uint64_t timeout; /* Timeout for current state */
uint8_t *dhsecret;
uint8_t *sharedsecret;
+ uint32_t sharedsecretlen;
struct transform_inst_if *new_transform; /* For key setup/verify */
};
return False;
}
if (type==LABEL_MSG2) return True;
- if (memcmp(m->nR,st->remoteN,NONCELEN)!=0) {
+ if (!consttime_memeq(m->nR,st->remoteN,NONCELEN)!=0) {
*error="wrong remotely-generated nonce";
return False;
}
/* Generate the shared key */
st->dh->makeshared(st->dh->st,st->dhsecret,st->dh->len,m.pk,
- st->sharedsecret,st->transform->keylen);
+ st->sharedsecret,st->sharedsecretlen);
/* Set up the transform */
st->new_transform->setkey(st->new_transform->st,st->sharedsecret,
- st->transform->keylen);
+ st->sharedsecretlen,st->setup_priority);
return True;
}
m.pk[m.pklen]=0;
/* Generate the shared key */
st->dh->makeshared(st->dh->st,st->dhsecret,st->dh->len,m.pk,
- st->sharedsecret,st->transform->keylen);
+ st->sharedsecret,st->sharedsecretlen);
/* Set up the transform */
st->new_transform->setkey(st->new_transform->st,st->sharedsecret,
- st->transform->keylen);
+ st->sharedsecretlen,st->setup_priority);
return True;
}
return True;
}
-static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0)
+static bool_t decrypt_msg0(struct site *st, struct buffer_if *msg0,
+ const struct comm_addr *src)
{
cstring_t transform_err, auxkey_err, newkey_err="n/a";
struct msg0 m;
"peer has used new key","auxiliary key",LOG_SEC);
return True;
}
-
- if (problem==2) {
- slog(st,LOG_DROP,"transform: %s (merely skew)",transform_err);
- return False;
- }
+ if (problem==2)
+ goto skew;
buffer_copy(msg0, &st->scratch);
problem = st->auxiliary_key.transform->reverse
}
return True;
}
+ if (problem==2)
+ goto skew;
if (st->state==SITE_SENTMSG5) {
buffer_copy(msg0, &st->scratch);
- if (!st->new_transform->reverse(st->new_transform->st,
- msg0,&newkey_err)) {
+ problem = st->new_transform->reverse(st->new_transform->st,
+ msg0,&newkey_err);
+ if (!problem) {
/* It looks like we didn't get the peer's MSG6 */
/* This is like a cut-down enter_new_state(SITE_RUN) */
slog(st,LOG_STATE,"will enter state RUN (MSG0 with new key)");
activate_new_key(st);
return True; /* do process the data in this packet */
}
+ if (problem==2)
+ goto skew;
}
slog(st,LOG_SEC,"transform: %s (aux: %s, new: %s)",
transform_err,auxkey_err,newkey_err);
initiate_key_setup(st,"incoming message would not decrypt");
+ send_nak(src,m.dest,m.source,m.type,msg0,"message would not decrypt");
+ return False;
+
+ skew:
+ slog(st,LOG_DROP,"transform: %s (merely skew)",transform_err);
return False;
}
{
uint32_t type;
- if (!decrypt_msg0(st,msg0))
+ if (!decrypt_msg0(st,msg0,src))
return False;
CHECK_AVAIL(msg0,4);
memset(st->remoteN,0,NONCELEN);
st->new_transform->delkey(st->new_transform->st);
memset(st->dhsecret,0,st->dh->len);
- memset(st->sharedsecret,0,st->transform->keylen);
+ memset(st->sharedsecret,0,st->sharedsecretlen);
set_link_quality(st);
}
uint32_t msgtype=ntohl(get_uint32(buf->start+8));
if (msgtype!=LABEL_MSG0) dump_packet(st,buf,source,True);
switch (msgtype) {
- case 0: /* NAK */
+ case LABEL_NAK:
/* If the source is our current peer then initiate a key setup,
because our peer's forgotten the key */
if (get_uint32(buf->start+4)==st->current.remote_session_id) {
transport_peers_clear(st,&st->setup_peers);
/* XXX mlock these */
st->dhsecret=safe_malloc(st->dh->len,"site:dhsecret");
- st->sharedsecret=safe_malloc(st->transform->keylen,"site:sharedsecret");
+ st->sharedsecretlen=st->transform->keylen?:st->dh->ceil_len;
+ st->sharedsecret=safe_malloc(st->sharedsecretlen,"site:sharedsecret");
/* We need to compute some properties of our comms */
#define COMPUTE_WORST(pad) \