IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
     trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masking index = %s", mpstr(x));
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static octet *mpmask(buf *b, mp *x, size_t n,
     trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masked ciphertext", p, n);
   }))
   GC_DESTROY(mgf);
-  return (p);
 }
 
 /* --- @mpunmask@ --- *
@@ -428,6 +427,8 @@ static void kxc_stoptimer(kxchal *kxc)
  * Returns:    A pointer to the challenge block.
  *
  * Use:                Returns a pointer to a new challenge block to fill in.
+ *             In particular, the @c@ and @r@ members are left
+ *             uninitialized.
  */
 
 static kxchal *kxc_new(keyexch *kx)
@@ -447,8 +448,6 @@ static kxchal *kxc_new(keyexch *kx)
   /* --- Fill in the new structure --- */
 
   kxc = CREATE(kxchal);
-  kxc->c = G_CREATE(kx->kpriv->g);
-  kxc->r = G_CREATE(kx->kpriv->g);
   kxc->ks = 0;
   kxc->kx = kx;
   kxc->f = 0;
@@ -678,9 +677,10 @@ static kxchal *respond(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
     /* --- Compute the reply, and check the magic --- */
 
     G_EXP(g, r, c, kx->kpriv->kpriv);
-    cv = mpunmask(MP_NEW, ck, ixsz, algs->mgf,
-                 hashcheck(kx, kx->kpub->kpub, kx->c, c, r),
-                 algs->hashsz);
+    if ((cv = mpunmask(MP_NEW, ck, ixsz, algs->mgf,
+                      hashcheck(kx, kx->kpub->kpub, kx->c, c, r),
+                      algs->hashsz)) == 0)
+      goto badcheck;
     IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
       trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed reply = %s", gestr(g, r));
       trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: recovered log = %s", mpstr(cv));
@@ -693,8 +693,8 @@ static kxchal *respond(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
     /* --- Fill in a new challenge block --- */
 
     kxc = kxc_new(kx);
-    G_COPY(g, kxc->c, c);
-    G_COPY(g, kxc->r, r);
+    kxc->c = c; c = 0;
+    kxc->r = r; r = G_CREATE(g);
 
     h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-check-hash");
     GH_HASH(h, ck, ixsz);
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static kxchal *respond(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
 
     /* --- Work out the shared key --- */
 
-    G_EXP(g, r, c, kx->alpha);
+    G_EXP(g, r, kxc->c, kx->alpha);
     IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, {
       trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: shared secret = %s", gestr(g, r));
     }))
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static kxchal *respond(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b)
     kxc->ks = ks_gen(BBASE(&bb), x, y, z, kx->p);
   }
 
-  G_DESTROY(g, c);
+  if (c) G_DESTROY(g, c);
   G_DESTROY(g, cc);
   G_DESTROY(g, r);
   mp_drop(cv);
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ badcheck:
   a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END);
   goto bad;
 bad:
-  G_DESTROY(g, c);
+  if (c) G_DESTROY(g, c);
   G_DESTROY(g, cc);
   G_DESTROY(g, r);
   mp_drop(cv);
@@ -1479,8 +1479,8 @@ int kx_init(keyexch *kx, peer *p, keyset **ks, unsigned f)
 {
   if ((kx->kpriv = km_findpriv(p_privtag(p))) == 0) goto fail_0;
   if ((kx->kpub = km_findpub(p_tag(p))) == 0) goto fail_1;
-  if (!group_samep(kx->kpriv->g, kx->kpub->g)) {
-    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "group-mismatch",
+  if (!km_samealgsp(kx->kpriv, kx->kpub)) {
+    a_warn("KX", "?PEER", p, "group-mismatch",
           "local-private-key", "%s", p_privtag(p),
           "peer-public-key", "%s", p_tag(p),
           A_END);