Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
410c8acf | 1 | /* -*-c-*- |
410c8acf | 2 | * |
3 | * Key exchange protocol | |
4 | * | |
5 | * (c) 2001 Straylight/Edgeware | |
6 | */ | |
7 | ||
e04c2d50 | 8 | /*----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------* |
410c8acf | 9 | * |
10 | * This file is part of Trivial IP Encryption (TrIPE). | |
11 | * | |
12 | * TrIPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
13 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
14 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
15 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
e04c2d50 | 16 | * |
410c8acf | 17 | * TrIPE is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
18 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
19 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
20 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
e04c2d50 | 21 | * |
410c8acf | 22 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
23 | * along with TrIPE; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, | |
24 | * Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. | |
25 | */ | |
26 | ||
410c8acf | 27 | /*----- Header files ------------------------------------------------------*/ |
28 | ||
29 | #include "tripe.h" | |
30 | ||
737cc271 | 31 | /*----- Brief protocol overview -------------------------------------------* |
32 | * | |
33 | * Let %$G$% be a cyclic group; let %$g$% be a generator of %$G$%, and let | |
34 | * %$q$% be the order of %$G$%; for a key %$K$%, let %$E_K(\cdot)$% denote | |
35 | * application of the symmetric packet protocol to a message; let | |
36 | * %$H(\cdot)$% be the random oracle. Let $\alpha \inr \{0,\ldots,q - 1\}$% | |
37 | * be Alice's private key; let %$a = g^\alpha$% be her public key; let %$b$% | |
38 | * be Bob's public key. | |
39 | * | |
40 | * At the beginning of the session, Alice chooses | |
41 | * | |
42 | * %$\rho_A \inr \{0, \ldots q - 1\}$% | |
43 | * | |
44 | * We also have: | |
45 | * | |
46 | * %$r_A = g^{\rho_A}$% Alice's challenge | |
47 | * %$c_A = H(\cookie{cookie}, r_A)$% Alice's cookie | |
9317aa92 | 48 | * %$v_A = \rho_A \xor H(\cookie{expected-reply}, a, r_A, r_B, b^{\rho_A})$% |
e04c2d50 | 49 | * Alice's challenge check value |
737cc271 | 50 | * %$r_B^\alpha = a^{\rho_B}$% Alice's reply |
51 | * %$K = r_B^{\rho_A} = r_B^{\rho_A} = g^{\rho_A\rho_B}$% | |
e04c2d50 | 52 | * Alice and Bob's shared secret key |
737cc271 | 53 | * %$w_A = H(\cookie{switch-request}, c_A, c_B)$% |
e04c2d50 | 54 | * Alice's switch request value |
737cc271 | 55 | * %$u_A = H(\cookie{switch-confirm}, c_A, c_B)$% |
e04c2d50 | 56 | * Alice's switch confirm value |
737cc271 | 57 | * |
58 | * The messages are then: | |
59 | * | |
60 | * %$\cookie{kx-pre-challenge}, r_A$% | |
61 | * Initial greeting. In state @KXS_CHAL@. | |
62 | * | |
737cc271 | 63 | * %$\cookie{kx-challenge}, r_A, c_B, v_A$% |
64 | * Here's a full challenge for you to answer. | |
65 | * | |
28461f0e | 66 | * %$\cookie{kx-reply}, r_A, c_B, v_A, E_K(r_B^\alpha))$% |
737cc271 | 67 | * Challenge accpeted: here's the answer. Commit to my challenge. Move |
68 | * to @KXS_COMMIT@. | |
69 | * | |
3cdc3f3a | 70 | * %$\cookie{kx-switch-rq}, c_A, c_B, E_K(r_B^\alpha, w_A))$% |
737cc271 | 71 | * Reply received: here's my reply. Committed; send data; move to |
72 | * @KXS_SWITCH@. | |
73 | * | |
74 | * %$\cookie{kx-switch-ok}, E_K(u_A))$% | |
75 | * Switch received. Committed; send data; move to @KXS_SWITCH@. | |
e04c2d50 | 76 | */ |
737cc271 | 77 | |
410c8acf | 78 | /*----- Tunable parameters ------------------------------------------------*/ |
79 | ||
56516aeb | 80 | #define T_VALID SEC(20) /* Challenge validity period */ |
2de0ad0f | 81 | #define T_RETRY SEC(10) /* Challenge retransmit interval */ |
410c8acf | 82 | |
3cdc3f3a | 83 | #define VALIDP(kx, now) ((now) < (kx)->t_valid) |
84 | ||
85 | /*----- Static tables -----------------------------------------------------*/ | |
86 | ||
87 | static const char *const pkname[] = { | |
c3c51798 | 88 | "pre-challenge", "challenge", "reply", "switch-rq", "switch-ok" |
3cdc3f3a | 89 | }; |
0617b6e7 | 90 | |
91 | /*----- Various utilities -------------------------------------------------*/ | |
410c8acf | 92 | |
52c03a2a | 93 | /* --- @hashge@ --- * |
410c8acf | 94 | * |
b5c45da1 | 95 | * Arguments: @ghash *h@ = pointer to hash context |
35c8b547 | 96 | * @group *g@ = pointer to group |
52c03a2a | 97 | * @ge *x@ = pointer to group element |
410c8acf | 98 | * |
99 | * Returns: --- | |
100 | * | |
52c03a2a | 101 | * Use: Adds the hash of a group element to the context. Corrupts |
102 | * @buf_t@. | |
410c8acf | 103 | */ |
104 | ||
35c8b547 | 105 | static void hashge(ghash *h, group *g, ge *x) |
410c8acf | 106 | { |
107 | buf b; | |
35c8b547 | 108 | |
0617b6e7 | 109 | buf_init(&b, buf_t, sizeof(buf_t)); |
35c8b547 | 110 | G_TOBUF(g, &b, x); |
410c8acf | 111 | assert(BOK(&b)); |
b5c45da1 | 112 | GH_HASH(h, BBASE(&b), BLEN(&b)); |
410c8acf | 113 | } |
114 | ||
de7bd20b | 115 | /* --- @mpmask@ --- * |
5d418e24 | 116 | * |
de7bd20b MW |
117 | * Arguments: @buf *b@ = output buffer |
118 | * @mp *x@ = the plaintext integer | |
119 | * @size_t n@ = the expected size of the plaintext | |
35c8b547 | 120 | * @gcipher *mgfc@ = mask-generating function to use |
5d418e24 | 121 | * @const octet *k@ = pointer to key material |
de7bd20b | 122 | * @size_t ksz@ = size of the key |
5d418e24 | 123 | * |
de7bd20b | 124 | * Returns: Pointer to the output. |
5d418e24 | 125 | * |
de7bd20b MW |
126 | * Use: Masks a multiprecision integer: returns %$x \xor H(k)$%, so |
127 | * it's a random oracle thing rather than an encryption thing. | |
5d418e24 | 128 | */ |
129 | ||
35c8b547 MW |
130 | static octet *mpmask(buf *b, mp *x, size_t n, |
131 | const gccipher *mgfc, const octet *k, size_t ksz) | |
5d418e24 | 132 | { |
b5c45da1 | 133 | gcipher *mgf; |
de7bd20b | 134 | octet *p; |
5d418e24 | 135 | |
de7bd20b MW |
136 | if ((p = buf_get(b, n)) == 0) |
137 | return (0); | |
35c8b547 | 138 | mgf = GC_INIT(mgfc, k, ksz); |
de7bd20b | 139 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
61682d34 MW |
140 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masking index = %s", mpstr(x)); |
141 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masking key", k, ksz); | |
de7bd20b MW |
142 | })) |
143 | mp_storeb(x, buf_t, n); | |
144 | GC_ENCRYPT(mgf, buf_t, p, n); | |
145 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
61682d34 MW |
146 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: index plaintext", buf_t, n); |
147 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masked ciphertext", p, n); | |
de7bd20b | 148 | })) |
b5c45da1 | 149 | GC_DESTROY(mgf); |
de7bd20b | 150 | return (p); |
b5c45da1 | 151 | } |
152 | ||
de7bd20b MW |
153 | /* --- @mpunmask@ --- * |
154 | * | |
155 | * Arguments: @mp *d@ = the output integer | |
156 | * @const octet *p@ = pointer to the ciphertext | |
157 | * @size_t n@ = the size of the ciphertext | |
35c8b547 | 158 | * @gcipher *mgfc@ = mask-generating function to use |
de7bd20b MW |
159 | * @const octet *k@ = pointer to key material |
160 | * @size_t ksz@ = size of the key | |
161 | * | |
162 | * Returns: The decrypted integer, or null. | |
163 | * | |
164 | * Use: Unmasks a multiprecision integer. | |
165 | */ | |
166 | ||
167 | static mp *mpunmask(mp *d, const octet *p, size_t n, | |
35c8b547 | 168 | const gccipher *mgfc, const octet *k, size_t ksz) |
b5c45da1 | 169 | { |
170 | gcipher *mgf; | |
171 | ||
35c8b547 | 172 | mgf = GC_INIT(mgfc, k, ksz); |
de7bd20b | 173 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
61682d34 MW |
174 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: unmasking key", k, ksz); |
175 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: masked ciphertext", p, n); | |
de7bd20b MW |
176 | })) |
177 | GC_DECRYPT(mgf, p, buf_t, n); | |
178 | d = mp_loadb(d, buf_t, n); | |
179 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
61682d34 MW |
180 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: index plaintext", buf_t, n); |
181 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: unmasked index = %s", mpstr(d)); | |
de7bd20b | 182 | })) |
b5c45da1 | 183 | GC_DESTROY(mgf); |
de7bd20b MW |
184 | return (d); |
185 | } | |
186 | ||
187 | /* --- @hashcheck@ --- * | |
188 | * | |
35c8b547 MW |
189 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key-exchange block |
190 | * @ge *kpub@ = sender's public key | |
de7bd20b MW |
191 | * @ge *cc@ = receiver's challenge |
192 | * @ge *c@ = sender's challenge | |
193 | * @ge *y@ = reply to sender's challenge | |
194 | * | |
195 | * Returns: Pointer to the hash value (in @buf_t@) | |
196 | * | |
197 | * Use: Computes the check-value hash, used to mask or unmask | |
198 | * indices to prove the validity of challenges. This computes | |
199 | * the masking key used in challenge check values. This is | |
200 | * really the heart of the whole thing, since it ensures that | |
201 | * the index can be recovered from the history of hashing | |
202 | * queries, which gives us (a) a proof that the authentication | |
203 | * process is zero-knowledge, and (b) a proof that the whole | |
204 | * key-exchange is deniable. | |
205 | */ | |
206 | ||
35c8b547 | 207 | static const octet *hashcheck(keyexch *kx, ge *kpub, ge *cc, ge *c, ge *y) |
de7bd20b | 208 | { |
35c8b547 MW |
209 | ghash *h = GH_INIT(kx->kpriv->algs.h); |
210 | group *g = kx->kpriv->g; | |
de7bd20b MW |
211 | |
212 | HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-expected-reply"); | |
35c8b547 MW |
213 | hashge(h, g, kpub); |
214 | hashge(h, g, cc); | |
215 | hashge(h, g, c); | |
216 | hashge(h, g, y); | |
de7bd20b MW |
217 | GH_DONE(h, buf_t); |
218 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
61682d34 | 219 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computing challenge check hash"); |
35c8b547 MW |
220 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: public key = %s", gestr(g, kpub)); |
221 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: receiver challenge = %s", gestr(g, cc)); | |
222 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: sender challenge = %s", gestr(g, c)); | |
223 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: sender reply = %s", gestr(g, y)); | |
224 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: hash output", buf_t, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); | |
de7bd20b MW |
225 | })) |
226 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
227 | return (buf_t); | |
228 | } | |
229 | ||
230 | /* --- @sendchallenge@ --- * | |
231 | * | |
232 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
233 | * @buf *b@ = output buffer for challenge | |
234 | * @ge *c@ = peer's actual challenge | |
235 | * @const octet *hc@ = peer's challenge cookie | |
236 | * | |
237 | * Returns: --- | |
238 | * | |
239 | * Use: Writes a full challenge to the message buffer. | |
240 | */ | |
241 | ||
242 | static void sendchallenge(keyexch *kx, buf *b, ge *c, const octet *hc) | |
243 | { | |
35c8b547 MW |
244 | G_TOBUF(kx->kpriv->g, b, kx->c); |
245 | buf_put(b, hc, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); | |
246 | mpmask(b, kx->alpha, kx->kpriv->indexsz, kx->kpriv->algs.mgf, | |
247 | hashcheck(kx, kx->kpriv->kpub, c, kx->c, kx->rx), | |
248 | kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); | |
5d418e24 | 249 | } |
250 | ||
410c8acf | 251 | /* --- @timer@ --- * |
252 | * | |
253 | * Arguments: @struct timeval *tv@ = the current time | |
254 | * @void *v@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
255 | * | |
256 | * Returns: --- | |
257 | * | |
258 | * Use: Acts when the key exchange timer goes off. | |
259 | */ | |
260 | ||
261 | static void timer(struct timeval *tv, void *v) | |
262 | { | |
263 | keyexch *kx = v; | |
264 | kx->f &= ~KXF_TIMER; | |
265 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: timer has popped"); ) | |
de014da6 | 266 | kx_start(kx, 0); |
410c8acf | 267 | } |
268 | ||
269 | /* --- @settimer@ --- * | |
270 | * | |
271 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
272 | * @time_t t@ = when to set the timer for | |
273 | * | |
274 | * Returns: --- | |
275 | * | |
276 | * Use: Sets the timer for the next key exchange attempt. | |
277 | */ | |
278 | ||
279 | static void settimer(keyexch *kx, time_t t) | |
280 | { | |
281 | struct timeval tv; | |
282 | if (kx->f & KXF_TIMER) | |
283 | sel_rmtimer(&kx->t); | |
284 | tv.tv_sec = t; | |
285 | tv.tv_usec = 0; | |
286 | sel_addtimer(&sel, &kx->t, &tv, timer, kx); | |
287 | kx->f |= KXF_TIMER; | |
288 | } | |
289 | ||
0617b6e7 | 290 | /*----- Challenge management ----------------------------------------------*/ |
291 | ||
292 | /* --- Notes on challenge management --- * | |
410c8acf | 293 | * |
0617b6e7 | 294 | * We may get multiple different replies to our key exchange; some will be |
295 | * correct, some inserted by attackers. Up until @KX_THRESH@, all challenges | |
296 | * received will be added to the table and given a full response. After | |
297 | * @KX_THRESH@ distinct challenges are received, we return only a `cookie': | |
298 | * our existing challenge, followed by a hash of the sender's challenge. We | |
299 | * do %%\emph{not}%% give a bare challenge a reply slot at this stage. All | |
300 | * properly-formed cookies are assigned a table slot: if none is spare, a | |
301 | * used slot is randomly selected and destroyed. A cookie always receives a | |
302 | * full reply. | |
303 | */ | |
304 | ||
305 | /* --- @kxc_destroy@ --- * | |
306 | * | |
307 | * Arguments: @kxchal *kxc@ = pointer to the challenge block | |
410c8acf | 308 | * |
309 | * Returns: --- | |
310 | * | |
0617b6e7 | 311 | * Use: Disposes of a challenge block. |
410c8acf | 312 | */ |
313 | ||
0617b6e7 | 314 | static void kxc_destroy(kxchal *kxc) |
410c8acf | 315 | { |
0617b6e7 | 316 | if (kxc->f & KXF_TIMER) |
317 | sel_rmtimer(&kxc->t); | |
35c8b547 MW |
318 | G_DESTROY(kxc->kx->kpriv->g, kxc->c); |
319 | G_DESTROY(kxc->kx->kpriv->g, kxc->r); | |
0617b6e7 | 320 | ks_drop(kxc->ks); |
321 | DESTROY(kxc); | |
322 | } | |
410c8acf | 323 | |
0617b6e7 | 324 | /* --- @kxc_stoptimer@ --- * |
325 | * | |
326 | * Arguments: @kxchal *kxc@ = pointer to the challenge block | |
327 | * | |
328 | * Returns: --- | |
329 | * | |
330 | * Use: Stops the challenge's retry timer from sending messages. | |
331 | * Useful when the state machine is in the endgame of the | |
332 | * exchange. | |
333 | */ | |
410c8acf | 334 | |
0617b6e7 | 335 | static void kxc_stoptimer(kxchal *kxc) |
336 | { | |
337 | if (kxc->f & KXF_TIMER) | |
338 | sel_rmtimer(&kxc->t); | |
2de0ad0f | 339 | kxc->f &= ~KXF_TIMER; |
0617b6e7 | 340 | } |
410c8acf | 341 | |
0617b6e7 | 342 | /* --- @kxc_new@ --- * |
343 | * | |
344 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
0617b6e7 | 345 | * |
346 | * Returns: A pointer to the challenge block. | |
347 | * | |
348 | * Use: Returns a pointer to a new challenge block to fill in. | |
349 | */ | |
410c8acf | 350 | |
0617b6e7 | 351 | static kxchal *kxc_new(keyexch *kx) |
352 | { | |
353 | kxchal *kxc; | |
354 | unsigned i; | |
355 | ||
356 | /* --- If we're over reply threshold, discard one at random --- */ | |
357 | ||
358 | if (kx->nr < KX_NCHAL) | |
359 | i = kx->nr++; | |
360 | else { | |
361 | i = rand_global.ops->range(&rand_global, KX_NCHAL); | |
362 | kxc_destroy(kx->r[i]); | |
410c8acf | 363 | } |
364 | ||
0617b6e7 | 365 | /* --- Fill in the new structure --- */ |
410c8acf | 366 | |
0617b6e7 | 367 | kxc = CREATE(kxchal); |
35c8b547 MW |
368 | kxc->c = G_CREATE(kx->kpriv->g); |
369 | kxc->r = G_CREATE(kx->kpriv->g); | |
0617b6e7 | 370 | kxc->ks = 0; |
371 | kxc->kx = kx; | |
372 | kxc->f = 0; | |
373 | kx->r[i] = kxc; | |
374 | return (kxc); | |
375 | } | |
410c8acf | 376 | |
0617b6e7 | 377 | /* --- @kxc_bychal@ --- * |
378 | * | |
379 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
52c03a2a | 380 | * @ge *c@ = challenge from remote host |
0617b6e7 | 381 | * |
382 | * Returns: Pointer to the challenge block, or null. | |
383 | * | |
384 | * Use: Finds a challenge block, given its challenge. | |
385 | */ | |
386 | ||
52c03a2a | 387 | static kxchal *kxc_bychal(keyexch *kx, ge *c) |
0617b6e7 | 388 | { |
389 | unsigned i; | |
390 | ||
391 | for (i = 0; i < kx->nr; i++) { | |
35c8b547 | 392 | if (G_EQ(kx->kpriv->g, c, kx->r[i]->c)) |
0617b6e7 | 393 | return (kx->r[i]); |
394 | } | |
395 | return (0); | |
396 | } | |
397 | ||
398 | /* --- @kxc_byhc@ --- * | |
399 | * | |
400 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
401 | * @const octet *hc@ = challenge hash from remote host | |
402 | * | |
403 | * Returns: Pointer to the challenge block, or null. | |
404 | * | |
405 | * Use: Finds a challenge block, given a hash of its challenge. | |
406 | */ | |
410c8acf | 407 | |
0617b6e7 | 408 | static kxchal *kxc_byhc(keyexch *kx, const octet *hc) |
409 | { | |
410 | unsigned i; | |
411 | ||
412 | for (i = 0; i < kx->nr; i++) { | |
35c8b547 | 413 | if (memcmp(hc, kx->r[i]->hc, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz) == 0) |
0617b6e7 | 414 | return (kx->r[i]); |
410c8acf | 415 | } |
0617b6e7 | 416 | return (0); |
417 | } | |
418 | ||
419 | /* --- @kxc_answer@ --- * | |
420 | * | |
421 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
422 | * @kxchal *kxc@ = pointer to challenge block | |
423 | * | |
424 | * Returns: --- | |
425 | * | |
426 | * Use: Sends a reply to the remote host, according to the data in | |
427 | * this challenge block. | |
428 | */ | |
429 | ||
430 | static void kxc_answer(keyexch *kx, kxchal *kxc); | |
431 | ||
432 | static void kxc_timer(struct timeval *tv, void *v) | |
433 | { | |
434 | kxchal *kxc = v; | |
435 | kxc->f &= ~KXF_TIMER; | |
436 | kxc_answer(kxc->kx, kxc); | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | static void kxc_answer(keyexch *kx, kxchal *kxc) | |
440 | { | |
441 | stats *st = p_stats(kx->p); | |
de7bd20b | 442 | buf *b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_REPLY); |
0617b6e7 | 443 | struct timeval tv; |
444 | buf bb; | |
445 | ||
446 | /* --- Build the reply packet --- */ | |
447 | ||
de7bd20b MW |
448 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: sending reply to `%s'", p_name(kx->p)); ) |
449 | sendchallenge(kx, b, kxc->c, kxc->hc); | |
450 | buf_init(&bb, buf_i, sizeof(buf_i)); | |
35c8b547 | 451 | G_TORAW(kx->kpriv->g, &bb, kxc->r); |
de7bd20b MW |
452 | buf_flip(&bb); |
453 | ks_encrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_REPLY, &bb, b); | |
0617b6e7 | 454 | |
455 | /* --- Update the statistics --- */ | |
456 | ||
457 | if (BOK(b)) { | |
458 | st->n_kxout++; | |
459 | st->sz_kxout += BLEN(b); | |
460 | p_txend(kx->p); | |
461 | } | |
462 | ||
463 | /* --- Schedule another resend --- */ | |
464 | ||
465 | if (kxc->f & KXF_TIMER) | |
466 | sel_rmtimer(&kxc->t); | |
467 | gettimeofday(&tv, 0); | |
468 | tv.tv_sec += T_RETRY; | |
469 | sel_addtimer(&sel, &kxc->t, &tv, kxc_timer, kxc); | |
470 | kxc->f |= KXF_TIMER; | |
471 | } | |
472 | ||
473 | /*----- Individual message handlers ---------------------------------------*/ | |
474 | ||
de7bd20b | 475 | /* --- @doprechallenge@ --- * |
0617b6e7 | 476 | * |
de7bd20b MW |
477 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block |
478 | * @buf *b@ = buffer containing the packet | |
0617b6e7 | 479 | * |
de7bd20b | 480 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero of the packet was rejected. |
0617b6e7 | 481 | * |
de7bd20b | 482 | * Use: Processes a pre-challenge message. |
0617b6e7 | 483 | */ |
484 | ||
de7bd20b | 485 | static int doprechallenge(keyexch *kx, buf *b) |
0617b6e7 | 486 | { |
de7bd20b | 487 | stats *st = p_stats(kx->p); |
35c8b547 | 488 | ge *c = G_CREATE(kx->kpriv->g); |
b5c45da1 | 489 | ghash *h; |
0617b6e7 | 490 | |
de7bd20b MW |
491 | /* --- Ensure that we're in a sensible state --- */ |
492 | ||
493 | if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL) { | |
494 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "pre-challenge", A_END); | |
495 | goto bad; | |
496 | } | |
497 | ||
498 | /* --- Unpack the packet --- */ | |
499 | ||
35c8b547 | 500 | if (G_FROMBUF(kx->kpriv->g, b, c) || BLEFT(b)) |
de7bd20b | 501 | goto bad; |
b5c45da1 | 502 | |
0617b6e7 | 503 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
35c8b547 | 504 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: challenge = %s", gestr(kx->kpriv->g, c)); |
0617b6e7 | 505 | })) |
de7bd20b MW |
506 | |
507 | /* --- Send out a full challenge by return --- */ | |
508 | ||
509 | b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_CHAL); | |
35c8b547 | 510 | h = GH_INIT(kx->kpriv->algs.h); |
de7bd20b | 511 | HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-cookie"); |
35c8b547 | 512 | hashge(h, kx->kpriv->g, c); |
de7bd20b | 513 | sendchallenge(kx, b, c, GH_DONE(h, 0)); |
b5c45da1 | 514 | GH_DESTROY(h); |
de7bd20b MW |
515 | st->n_kxout++; |
516 | st->sz_kxout += BLEN(b); | |
517 | p_txend(kx->p); | |
518 | ||
519 | /* --- Done --- */ | |
520 | ||
35c8b547 | 521 | G_DESTROY(kx->kpriv->g, c); |
de7bd20b MW |
522 | return (0); |
523 | ||
524 | bad: | |
35c8b547 | 525 | if (c) G_DESTROY(kx->kpriv->g, c); |
de7bd20b | 526 | return (-1); |
0617b6e7 | 527 | } |
528 | ||
de7bd20b | 529 | /* --- @respond@ --- * |
0617b6e7 | 530 | * |
531 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
de7bd20b | 532 | * @unsigned msg@ = message code for this packet |
0617b6e7 | 533 | * @buf *b@ = buffer containing the packet |
534 | * | |
de7bd20b | 535 | * Returns: Key-exchange challenge block, or null. |
0617b6e7 | 536 | * |
de7bd20b MW |
537 | * Use: Computes a response for the given challenge, entering it into |
538 | * a challenge block and so on. | |
0617b6e7 | 539 | */ |
540 | ||
de7bd20b | 541 | static kxchal *respond(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) |
0617b6e7 | 542 | { |
35c8b547 MW |
543 | group *g = kx->kpriv->g; |
544 | const algswitch *algs = &kx->kpriv->algs; | |
545 | size_t ixsz = kx->kpriv->indexsz; | |
546 | ge *c = G_CREATE(g); | |
547 | ge *r = G_CREATE(g); | |
548 | ge *cc = G_CREATE(g); | |
de7bd20b MW |
549 | const octet *hc, *ck; |
550 | size_t x, y, z; | |
551 | mp *cv = 0; | |
0617b6e7 | 552 | kxchal *kxc; |
de7bd20b MW |
553 | ghash *h = 0; |
554 | buf bb; | |
555 | int ok; | |
0617b6e7 | 556 | |
557 | /* --- Unpack the packet --- */ | |
558 | ||
35c8b547 MW |
559 | if (G_FROMBUF(g, b, c) || |
560 | (hc = buf_get(b, algs->hashsz)) == 0 || | |
561 | (ck = buf_get(b, ixsz)) == 0) { | |
f43df819 | 562 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 563 | goto bad; |
564 | } | |
0617b6e7 | 565 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
35c8b547 MW |
566 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: challenge = %s", gestr(g, c)); |
567 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: cookie", hc, algs->hashsz); | |
568 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: check-value", ck, ixsz); | |
0617b6e7 | 569 | })) |
570 | ||
0617b6e7 | 571 | /* --- Discard a packet with an invalid cookie --- */ |
572 | ||
35c8b547 | 573 | if (hc && memcmp(hc, kx->hc, algs->hashsz) != 0) { |
5ac9463b | 574 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "cookie", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 575 | goto bad; |
576 | } | |
577 | ||
de7bd20b MW |
578 | /* --- Recover the check value and verify it --- * |
579 | * | |
580 | * To avoid recomputation on replays, we store a hash of the `right' | |
581 | * value. The `correct' value is unique, so this is right. | |
410c8acf | 582 | * |
de7bd20b | 583 | * This will also find a challenge block and, if necessary, populate it. |
410c8acf | 584 | */ |
585 | ||
de7bd20b | 586 | if ((kxc = kxc_bychal(kx, c)) != 0) { |
35c8b547 | 587 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); |
de7bd20b | 588 | HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-check-hash"); |
35c8b547 MW |
589 | GH_HASH(h, ck, ixsz); |
590 | ok = !memcmp(kxc->ck, GH_DONE(h, 0), algs->hashsz); | |
de7bd20b MW |
591 | GH_DESTROY(h); |
592 | if (!ok) goto badcheck; | |
593 | } else { | |
594 | ||
595 | /* --- Compute the reply, and check the magic --- */ | |
596 | ||
35c8b547 MW |
597 | G_EXP(g, r, c, kx->kpriv->kpriv); |
598 | cv = mpunmask(MP_NEW, ck, ixsz, algs->mgf, | |
599 | hashcheck(kx, kx->kpub->kpub, kx->c, c, r), | |
600 | algs->hashsz); | |
de7bd20b | 601 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
35c8b547 | 602 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed reply = %s", gestr(g, r)); |
de7bd20b MW |
603 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: recovered log = %s", mpstr(cv)); |
604 | })) | |
35c8b547 MW |
605 | if (MP_CMP(cv, >, g->r) || |
606 | (G_EXP(g, cc, g->g, cv), | |
607 | !G_EQ(g, c, cc))) | |
de7bd20b MW |
608 | goto badcheck; |
609 | ||
610 | /* --- Fill in a new challenge block --- */ | |
e04c2d50 | 611 | |
de7bd20b | 612 | kxc = kxc_new(kx); |
35c8b547 MW |
613 | G_COPY(g, kxc->c, c); |
614 | G_COPY(g, kxc->r, r); | |
0617b6e7 | 615 | |
35c8b547 MW |
616 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-check-hash"); |
617 | GH_HASH(h, ck, ixsz); | |
618 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->ck); GH_DESTROY(h); | |
0617b6e7 | 619 | |
35c8b547 MW |
620 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-cookie"); |
621 | hashge(h, g, kxc->c); | |
622 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->hc); GH_DESTROY(h); | |
b5c45da1 | 623 | |
624 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
35c8b547 MW |
625 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: computed cookie", |
626 | kxc->hc, algs->hashsz); | |
b5c45da1 | 627 | })) |
0617b6e7 | 628 | |
0617b6e7 | 629 | /* --- Work out the shared key --- */ |
630 | ||
35c8b547 | 631 | G_EXP(g, r, c, kx->alpha); |
b5c45da1 | 632 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
35c8b547 | 633 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: shared secret = %s", gestr(g, r)); |
b5c45da1 | 634 | })) |
0617b6e7 | 635 | |
636 | /* --- Compute the switch messages --- */ | |
637 | ||
35c8b547 MW |
638 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-switch-request"); |
639 | hashge(h, g, kx->c); hashge(h, g, kxc->c); | |
b5c45da1 | 640 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->hswrq_out); GH_DESTROY(h); |
35c8b547 MW |
641 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-switch-confirm"); |
642 | hashge(h, g, kx->c); hashge(h, g, kxc->c); | |
b5c45da1 | 643 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->hswok_out); GH_DESTROY(h); |
0617b6e7 | 644 | |
35c8b547 MW |
645 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-switch-request"); |
646 | hashge(h, g, kxc->c); hashge(h, g, kx->c); | |
b5c45da1 | 647 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->hswrq_in); GH_DESTROY(h); |
35c8b547 MW |
648 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-switch-confirm"); |
649 | hashge(h, g, kxc->c); hashge(h, g, kx->c); | |
b5c45da1 | 650 | GH_DONE(h, kxc->hswok_in); GH_DESTROY(h); |
0617b6e7 | 651 | |
652 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
0617b6e7 | 653 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: outbound switch request", |
35c8b547 | 654 | kxc->hswrq_out, algs->hashsz); |
0617b6e7 | 655 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: outbound switch confirm", |
35c8b547 | 656 | kxc->hswok_out, algs->hashsz); |
0617b6e7 | 657 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: inbound switch request", |
35c8b547 | 658 | kxc->hswrq_in, algs->hashsz); |
0617b6e7 | 659 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: inbound switch confirm", |
35c8b547 | 660 | kxc->hswok_in, algs->hashsz); |
0617b6e7 | 661 | })) |
662 | ||
663 | /* --- Create a new symmetric keyset --- */ | |
664 | ||
de7bd20b | 665 | buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o)); |
35c8b547 MW |
666 | G_TOBUF(g, &bb, kx->c); x = BLEN(&bb); |
667 | G_TOBUF(g, &bb, kxc->c); y = BLEN(&bb); | |
668 | G_TOBUF(g, &bb, r); z = BLEN(&bb); | |
de7bd20b | 669 | assert(BOK(&bb)); |
0617b6e7 | 670 | |
de7bd20b | 671 | kxc->ks = ks_gen(BBASE(&bb), x, y, z, kx->p); |
410c8acf | 672 | } |
673 | ||
35c8b547 MW |
674 | G_DESTROY(g, c); |
675 | G_DESTROY(g, cc); | |
676 | G_DESTROY(g, r); | |
de7bd20b MW |
677 | mp_drop(cv); |
678 | return (kxc); | |
410c8acf | 679 | |
de7bd20b MW |
680 | badcheck: |
681 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "bad-expected-reply-log", A_END); | |
682 | goto bad; | |
683 | bad: | |
35c8b547 MW |
684 | G_DESTROY(g, c); |
685 | G_DESTROY(g, cc); | |
686 | G_DESTROY(g, r); | |
de7bd20b | 687 | mp_drop(cv); |
e04c2d50 | 688 | return (0); |
de7bd20b | 689 | } |
0617b6e7 | 690 | |
de7bd20b MW |
691 | /* --- @dochallenge@ --- * |
692 | * | |
693 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
694 | * @unsigned msg@ = message code for the packet | |
695 | * @buf *b@ = buffer containing the packet | |
696 | * | |
697 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the packet was rejected. | |
698 | * | |
699 | * Use: Processes a packet containing a challenge. | |
700 | */ | |
0617b6e7 | 701 | |
de7bd20b MW |
702 | static int dochallenge(keyexch *kx, buf *b) |
703 | { | |
704 | kxchal *kxc; | |
0617b6e7 | 705 | |
de7bd20b MW |
706 | if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL) { |
707 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "challenge", A_END); | |
708 | goto bad; | |
709 | } | |
710 | if ((kxc = respond(kx, KX_CHAL, b)) == 0) | |
711 | goto bad; | |
712 | if (BLEFT(b)) { | |
713 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "challenge", A_END); | |
714 | goto bad; | |
715 | } | |
716 | kxc_answer(kx, kxc); | |
0617b6e7 | 717 | return (0); |
718 | ||
719 | bad: | |
0617b6e7 | 720 | return (-1); |
410c8acf | 721 | } |
722 | ||
0617b6e7 | 723 | /* --- @resend@ --- * |
410c8acf | 724 | * |
725 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
410c8acf | 726 | * |
727 | * Returns: --- | |
728 | * | |
0617b6e7 | 729 | * Use: Sends the next message for a key exchange. |
410c8acf | 730 | */ |
731 | ||
0617b6e7 | 732 | static void resend(keyexch *kx) |
410c8acf | 733 | { |
0617b6e7 | 734 | kxchal *kxc; |
735 | buf bb; | |
736 | stats *st = p_stats(kx->p); | |
410c8acf | 737 | buf *b; |
738 | ||
0617b6e7 | 739 | switch (kx->s) { |
740 | case KXS_CHAL: | |
00e64b67 | 741 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: sending prechallenge to `%s'", |
742 | p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
0617b6e7 | 743 | b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_PRECHAL); |
35c8b547 | 744 | G_TOBUF(kx->kpriv->g, b, kx->c); |
0617b6e7 | 745 | break; |
746 | case KXS_COMMIT: | |
00e64b67 | 747 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: sending switch request to `%s'", |
748 | p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
0617b6e7 | 749 | kxc = kx->r[0]; |
750 | b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCH); | |
35c8b547 MW |
751 | buf_put(b, kx->hc, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); |
752 | buf_put(b, kxc->hc, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); | |
0617b6e7 | 753 | buf_init(&bb, buf_i, sizeof(buf_i)); |
35c8b547 MW |
754 | G_TORAW(kx->kpriv->g, &bb, kxc->r); |
755 | buf_put(&bb, kxc->hswrq_out, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); | |
0617b6e7 | 756 | buf_flip(&bb); |
7ed14135 | 757 | ks_encrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCH, &bb, b); |
0617b6e7 | 758 | break; |
759 | case KXS_SWITCH: | |
00e64b67 | 760 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: sending switch confirmation to `%s'", |
0617b6e7 | 761 | p_name(kx->p)); ) |
762 | kxc = kx->r[0]; | |
763 | b = p_txstart(kx->p, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCHOK); | |
764 | buf_init(&bb, buf_i, sizeof(buf_i)); | |
35c8b547 | 765 | buf_put(&bb, kxc->hswok_out, kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz); |
0617b6e7 | 766 | buf_flip(&bb); |
7ed14135 | 767 | ks_encrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | KX_SWITCHOK, &bb, b); |
0617b6e7 | 768 | break; |
769 | default: | |
770 | abort(); | |
410c8acf | 771 | } |
0617b6e7 | 772 | |
773 | if (BOK(b)) { | |
774 | st->n_kxout++; | |
775 | st->sz_kxout += BLEN(b); | |
776 | p_txend(kx->p); | |
777 | } | |
778 | ||
779 | if (kx->s < KXS_SWITCH) | |
780 | settimer(kx, time(0) + T_RETRY); | |
410c8acf | 781 | } |
782 | ||
de7bd20b | 783 | /* --- @decryptrest@ --- * |
0617b6e7 | 784 | * |
785 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
de7bd20b MW |
786 | * @kxchal *kxc@ = pointer to challenge block |
787 | * @unsigned msg@ = type of incoming message | |
0617b6e7 | 788 | * @buf *b@ = encrypted remainder of the packet |
789 | * | |
de7bd20b | 790 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero on some kind of error. |
0617b6e7 | 791 | * |
de7bd20b MW |
792 | * Use: Decrypts the remainder of the packet, and points @b@ at the |
793 | * recovered plaintext. | |
0617b6e7 | 794 | */ |
795 | ||
de7bd20b | 796 | static int decryptrest(keyexch *kx, kxchal *kxc, unsigned msg, buf *b) |
410c8acf | 797 | { |
0617b6e7 | 798 | buf bb; |
0617b6e7 | 799 | |
de7bd20b MW |
800 | buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o)); |
801 | if (ks_decrypt(kxc->ks, MSG_KEYEXCH | msg, b, &bb)) { | |
802 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "decrypt-failed", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END); | |
803 | return (-1); | |
0617b6e7 | 804 | } |
12a26b8b | 805 | if (!BOK(&bb)) return (-1); |
de7bd20b MW |
806 | buf_init(b, BBASE(&bb), BLEN(&bb)); |
807 | return (0); | |
808 | } | |
410c8acf | 809 | |
de7bd20b MW |
810 | /* --- @checkresponse@ --- * |
811 | * | |
812 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
813 | * @unsigned msg@ = type of incoming message | |
814 | * @buf *b@ = decrypted remainder of the packet | |
815 | * | |
816 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero on some kind of error. | |
817 | * | |
818 | * Use: Checks a reply or switch packet, ensuring that its response | |
819 | * is correct. | |
820 | */ | |
0617b6e7 | 821 | |
de7bd20b MW |
822 | static int checkresponse(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) |
823 | { | |
35c8b547 MW |
824 | group *g = kx->kpriv->g; |
825 | ge *r = G_CREATE(g); | |
0617b6e7 | 826 | |
35c8b547 | 827 | if (G_FROMRAW(g, b, r)) { |
de7bd20b | 828 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "%s", pkname[msg], A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 829 | goto bad; |
830 | } | |
831 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
35c8b547 | 832 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: reply = %s", gestr(g, r)); |
0617b6e7 | 833 | })) |
35c8b547 | 834 | if (!G_EQ(g, r, kx->rx)) { |
de7bd20b | 835 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "response", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 836 | goto bad; |
837 | } | |
838 | ||
35c8b547 | 839 | G_DESTROY(g, r); |
de7bd20b | 840 | return (0); |
0617b6e7 | 841 | |
842 | bad: | |
35c8b547 | 843 | G_DESTROY(g, r); |
de7bd20b | 844 | return (-1); |
410c8acf | 845 | } |
846 | ||
0617b6e7 | 847 | /* --- @commit@ --- * |
410c8acf | 848 | * |
849 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
0617b6e7 | 850 | * @kxchal *kxc@ = pointer to challenge to commit to |
410c8acf | 851 | * |
852 | * Returns: --- | |
853 | * | |
0617b6e7 | 854 | * Use: Commits to a particular challenge as being the `right' one, |
855 | * since a reply has arrived for it. | |
410c8acf | 856 | */ |
857 | ||
0617b6e7 | 858 | static void commit(keyexch *kx, kxchal *kxc) |
410c8acf | 859 | { |
0617b6e7 | 860 | unsigned i; |
410c8acf | 861 | |
0617b6e7 | 862 | for (i = 0; i < kx->nr; i++) { |
863 | if (kx->r[i] != kxc) | |
864 | kxc_destroy(kx->r[i]); | |
865 | } | |
866 | kx->r[0] = kxc; | |
867 | kx->nr = 1; | |
868 | kxc_stoptimer(kxc); | |
e04c2d50 | 869 | ksl_link(kx->ks, kxc->ks); |
410c8acf | 870 | } |
871 | ||
0617b6e7 | 872 | /* --- @doreply@ --- * |
410c8acf | 873 | * |
874 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
0617b6e7 | 875 | * @buf *b@ = buffer containing packet |
410c8acf | 876 | * |
0617b6e7 | 877 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the packet was rejected. |
410c8acf | 878 | * |
0617b6e7 | 879 | * Use: Handles a reply packet. This doesn't handle the various |
880 | * switch packets: they're rather too different. | |
410c8acf | 881 | */ |
882 | ||
0617b6e7 | 883 | static int doreply(keyexch *kx, buf *b) |
410c8acf | 884 | { |
0617b6e7 | 885 | kxchal *kxc; |
886 | ||
887 | if (kx->s != KXS_CHAL && kx->s != KXS_COMMIT) { | |
f43df819 | 888 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "reply", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 889 | goto bad; |
890 | } | |
de7bd20b MW |
891 | if ((kxc = respond(kx, KX_REPLY, b)) == 0 || |
892 | decryptrest(kx, kxc, KX_REPLY, b) || | |
893 | checkresponse(kx, KX_REPLY, b)) | |
0617b6e7 | 894 | goto bad; |
895 | if (BLEFT(b)) { | |
f43df819 | 896 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "reply", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 897 | goto bad; |
e04c2d50 | 898 | } |
0617b6e7 | 899 | if (kx->s == KXS_CHAL) { |
900 | commit(kx, kxc); | |
901 | kx->s = KXS_COMMIT; | |
902 | } | |
903 | resend(kx); | |
904 | return (0); | |
905 | ||
906 | bad: | |
907 | return (-1); | |
410c8acf | 908 | } |
909 | ||
3cdc3f3a | 910 | /* --- @kxfinish@ --- * |
911 | * | |
912 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
913 | * | |
914 | * Returns: --- | |
915 | * | |
916 | * Use: Sets everything up following a successful key exchange. | |
917 | */ | |
918 | ||
919 | static void kxfinish(keyexch *kx) | |
920 | { | |
921 | kxchal *kxc = kx->r[0]; | |
922 | ks_activate(kxc->ks); | |
923 | settimer(kx, ks_tregen(kxc->ks)); | |
924 | kx->s = KXS_SWITCH; | |
f43df819 | 925 | a_notify("KXDONE", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END); |
3cdc3f3a | 926 | p_stats(kx->p)->t_kx = time(0); |
927 | } | |
928 | ||
0617b6e7 | 929 | /* --- @doswitch@ --- * |
410c8acf | 930 | * |
0617b6e7 | 931 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block |
932 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to buffer containing packet | |
410c8acf | 933 | * |
0617b6e7 | 934 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the packet was rejected. |
410c8acf | 935 | * |
0617b6e7 | 936 | * Use: Handles a reply with a switch request bolted onto it. |
410c8acf | 937 | */ |
938 | ||
0617b6e7 | 939 | static int doswitch(keyexch *kx, buf *b) |
410c8acf | 940 | { |
35c8b547 | 941 | size_t hsz = kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz; |
0617b6e7 | 942 | const octet *hc_in, *hc_out, *hswrq; |
943 | kxchal *kxc; | |
410c8acf | 944 | |
35c8b547 MW |
945 | if ((hc_in = buf_get(b, hsz)) == 0 || |
946 | (hc_out = buf_get(b, hsz)) == 0) { | |
f43df819 | 947 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 948 | goto bad; |
410c8acf | 949 | } |
de7bd20b | 950 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { |
35c8b547 MW |
951 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: challenge", hc_in, hsz); |
952 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: cookie", hc_out, hsz); | |
de7bd20b MW |
953 | })) |
954 | if ((kxc = kxc_byhc(kx, hc_in)) == 0 || | |
35c8b547 | 955 | memcmp(hc_out, kx->hc, hsz) != 0) { |
de7bd20b MW |
956 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-rq", A_END); |
957 | goto bad; | |
958 | } | |
959 | if (decryptrest(kx, kxc, KX_SWITCH, b) || | |
960 | checkresponse(kx, KX_SWITCH, b)) | |
0617b6e7 | 961 | goto bad; |
35c8b547 | 962 | if ((hswrq = buf_get(b, hsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) { |
5ac9463b | 963 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "switch-rq", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 964 | goto bad; |
965 | } | |
966 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, { | |
35c8b547 | 967 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: switch request hash", hswrq, hsz); |
0617b6e7 | 968 | }) |
35c8b547 | 969 | if (memcmp(hswrq, kxc->hswrq_in, hsz) != 0) { |
f43df819 | 970 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-rq", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 971 | goto bad; |
972 | } | |
de7bd20b MW |
973 | if (kx->s == KXS_CHAL) |
974 | commit(kx, kxc); | |
975 | if (kx->s < KXS_SWITCH) | |
976 | kxfinish(kx); | |
0617b6e7 | 977 | resend(kx); |
978 | return (0); | |
979 | ||
980 | bad: | |
981 | return (-1); | |
410c8acf | 982 | } |
983 | ||
0617b6e7 | 984 | /* --- @doswitchok@ --- * |
985 | * | |
986 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange block | |
987 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to buffer containing packet | |
988 | * | |
989 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the packet was rejected. | |
990 | * | |
991 | * Use: Handles a reply with a switch request bolted onto it. | |
992 | */ | |
993 | ||
994 | static int doswitchok(keyexch *kx, buf *b) | |
410c8acf | 995 | { |
35c8b547 | 996 | size_t hsz = kx->kpriv->algs.hashsz; |
0617b6e7 | 997 | const octet *hswok; |
998 | kxchal *kxc; | |
999 | buf bb; | |
410c8acf | 1000 | |
0617b6e7 | 1001 | if (kx->s < KXS_COMMIT) { |
f43df819 | 1002 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unexpected", "switch-ok", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 1003 | goto bad; |
410c8acf | 1004 | } |
0617b6e7 | 1005 | kxc = kx->r[0]; |
1006 | buf_init(&bb, buf_o, sizeof(buf_o)); | |
de7bd20b | 1007 | if (decryptrest(kx, kxc, KX_SWITCHOK, b)) |
0617b6e7 | 1008 | goto bad; |
35c8b547 | 1009 | if ((hswok = buf_get(b, hsz)) == 0 || BLEFT(b)) { |
5ac9463b | 1010 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "invalid", "switch-ok", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 1011 | goto bad; |
1012 | } | |
1013 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, { | |
b5c45da1 | 1014 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: switch confirmation hash", |
35c8b547 | 1015 | hswok, hsz); |
0617b6e7 | 1016 | }) |
35c8b547 | 1017 | if (memcmp(hswok, kxc->hswok_in, hsz) != 0) { |
f43df819 | 1018 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "incorrect", "switch-ok", A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 1019 | goto bad; |
1020 | } | |
3cdc3f3a | 1021 | if (kx->s < KXS_SWITCH) |
1022 | kxfinish(kx); | |
0617b6e7 | 1023 | return (0); |
1024 | ||
1025 | bad: | |
e04c2d50 | 1026 | return (-1); |
0617b6e7 | 1027 | } |
1028 | ||
1029 | /*----- Main code ---------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
1030 | ||
1031 | /* --- @stop@ --- * | |
1032 | * | |
1033 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1034 | * | |
1035 | * Returns: --- | |
1036 | * | |
1037 | * Use: Stops a key exchange dead in its tracks. Throws away all of | |
1038 | * the context information. The context is left in an | |
1039 | * inconsistent state. The only functions which understand this | |
1040 | * state are @kx_free@ and @kx_init@ (which cause it internally | |
1041 | * it), and @start@ (which expects it to be the prevailing | |
1042 | * state). | |
1043 | */ | |
1044 | ||
1045 | static void stop(keyexch *kx) | |
1046 | { | |
1047 | unsigned i; | |
1048 | ||
00e64b67 | 1049 | if (kx->f & KXF_DEAD) |
1050 | return; | |
1051 | ||
0617b6e7 | 1052 | if (kx->f & KXF_TIMER) |
1053 | sel_rmtimer(&kx->t); | |
1054 | for (i = 0; i < kx->nr; i++) | |
1055 | kxc_destroy(kx->r[i]); | |
1056 | mp_drop(kx->alpha); | |
35c8b547 MW |
1057 | G_DESTROY(kx->kpriv->g, kx->c); |
1058 | G_DESTROY(kx->kpriv->g, kx->rx); | |
00e64b67 | 1059 | kx->t_valid = 0; |
1060 | kx->f |= KXF_DEAD; | |
1061 | kx->f &= ~KXF_TIMER; | |
0617b6e7 | 1062 | } |
1063 | ||
1064 | /* --- @start@ --- * | |
1065 | * | |
1066 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1067 | * @time_t now@ = the current time | |
1068 | * | |
1069 | * Returns: --- | |
1070 | * | |
1071 | * Use: Starts a new key exchange with the peer. The context must be | |
1072 | * in the bizarre state left by @stop@ or @kx_init@. | |
1073 | */ | |
1074 | ||
1075 | static void start(keyexch *kx, time_t now) | |
1076 | { | |
35c8b547 MW |
1077 | algswitch *algs = &kx->kpriv->algs; |
1078 | group *g = kx->kpriv->g; | |
b5c45da1 | 1079 | ghash *h; |
0617b6e7 | 1080 | |
00e64b67 | 1081 | assert(kx->f & KXF_DEAD); |
1082 | ||
010e6f63 | 1083 | kx->f &= ~(KXF_DEAD | KXF_CORK); |
0617b6e7 | 1084 | kx->nr = 0; |
35c8b547 MW |
1085 | kx->alpha = mprand_range(MP_NEW, g->r, &rand_global, 0); |
1086 | kx->c = G_CREATE(g); G_EXP(g, kx->c, g->g, kx->alpha); | |
1087 | kx->rx = G_CREATE(g); G_EXP(g, kx->rx, kx->kpub->kpub, kx->alpha); | |
0617b6e7 | 1088 | kx->s = KXS_CHAL; |
1089 | kx->t_valid = now + T_VALID; | |
1090 | ||
35c8b547 | 1091 | h = GH_INIT(algs->h); |
b5c45da1 | 1092 | HASH_STRING(h, "tripe-cookie"); |
35c8b547 | 1093 | hashge(h, g, kx->c); |
b5c45da1 | 1094 | GH_DONE(h, kx->hc); |
1095 | GH_DESTROY(h); | |
0617b6e7 | 1096 | |
1097 | IF_TRACING(T_KEYEXCH, { | |
1098 | trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: creating new challenge"); | |
1099 | IF_TRACING(T_CRYPTO, { | |
1100 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: secret = %s", mpstr(kx->alpha)); | |
35c8b547 MW |
1101 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: challenge = %s", gestr(g, kx->c)); |
1102 | trace(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: expected response = %s", gestr(g, kx->rx)); | |
1103 | trace_block(T_CRYPTO, "crypto: challenge cookie", | |
1104 | kx->hc, algs->hashsz); | |
0617b6e7 | 1105 | }) |
1106 | }) | |
410c8acf | 1107 | } |
1108 | ||
00e64b67 | 1109 | /* --- @checkpub@ --- * |
1110 | * | |
1111 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1112 | * | |
1113 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if the peer's public key has expired. | |
1114 | * | |
1115 | * Use: Deactivates the key-exchange until the peer acquires a new | |
1116 | * public key. | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | ||
1119 | static int checkpub(keyexch *kx) | |
1120 | { | |
1121 | time_t now; | |
35c8b547 MW |
1122 | unsigned f = 0; |
1123 | ||
00e64b67 | 1124 | if (kx->f & KXF_DEAD) |
1125 | return (-1); | |
1126 | now = time(0); | |
35c8b547 MW |
1127 | if (KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpriv->t_exp)) f |= 1; |
1128 | if (KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpub->t_exp)) f |= 2; | |
1129 | if (f) { | |
00e64b67 | 1130 | stop(kx); |
35c8b547 MW |
1131 | if (f & 1) a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "private-key-expired", A_END); |
1132 | if (f & 2) a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "public-key-expired", A_END); | |
00e64b67 | 1133 | kx->f &= ~KXF_PUBKEY; |
1134 | return (-1); | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | return (0); | |
1137 | } | |
1138 | ||
0617b6e7 | 1139 | /* --- @kx_start@ --- * |
410c8acf | 1140 | * |
1141 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
de014da6 | 1142 | * @int forcep@ = nonzero to ignore the quiet timer |
410c8acf | 1143 | * |
1144 | * Returns: --- | |
1145 | * | |
0617b6e7 | 1146 | * Use: Stimulates a key exchange. If a key exchage is in progress, |
1147 | * a new challenge is sent (unless the quiet timer forbids | |
1148 | * this); if no exchange is in progress, one is commenced. | |
410c8acf | 1149 | */ |
1150 | ||
de014da6 | 1151 | void kx_start(keyexch *kx, int forcep) |
410c8acf | 1152 | { |
1153 | time_t now = time(0); | |
410c8acf | 1154 | |
00e64b67 | 1155 | if (checkpub(kx)) |
1156 | return; | |
de014da6 | 1157 | if (forcep || !VALIDP(kx, now)) { |
0617b6e7 | 1158 | stop(kx); |
1159 | start(kx, now); | |
f43df819 | 1160 | a_notify("KXSTART", "?PEER", kx->p, A_END); |
410c8acf | 1161 | } |
0617b6e7 | 1162 | resend(kx); |
1163 | } | |
1164 | ||
1165 | /* --- @kx_message@ --- * | |
1166 | * | |
1167 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1168 | * @unsigned msg@ = the message code | |
1169 | * @buf *b@ = pointer to buffer containing the packet | |
1170 | * | |
1171 | * Returns: --- | |
1172 | * | |
1173 | * Use: Reads a packet containing key exchange messages and handles | |
1174 | * it. | |
1175 | */ | |
1176 | ||
1177 | void kx_message(keyexch *kx, unsigned msg, buf *b) | |
1178 | { | |
1179 | time_t now = time(0); | |
1180 | stats *st = p_stats(kx->p); | |
1181 | size_t sz = BSZ(b); | |
1182 | int rc; | |
1183 | ||
010e6f63 MW |
1184 | if (kx->f & KXF_CORK) { |
1185 | start(kx, now); | |
1186 | settimer(kx, now + T_RETRY); | |
1187 | a_notify("KXSTART", A_END); | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | ||
00e64b67 | 1190 | if (checkpub(kx)) |
1191 | return; | |
1192 | ||
3cdc3f3a | 1193 | if (!VALIDP(kx, now)) { |
0617b6e7 | 1194 | stop(kx); |
1195 | start(kx, now); | |
410c8acf | 1196 | } |
0617b6e7 | 1197 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: processing %s packet from `%s'", |
1198 | msg < KX_NMSG ? pkname[msg] : "unknown", p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
1199 | ||
1200 | switch (msg) { | |
1201 | case KX_PRECHAL: | |
de7bd20b MW |
1202 | rc = doprechallenge(kx, b); |
1203 | break; | |
0617b6e7 | 1204 | case KX_CHAL: |
de7bd20b | 1205 | rc = dochallenge(kx, b); |
0617b6e7 | 1206 | break; |
1207 | case KX_REPLY: | |
1208 | rc = doreply(kx, b); | |
1209 | break; | |
1210 | case KX_SWITCH: | |
1211 | rc = doswitch(kx, b); | |
1212 | break; | |
1213 | case KX_SWITCHOK: | |
1214 | rc = doswitchok(kx, b); | |
1215 | break; | |
1216 | default: | |
f43df819 | 1217 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "unknown-message", "0x%02x", msg, A_END); |
0617b6e7 | 1218 | rc = -1; |
1219 | break; | |
410c8acf | 1220 | } |
410c8acf | 1221 | |
0617b6e7 | 1222 | if (rc) |
1223 | st->n_reject++; | |
1224 | else { | |
1225 | st->n_kxin++; | |
1226 | st->sz_kxin += sz; | |
1227 | } | |
410c8acf | 1228 | } |
1229 | ||
1230 | /* --- @kx_free@ --- * | |
1231 | * | |
1232 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1233 | * | |
1234 | * Returns: --- | |
1235 | * | |
1236 | * Use: Frees everything in a key exchange context. | |
1237 | */ | |
1238 | ||
1239 | void kx_free(keyexch *kx) | |
1240 | { | |
0617b6e7 | 1241 | stop(kx); |
35c8b547 MW |
1242 | km_unref(kx->kpub); |
1243 | km_unref(kx->kpriv); | |
410c8acf | 1244 | } |
1245 | ||
1246 | /* --- @kx_newkeys@ --- * | |
1247 | * | |
1248 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1249 | * | |
1250 | * Returns: --- | |
1251 | * | |
1252 | * Use: Informs the key exchange module that its keys may have | |
1253 | * changed. If fetching the new keys fails, the peer will be | |
1254 | * destroyed, we log messages and struggle along with the old | |
1255 | * keys. | |
1256 | */ | |
1257 | ||
1258 | void kx_newkeys(keyexch *kx) | |
1259 | { | |
35c8b547 MW |
1260 | kdata *kpriv, *kpub; |
1261 | unsigned i; | |
1262 | int switchp; | |
1263 | time_t now = time(0); | |
1264 | ||
1265 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: checking new keys for `%s'", | |
1266 | p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
1267 | ||
1268 | /* --- Find out whether we can use new keys --- * | |
1269 | * | |
1270 | * Try each available combination of new and old, public and private, | |
1271 | * except both old (which is status quo anyway). The selection is encoded | |
1272 | * in @i@, with bit 0 for the private key and bit 1 for public key; a set | |
1273 | * bit means to use the old value, and a clear bit means to use the new | |
1274 | * one. | |
1275 | * | |
1276 | * This means that we currently prefer `old private and new public' over | |
1277 | * `new private and old public'. I'm not sure which way round this should | |
1278 | * actually be. | |
1279 | */ | |
1280 | ||
1281 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { | |
1282 | ||
1283 | /* --- Select the keys we're going to examine --- * | |
1284 | * | |
1285 | * If we're meant to have a new key and don't, then skip this | |
1286 | * combination. | |
1287 | */ | |
1288 | ||
1289 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: checking %s private, %s public", | |
1290 | i & 1 ? "old" : "new", i & 2 ? "old" : "new"); ) | |
1291 | ||
1292 | if (i & 1) kpriv = kx->kpriv; | |
1293 | else if (kx->kpriv->kn->kd != kx->kpriv) kpriv = kx->kpriv->kn->kd; | |
1294 | else { | |
1295 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: private key unchanged, skipping"); ) | |
1296 | continue; | |
1297 | } | |
1298 | ||
1299 | if (i & 2) kpub = kx->kpub; | |
1300 | else if (kx->kpub->kn->kd != kx->kpub) kpub = kx->kpub->kn->kd; | |
1301 | else { | |
1302 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: public key unchanged, skipping"); ) | |
1303 | continue; | |
1304 | } | |
1305 | ||
1306 | /* --- Skip if either key is expired --- * | |
1307 | * | |
1308 | * We're not going to get far with expired keys, and this simplifies the | |
1309 | * logic below. | |
1310 | */ | |
1311 | ||
1312 | if (KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpriv->t_exp) || | |
1313 | KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpub->t_exp)) { | |
1314 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: %s expired, skipping", | |
1315 | !KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpriv->t_exp) ? "public key" : | |
1316 | !KEY_EXPIRED(now, kx->kpub->t_exp) ? "private key" : | |
1317 | "both keys"); ) | |
1318 | continue; | |
1319 | } | |
1320 | ||
1321 | /* --- If the groups don't match then we can't use this pair --- */ | |
1322 | ||
1323 | if (!km_samealgsp(kpriv, kpub)) { | |
1324 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: peer `%s' group mismatch; " | |
1325 | "%s priv `%s' and %s pub `%s'", p_name(kx->p), | |
1326 | i & 1 ? "old" : "new", km_tag(kx->kpriv), | |
1327 | i & 2 ? "old" : "new", km_tag(kx->kpub)); ) | |
1328 | continue; | |
1329 | } | |
1330 | goto newkeys; | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: peer `%s' continuing with old keys", | |
1333 | p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
1334 | return; | |
1335 | ||
1336 | /* --- We've chosen new keys --- * | |
1337 | * | |
1338 | * Switch the new ones into place. Neither of the keys we're switching to | |
1339 | * is expired (we checked that above), so we should just crank everything | |
1340 | * up. | |
1341 | * | |
1342 | * A complication arises: we don't really want to force a new key exchange | |
1343 | * unless we have to. If the group is unchanged, and we're currently | |
1344 | * running OK, then we should just let things lie. | |
1345 | */ | |
1346 | ||
1347 | newkeys: | |
1348 | switchp = ((kx->f & KXF_DEAD) || | |
1349 | kx->s != KXS_SWITCH || | |
1350 | !group_samep(kx->kpriv->g, kpriv->g)); | |
1351 | ||
1352 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: peer `%s' adopting " | |
1353 | "%s priv `%s' and %s pub `%s'; %sforcing exchange", p_name(kx->p), | |
1354 | i & 1 ? "old" : "new", km_tag(kx->kpriv), | |
1355 | i & 2 ? "old" : "new", km_tag(kx->kpub), | |
1356 | switchp ? "" : "not "); ) | |
1357 | ||
1358 | if (switchp) stop(kx); | |
1359 | km_ref(kpriv); km_unref(kx->kpriv); kx->kpriv = kpriv; | |
1360 | km_ref(kpub); km_unref(kx->kpub); kx->kpub = kpub; | |
00e64b67 | 1361 | kx->f |= KXF_PUBKEY; |
35c8b547 | 1362 | if (switchp) { |
410c8acf | 1363 | T( trace(T_KEYEXCH, "keyexch: restarting key negotiation with `%s'", |
1364 | p_name(kx->p)); ) | |
00e64b67 | 1365 | start(kx, time(0)); |
1366 | resend(kx); | |
410c8acf | 1367 | } |
1368 | } | |
1369 | ||
1370 | /* --- @kx_init@ --- * | |
1371 | * | |
1372 | * Arguments: @keyexch *kx@ = pointer to key exchange context | |
1373 | * @peer *p@ = pointer to peer context | |
1374 | * @keyset **ks@ = pointer to keyset list | |
010e6f63 | 1375 | * @unsigned f@ = various useful flags |
410c8acf | 1376 | * |
1377 | * Returns: Zero if OK, nonzero if it failed. | |
1378 | * | |
1379 | * Use: Initializes a key exchange module. The module currently | |
1380 | * contains no keys, and will attempt to initiate a key | |
1381 | * exchange. | |
1382 | */ | |
1383 | ||
010e6f63 | 1384 | int kx_init(keyexch *kx, peer *p, keyset **ks, unsigned f) |
410c8acf | 1385 | { |
35c8b547 MW |
1386 | if ((kx->kpriv = km_findpriv(tag_priv)) == 0) goto fail_0; |
1387 | if ((kx->kpub = km_findpub(p_tag(p))) == 0) goto fail_1; | |
1388 | if (!km_samealgsp(kx->kpriv, kx->kpub)) { | |
1389 | a_warn("KX", "?PEER", kx->p, "algorithms-mismatch", | |
1390 | "local-private-key", "%s", tag_priv, | |
1391 | "peer-public-key", "%s", p_tag(p), | |
1392 | A_END); | |
1393 | goto fail_2; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
410c8acf | 1396 | kx->ks = ks; |
1397 | kx->p = p; | |
010e6f63 MW |
1398 | kx->f = KXF_DEAD | KXF_PUBKEY | f; |
1399 | if (!(kx->f & KXF_CORK)) { | |
1400 | start(kx, time(0)); | |
1401 | resend(kx); | |
1402 | /* Don't notify here: the ADD message hasn't gone out yet. */ | |
1403 | } | |
410c8acf | 1404 | return (0); |
35c8b547 MW |
1405 | |
1406 | fail_2: | |
1407 | km_unref(kx->kpub); | |
1408 | fail_1: | |
1409 | km_unref(kx->kpriv); | |
1410 | fail_0: | |
1411 | return (-1); | |
410c8acf | 1412 | } |
1413 | ||
1414 | /*----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------*/ |