X-Git-Url: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?p=elogind.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fcore%2Fexecute.c;h=ae2a52d44a05cc7fc0cb98a8630bcfef61e157e3;hp=437065465db1dd10e3ddb291838f008ab769409f;hb=ee33e53a70c0d3f9d8aeafe4b8fd84a0d5e1d8d9;hpb=0d3f7bb3a5bc6d5c0712f88a080fed388981bca3 diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index 437065465..ae2a52d44 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include +#include #include #undef basename @@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ #include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR +#include +#endif + #include "execute.h" #include "strv.h" #include "macro.h" @@ -61,18 +69,28 @@ #include "ioprio.h" #include "securebits.h" #include "namespace.h" -#include "tcpwrap.h" #include "exit-status.h" #include "missing.h" #include "utmp-wtmp.h" #include "def.h" #include "path-util.h" -#include "syscall-list.h" #include "env-util.h" #include "fileio.h" #include "unit.h" #include "async.h" #include "selinux-util.h" +#include "errno-list.h" +#include "af-list.h" +#include "mkdir.h" +#include "apparmor-util.h" +#include "smack-util.h" +#include "bus-kernel.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "cap-list.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP +#include "seccomp-util.h" +#endif #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) @@ -108,11 +126,11 @@ static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) { if ((nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i+3)) < 0) return -errno; - close_nointr_nofail(fds[i]); + safe_close(fds[i]); fds[i] = nfd; /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then - * let's remember that and try again from here*/ + * let's remember that and try again from here */ if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) restart_from = i; } @@ -194,7 +212,7 @@ static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { if (fd != nfd) { r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); } else r = nfd; @@ -219,12 +237,12 @@ static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, cons r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path)); if (r < 0) { - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); return -errno; } if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) { - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); return -errno; } @@ -248,7 +266,7 @@ static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, cons if (fd != nfd) { r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); } else r = nfd; @@ -265,7 +283,7 @@ static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, mode_t mode, int nfd) { if (fd != nfd) { r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); } else r = nfd; @@ -319,13 +337,13 @@ static int setup_input(const ExecContext *context, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL, i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, false, - (usec_t) -1); + USEC_INFINITY); if (fd < 0) return fd; if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { r = dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO; - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); } else r = STDIN_FILENO; @@ -409,12 +427,13 @@ static int setup_output(const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, c case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit_id, fileno); if (r < 0) { - log_struct_unit(LOG_CRIT, unit_id, - "MESSAGE=Failed to connect std%s of %s to the journal socket: %s", - fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "out" : "err", - unit_id, strerror(-r), - "ERRNO=%d", -r, - NULL); + log_unit_struct(unit_id, + LOG_CRIT, + LOG_MESSAGE("Failed to connect %s of %s to the journal socket: %s", + fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr", + unit_id, strerror(-r)), + LOG_ERRNO(-r), + NULL); r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); } return r; @@ -489,7 +508,7 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, } if (fd >= 2) - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(fd); *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin; *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout; @@ -497,20 +516,15 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, return 0; fail: - if (saved_stdout >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(saved_stdout); - - if (saved_stdin >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(saved_stdin); - - if (fd >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(fd); + safe_close(saved_stdout); + safe_close(saved_stdin); + safe_close(fd); return r; } _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) { - int fd; + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; va_list ap; assert(format); @@ -523,8 +537,6 @@ _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) { vdprintf(fd, format, ap); va_end(ap); - close_nointr_nofail(fd); - return 0; } @@ -546,18 +558,15 @@ static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) r = -errno; - if (*saved_stdin >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(*saved_stdin); - - if (*saved_stdout >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(*saved_stdout); + safe_close(*saved_stdin); + safe_close(*saved_stdout); return r; } static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) { int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; - char *line; + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; r = setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); if (r < 0) @@ -567,8 +576,7 @@ static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) { if (!line) return -ENOMEM; - r = ask(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line); - free(line); + r = ask_char(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line); restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); @@ -816,7 +824,7 @@ static int setup_pam( * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads * to fail to exit normally */ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) - log_error("Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %s", strerror(-r)); + log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel @@ -878,7 +886,7 @@ fail: log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); err = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ } else { - log_error("PAM failed: %m"); + log_error_errno(errno, "PAM failed: %m"); err = -errno; } @@ -933,65 +941,186 @@ static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { rename_process(process_name); } -static int apply_seccomp(uint32_t *syscall_filter) { - static const struct sock_filter header[] = { - VALIDATE_ARCHITECTURE, - EXAMINE_SYSCALL - }; - static const struct sock_filter footer[] = { - _KILL_PROCESS - }; +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP - int i; - unsigned n; - struct sock_filter *f; - struct sock_fprog prog = {}; +static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) { + uint32_t negative_action, action; + scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp; + Iterator i; + void *id; + int r; - assert(syscall_filter); + assert(c); - /* First: count the syscalls to check for */ - for (i = 0, n = 0; i < syscall_max(); i++) - if (syscall_filter[i >> 4] & (1 << (i & 31))) - n++; + negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); - /* Second: build the filter program from a header the syscall - * matches and the footer */ - f = alloca(sizeof(struct sock_filter) * (ELEMENTSOF(header) + 2*n + ELEMENTSOF(footer))); - memcpy(f, header, sizeof(header)); + seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); + if (!seccomp) + return -ENOMEM; - for (i = 0, n = 0; i < syscall_max(); i++) - if (syscall_filter[i >> 4] & (1 << (i & 31))) { - struct sock_filter item[] = { - BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, INDEX_TO_SYSCALL(i), 0, 1), - BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) - }; + if (c->syscall_archs) { - assert_cc(ELEMENTSOF(item) == 2); + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) { + r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1); + if (r == -EEXIST) + continue; + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } - f[ELEMENTSOF(header) + 2*n] = item[0]; - f[ELEMENTSOF(header) + 2*n+1] = item[1]; + } else { + r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } - n++; + action = c->syscall_whitelist ? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW : negative_action; + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) { + r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = seccomp_load(seccomp); + +finish: + seccomp_release(seccomp); + return r; +} + +static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { + scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp; + Iterator i; + int r; + + assert(c); + + seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); + if (!seccomp) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (c->address_families_whitelist) { + int af, first = 0, last = 0; + void *afp; + + /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address + * families that are out of range and then everything + * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest + * and highest address family in the set. */ + + SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families, i) { + af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); + + if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max()) + continue; + + if (first == 0 || af < first) + first = af; + + if (last == 0 || af > last) + last = af; } - memcpy(f + (ELEMENTSOF(header) + 2*n), footer, sizeof(footer)); + assert((first == 0) == (last == 0)); - /* Third: install the filter */ - prog.len = ELEMENTSOF(header) + ELEMENTSOF(footer) + 2*n; - prog.filter = f; - if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) < 0) - return -errno; + if (first == 0) { - return 0; + /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + } else { + + /* Block everything below the first entry */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + /* Block everything above the last entry */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + /* Block everything between the first and last + * entry */ + for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) { + + if (set_contains(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af))) + continue; + + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + } + + } else { + void *af; + + /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for + * each address family that are then combined in OR + * checks. */ + + SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families, i) { + + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af))); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + } + + r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = seccomp_load(seccomp); + +finish: + seccomp_release(seccomp); + return r; } +#endif + static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) { assert(idle_pipe); - if (idle_pipe[1] >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(idle_pipe[1]); - if (idle_pipe[2] >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(idle_pipe[2]); + + safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); + safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { int r; @@ -1006,16 +1135,15 @@ static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) { fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); } - close_nointr_nofail(idle_pipe[0]); + safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); } - if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail(idle_pipe[3]); + safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); } static int build_environment( - ExecContext *c, + const ExecContext *c, unsigned n_fds, usec_t watchdog_usec, const char *home, @@ -1049,7 +1177,7 @@ static int build_environment( return -ENOMEM; our_env[n_env++] = x; - if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC=%llu", (unsigned long long) watchdog_usec) < 0) + if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, watchdog_usec) < 0) return -ENOMEM; our_env[n_env++] = x; } @@ -1100,551 +1228,622 @@ static int build_environment( return 0; } -int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command, - char **argv, - ExecContext *context, - int fds[], unsigned n_fds, - char **environment, - bool apply_permissions, - bool apply_chroot, - bool apply_tty_stdin, - bool confirm_spawn, - CGroupControllerMask cgroup_supported, - const char *cgroup_path, - const char *unit_id, - usec_t watchdog_usec, - int idle_pipe[4], - ExecRuntime *runtime, - pid_t *ret) { - - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; - int socket_fd; - char *line; - pid_t pid; - int r; +static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + char **argv, + int socket_fd, + int *fds, unsigned n_fds, + char **files_env, + int *error) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; + const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; + unsigned n_dont_close = 0; + int dont_close[n_fds + 4]; + uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; + int i, err; assert(command); assert(context); - assert(ret); - assert(fds || n_fds <= 0); + assert(params); + assert(error); + + rename_process_from_path(command->path); + + /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the + * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All + * others we leave untouched because we set them to + * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which + * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ + default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, + SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1); + + if (context->ignore_sigpipe) + ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); + + err = reset_signal_mask(); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; + return err; + } - if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { + if (params->idle_pipe) + do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); - if (n_fds != 1) - return -EINVAL; + /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't + * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its + * sockets */ + log_forget_fds(); - socket_fd = fds[0]; + if (socket_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; + if (n_fds > 0) { + memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); + n_dont_close += n_fds; + } + if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd; + if (runtime) { + if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0]; + if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1]; + } - fds = NULL; - n_fds = 0; - } else - socket_fd = -1; + err = close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_FDS; + return err; + } - r = exec_context_load_environment(context, &files_env); - if (r < 0) { - log_struct_unit(LOG_ERR, - unit_id, - "MESSAGE=Failed to load environment files: %s", strerror(-r), - "ERRNO=%d", -r, - NULL); - return r; + if (!context->same_pgrp) + if (setsid() < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SETSID; + return -errno; + } + + exec_context_tty_reset(context); + + if (params->confirm_spawn) { + char response; + + err = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv); + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) + write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n"); + else if (err < 0) + write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-err)); + else if (response == 's') { + write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n"); + *error = EXIT_CONFIRM; + return -ECANCELED; + } else if (response == 'n') { + write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n"); + *error = 0; + return 0; + } } - if (!argv) - argv = command->argv; + /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we + * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */ + if (socket_fd >= 0) + fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); - line = exec_command_line(argv); - if (!line) - return log_oom(); + err = setup_input(context, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_STDIN; + return err; + } - log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG, - unit_id, - "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, - "MESSAGE=About to execute: %s", line, - NULL); - free(line); + err = setup_output(context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_STDOUT; + return err; + } - pid = fork(); - if (pid < 0) - return -errno; + err = setup_output(context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_STDERR; + return err; + } - if (pid == 0) { - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL; - const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; - unsigned n_dont_close = 0; - int dont_close[n_fds + 3]; - uid_t uid = (uid_t) -1; - gid_t gid = (gid_t) -1; - sigset_t ss; - int i, err; - - /* child */ - - rename_process_from_path(command->path); - - /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the - * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All - * others we leave untouched because we set them to - * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which - * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ - default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, - SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1); - - if (context->ignore_sigpipe) - ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); - - assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) == 0); - if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ss, NULL) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; - goto fail_child; + if (params->cgroup_path) { + err = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CGROUP; + return err; } + } - if (idle_pipe) - do_idle_pipe_dance(idle_pipe); + if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { + char t[16]; - /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't - * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its - * sockets */ - log_forget_fds(); + snprintf(t, sizeof(t), "%i", context->oom_score_adjust); + char_array_0(t); - if (socket_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; - if (n_fds > 0) { - memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); - n_dont_close += n_fds; + if (write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; + return -errno; } - if (runtime) { - if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0]; - if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1]; + } + + if (context->nice_set) + if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_NICE; + return -errno; } - err = close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); + if (context->cpu_sched_set) { + struct sched_param param = { + .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, + }; + + err = sched_setscheduler(0, + context->cpu_sched_policy | + (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? + SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), + ¶m); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_FDS; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; + return -errno; } + } - if (!context->same_pgrp) - if (setsid() < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_SETSID; - goto fail_child; - } + if (context->cpuset) + if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; + return -errno; + } - if (context->tcpwrap_name) { - if (socket_fd >= 0) - if (!socket_tcpwrap(socket_fd, context->tcpwrap_name)) { - err = -EACCES; - r = EXIT_TCPWRAP; - goto fail_child; - } + if (context->ioprio_set) + if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_IOPRIO; + return -errno; + } - for (i = 0; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { - if (!socket_tcpwrap(fds[i], context->tcpwrap_name)) { - err = -EACCES; - r = EXIT_TCPWRAP; - goto fail_child; - } - } + if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; + return -errno; } - exec_context_tty_reset(context); + if (context->personality != 0xffffffffUL) + if (personality(context->personality) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_PERSONALITY; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->utmp_id) + utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path); - if (confirm_spawn) { - char response; - - err = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv); - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) - write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n"); - else if (err < 0) - write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-err)); - else if (response == 's') { - write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n"); - err = -ECANCELED; - r = EXIT_CONFIRM; - goto fail_child; - } else if (response == 'n') { - write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n"); - err = r = 0; - goto fail_child; + if (context->user) { + username = context->user; + err = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_USER; + return err; + } + + if (is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) { + err = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_STDIN; + return err; } } + } - /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we - * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */ - if (socket_fd >= 0) - fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); +#ifdef ENABLE_KDBUS + if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) { + uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid; - err = setup_input(context, socket_fd, apply_tty_stdin); + err = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_STDIN; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT; + return err; } + } +#endif - err = setup_output(context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), unit_id, apply_tty_stdin); + /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup + * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the + * user of the new process. */ + if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) { + err = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_STDOUT; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_CGROUP; + return err; } - err = setup_output(context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), unit_id, apply_tty_stdin); + + err = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_STDERR; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_CGROUP; + return err; } + } + + if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) { + char **rt; + + STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p; + + p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL); + if (!p) { + *error = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } - if (cgroup_path) { - err = cg_attach_everywhere(cgroup_supported, cgroup_path, 0); + err = mkdir_safe(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_CGROUP; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY; + return err; } } + } - if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { - char t[16]; + if (params->apply_permissions) { + err = enforce_groups(context, username, gid); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_GROUP; + return err; + } + } - snprintf(t, sizeof(t), "%i", context->oom_score_adjust); - char_array_0(t); + umask(context->umask); - if (write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; - goto fail_child; - } +#ifdef HAVE_PAM + if (params->apply_permissions && context->pam_name && username) { + err = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_PAM; + return err; } + } +#endif - if (context->nice_set) - if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_NICE; - goto fail_child; - } - - if (context->cpu_sched_set) { - struct sched_param param = { - .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, - }; + if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + err = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_NETWORK; + return err; + } + } - r = sched_setscheduler(0, - context->cpu_sched_policy | - (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? - SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), - ¶m); - if (r < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; - goto fail_child; - } + if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) || + !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) || + !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs) || + context->mount_flags != 0 || + (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) || + params->bus_endpoint_path || + context->private_devices || + context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || + context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) { + + char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL; + + /* The runtime struct only contains the parent + * of the private /tmp, which is + * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it + * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's + * the one we want to use here. */ + + if (context->private_tmp && runtime) { + if (runtime->tmp_dir) + tmp = strappenda(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + if (runtime->var_tmp_dir) + var = strappenda(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); } - if (context->cpuset) - if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; - goto fail_child; - } + err = setup_namespace( + context->read_write_dirs, + context->read_only_dirs, + context->inaccessible_dirs, + tmp, + var, + params->bus_endpoint_path, + context->private_devices, + context->protect_home, + context->protect_system, + context->mount_flags); + + if (err == -EPERM) + log_unit_warning_errno(params->unit_id, err, "Failed to set up file system namespace due to lack of privileges. Execution sandbox will not be in effect: %m"); + else if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return err; + } + } - if (context->ioprio_set) - if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_IOPRIO; - goto fail_child; + if (params->apply_chroot) { + if (context->root_directory) + if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CHROOT; + return -errno; } - if (context->timer_slack_nsec != (nsec_t) -1) - if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; - goto fail_child; - } + if (chdir(context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "/") < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -errno; + } + } else { + _cleanup_free_ char *d = NULL; - if (context->utmp_id) - utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path); + if (asprintf(&d, "%s/%s", + context->root_directory ? context->root_directory : "", + context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "") < 0) { + *error = EXIT_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } - if (context->user) { - username = context->user; - err = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_USER; - goto fail_child; - } + if (chdir(d) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -errno; + } + } - if (is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) { - err = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_STDIN; - goto fail_child; - } - } +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { + err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return err; } + } +#endif -#ifdef HAVE_PAM - if (cgroup_path && context->user && context->pam_name) { - err = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_CGROUP; - goto fail_child; - } + /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that + * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that + * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd + * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom + * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can + * now be closed as well. */ + err = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds); + if (err >= 0) + err = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); + if (err >= 0) + err = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_FDS; + return err; + } + if (params->apply_permissions) { - err = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_CGROUP; - goto fail_child; + for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) { + if (!context->rlimit[i]) + continue; + + if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_LIMITS; + return -errno; } } -#endif - if (apply_permissions) { - err = enforce_groups(context, username, gid); + if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop) { + err = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set_drop, false); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_GROUP; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return err; } } - umask(context->umask); - -#ifdef HAVE_PAM - if (apply_permissions && context->pam_name && username) { - err = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds); +#ifdef HAVE_SMACK + if (context->smack_process_label) { + err = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_PAM; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; + return err; } } #endif - if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { - err = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket); + + if (context->user) { + err = enforce_user(context, uid); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_NETWORK; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_USER; + return err; } } - if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) || - !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) || - !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs) || - context->mount_flags != 0 || - (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) || - context->private_devices) { - - char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL; - - /* The runtime struct only contains the parent - * of the private /tmp, which is - * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it - * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's - * the one we want to use here. */ - - if (context->private_tmp && runtime) { - if (runtime->tmp_dir) - tmp = strappenda(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); - if (runtime->var_tmp_dir) - var = strappenda(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while + * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress + * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call + * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */ + if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != context->secure_bits) + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, context->secure_bits) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SECUREBITS; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->capabilities) + if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return -errno; } - err = setup_namespace( - context->read_write_dirs, - context->read_only_dirs, - context->inaccessible_dirs, - tmp, - var, - context->private_devices, - context->mount_flags); + if (context->no_new_privileges) + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { + *error = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; + return -errno; + } +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + if (context->address_families_whitelist || + !set_isempty(context->address_families)) { + err = apply_address_families(context); if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - goto fail_child; + *error = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; + return err; } } - if (apply_chroot) { - if (context->root_directory) - if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_CHROOT; - goto fail_child; - } - - if (chdir(context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "/") < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_CHDIR; - goto fail_child; - } - } else { - _cleanup_free_ char *d = NULL; - - if (asprintf(&d, "%s/%s", - context->root_directory ? context->root_directory : "", - context->working_directory ? context->working_directory : "") < 0) { - err = -ENOMEM; - r = EXIT_MEMORY; - goto fail_child; + if (context->syscall_whitelist || + !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) || + !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs)) { + err = apply_seccomp(context); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return err; } + } +#endif - if (chdir(d) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_CHDIR; - goto fail_child; +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (mac_selinux_use()) { + char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; + + if (exec_context) { + err = setexeccon(exec_context); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return err; + } } } +#endif - /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that - * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules */ - err = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds); - if (err >= 0) - err = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); - if (err >= 0) - err = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_FDS; - goto fail_child; +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR + if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) { + err = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); + if (err < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { + *error = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; + return -errno; + } } +#endif + } - if (apply_permissions) { + err = build_environment(context, n_fds, params->watchdog_usec, home, username, shell, &our_env); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_MEMORY; + return err; + } - for (i = 0; i < RLIMIT_NLIMITS; i++) { - if (!context->rlimit[i]) - continue; + final_env = strv_env_merge(5, + params->environment, + our_env, + context->environment, + files_env, + pam_env, + NULL); + if (!final_env) { + *error = EXIT_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } - if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_LIMITS; - goto fail_child; - } - } + final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, final_env); + if (!final_argv) { + *error = EXIT_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } - if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop) { - err = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set_drop, false); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - goto fail_child; - } - } + final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env); - if (context->user) { - err = enforce_user(context, uid); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_USER; - goto fail_child; - } - } + if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_PRI(LOG_DEBUG))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *line; - /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while - * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress - * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call - * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */ - if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != context->secure_bits) - if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, context->secure_bits) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_SECUREBITS; - goto fail_child; - } + line = exec_command_line(final_argv); + if (line) { + log_open(); + log_unit_struct(params->unit_id, + LOG_DEBUG, + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, + LOG_MESSAGE("Executing: %s", line), + NULL); + log_close(); + } + } + execve(command->path, final_argv, final_env); + *error = EXIT_EXEC; + return -errno; +} - if (context->capabilities) - if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - goto fail_child; - } +int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + pid_t *ret) { - if (context->no_new_privileges) - if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; - goto fail_child; - } + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; + int *fds = NULL; unsigned n_fds = 0; + char *line, **argv; + int socket_fd; + pid_t pid; + int err; - if (context->syscall_filter) { - err = apply_seccomp(context->syscall_filter); - if (err < 0) { - r = EXIT_SECCOMP; - goto fail_child; - } - } -#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX - if (context->selinux_context && use_selinux()) { - bool ignore; - char* c; - - c = context->selinux_context; - if (c[0] == '-') { - c++; - ignore = true; - } else - ignore = false; - - err = setexeccon(c); - if (err < 0 && !ignore) { - r = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - goto fail_child; - } - } -#endif - } + assert(command); + assert(context); + assert(ret); + assert(params); + assert(params->fds || params->n_fds <= 0); - err = build_environment(context, n_fds, watchdog_usec, home, username, shell, &our_env); - if (r < 0) { - r = EXIT_MEMORY; - goto fail_child; - } + if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { - final_env = strv_env_merge(5, - environment, - our_env, - context->environment, - files_env, - pam_env, - NULL); - if (!final_env) { - err = -ENOMEM; - r = EXIT_MEMORY; - goto fail_child; - } + if (params->n_fds != 1) + return -EINVAL; - final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, final_env); - if (!final_argv) { - err = -ENOMEM; - r = EXIT_MEMORY; - goto fail_child; - } + socket_fd = params->fds[0]; + } else { + socket_fd = -1; + fds = params->fds; + n_fds = params->n_fds; + } - final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env); - - if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_PRI(LOG_DEBUG))) { - line = exec_command_line(final_argv); - if (line) { - log_open(); - log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG, - unit_id, - "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, - "MESSAGE=Executing: %s", line, - NULL); - log_close(); - free(line); - line = NULL; - } - } - execve(command->path, final_argv, final_env); - err = -errno; - r = EXIT_EXEC; + err = exec_context_load_environment(context, params->unit_id, &files_env); + if (err < 0) { + log_unit_struct(params->unit_id, + LOG_ERR, + LOG_MESSAGE("Failed to load environment files: %s", strerror(-err)), + LOG_ERRNO(-err), + NULL); + return err; + } + + argv = params->argv ?: command->argv; + + line = exec_command_line(argv); + if (!line) + return log_oom(); + + log_unit_struct(params->unit_id, + LOG_DEBUG, + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, + LOG_MESSAGE("About to execute: %s", line), + NULL); + free(line); + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + return -errno; - fail_child: + if (pid == 0) { + int r; + + err = exec_child(command, + context, + params, + runtime, + argv, + socket_fd, + fds, n_fds, + files_env, + &r); if (r != 0) { log_open(); - log_struct(LOG_ERR, MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED), + log_struct(LOG_ERR, + LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED), "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, - "MESSAGE=Failed at step %s spawning %s: %s", - exit_status_to_string(r, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD), - command->path, strerror(-err), - "ERRNO=%d", -err, + LOG_MESSAGE("Failed at step %s spawning %s: %s", + exit_status_to_string(r, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD), + command->path, strerror(-err)), + LOG_ERRNO(-err), NULL); log_close(); } @@ -1652,10 +1851,10 @@ int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command, _exit(r); } - log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG, - unit_id, - "MESSAGE=Forked %s as "PID_FMT, - command->path, pid, + log_unit_struct(params->unit_id, + LOG_DEBUG, + LOG_MESSAGE("Forked %s as "PID_FMT, + command->path, pid), NULL); /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so @@ -1663,8 +1862,8 @@ int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command, * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be * killed too). */ - if (cgroup_path) - cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, cgroup_path, pid); + if (params->cgroup_path) + cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, pid); exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); @@ -1681,7 +1880,9 @@ void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO; c->syslog_level_prefix = true; c->ignore_sigpipe = true; - c->timer_slack_nsec = (nsec_t) -1; + c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY; + c->personality = 0xffffffffUL; + c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755; } void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { @@ -1708,9 +1909,6 @@ void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { free(c->tty_path); c->tty_path = NULL; - free(c->tcpwrap_name); - c->tcpwrap_name = NULL; - free(c->syslog_identifier); c->syslog_identifier = NULL; @@ -1749,8 +1947,47 @@ void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { free(c->selinux_context); c->selinux_context = NULL; - free(c->syscall_filter); + free(c->apparmor_profile); + c->apparmor_profile = NULL; + + set_free(c->syscall_filter); c->syscall_filter = NULL; + + set_free(c->syscall_archs); + c->syscall_archs = NULL; + + set_free(c->address_families); + c->address_families = NULL; + + strv_free(c->runtime_directory); + c->runtime_directory = NULL; + + bus_endpoint_free(c->bus_endpoint); + c->bus_endpoint = NULL; +} + +int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { + char **i; + + assert(c); + + if (!runtime_prefix) + return 0; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->runtime_directory) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p; + + p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i, NULL); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be + * sure this is gone when we start the service + * next. */ + rm_rf_dangerous(p, false, true, false); + } + + return 0; } void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { @@ -1789,7 +2026,7 @@ void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) { } } -int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { +int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, char ***l) { char **i, **r = NULL; assert(c); @@ -1836,7 +2073,7 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { return -EINVAL; } for (n = 0; n < count; n++) { - k = load_env_file(pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p); + k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p); if (k < 0) { if (ignore) continue; @@ -1846,7 +2083,7 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { } /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ if (p) - p = strv_env_clean_log(p, pglob.gl_pathv[n]); + p = strv_env_clean_log(p, unit_id, pglob.gl_pathv[n]); if (r == NULL) r = p; @@ -1870,8 +2107,8 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { } static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { - char *active = NULL, *console; - bool b; + _cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL; + char *console; if (startswith(tty, "/dev/")) tty += 5; @@ -1886,10 +2123,7 @@ static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { return true; /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ - b = streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); - free(active); - - return b; + return streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); } bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext *ec) { @@ -1926,6 +2160,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" + "%sProtectHome: %s\n" + "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n", prefix, c->umask, prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/", @@ -1934,6 +2170,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), + prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), + prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe)); STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) @@ -1942,11 +2180,6 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); - if (c->tcpwrap_name) - fprintf(f, - "%sTCPWrapName: %s\n", - prefix, c->tcpwrap_name); - if (c->nice_set) fprintf(f, "%sNice: %i\n", @@ -1959,30 +2192,24 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) if (c->rlimit[i]) - fprintf(f, "%s%s: %llu\n", prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), (unsigned long long) c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); + fprintf(f, "%s%s: "RLIM_FMT"\n", + prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); if (c->ioprio_set) { - char *class_str; - int r; + _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; - r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str); - if (r < 0) - class_str = NULL; + ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str); fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n" "%sIOPriority: %i\n", prefix, strna(class_str), prefix, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio)); - free(class_str); } if (c->cpu_sched_set) { - char *policy_str; - int r; + _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; - r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); - if (r < 0) - policy_str = NULL; + sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n" "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" @@ -1990,7 +2217,6 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { prefix, strna(policy_str), prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); - free(policy_str); } if (c->cpuset) { @@ -2001,7 +2227,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { fputs("\n", f); } - if (c->timer_slack_nsec != (nsec_t) -1) + if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); fprintf(f, @@ -2071,13 +2297,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix); for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++) - if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l))) { - _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t; - - t = cap_to_name(l); - if (t) - fprintf(f, " %s", t); - } + if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l))) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l))); fputs("\n", f); } @@ -2121,9 +2342,86 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { if (c->selinux_context) fprintf(f, - "%sSELinuxContext: %s\n", - prefix, c->selinux_context); + "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); + + if (c->personality != 0xffffffffUL) + fprintf(f, + "%sPersonality: %s\n", + prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); + + if (c->syscall_filter) { +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + Iterator j; + void *id; + bool first = true; +#endif + + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallFilter: ", + prefix); + + if (!c->syscall_whitelist) + fputc('~', f); + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; + + if (first) + first = false; + else + fputc(' ', f); + + name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); + fputs(strna(name), f); + } +#endif + + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->syscall_archs) { +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + Iterator j; + void *id; +#endif + + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", + prefix); + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); +#endif + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->syscall_errno != 0) + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n", + prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno))); + + if (c->apparmor_profile) + fprintf(f, + "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); +} + +bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under + * an unchanged UID or as root. */ + if (!c->user) + return true; + + if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) + return true; + + return false; } void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { @@ -2160,12 +2458,11 @@ void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { assert(s); assert(f); - if (!prefix) - prefix = ""; - if (s->pid <= 0) return; + prefix = strempty(prefix); + fprintf(f, "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", prefix, s->pid); @@ -2225,37 +2522,27 @@ char *exec_command_line(char **argv) { } void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { - char *p2; + _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; const char *prefix2; - char *cmd; - assert(c); assert(f); - if (!prefix) - prefix = ""; - p2 = strappend(prefix, "\t"); - prefix2 = p2 ? p2 : prefix; + prefix = strempty(prefix); + prefix2 = strappenda(prefix, "\t"); cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv); - fprintf(f, "%sCommand Line: %s\n", prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM)); - free(cmd); - exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); - - free(p2); } void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { assert(f); - if (!prefix) - prefix = ""; + prefix = strempty(prefix); LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c) exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix); @@ -2304,6 +2591,29 @@ int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { return 0; } +int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + va_list ap; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(path); + + va_start(ap, path); + l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + + static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) { if (*rt) @@ -2369,7 +2679,7 @@ ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *r) { if (r->n_ref <= 0) { free(r->tmp_dir); free(r->var_tmp_dir); - close_pipe(r->netns_storage_socket); + safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket); free(r); } @@ -2456,11 +2766,9 @@ int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(ExecRuntime **rt, Unit *u, const char *key, co return r; if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) - log_debug_unit(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value); + log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value); else { - if ((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]); - + safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]); (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); } } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { @@ -2471,11 +2779,9 @@ int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(ExecRuntime **rt, Unit *u, const char *key, co return r; if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) - log_debug_unit(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value); + log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value); else { - if ((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) - close_nointr_nofail((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]); - + safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]); (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); } } else @@ -2492,6 +2798,8 @@ static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) { } void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { + int r; + if (!rt) return; @@ -2501,17 +2809,29 @@ void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { if (rt->tmp_dir) { log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir); - asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); + + r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir); + free(rt->tmp_dir); + } + rt->tmp_dir = NULL; } if (rt->var_tmp_dir) { log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir); - asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); + + r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir); + free(rt->var_tmp_dir); + } + rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL; } - close_pipe(rt->netns_storage_socket); + safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); } static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = {