Move buf stuff to Catacomb library.

[tripe] / keyexch.c

diff --git a/keyexch.c b/keyexch.c
index eb4fc9c8f538ea2eb37daf64f96b456604674b3c..f4125da2e90308932a781427099c496b7bba477a 100644 (file)
--- a/keyexch.c
+++ b/keyexch.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* -*-c-*-
  *
- * $Id: keyexch.c,v 1.8 2003/07/13 11:19:49 mdw Exp $
+ * $Id: keyexch.c,v 1.9 2003/07/13 11:53:14 mdw Exp $
  *
  * Key exchange protocol
  *
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
 /*----- Revision history --------------------------------------------------* 
  *
  * $Log: keyexch.c,v $
+ * Revision 1.9  2003/07/13 11:53:14  mdw
+ * Add protocol commentary.
+ *
  * Revision 1.8  2003/07/13 11:19:49  mdw
  * Incopatible protocol fix!  Include message type code under MAC tag to prevent
  * cut-and-paste from key-exchange messages to general packet transport.
@@ -62,6 +65,56 @@
 
 #include "tripe.h"
 
+/*----- Brief protocol overview -------------------------------------------*
+ *
+ * Let %$G$% be a cyclic group; let %$g$% be a generator of %$G$%, and let
+ * %$q$% be the order of %$G$%; for a key %$K$%, let %$E_K(\cdot)$% denote
+ * application of the symmetric packet protocol to a message; let
+ * %$H(\cdot)$% be the random oracle.  Let $\alpha \inr \{0,\ldots,q - 1\}$%
+ * be Alice's private key; let %$a = g^\alpha$% be her public key; let %$b$%
+ * be Bob's public key.
+ *
+ * At the beginning of the session, Alice chooses
+ *
+ *   %$\rho_A \inr \{0, \ldots q - 1\}$%
+ *
+ * We also have:
+ *
+ * %$r_A = g^{\rho_A}$%                        Alice's challenge
+ * %$c_A = H(\cookie{cookie}, r_A)$%   Alice's cookie
+ * %$v_A = \rho_A \xor H(\cookie{expected-reply}, r_A, r_B, b^{\rho_A})$%
+ *                                     Alice's challenge check value
+ * %$r_B^\alpha = a^{\rho_B}$%         Alice's reply
+ * %$K = r_B^{\rho_A} = r_B^{\rho_A} = g^{\rho_A\rho_B}$%
+ *                                     Alice and Bob's shared secret key
+ * %$w_A = H(\cookie{switch-request}, c_A, c_B)$%
+ *                                     Alice's switch request value
+ * %$u_A = H(\cookie{switch-confirm}, c_A, c_B)$%
+ *                                     Alice's switch confirm value
+ *
+ * The messages are then:
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-pre-challenge}, r_A$%
+ *     Initial greeting.  In state @KXS_CHAL@.
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-cookie}, r_A, c_B$%
+ *     My table is full but I got your message.
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-challenge}, r_A, c_B, v_A$%
+ *     Here's a full challenge for you to answer.
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-reply}, c_A, c_B, v_A, E_K(r_B^\alpha))$%
+ *     Challenge accpeted: here's the answer.  Commit to my challenge.  Move
+ *     to @KXS_COMMIT@.
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-switch}, c_A, c_B, E_K(r_B^\alpha, w_A))$%
+ *     Reply received: here's my reply.  Committed; send data; move to
+ *     @KXS_SWITCH@.
+ *
+ * %$\cookie{kx-switch-ok}, E_K(u_A))$%
+ *     Switch received.  Committed; send data; move to @KXS_SWITCH@.
+ */ 
+
 /*----- Tunable parameters ------------------------------------------------*/
 
 #define T_VALID MIN(2)                 /* Challenge validity period */