noip.c: Shut up some GCC warnings.

[preload-hacks] / noip.1

diff --git a/noip.1 b/noip.1
index d11ce7d78dcbfed25e377aea722c7199c0fac900..c18110d99d3c4581e665474fbfd01cabb68eecbf 100644 (file)
--- a/noip.1
+++ b/noip.1
@@ -79,10 +79,8 @@ reads configuration from
 .B .noip
 in the calling user's home directory, as determined by the
 .B HOME
-environment, or, failing that, looking up the 
-.I real
-(not effective) user id in the password database.  However, if the
-environment variable
+environment, or, failing that, looking up the effective user id in the
+password database.  However, if the environment variable
 .B NOIP_CONFIG
 is set, then the file it names is read instead (assuming it exists; if
 it doesn't, no configuration is read).
@@ -251,7 +249,7 @@ is empty, the default is to deny all addresses.
 For example, it may be useful to allow access at least to a DNS server.
 This can be accomplished by adding a line
 .VS
-realconnect +1.2.3.4:52
+realconnect +1.2.3.4:53
 .VE
 to the configuration file, where 1.2.3.4 is the IP address of one of
 your DNS server. 
@@ -282,9 +280,9 @@ port to himself or a small group.
 is implemented as an
 .B LD_PRELOAD
 hack.  It won't work on setuid programs.  Also, perhaps more
-importantly, it can't do anything a
+importantly, it can't do anything to prevent a
 .I malicious
-program use of networking: a program could theoretically issue sockets
+program's use of networking: a program could theoretically issue sockets
 system calls directly instead of using the C library calls that
 .B noip
 intercepts.  It is intended only as a tool for enhancing the security of
@@ -319,4 +317,4 @@ child processes will be unaffected.
 .PP
 This manual is surprisingly long and complicated for such a simple hack.
 .SH AUTHOR
-Mark Wooding, <mdw@nsict.org>
+Mark Wooding, <mdw@distorted.org.uk>