Commit | Line | Data |
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a93aacce MW |
1 | /* -*-c-*- |
2 | * | |
3 | * Bulk crypto transformations | |
4 | * | |
5 | * (c) 2014 Straylight/Edgeware | |
6 | */ | |
7 | ||
8 | /*----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------* | |
9 | * | |
10 | * This file is part of Trivial IP Encryption (TrIPE). | |
11 | * | |
11ad66c2 MW |
12 | * TrIPE is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under |
13 | * the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free | |
14 | * Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your | |
15 | * option) any later version. | |
a93aacce | 16 | * |
11ad66c2 MW |
17 | * TrIPE is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
18 | * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | |
19 | * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * for more details. | |
a93aacce MW |
21 | * |
22 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
11ad66c2 | 23 | * along with TrIPE. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
a93aacce MW |
24 | */ |
25 | ||
26 | /*----- Header files ------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
27 | ||
28 | #include "tripe.h" | |
29 | ||
30 | /*----- Utilities ---------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
31 | ||
32 | #define SEQSZ 4 /* Size of sequence number packet */ | |
33 | ||
34 | #define TRACE_IV(qiv, ivsz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ | |
35 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: initialization vector", \ | |
36 | (qiv), (ivsz)); \ | |
37 | }) } while (0) | |
38 | ||
39 | #define TRACE_CT(qpk, sz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ | |
40 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: encrypted packet", (qpk), (sz)); \ | |
41 | }) } while (0) | |
42 | ||
43 | #define TRACE_MAC(qmac, tagsz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ | |
44 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed MAC", (qmac), (tagsz)); \ | |
45 | }) } while (0) | |
46 | ||
9a361a98 MW |
47 | #define TRACE_MACERR(pmac, tagsz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ |
48 | trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: incorrect MAC: decryption failed"); \ | |
49 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: expected MAC", (pmac), (tagsz)); \ | |
50 | }) } while (0) | |
51 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
52 | /* --- @derivekey@ --- * |
53 | * | |
54 | * Arguments: @octet *k@ = pointer to an output buffer of at least | |
55 | * @MAXHASHSZ@ bytes | |
56 | * @size_t ksz@ = actual size wanted (for tracing) | |
57 | * @const deriveargs@ = derivation parameters, as passed into | |
58 | * @genkeys@ | |
59 | * @int dir@ = direction for the key (@DIR_IN@ or @DIR_OUT@) | |
60 | * @const char *what@ = label for the key (input to derivation) | |
61 | * | |
62 | * Returns: --- | |
63 | * | |
64 | * Use: Derives a session key, for use on incoming or outgoing data. | |
65 | */ | |
66 | ||
67 | static void derivekey(octet *k, size_t ksz, const deriveargs *a, | |
68 | int dir, const char *what) | |
69 | { | |
70 | const gchash *hc = a->hc; | |
71 | ghash *h; | |
72 | ||
73 | assert(ksz <= hc->hashsz); | |
74 | assert(hc->hashsz <= MAXHASHSZ); | |
75 | h = GH_INIT(hc); | |
76 | GH_HASH(h, a->what, strlen(a->what)); GH_HASH(h, what, strlen(what) + 1); | |
77 | switch (dir) { | |
78 | case DIR_IN: | |
79 | if (a->x) GH_HASH(h, a->k, a->x); | |
80 | if (a->y != a->x) GH_HASH(h, a->k + a->x, a->y - a->x); | |
81 | break; | |
82 | case DIR_OUT: | |
83 | if (a->y != a->x) GH_HASH(h, a->k + a->x, a->y - a->x); | |
84 | if (a->x) GH_HASH(h, a->k, a->x); | |
85 | break; | |
86 | default: | |
87 | abort(); | |
88 | } | |
89 | GH_HASH(h, a->k + a->y, a->z - a->y); | |
90 | GH_DONE(h, k); | |
91 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
92 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
93 | char _buf[32]; | |
94 | sprintf(_buf, "crypto: %s key %s", dir ? "outgoing" : "incoming", what); | |
95 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, _buf, k, ksz); | |
96 | }) }) | |
97 | } | |
98 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
99 | /*----- Common functionality for generic-composition transforms -----------*/ |
100 | ||
a93aacce MW |
101 | #define CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz) do { \ |
102 | ghash *_h = (h); \ | |
103 | const octet *_pmac = (pmac); \ | |
104 | size_t _tagsz = (tagsz); \ | |
105 | octet *_mac = GH_DONE(_h, 0); \ | |
106 | int _eq = ct_memeq(_mac, _pmac, _tagsz); \ | |
107 | TRACE_MAC(_mac, _tagsz); \ | |
108 | GH_DESTROY(_h); \ | |
109 | if (!_eq) { \ | |
9a361a98 | 110 | TRACE_MACERR(_pmac, _tagsz); \ |
a93aacce MW |
111 | return (KSERR_DECRYPT); \ |
112 | } \ | |
113 | } while (0) | |
114 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
115 | typedef struct gencomp_algs { |
116 | const gccipher *c; size_t cksz; | |
117 | const gcmac *m; size_t mksz; size_t tagsz; | |
118 | } gencomp_algs; | |
119 | ||
120 | typedef struct gencomp_chal { | |
121 | bulkchal _b; | |
e14a412e | 122 | gmac *m; |
c70a7c5c MW |
123 | } gencomp_chal; |
124 | ||
125 | static int gencomp_getalgs(gencomp_algs *a, const algswitch *asw, | |
126 | dstr *e, key_file *kf, key *k) | |
127 | { | |
128 | const char *p; | |
129 | char *q, *qq; | |
130 | unsigned long n; | |
131 | dstr d = DSTR_INIT; | |
132 | int rc = -1; | |
133 | ||
134 | /* --- Symmetric encryption --- */ | |
135 | ||
136 | if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "cipher")) == 0) p = "blowfish-cbc"; | |
137 | if ((a->c = gcipher_byname(p)) == 0) { | |
138 | a_format(e, "unknown-cipher", "%s", p, A_END); | |
139 | goto done; | |
140 | } | |
141 | ||
142 | /* --- Message authentication --- */ | |
143 | ||
144 | if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "mac")) != 0) { | |
145 | dstr_reset(&d); | |
146 | dstr_puts(&d, p); | |
73d383c0 | 147 | if ((q = strrchr(d.buf, '/')) != 0) |
c70a7c5c MW |
148 | *q++ = 0; |
149 | if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) { | |
150 | a_format(e, "unknown-mac", "%s", d.buf, A_END); | |
151 | goto done; | |
152 | } | |
153 | if (!q) | |
154 | a->tagsz = a->m->hashsz; | |
155 | else { | |
156 | n = strtoul(q, &qq, 0); | |
157 | if (*qq) { | |
158 | a_format(e, "bad-tag-length-string", "%s", q, A_END); | |
159 | goto done; | |
160 | } | |
161 | if (n%8 || n/8 > a->m->hashsz) { | |
162 | a_format(e, "bad-tag-length", "%lu", n, A_END); | |
163 | goto done; | |
164 | } | |
165 | a->tagsz = n/8; | |
166 | } | |
167 | } else { | |
168 | dstr_reset(&d); | |
169 | dstr_putf(&d, "%s-hmac", asw->h->name); | |
170 | if ((a->m = gmac_byname(d.buf)) == 0) { | |
171 | a_format(e, "no-hmac-for-hash", "%s", asw->h->name, A_END); | |
172 | goto done; | |
173 | } | |
174 | a->tagsz = asw->h->hashsz/2; | |
175 | } | |
176 | ||
177 | rc = 0; | |
178 | done: | |
179 | dstr_destroy(&d); | |
180 | return (rc); | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
183 | #ifndef NTRACE | |
184 | static void gencomp_tracealgs(const gencomp_algs *a) | |
185 | { | |
186 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: cipher = %s", a->c->name); | |
187 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: mac = %s/%lu", | |
188 | a->m->name, (unsigned long)a->tagsz * 8); | |
189 | } | |
190 | #endif | |
191 | ||
192 | static int gencomp_checkalgs(gencomp_algs *a, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e) | |
193 | { | |
194 | /* --- Derive the key sizes --- * | |
195 | * | |
196 | * Must ensure that we have non-empty keys. This isn't ideal, but it | |
197 | * provides a handy sanity check. Also must be based on a 64- or 128-bit | |
198 | * block cipher or we can't do the data expiry properly. | |
199 | */ | |
200 | ||
201 | if ((a->cksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->c->keysz)) == 0) { | |
202 | a_format(e, "cipher", "%s", a->c->name, | |
203 | "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz, | |
204 | A_END); | |
205 | return (-1); | |
206 | } | |
207 | if ((a->mksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->m->keysz)) == 0) { | |
208 | a_format(e, "mac", "%s", a->m->name, | |
209 | "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz, | |
210 | A_END); | |
211 | return (-1); | |
212 | } | |
213 | ||
214 | return (0); | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | static void gencomp_alginfo(const gencomp_algs *a, admin *adm) | |
218 | { | |
219 | a_info(adm, | |
220 | "cipher=%s", a->c->name, | |
221 | "cipher-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->cksz, | |
222 | "cipher-blksz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->c->blksz, | |
223 | A_END); | |
224 | a_info(adm, | |
225 | "mac=%s", a->m->name, | |
226 | "mac-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->mksz, | |
227 | "mac-tagsz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->tagsz, | |
228 | A_END); | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | static int gencomp_samealgsp(const gencomp_algs *a, const gencomp_algs *aa) | |
232 | { | |
233 | return (a->c == aa->c && | |
234 | a->m == aa->m && a->tagsz == aa->tagsz); | |
235 | } | |
236 | ||
237 | static size_t gencomp_expsz(const gencomp_algs *a) | |
238 | { return (a->c->blksz < 16 ? MEG(64) : MEG(2048)); } | |
239 | ||
240 | static bulkchal *gencomp_genchal(const gencomp_algs *a) | |
241 | { | |
242 | gencomp_chal *gc = CREATE(gencomp_chal); | |
243 | ||
244 | rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, buf_t, a->mksz); | |
245 | gc->m = GM_KEY(a->m, buf_t, a->mksz); | |
246 | gc->_b.tagsz = a->tagsz; | |
247 | IF_TRACING(T_CHAL, { | |
248 | trace(T_CHAL, "chal: generated new challenge key"); | |
249 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "chal: new key", buf_t, a->mksz); | |
250 | }) | |
251 | return (&gc->_b); | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | static int gencomp_chaltag(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz, void *t) | |
255 | { | |
256 | gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc; | |
257 | ghash *h = GM_INIT(gc->m); | |
258 | ||
259 | GH_HASH(h, m, msz); | |
260 | memcpy(t, GH_DONE(h, 0), bc->tagsz); | |
261 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
262 | return (0); | |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
265 | static int gencomp_chalvrf(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz, | |
266 | const void *t) | |
267 | { | |
268 | gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc; | |
269 | ghash *h = GM_INIT(gc->m); | |
270 | int ok; | |
271 | ||
272 | GH_HASH(h, m, msz); | |
273 | ok = ct_memeq(GH_DONE(h, 0), t, gc->_b.tagsz); | |
274 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
275 | return (ok ? 0 : -1); | |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
278 | static void gencomp_freechal(bulkchal *bc) | |
279 | { gencomp_chal *gc = (gencomp_chal *)bc; GM_DESTROY(gc->m); DESTROY(gc); } | |
280 | ||
a93aacce MW |
281 | /*----- The original transform --------------------------------------------* |
282 | * | |
283 | * We generate a random initialization vector (if the cipher needs one). We | |
284 | * encrypt the input message with the cipher, and format the type, sequence | |
285 | * number, IV, and ciphertext as follows. | |
286 | * | |
287 | * +------+ +------+---...---+------...------+ | |
288 | * | type | | seq | iv | ciphertext | | |
289 | * +------+ +------+---...---+------...------+ | |
290 | * 32 32 blksz sz | |
291 | * | |
292 | * All of this is fed into the MAC to compute a tag. The type is not | |
293 | * transmitted: the other end knows what type of message it expects, and the | |
294 | * type is only here to prevent us from being confused because some other | |
295 | * kind of ciphertext has been substituted. The tag is prepended to the | |
296 | * remainder, to yield the finished cryptogram, as follows. | |
297 | * | |
298 | * +---...---+------+---...---+------...------+ | |
299 | * | tag | seq | iv | ciphertext | | |
300 | * +---...---+------+---...---+------...------+ | |
301 | * tagsz 32 blksz sz | |
302 | * | |
303 | * Decryption: checks the overall size, verifies the tag, then decrypts the | |
304 | * ciphertext and extracts the sequence number. | |
305 | */ | |
306 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
307 | typedef struct v0_algs { |
308 | bulkalgs _b; | |
309 | gencomp_algs ga; | |
310 | } v0_algs; | |
311 | ||
312 | typedef struct v0_ctx { | |
313 | bulkctx _b; | |
314 | size_t tagsz; | |
315 | struct { | |
316 | gcipher *c; | |
317 | gmac *m; | |
318 | } d[NDIR]; | |
319 | } v0_ctx; | |
320 | ||
321 | static bulkalgs *v0_getalgs(const algswitch *asw, dstr *e, | |
322 | key_file *kf, key *k) | |
323 | { | |
324 | v0_algs *a = CREATE(v0_algs); | |
325 | if (gencomp_getalgs(&a->ga, asw, e, kf, k)) { DESTROY(a); return (0); } | |
326 | return (&a->_b); | |
327 | } | |
328 | ||
329 | #ifndef NTRACE | |
330 | static void v0_tracealgs(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
331 | { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; gencomp_tracealgs(&a->ga); } | |
332 | #endif | |
333 | ||
334 | static int v0_checkalgs(bulkalgs *aa, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e) | |
335 | { | |
336 | v0_algs *a = (v0_algs *)aa; | |
337 | if (gencomp_checkalgs(&a->ga, asw, e)) return (-1); | |
338 | return (0); | |
339 | } | |
340 | ||
341 | static int v0_samealgsp(const bulkalgs *aa, const bulkalgs *bb) | |
342 | { | |
343 | const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa, *b = (const v0_algs *)bb; | |
344 | return (gencomp_samealgsp(&a->ga, &b->ga)); | |
345 | } | |
346 | ||
347 | static void v0_alginfo(const bulkalgs *aa, admin *adm) | |
348 | { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; gencomp_alginfo(&a->ga, adm); } | |
349 | ||
350 | static size_t v0_overhead(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
351 | { | |
352 | const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; | |
353 | return (a->ga.tagsz + SEQSZ + a->ga.c->blksz); | |
354 | } | |
a93aacce | 355 | |
c70a7c5c MW |
356 | static size_t v0_expsz(const bulkalgs *aa) |
357 | { const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; return (gencomp_expsz(&a->ga)); } | |
a93aacce | 358 | |
ef09dae1 | 359 | static bulkctx *v0_genkeys(const bulkalgs *aa, const deriveargs *da) |
a93aacce | 360 | { |
c70a7c5c MW |
361 | const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; |
362 | v0_ctx *bc = CREATE(v0_ctx); | |
363 | octet k[MAXHASHSZ]; | |
364 | int i; | |
365 | ||
366 | bc->tagsz = a->ga.tagsz; | |
367 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { | |
ef09dae1 MW |
368 | if (!(da->f&(1 << i))) { bc->d[i].c = 0; bc->d[i].m = 0; continue; } |
369 | derivekey(k, a->ga.cksz, da, i, "encryption"); | |
c70a7c5c | 370 | bc->d[i].c = GC_INIT(a->ga.c, k, a->ga.cksz); |
ef09dae1 | 371 | derivekey(k, a->ga.mksz, da, i, "integrity"); |
c70a7c5c MW |
372 | bc->d[i].m = GM_KEY(a->ga.m, k, a->ga.mksz); |
373 | } | |
374 | return (&bc->_b); | |
375 | } | |
376 | ||
377 | static bulkchal *v0_genchal(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
378 | { | |
379 | const v0_algs *a = (const v0_algs *)aa; | |
380 | return (gencomp_genchal(&a->ga)); | |
381 | } | |
382 | #define v0_chaltag gencomp_chaltag | |
383 | #define v0_chalvrf gencomp_chalvrf | |
384 | #define v0_freechal gencomp_freechal | |
385 | ||
386 | static void v0_freealgs(bulkalgs *aa) | |
387 | { v0_algs *a = (v0_algs *)aa; DESTROY(a); } | |
388 | ||
389 | static void v0_freectx(bulkctx *bbc) | |
390 | { | |
391 | v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc; | |
392 | int i; | |
393 | ||
394 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { | |
ef09dae1 MW |
395 | if (bc->d[i].c) GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].c); |
396 | if (bc->d[i].m) GM_DESTROY(bc->d[i].m); | |
c70a7c5c MW |
397 | } |
398 | DESTROY(bc); | |
399 | } | |
400 | ||
401 | static int v0_encrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, | |
402 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 seq) | |
403 | { | |
404 | v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc; | |
a93aacce | 405 | ghash *h; |
c70a7c5c | 406 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_OUT].c; |
a93aacce MW |
407 | const octet *p = BCUR(b); |
408 | size_t sz = BLEFT(b); | |
409 | octet *qmac, *qseq, *qiv, *qpk; | |
ef09dae1 | 410 | size_t ivsz; |
c70a7c5c | 411 | size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz; |
a93aacce MW |
412 | octet t[4]; |
413 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
414 | assert(c); |
415 | ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz; | |
416 | ||
a93aacce MW |
417 | /* --- Determine the ciphertext layout --- */ |
418 | ||
419 | if (buf_ensure(bb, tagsz + SEQSZ + ivsz + sz)) return (0); | |
420 | qmac = BCUR(bb); qseq = qmac + tagsz; qiv = qseq + SEQSZ; qpk = qiv + ivsz; | |
421 | BSTEP(bb, tagsz + SEQSZ + ivsz + sz); | |
422 | ||
423 | /* --- Store the type --- * | |
424 | * | |
425 | * This isn't transmitted, but it's covered by the MAC. | |
426 | */ | |
427 | ||
428 | STORE32(t, ty); | |
429 | ||
430 | /* --- Store the sequence number --- */ | |
431 | ||
c70a7c5c | 432 | STORE32(qseq, seq); |
a93aacce MW |
433 | |
434 | /* --- Establish an initialization vector if necessary --- */ | |
435 | ||
436 | if (ivsz) { | |
437 | rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, qiv, ivsz); | |
438 | GC_SETIV(c, qiv); | |
439 | TRACE_IV(qiv, ivsz); | |
440 | } | |
441 | ||
442 | /* --- Encrypt the packet --- */ | |
443 | ||
444 | GC_ENCRYPT(c, p, qpk, sz); | |
445 | TRACE_CT(qpk, sz); | |
446 | ||
447 | /* --- Compute a MAC over type, sequence number, IV, and ciphertext --- */ | |
448 | ||
449 | if (tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 450 | h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_OUT].m); |
a93aacce MW |
451 | GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t)); |
452 | GH_HASH(h, qseq, SEQSZ + ivsz + sz); | |
453 | memcpy(qmac, GH_DONE(h, 0), tagsz); | |
454 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
455 | TRACE_MAC(qmac, tagsz); | |
456 | } | |
457 | ||
458 | /* --- We're done --- */ | |
459 | ||
460 | return (0); | |
461 | } | |
462 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
463 | static int v0_decrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, |
464 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq) | |
a93aacce | 465 | { |
c70a7c5c | 466 | v0_ctx *bc = (v0_ctx *)bbc; |
a93aacce MW |
467 | const octet *pmac, *piv, *pseq, *ppk; |
468 | size_t psz = BLEFT(b); | |
469 | size_t sz; | |
470 | octet *q = BCUR(bb); | |
471 | ghash *h; | |
c70a7c5c | 472 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_IN].c; |
ef09dae1 | 473 | size_t ivsz; |
c70a7c5c | 474 | size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz; |
a93aacce MW |
475 | octet t[4]; |
476 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
477 | assert(c); |
478 | ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz; | |
479 | ||
a93aacce MW |
480 | /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */ |
481 | ||
482 | if (psz < ivsz + SEQSZ + tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 483 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset"); ) |
a93aacce MW |
484 | return (KSERR_MALFORMED); |
485 | } | |
486 | sz = psz - ivsz - SEQSZ - tagsz; | |
487 | pmac = BCUR(b); pseq = pmac + tagsz; piv = pseq + SEQSZ; ppk = piv + ivsz; | |
488 | STORE32(t, ty); | |
489 | ||
490 | /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */ | |
491 | ||
492 | if (tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 493 | h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_IN].m); |
a93aacce MW |
494 | GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t)); |
495 | GH_HASH(h, pseq, SEQSZ + ivsz + sz); | |
496 | CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz); | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | /* --- Decrypt the packet --- */ | |
500 | ||
501 | if (ivsz) { | |
502 | TRACE_IV(piv, ivsz); | |
503 | GC_SETIV(c, piv); | |
504 | } | |
505 | GC_DECRYPT(c, ppk, q, sz); | |
506 | ||
507 | /* --- Finished --- */ | |
508 | ||
509 | *seq = LOAD32(pseq); | |
510 | BSTEP(bb, sz); | |
511 | return (0); | |
512 | } | |
513 | ||
b87bffcb MW |
514 | /*----- The implicit-IV transform -----------------------------------------* |
515 | * | |
516 | * The v0 transform makes everything explicit. There's an IV because the | |
517 | * cipher needs an IV; there's a sequence number because replay prevention | |
518 | * needs a sequence number. | |
519 | * | |
520 | * This new transform works rather differently. We make use of a block | |
521 | * cipher to encrypt the sequence number, and use that as the IV. We | |
522 | * transmit the sequence number in the clear, as before. This reduces | |
523 | * overhead; and it's not a significant privacy leak because the adversary | |
524 | * can see the order in which the messages are transmitted -- i.e., the | |
525 | * sequence numbers are almost completely predictable anyway. | |
526 | * | |
527 | * So, a MAC is computed over | |
528 | * | |
529 | * +------+ +------+------...------+ | |
530 | * | type | | seq | ciphertext | | |
531 | * +------+ +------+------...------+ | |
532 | * 32 32 sz | |
533 | * | |
534 | * and we actually transmit the following as the cryptogram. | |
535 | * | |
536 | * +---...---+------+------...------+ | |
537 | * | tag | seq | ciphertext | | |
538 | * +---...---+------+------...------+ | |
539 | * tagsz 32 sz | |
540 | */ | |
541 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
542 | typedef struct iiv_algs { |
543 | bulkalgs _b; | |
544 | gencomp_algs ga; | |
545 | const gccipher *b; size_t bksz; | |
546 | } iiv_algs; | |
547 | ||
548 | typedef struct iiv_ctx { | |
549 | bulkctx _b; | |
550 | size_t tagsz; | |
551 | struct { | |
552 | gcipher *c, *b; | |
553 | gmac *m; | |
554 | } d[NDIR]; | |
555 | } iiv_ctx; | |
556 | ||
557 | ||
558 | static bulkalgs *iiv_getalgs(const algswitch *asw, dstr *e, | |
559 | key_file *kf, key *k) | |
560 | { | |
561 | iiv_algs *a = CREATE(iiv_algs); | |
562 | dstr d = DSTR_INIT, dd = DSTR_INIT; | |
563 | const char *p; | |
564 | char *q; | |
565 | ||
566 | if (gencomp_getalgs(&a->ga, asw, e, kf, k)) goto fail; | |
567 | ||
568 | if ((p = key_getattr(kf, k, "blkc")) == 0) { | |
569 | dstr_puts(&dd, a->ga.c->name); | |
570 | if ((q = strrchr(dd.buf, '-')) != 0) *q = 0; | |
571 | p = dd.buf; | |
572 | } | |
573 | dstr_putf(&d, "%s-ecb", p); | |
574 | if ((a->b = gcipher_byname(d.buf)) == 0) { | |
575 | a_format(e, "unknown-blkc", "%s", p, A_END); | |
576 | goto fail; | |
577 | } | |
578 | ||
579 | dstr_destroy(&d); dstr_destroy(&dd); | |
580 | return (&a->_b); | |
581 | fail: | |
582 | dstr_destroy(&d); dstr_destroy(&dd); | |
583 | DESTROY(a); | |
584 | return (0); | |
585 | } | |
586 | ||
587 | #ifndef NTRACE | |
588 | static void iiv_tracealgs(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
589 | { | |
590 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; | |
591 | ||
592 | gencomp_tracealgs(&a->ga); | |
ed621603 MW |
593 | trace(T_CRYPTO, |
594 | "crypto: blkc = %.*s", (int)strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name); | |
c70a7c5c MW |
595 | } |
596 | #endif | |
597 | ||
598 | static int iiv_checkalgs(bulkalgs *aa, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e) | |
b87bffcb | 599 | { |
c70a7c5c MW |
600 | iiv_algs *a = (iiv_algs *)aa; |
601 | ||
602 | if (gencomp_checkalgs(&a->ga, asw, e)) return (-1); | |
603 | ||
604 | if ((a->bksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->b->keysz)) == 0) { | |
605 | a_format(e, "blkc", "%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name, | |
606 | "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz, | |
607 | A_END); | |
608 | return (-1); | |
609 | } | |
610 | if (a->b->blksz < a->ga.c->blksz) { | |
b87bffcb MW |
611 | a_format(e, "blkc", "%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name, |
612 | "blksz-insufficient", A_END); | |
613 | return (-1); | |
614 | } | |
615 | return (0); | |
616 | } | |
617 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
618 | static int iiv_samealgsp(const bulkalgs *aa, const bulkalgs *bb) |
619 | { | |
620 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa, *b = (const iiv_algs *)bb; | |
621 | return (gencomp_samealgsp(&a->ga, &b->ga) && a->b == b->b); | |
622 | } | |
623 | ||
624 | static void iiv_alginfo(const bulkalgs *aa, admin *adm) | |
625 | { | |
626 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; | |
627 | gencomp_alginfo(&a->ga, adm); | |
628 | a_info(adm, | |
629 | "blkc=%.*s", strlen(a->b->name) - 4, a->b->name, | |
630 | "blkc-keysz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->bksz, | |
631 | "blkc-blksz=%lu", (unsigned long)a->b->blksz, | |
632 | A_END); | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | static size_t iiv_overhead(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
636 | { const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; return (a->ga.tagsz + SEQSZ); } | |
637 | ||
638 | static size_t iiv_expsz(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
639 | { | |
640 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; | |
641 | return (gencomp_expsz(&a->ga)); | |
642 | } | |
643 | ||
ef09dae1 | 644 | static bulkctx *iiv_genkeys(const bulkalgs *aa, const deriveargs *da) |
c70a7c5c MW |
645 | { |
646 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; | |
647 | iiv_ctx *bc = CREATE(iiv_ctx); | |
648 | octet k[MAXHASHSZ]; | |
649 | int i; | |
650 | ||
651 | bc->tagsz = a->ga.tagsz; | |
652 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { | |
ef09dae1 MW |
653 | if (!(da->f&(1 << i))) |
654 | { bc->d[i].c = 0; bc->d[i].b = 0; bc->d[i].m = 0; continue; } | |
655 | derivekey(k, a->ga.cksz, da, i, "encryption"); | |
c70a7c5c | 656 | bc->d[i].c = GC_INIT(a->ga.c, k, a->ga.cksz); |
ef09dae1 | 657 | derivekey(k, a->bksz, da, i, "blkc"); |
c70a7c5c | 658 | bc->d[i].b = GC_INIT(a->b, k, a->bksz); |
ef09dae1 | 659 | derivekey(k, a->ga.mksz, da, i, "integrity"); |
c70a7c5c MW |
660 | bc->d[i].m = GM_KEY(a->ga.m, k, a->ga.mksz); |
661 | } | |
662 | return (&bc->_b); | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | static bulkchal *iiv_genchal(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
666 | { | |
667 | const iiv_algs *a = (const iiv_algs *)aa; | |
668 | return (gencomp_genchal(&a->ga)); | |
669 | } | |
670 | #define iiv_chaltag gencomp_chaltag | |
671 | #define iiv_chalvrf gencomp_chalvrf | |
672 | #define iiv_freechal gencomp_freechal | |
673 | ||
674 | static void iiv_freealgs(bulkalgs *aa) | |
675 | { iiv_algs *a = (iiv_algs *)aa; DESTROY(a); } | |
676 | ||
677 | static void iiv_freectx(bulkctx *bbc) | |
678 | { | |
679 | iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc; | |
680 | int i; | |
681 | ||
682 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { | |
ef09dae1 MW |
683 | if (bc->d[i].c) GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].c); |
684 | if (bc->d[i].b) GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].b); | |
685 | if (bc->d[i].m) GM_DESTROY(bc->d[i].m); | |
c70a7c5c MW |
686 | } |
687 | DESTROY(bc); | |
688 | } | |
b87bffcb MW |
689 | |
690 | #define TRACE_PRESEQ(qseq, ivsz) do { IF_TRACING(T_KEYSET, { \ | |
691 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: IV derivation input", (qseq), (ivsz)); \ | |
692 | }) } while (0) | |
693 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
694 | static int iiv_encrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, |
695 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 seq) | |
b87bffcb | 696 | { |
c70a7c5c | 697 | iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc; |
b87bffcb | 698 | ghash *h; |
c70a7c5c | 699 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_OUT].c, *blkc = bc->d[DIR_OUT].b; |
b87bffcb MW |
700 | const octet *p = BCUR(b); |
701 | size_t sz = BLEFT(b); | |
702 | octet *qmac, *qseq, *qpk; | |
ef09dae1 | 703 | size_t ivsz, blkcsz; |
c70a7c5c | 704 | size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz; |
b87bffcb MW |
705 | octet t[4]; |
706 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
707 | assert(c); assert(blkc); |
708 | ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz; | |
709 | blkcsz = GC_CLASS(blkc)->blksz; | |
710 | ||
b87bffcb MW |
711 | /* --- Determine the ciphertext layout --- */ |
712 | ||
713 | if (buf_ensure(bb, tagsz + SEQSZ + sz)) return (0); | |
714 | qmac = BCUR(bb); qseq = qmac + tagsz; qpk = qseq + SEQSZ; | |
715 | BSTEP(bb, tagsz + SEQSZ + sz); | |
716 | ||
717 | /* --- Store the type --- * | |
718 | * | |
719 | * This isn't transmitted, but it's covered by the MAC. | |
720 | */ | |
721 | ||
722 | STORE32(t, ty); | |
723 | ||
724 | /* --- Store the sequence number --- */ | |
725 | ||
c70a7c5c | 726 | STORE32(qseq, seq); |
b87bffcb MW |
727 | |
728 | /* --- Establish an initialization vector if necessary --- */ | |
729 | ||
730 | if (ivsz) { | |
731 | memset(buf_u, 0, blkcsz - SEQSZ); | |
732 | memcpy(buf_u + blkcsz - SEQSZ, qseq, SEQSZ); | |
733 | TRACE_PRESEQ(buf_u, ivsz); | |
734 | GC_ENCRYPT(blkc, buf_u, buf_u, blkcsz); | |
735 | GC_SETIV(c, buf_u); | |
736 | TRACE_IV(buf_u, ivsz); | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
739 | /* --- Encrypt the packet --- */ | |
740 | ||
741 | GC_ENCRYPT(c, p, qpk, sz); | |
742 | TRACE_CT(qpk, sz); | |
743 | ||
744 | /* --- Compute a MAC over type, sequence number, and ciphertext --- */ | |
745 | ||
746 | if (tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 747 | h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_OUT].m); |
b87bffcb MW |
748 | GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t)); |
749 | GH_HASH(h, qseq, SEQSZ + sz); | |
750 | memcpy(qmac, GH_DONE(h, 0), tagsz); | |
751 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
752 | TRACE_MAC(qmac, tagsz); | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
755 | /* --- We're done --- */ | |
756 | ||
757 | return (0); | |
758 | } | |
759 | ||
c70a7c5c MW |
760 | static int iiv_decrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, |
761 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq) | |
b87bffcb | 762 | { |
c70a7c5c | 763 | iiv_ctx *bc = (iiv_ctx *)bbc; |
b87bffcb MW |
764 | const octet *pmac, *pseq, *ppk; |
765 | size_t psz = BLEFT(b); | |
766 | size_t sz; | |
767 | octet *q = BCUR(bb); | |
768 | ghash *h; | |
c70a7c5c | 769 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_IN].c, *blkc = bc->d[DIR_IN].b; |
ef09dae1 | 770 | size_t ivsz, blkcsz; |
c70a7c5c | 771 | size_t tagsz = bc->tagsz; |
b87bffcb MW |
772 | octet t[4]; |
773 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
774 | assert(c); assert(blkc); |
775 | ivsz = GC_CLASS(c)->blksz; | |
776 | blkcsz = GC_CLASS(blkc)->blksz; | |
777 | ||
b87bffcb MW |
778 | /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */ |
779 | ||
780 | if (psz < SEQSZ + tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 781 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset"); ) |
b87bffcb MW |
782 | return (KSERR_MALFORMED); |
783 | } | |
784 | sz = psz - SEQSZ - tagsz; | |
785 | pmac = BCUR(b); pseq = pmac + tagsz; ppk = pseq + SEQSZ; | |
786 | STORE32(t, ty); | |
787 | ||
788 | /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */ | |
789 | ||
790 | if (tagsz) { | |
c70a7c5c | 791 | h = GM_INIT(bc->d[DIR_IN].m); |
b87bffcb MW |
792 | GH_HASH(h, t, sizeof(t)); |
793 | GH_HASH(h, pseq, SEQSZ + sz); | |
794 | CHECK_MAC(h, pmac, tagsz); | |
795 | } | |
796 | ||
797 | /* --- Decrypt the packet --- */ | |
798 | ||
799 | if (ivsz) { | |
800 | memset(buf_u, 0, blkcsz - SEQSZ); | |
801 | memcpy(buf_u + blkcsz - SEQSZ, pseq, SEQSZ); | |
802 | TRACE_PRESEQ(buf_u, ivsz); | |
803 | GC_ENCRYPT(blkc, buf_u, buf_u, blkcsz); | |
804 | GC_SETIV(c, buf_u); | |
805 | TRACE_IV(buf_u, ivsz); | |
806 | } | |
807 | GC_DECRYPT(c, ppk, q, sz); | |
808 | ||
809 | /* --- Finished --- */ | |
810 | ||
811 | *seq = LOAD32(pseq); | |
812 | BSTEP(bb, sz); | |
813 | return (0); | |
814 | } | |
815 | ||
de8edc7f MW |
816 | /*----- The NaCl box transform --------------------------------------------* |
817 | * | |
818 | * This transform is very similar to the NaCl `crypto_secretbox' transform | |
819 | * described in Bernstein, `Cryptography in NaCl', with the difference that, | |
820 | * rather than using XSalsa20, we use either Salsa20/r or ChaChar, because we | |
821 | * have no need of XSalsa20's extended nonce. The default cipher is Salsa20. | |
822 | * | |
823 | * Salsa20 and ChaCha accept a 64-bit nonce. The low 32 bits are the | |
824 | * sequence number, and the high 32 bits are the type, both big-endian. | |
825 | * | |
826 | * +------+------+ | |
827 | * | seq | type | | |
828 | * +------+------+ | |
829 | * 32 32 | |
830 | * | |
831 | * A stream is generated by concatenating the raw output blocks generated | |
832 | * with this nonce and successive counter values starting from zero. The | |
833 | * first 32 bytes of the stream are used as a key for Poly1305: the first 16 | |
834 | * bytes are the universal hash key r, and the second 16 bytes are the mask | |
835 | * value s. | |
836 | * | |
837 | * +------+------+ +------...------+ | |
838 | * | r | s | | keystream | | |
839 | * +------+------+ +------...------+ | |
840 | * 128 128 sz | |
841 | * | |
842 | * The remainder of the stream is XORed with the incoming plaintext to form a | |
843 | * ciphertext with the same length. The ciphertext (only) is then tagged | |
844 | * using Poly1305. The tag, sequence number, and ciphertext are concatenated | |
845 | * in this order, and transmitted. | |
846 | * | |
847 | * | |
848 | * +---...---+------+------...------+ | |
849 | * | tag | seq | ciphertext | | |
850 | * +---...---+------+------...------+ | |
851 | * 128 32 sz | |
852 | * | |
853 | * Note that there is no need to authenticate the type separately, since it | |
854 | * was used to select the cipher nonce, and hence the Poly1305 key. The | |
855 | * Poly1305 tag length is fixed. | |
856 | */ | |
857 | ||
858 | typedef struct naclbox_algs { | |
859 | bulkalgs _b; | |
860 | const gccipher *c; size_t cksz; | |
861 | } naclbox_algs; | |
862 | ||
863 | typedef struct naclbox_ctx { | |
864 | bulkctx _b; | |
865 | struct { gcipher *c; } d[NDIR]; | |
866 | } naclbox_ctx; | |
867 | ||
868 | ||
869 | static bulkalgs *naclbox_getalgs(const algswitch *asw, dstr *e, | |
870 | key_file *kf, key *k) | |
871 | { | |
872 | naclbox_algs *a = CREATE(naclbox_algs); | |
873 | const char *p; | |
874 | char *qq; | |
875 | unsigned long n; | |
876 | ||
877 | /* --- Collect the selected cipher and check that it's supported --- */ | |
878 | ||
879 | p = key_getattr(kf, k, "cipher"); | |
880 | if (!p || strcmp(p, "salsa20") == 0) a->c = &salsa20; | |
881 | else if (strcmp(p, "salsa20/12") == 0) a->c = &salsa2012; | |
882 | else if (strcmp(p, "salsa20/8") == 0) a->c = &salsa208; | |
883 | else if (strcmp(p, "chacha20") == 0) a->c = &chacha20; | |
884 | else if (strcmp(p, "chacha12") == 0) a->c = &chacha12; | |
885 | else if (strcmp(p, "chacha8") == 0) a->c = &chacha8; | |
886 | else { | |
887 | a_format(e, "unknown-cipher", "%s", p, A_END); | |
888 | goto fail; | |
889 | } | |
890 | ||
891 | /* --- Collect the selected MAC, and check the tag length --- */ | |
892 | ||
893 | p = key_getattr(kf, k, "mac"); | |
894 | if (!p) | |
895 | ; | |
896 | else if (strncmp(p, "poly1305", 8) != 0 || (p[8] && p[8] != '/')) { | |
897 | a_format(e, "unknown-mac", "%s", p, A_END); | |
898 | goto fail; | |
899 | } else if (p[8] == '/') { | |
900 | n = strtoul(p + 9, &qq, 0); | |
901 | if (*qq) { | |
902 | a_format(e, "bad-tag-length-string", "%s", p + 9, A_END); | |
903 | goto fail; | |
904 | } | |
905 | if (n != 128) { | |
906 | a_format(e, "bad-tag-length", "%lu", n, A_END); | |
907 | goto fail; | |
908 | } | |
909 | } | |
910 | ||
911 | return (&a->_b); | |
912 | fail: | |
913 | DESTROY(a); | |
914 | return (0); | |
915 | } | |
916 | ||
917 | #ifndef NTRACE | |
918 | static void naclbox_tracealgs(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
919 | { | |
920 | const naclbox_algs *a = (const naclbox_algs *)aa; | |
921 | ||
922 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: cipher = %s", a->c->name); | |
923 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: mac = poly1305/128"); | |
924 | } | |
925 | #endif | |
926 | ||
927 | static int naclbox_checkalgs(bulkalgs *aa, const algswitch *asw, dstr *e) | |
928 | { | |
929 | naclbox_algs *a = (naclbox_algs *)aa; | |
930 | ||
931 | if ((a->cksz = keysz(asw->hashsz, a->c->keysz)) == 0) { | |
932 | a_format(e, "cipher", "%s", a->c->name, | |
933 | "no-key-size", "%lu", (unsigned long)asw->hashsz, | |
934 | A_END); | |
935 | return (-1); | |
936 | } | |
937 | return (0); | |
938 | } | |
939 | ||
940 | static int naclbox_samealgsp(const bulkalgs *aa, const bulkalgs *bb) | |
941 | { | |
942 | const naclbox_algs *a = (const naclbox_algs *)aa, | |
943 | *b = (const naclbox_algs *)bb; | |
944 | return (a->c == b->c); | |
945 | } | |
946 | ||
947 | static void naclbox_alginfo(const bulkalgs *aa, admin *adm) | |
948 | { | |
949 | const naclbox_algs *a = (const naclbox_algs *)aa; | |
950 | a_info(adm, "cipher=%s", a->c->name, "cipher-keysz=32", A_END); | |
951 | a_info(adm, "mac=poly1305", "mac-tagsz=16", A_END); | |
952 | } | |
953 | ||
954 | static size_t naclbox_overhead(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
955 | { return (POLY1305_TAGSZ + SEQSZ); } | |
956 | ||
957 | static size_t naclbox_expsz(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
958 | { return (MEG(2048)); } | |
959 | ||
ef09dae1 | 960 | static bulkctx *naclbox_genkeys(const bulkalgs *aa, const deriveargs *da) |
de8edc7f MW |
961 | { |
962 | const naclbox_algs *a = (const naclbox_algs *)aa; | |
963 | naclbox_ctx *bc = CREATE(naclbox_ctx); | |
964 | octet k[MAXHASHSZ]; | |
965 | int i; | |
966 | ||
967 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { | |
ef09dae1 MW |
968 | if (!(da->f&(1 << i))) { bc->d[i].c = 0; continue; } |
969 | derivekey(k, a->cksz, da, i, "encryption"); | |
de8edc7f MW |
970 | bc->d[i].c = GC_INIT(a->c, k, a->cksz); |
971 | } | |
972 | return (&bc->_b); | |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | typedef struct naclbox_chal { | |
976 | bulkchal _b; | |
977 | gcipher *c; | |
978 | } naclbox_chal; | |
979 | ||
980 | static bulkchal *naclbox_genchal(const bulkalgs *aa) | |
981 | { | |
982 | const naclbox_algs *a = (const naclbox_algs *)aa; | |
983 | naclbox_chal *c = CREATE(naclbox_chal); | |
984 | rand_get(RAND_GLOBAL, buf_t, a->cksz); | |
985 | c->c = GC_INIT(a->c, buf_t, a->cksz); | |
986 | IF_TRACING(T_CHAL, { | |
987 | trace(T_CHAL, "chal: generated new challenge key"); | |
988 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "chal: new key", buf_t, a->cksz); | |
989 | }) | |
990 | c->_b.tagsz = 16; | |
991 | return (&c->_b); | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
994 | static int naclbox_chaltag(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz, void *t) | |
995 | { | |
996 | naclbox_chal *c = (naclbox_chal *)bc; | |
997 | octet b0[SALSA20_NONCESZ]; | |
998 | assert(msz <= sizeof(b0)); | |
999 | memcpy(b0, m, msz); memset(b0 + msz, 0, sizeof(b0) - msz); | |
1000 | GC_SETIV(c->c, b0); | |
1001 | GC_ENCRYPT(c->c, 0, t, c->_b.tagsz); | |
1002 | return (0); | |
1003 | } | |
1004 | ||
1005 | static int naclbox_chalvrf(bulkchal *bc, const void *m, size_t msz, | |
1006 | const void *t) | |
1007 | { | |
1008 | naclbox_chal *c = (naclbox_chal *)bc; | |
1009 | octet b0[SALSA20_NONCESZ], b1[16]; | |
1010 | assert(msz <= sizeof(b0)); assert(c->_b.tagsz <= sizeof(b1)); | |
1011 | memcpy(b0, m, msz); memset(b0 + msz, 0, sizeof(b0) - msz); | |
1012 | GC_SETIV(c->c, b0); | |
1013 | GC_ENCRYPT(c->c, 0, b1, c->_b.tagsz); | |
1014 | return (ct_memeq(t, b1, c->_b.tagsz) ? 0 : -1); | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | ||
1017 | static void naclbox_freechal(bulkchal *bc) | |
1018 | { naclbox_chal *c = (naclbox_chal *)bc; GC_DESTROY(c->c); DESTROY(c); } | |
1019 | ||
1020 | static void naclbox_freealgs(bulkalgs *aa) | |
1021 | { naclbox_algs *a = (naclbox_algs *)aa; DESTROY(a); } | |
1022 | ||
1023 | static void naclbox_freectx(bulkctx *bbc) | |
1024 | { | |
1025 | naclbox_ctx *bc = (naclbox_ctx *)bbc; | |
1026 | int i; | |
1027 | ||
ef09dae1 | 1028 | for (i = 0; i < NDIR; i++) { if (bc->d[i].c) GC_DESTROY(bc->d[i].c); } |
de8edc7f MW |
1029 | DESTROY(bc); |
1030 | } | |
1031 | ||
1032 | static int naclbox_encrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, | |
1033 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 seq) | |
1034 | { | |
1035 | naclbox_ctx *bc = (naclbox_ctx *)bbc; | |
1036 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_OUT].c; | |
1037 | poly1305_key polyk; | |
1038 | poly1305_ctx poly; | |
1039 | const octet *p = BCUR(b); | |
1040 | size_t sz = BLEFT(b); | |
1041 | octet *qmac, *qseq, *qpk; | |
1042 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
1043 | assert(c); |
1044 | ||
de8edc7f MW |
1045 | /* --- Determine the ciphertext layout --- */ |
1046 | ||
1047 | if (buf_ensure(bb, POLY1305_TAGSZ + SEQSZ + sz)) return (0); | |
1048 | qmac = BCUR(bb); qseq = qmac + POLY1305_TAGSZ; qpk = qseq + SEQSZ; | |
1049 | BSTEP(bb, POLY1305_TAGSZ + SEQSZ + sz); | |
1050 | ||
1051 | /* --- Construct and set the nonce --- */ | |
1052 | ||
1053 | STORE32(qseq, seq); | |
1054 | memcpy(buf_u, qseq, SEQSZ); STORE32(buf_u + SEQSZ, ty); | |
1055 | GC_SETIV(c, buf_u); | |
1056 | TRACE_IV(buf_u, SALSA20_NONCESZ); | |
1057 | ||
1058 | /* --- Determine the MAC key --- */ | |
1059 | ||
1060 | GC_ENCRYPT(c, 0, buf_u, POLY1305_KEYSZ + POLY1305_MASKSZ); | |
1061 | poly1305_keyinit(&polyk, buf_u, POLY1305_KEYSZ); | |
1062 | poly1305_macinit(&poly, &polyk, buf_u + POLY1305_KEYSZ); | |
1063 | ||
1064 | /* --- Encrypt the message --- */ | |
1065 | ||
1066 | GC_ENCRYPT(c, p, qpk, sz); | |
1067 | TRACE_CT(qpk, sz); | |
1068 | ||
1069 | /* --- Compute the MAC --- */ | |
1070 | ||
1071 | poly1305_hash(&poly, qpk, sz); | |
1072 | poly1305_done(&poly, qmac); | |
1073 | TRACE_MAC(qmac, POLY1305_TAGSZ); | |
1074 | ||
1075 | /* --- We're done --- */ | |
1076 | ||
1077 | return (0); | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | ||
1080 | static int naclbox_decrypt(bulkctx *bbc, unsigned ty, | |
1081 | buf *b, buf *bb, uint32 *seq) | |
1082 | { | |
1083 | naclbox_ctx *bc = (naclbox_ctx *)bbc; | |
1084 | gcipher *c = bc->d[DIR_IN].c; | |
1085 | poly1305_key polyk; | |
1086 | poly1305_ctx poly; | |
1087 | const octet *pmac, *pseq, *ppk; | |
1088 | size_t psz = BLEFT(b); | |
1089 | size_t sz; | |
1090 | octet *q = BCUR(bb); | |
1091 | ||
ef09dae1 MW |
1092 | assert(c); |
1093 | ||
de8edc7f MW |
1094 | /* --- Break up the packet into its components --- */ |
1095 | ||
1096 | if (psz < SEQSZ + POLY1305_TAGSZ) { | |
1097 | T( trace(T_KEYSET, "keyset: block too small for keyset"); ) | |
1098 | return (KSERR_MALFORMED); | |
1099 | } | |
1100 | sz = psz - SEQSZ - POLY1305_TAGSZ; | |
1101 | pmac = BCUR(b); pseq = pmac + POLY1305_TAGSZ; ppk = pseq + SEQSZ; | |
1102 | ||
1103 | /* --- Construct and set the nonce --- */ | |
1104 | ||
1105 | memcpy(buf_u, pseq, SEQSZ); STORE32(buf_u + SEQSZ, ty); | |
1106 | GC_SETIV(c, buf_u); | |
1107 | TRACE_IV(buf_u, SALSA20_NONCESZ); | |
1108 | ||
1109 | /* --- Determine the MAC key --- */ | |
1110 | ||
1111 | GC_ENCRYPT(c, 0, buf_u, POLY1305_KEYSZ + POLY1305_MASKSZ); | |
1112 | poly1305_keyinit(&polyk, buf_u, POLY1305_KEYSZ); | |
1113 | poly1305_macinit(&poly, &polyk, buf_u + POLY1305_KEYSZ); | |
1114 | ||
1115 | /* --- Verify the MAC on the packet --- */ | |
1116 | ||
1117 | poly1305_hash(&poly, ppk, sz); | |
1118 | poly1305_done(&poly, buf_u); | |
e713954a | 1119 | TRACE_MAC(buf_u, POLY1305_TAGSZ); |
de8edc7f MW |
1120 | if (!ct_memeq(buf_u, pmac, POLY1305_TAGSZ)) { |
1121 | TRACE_MACERR(pmac, POLY1305_TAGSZ); | |
1122 | return (KSERR_DECRYPT); | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | ||
1125 | /* --- Decrypt the packet --- */ | |
1126 | ||
1127 | GC_DECRYPT(c, ppk, q, sz); | |
1128 | ||
1129 | /* --- Finished --- */ | |
1130 | ||
1131 | *seq = LOAD32(pseq); | |
1132 | BSTEP(bb, sz); | |
1133 | return (0); | |
1134 | } | |
1135 | ||
a93aacce MW |
1136 | /*----- Bulk crypto transform table ---------------------------------------*/ |
1137 | ||
fddd7fb7 | 1138 | const bulkops bulktab[] = { |
a93aacce | 1139 | |
c70a7c5c MW |
1140 | #define COMMA , |
1141 | ||
1142 | #define BULK(name, pre) \ | |
1143 | { name, pre##_getalgs, T( pre##_tracealgs COMMA ) \ | |
1144 | pre##_checkalgs, pre##_samealgsp, \ | |
1145 | pre##_alginfo, pre##_overhead, pre##_expsz, \ | |
1146 | pre##_genkeys, pre##_genchal, pre##_freealgs, \ | |
1147 | pre##_encrypt, pre##_decrypt, pre##_freectx, \ | |
1148 | pre##_chaltag, pre##_chalvrf, pre##_freechal } | |
a93aacce | 1149 | |
c70a7c5c MW |
1150 | BULK("v0", v0), |
1151 | BULK("iiv", iiv), | |
de8edc7f | 1152 | BULK("naclbox", naclbox), |
a93aacce MW |
1153 | |
1154 | #undef BULK | |
1155 | { 0 } | |
1156 | }; | |
1157 | ||
1158 | /*----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------*/ |