| 1 | ### -*-python-*- |
| 2 | ### |
| 3 | ### HTTP authentication |
| 4 | ### |
| 5 | ### (c) 2013 Mark Wooding |
| 6 | ### |
| 7 | |
| 8 | ###----- Licensing notice --------------------------------------------------- |
| 9 | ### |
| 10 | ### This file is part of Chopwood: a password-changing service. |
| 11 | ### |
| 12 | ### Chopwood is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| 13 | ### it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as |
| 14 | ### published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the |
| 15 | ### License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| 16 | ### |
| 17 | ### Chopwood is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| 18 | ### but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 19 | ### MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| 20 | ### GNU Affero General Public License for more details. |
| 21 | ### |
| 22 | ### You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public |
| 23 | ### License along with Chopwood; if not, see |
| 24 | ### <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
| 25 | |
| 26 | from __future__ import with_statement |
| 27 | |
| 28 | import base64 as BN |
| 29 | import hashlib as H |
| 30 | import hmac as HM |
| 31 | import os as OS |
| 32 | |
| 33 | import cgi as CGI |
| 34 | import config as CONF; CFG = CONF.CFG |
| 35 | import dbmaint as D |
| 36 | import output as O; PRINT = O.PRINT |
| 37 | import service as S |
| 38 | import subcommand as SC |
| 39 | import util as U |
| 40 | |
| 41 | ###-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 42 | ### About the authentication scheme. |
| 43 | ### |
| 44 | ### We mustn't allow a CGI user to make changes (or even learn about a user's |
| 45 | ### accounts) without authenticating first. Curently, that means a username |
| 46 | ### and password, though I really dislike this; maybe I'll add a feature for |
| 47 | ### handling TLS client certificates some time. |
| 48 | ### |
| 49 | ### We're particularly worried about cross-site request forgery: a forged |
| 50 | ### request to change a password to some known value lets a bad guy straight |
| 51 | ### into a restricted service -- and a change to the `master' account lets |
| 52 | ### him into all of them. |
| 53 | ### |
| 54 | ### Once we've satisfied ourselves of the user's credentials, we issue a |
| 55 | ### short-lived session token, stored in a cookie namde `chpwd-token'. This |
| 56 | ### token has the form `DATE.NONCE.TAG.USER': here, DATE is the POSIX time of |
| 57 | ### issue, as a decimal number; NONCE is a randomly chosen string, encoded in |
| 58 | ### base64, USER is the user's login name, and TAG is a cryptographic MAC tag |
| 59 | ### on the string `DATE.NONCE.USER'. (The USER name is on the end so that it |
| 60 | ### can contain `.' characters without introducing parsing difficulties.) |
| 61 | ### |
| 62 | ### Secrets for these MAC tags are stored in the database: secrets expire |
| 63 | ### after 30 minutes (invalidating all tokens issued with them); we only |
| 64 | ### issue a token with a secret that's at most five minutes old. A session's |
| 65 | ### lifetime, then, is somewhere between 25 and 30 minutes. We choose the |
| 66 | ### lower bound as the cookie lifetime, just so that error messages end up |
| 67 | ### consistent. |
| 68 | ### |
| 69 | ### A cookie with a valid token is sufficient to grant read-only access to a |
| 70 | ### user's account details. However, this authority is ambient: during the |
| 71 | ### validity period of the token, a cross-site request forgery can easily |
| 72 | ### succeed, since there's nothing about the rest of a request which is hard |
| 73 | ### to forge, and the cookie will be supplied automatically by the user |
| 74 | ### agent. Showing the user some information we were quite happy to release |
| 75 | ### anyway isn't an interesting attack, but we must certainly require |
| 76 | ### something stronger for state-change requests. Here, we also check that a |
| 77 | ### special request parameter `%nonce' matches the token's NONCE field: forms |
| 78 | ### setting up a `POST' action must include an appropriate hidden input |
| 79 | ### element. |
| 80 | ### |
| 81 | ### Messing about with cookies is a bit annoying, but it's hard to come up |
| 82 | ### with alternatives. I'm trying to keep the URLs fairly pretty, and anyway |
| 83 | ### putting secrets into them is asking for trouble, since user agents have |
| 84 | ### an awful tendecy to store URLs in a history database, send them to |
| 85 | ### motherships, leak them in `Referer' headers, and other awful things. Our |
| 86 | ### cookie is marked `HttpOnly' so, in particular, user agents must keep them |
| 87 | ### out of the grubby mitts of Javascript programs. |
| 88 | ### |
| 89 | ### I promise that I'm only using these cookies for the purposes of |
| 90 | ### maintaining security: I don't log them or do anything else at all with |
| 91 | ### them. |
| 92 | |
| 93 | ###-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 94 | ### Generating and checking authentication tokens. |
| 95 | |
| 96 | ## Secret lifetime parameters. |
| 97 | CONF.DEFAULTS.update( |
| 98 | |
| 99 | ## The lifetime of a session cookie, in seconds. |
| 100 | SECRETLIFE = 30*60, |
| 101 | |
| 102 | ## Maximum age of an authentication key, in seconds. |
| 103 | SECRETFRESH = 5*60) |
| 104 | |
| 105 | def cleansecrets(): |
| 106 | """Remove dead secrets from the database.""" |
| 107 | with D.DB: |
| 108 | D.DB.execute("DELETE FROM secrets WHERE stamp < $stale", |
| 109 | stale = U.NOW - CFG.SECRETLIFE) |
| 110 | |
| 111 | def getsecret(when): |
| 112 | """ |
| 113 | Return the newest and most shiny secret no older than WHEN. |
| 114 | |
| 115 | If there is no such secret, or the only one available would have been stale |
| 116 | at WHEN, then return `None'. |
| 117 | """ |
| 118 | cleansecrets() |
| 119 | with D.DB: |
| 120 | D.DB.execute("""SELECT stamp, secret FROM secrets |
| 121 | WHERE stamp <= $when |
| 122 | ORDER BY stamp DESC""", |
| 123 | when = when) |
| 124 | row = D.DB.fetchone() |
| 125 | if row is None: return None |
| 126 | if row[0] < when - CFG.SECRETFRESH: return None |
| 127 | return row[1].decode('base64') |
| 128 | |
| 129 | def freshsecret(): |
| 130 | """Return a fresh secret.""" |
| 131 | cleansecrets() |
| 132 | with D.DB: |
| 133 | D.DB.execute("""SELECT secret FROM secrets |
| 134 | WHERE stamp >= $fresh |
| 135 | ORDER BY stamp DESC""", |
| 136 | fresh = U.NOW - CFG.SECRETFRESH) |
| 137 | row = D.DB.fetchone() |
| 138 | if row is not None: |
| 139 | sec = row[0].decode('base64') |
| 140 | else: |
| 141 | sec = OS.urandom(16) |
| 142 | D.DB.execute("""INSERT INTO secrets(stamp, secret) |
| 143 | VALUES ($stamp, $secret)""", |
| 144 | stamp = U.NOW, secret = sec.encode('base64')) |
| 145 | return sec |
| 146 | |
| 147 | def hack_octets(s): |
| 148 | """Return the octet string S, in a vaguely pretty form.""" |
| 149 | return BN.b64encode(s) \ |
| 150 | .rstrip('=') \ |
| 151 | .replace('/', '$') |
| 152 | |
| 153 | def auth_tag(sec, stamp, nonce, user): |
| 154 | """Compute a tag using secret SEC on `STAMP.NONCE.USER'.""" |
| 155 | hmac = HM.HMAC(sec, digestmod = H.sha256) |
| 156 | hmac.update('%d.%s.%s' % (stamp, nonce, user)) |
| 157 | return hack_octets(hmac.digest()) |
| 158 | |
| 159 | def mint_token(user): |
| 160 | """Make and return a fresh token for USER.""" |
| 161 | sec = freshsecret() |
| 162 | nonce = hack_octets(OS.urandom(16)) |
| 163 | tag = auth_tag(sec, U.NOW, nonce, user) |
| 164 | return '%d.%s.%s.%s' % (U.NOW, nonce, tag, user) |
| 165 | |
| 166 | ## Long messages for reasons why one might have been redirected back to the |
| 167 | ## login page. |
| 168 | LOGIN_REASONS = { |
| 169 | 'AUTHFAIL': 'incorrect user name or password', |
| 170 | 'NOAUTH': 'not authenticated', |
| 171 | 'NONONCE': 'missing nonce', |
| 172 | 'BADTOKEN': 'malformed token', |
| 173 | 'BADTIME': 'invalid timestamp', |
| 174 | 'BADNONCE': 'nonce mismatch', |
| 175 | 'EXPIRED': 'session timed out', |
| 176 | 'BADTAG': 'incorrect tag', |
| 177 | 'NOUSER': 'unknown user name', |
| 178 | None: None |
| 179 | } |
| 180 | |
| 181 | class AuthenticationFailed (U.ExpectedError): |
| 182 | """ |
| 183 | An authentication error. The most interesting extra feature is an |
| 184 | attribute `why' carrying a reason code, which can be looked up in |
| 185 | `LOGIN_REASONS'. |
| 186 | """ |
| 187 | def __init__(me, why): |
| 188 | msg = LOGIN_REASONS[why] |
| 189 | U.ExpectedError.__init__(me, 403, msg) |
| 190 | me.why = why |
| 191 | |
| 192 | def check_auth(token, nonce = None): |
| 193 | """ |
| 194 | Check that the TOKEN is valid, comparing it against the NONCE if this is |
| 195 | not `None'. |
| 196 | |
| 197 | If the token is OK, then return the correct user name, and set `NONCE' set |
| 198 | to the appropriate portion of the token. Otherwise raise an |
| 199 | `AuthenticationFailed' exception with an appropriate `why'. |
| 200 | """ |
| 201 | |
| 202 | global NONCE |
| 203 | |
| 204 | ## Parse the token. |
| 205 | bits = token.split('.', 3) |
| 206 | if len(bits) != 4: raise AuthenticationFailed, 'BADTOKEN' |
| 207 | stamp, NONCE, tag, user = bits |
| 208 | |
| 209 | ## Check that the nonce matches, if one was supplied. |
| 210 | if nonce is not None and nonce != NONCE: |
| 211 | raise AuthenticationFailed, 'BADNONCE' |
| 212 | |
| 213 | ## Check the stamp, and find the right secret. |
| 214 | if not stamp.isdigit(): raise AuthenticationFailed, 'BADTIME' |
| 215 | when = int(stamp) |
| 216 | sec = getsecret(when) |
| 217 | if sec is None: raise AuthenticationFailed, 'EXPIRED' |
| 218 | |
| 219 | ## Check the tag. |
| 220 | t = auth_tag(sec, when, NONCE, user) |
| 221 | if t != tag: raise AuthenticationFailed, 'BADTAG' |
| 222 | |
| 223 | ## Make sure the user still exists. |
| 224 | try: acct = S.SERVICES['master'].find(user) |
| 225 | except S.UnknownUser: raise AuthenticationFailed, 'NOUSER' |
| 226 | |
| 227 | ## Done. |
| 228 | return user |
| 229 | |
| 230 | ###-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 231 | ### Authentication commands. |
| 232 | |
| 233 | ## A dummy string, for when we're invoked from the command-line. |
| 234 | NONCE = '@DUMMY-NONCE' |
| 235 | |
| 236 | @CGI.subcommand( |
| 237 | 'login', ['cgi-noauth'], |
| 238 | 'Authenticate to the CGI machinery', |
| 239 | opts = [SC.Opt('why', '-w', '--why', |
| 240 | 'Reason for redirection back to the login page.', |
| 241 | argname = 'WHY')]) |
| 242 | def cmd_login(why = None): |
| 243 | CGI.page('login.fhtml', |
| 244 | title = 'Chopwood: login', |
| 245 | why =LOGIN_REASONS.get(why, '<unknown error %s>' % why)) |
| 246 | |
| 247 | @CGI.subcommand( |
| 248 | 'auth', ['cgi-noauth'], |
| 249 | 'Verify a user name and password', |
| 250 | params = [SC.Arg('u'), SC.Arg('pw')]) |
| 251 | def cmd_auth(u, pw): |
| 252 | svc = S.SERVICES['master'] |
| 253 | try: |
| 254 | acct = svc.find(u) |
| 255 | acct.check(pw) |
| 256 | except (S.UnknownUser, S.IncorrectPassword): |
| 257 | CGI.redirect(CGI.action('login', why = 'AUTHFAIL')) |
| 258 | else: |
| 259 | t = mint_token(u) |
| 260 | CGI.redirect(CGI.action('list', u), |
| 261 | set_cookie = CGI.cookie('chpwd-token', t, |
| 262 | httponly = True, |
| 263 | secure = CGI.SSLP, |
| 264 | path = CFG.SCRIPT_NAME, |
| 265 | max_age = (CFG.SECRETLIFE - |
| 266 | CFG.SECRETFRESH))) |
| 267 | |
| 268 | ###----- That's all, folks -------------------------------------------------- |