NOTES: Remove paragraph about slow-to-prepare messages

[secnet.git] / site.c

diff --git a/site.c b/site.c
index db65bd80d7ad93d9d22e19d83a7a4b2321fbd088..8fa4c113ffb33be343c3359e7a1254c29b44e708 100644 (file)
--- a/site.c
+++ b/site.c
@@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ struct site {
     uint64_t timeout; /* Timeout for current state */
     uint8_t *dhsecret;
     uint8_t *sharedsecret;
+    uint32_t sharedsecretlen;
     struct transform_inst_if *new_transform; /* For key setup/verify */
 };
 
@@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ static bool_t check_msg(struct site *st, uint32_t type, struct msg *m,
        return False;
     }
     if (type==LABEL_MSG2) return True;
-    if (memcmp(m->nR,st->remoteN,NONCELEN)!=0) {
+    if (!consttime_memeq(m->nR,st->remoteN,NONCELEN)!=0) {
        *error="wrong remotely-generated nonce";
        return False;
     }
@@ -561,11 +562,11 @@ static bool_t process_msg3(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg3,
 
     /* Generate the shared key */
     st->dh->makeshared(st->dh->st,st->dhsecret,st->dh->len,m.pk,
-                      st->sharedsecret,st->transform->keylen);
+                      st->sharedsecret,st->sharedsecretlen);
 
     /* Set up the transform */
     st->new_transform->setkey(st->new_transform->st,st->sharedsecret,
-                             st->transform->keylen);
+                             st->sharedsecretlen,st->setup_priority);
 
     return True;
 }
@@ -609,10 +610,10 @@ static bool_t process_msg4(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg4,
     m.pk[m.pklen]=0;
     /* Generate the shared key */
     st->dh->makeshared(st->dh->st,st->dhsecret,st->dh->len,m.pk,
-                      st->sharedsecret,st->transform->keylen);
+                      st->sharedsecret,st->sharedsecretlen);
     /* Set up the transform */
     st->new_transform->setkey(st->new_transform->st,st->sharedsecret,
-                             st->transform->keylen);
+                             st->sharedsecretlen,st->setup_priority);
 
     return True;
 }
@@ -730,7 +731,8 @@ static bool_t process_msg6(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg6,
     return True;
 }
 
-static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0)
+static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0,
+                          const struct comm_addr *src)
 {
     cstring_t transform_err, auxkey_err, newkey_err="n/a";
     struct msg0 m;
@@ -749,11 +751,8 @@ static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0)
                           "peer has used new key","auxiliary key",LOG_SEC);
        return True;
     }
-
-    if (problem==2) {
-       slog(st,LOG_DROP,"transform: %s (merely skew)",transform_err);
-       return False;
-    }
+    if (problem==2)
+       goto skew;
 
     buffer_copy(msg0, &st->scratch);
     problem = st->auxiliary_key.transform->reverse
@@ -777,11 +776,14 @@ static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0)
        }
        return True;
     }
+    if (problem==2)
+       goto skew;
 
     if (st->state==SITE_SENTMSG5) {
        buffer_copy(msg0, &st->scratch);
-       if (!st->new_transform->reverse(st->new_transform->st,
-                                       msg0,&newkey_err)) {
+       problem = st->new_transform->reverse(st->new_transform->st,
+                                            msg0,&newkey_err);
+       if (!problem) {
            /* It looks like we didn't get the peer's MSG6 */
            /* This is like a cut-down enter_new_state(SITE_RUN) */
            slog(st,LOG_STATE,"will enter state RUN (MSG0 with new key)");
@@ -790,11 +792,18 @@ static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0)
            activate_new_key(st);
            return True; /* do process the data in this packet */
        }
+       if (problem==2)
+           goto skew;
     }
 
     slog(st,LOG_SEC,"transform: %s (aux: %s, new: %s)",
         transform_err,auxkey_err,newkey_err);
     initiate_key_setup(st,"incoming message would not decrypt");
+    send_nak(src,m.dest,m.source,m.type,msg0,"message would not decrypt");
+    return False;
+
+ skew:
+    slog(st,LOG_DROP,"transform: %s (merely skew)",transform_err);
     return False;
 }
 
@@ -803,7 +812,7 @@ static bool_t process_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0,
 {
     uint32_t type;
 
-    if (!decrypt_msg0(st,msg0))
+    if (!decrypt_msg0(st,msg0,src))
        return False;
 
     CHECK_AVAIL(msg0,4);
@@ -1009,7 +1018,7 @@ static void enter_state_run(struct site *st)
     memset(st->remoteN,0,NONCELEN);
     st->new_transform->delkey(st->new_transform->st);
     memset(st->dhsecret,0,st->dh->len);
-    memset(st->sharedsecret,0,st->transform->keylen);
+    memset(st->sharedsecret,0,st->sharedsecretlen);
     set_link_quality(st);
 }
 
@@ -1285,7 +1294,7 @@ static bool_t site_incoming(void *sst, struct buffer_if *buf,
        uint32_t msgtype=ntohl(get_uint32(buf->start+8));
        if (msgtype!=LABEL_MSG0) dump_packet(st,buf,source,True);
        switch (msgtype) {
-       case 0: /* NAK */
+       case LABEL_NAK:
            /* If the source is our current peer then initiate a key setup,
               because our peer's forgotten the key */
            if (get_uint32(buf->start+4)==st->current.remote_session_id) {
@@ -1557,7 +1566,8 @@ static list_t *site_apply(closure_t *self, struct cloc loc, dict_t *context,
     transport_peers_clear(st,&st->setup_peers);
     /* XXX mlock these */
     st->dhsecret=safe_malloc(st->dh->len,"site:dhsecret");
-    st->sharedsecret=safe_malloc(st->transform->keylen,"site:sharedsecret");
+    st->sharedsecretlen=st->transform->keylen?:st->dh->ceil_len;
+    st->sharedsecret=safe_malloc(st->sharedsecretlen,"site:sharedsecret");
 
     /* We need to compute some properties of our comms */
 #define COMPUTE_WORST(pad)                     \