chiark / gitweb /
journald: introduce new "systemd-journal" group and make it own the journal files
[elogind.git] / src / journal / journald-server.c
index b46a2f63b35a0d9529295ece8d2bd1497d6b4293..ac565c7ece96ce1b1bbf57962c9fe04467ddea1e 100644 (file)
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static uint64_t available_space(Server *s) {
 }
 
 static void server_read_file_gid(Server *s) {
-        const char *adm = "adm";
+        const char *g = "systemd-journal";
         int r;
 
         assert(s);
@@ -182,9 +182,9 @@ static void server_read_file_gid(Server *s) {
         if (s->file_gid_valid)
                 return;
 
-        r = get_group_creds(&adm, &s->file_gid);
+        r = get_group_creds(&g, &s->file_gid);
         if (r < 0)
-                log_warning("Failed to resolve 'adm' group: %s", strerror(-r));
+                log_warning("Failed to resolve '%s' group: %s", g, strerror(-r));
 
         /* if we couldn't read the gid, then it will be 0, but that's
          * fine and we shouldn't try to resolve the group again, so
@@ -515,8 +515,8 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
         sd_id128_t id;
         int r;
         char *t;
-        uid_t loginuid = 0, realuid = 0, owner = 0, journal_uid;
-        bool loginuid_valid = false, owner_valid = false;
+        uid_t realuid = 0, owner = 0, journal_uid;
+        bool owner_valid = false;
 
         assert(s);
         assert(iovec);
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
 
         if (ucred) {
                 uint32_t audit;
+                uid_t loginuid;
 
                 realuid = ucred->uid;
 
@@ -570,11 +571,9 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
                                 IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], audit_session);
 
                 r = audit_loginuid_from_pid(ucred->pid, &loginuid);
-                if (r >= 0) {
-                        loginuid_valid = true;
+                if (r >= 0)
                         if (asprintf(&audit_loginuid, "_AUDIT_LOGINUID=%lu", (unsigned long) loginuid) >= 0)
                                 IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], audit_loginuid);
-                }
 
                 t = shortened_cgroup_path(ucred->pid);
                 if (t) {
@@ -621,9 +620,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
                 if (label) {
                         selinux_context = malloc(sizeof("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=") + label_len);
                         if (selinux_context) {
-                                memcpy(selinux_context, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT=", sizeof("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=")-1);
-                                memcpy(selinux_context+sizeof("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=")-1, label, label_len);
-                                selinux_context[sizeof("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=")-1+label_len] = 0;
+                                *((char*) mempcpy(stpcpy(selinux_context, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT="), label, label_len)) = 0;
                                 IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], selinux_context);
                         }
                 } else {
@@ -633,7 +630,6 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
                                 selinux_context = strappend("_SELINUX_CONTEXT=", con);
                                 if (selinux_context)
                                         IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], selinux_context);
-
                                 freecon(con);
                         }
                 }
@@ -672,18 +668,14 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
         if (s->split_mode == SPLIT_UID && realuid > 0)
                 /* Split up strictly by any UID */
                 journal_uid = realuid;
-        else if (s->split_mode == SPLIT_LOGIN && owner_valid && owner > 0 && realuid > 0)
+        else if (s->split_mode == SPLIT_LOGIN && realuid > 0 && owner_valid && owner > 0)
                 /* Split up by login UIDs, this avoids creation of
                  * individual journals for system UIDs.  We do this
                  * only if the realuid is not root, in order not to
-                 * accidentally leak privileged information logged by
-                 * a privileged process that is part of an
-                 * unprivileged session to the user. */
+                 * accidentally leak privileged information to the
+                 * user that is logged by a privileged process that is
+                 * part of an unprivileged session.*/
                 journal_uid = owner;
-        else if (s->split_mode == SPLIT_LOGIN && loginuid_valid && loginuid > 0 && realuid > 0)
-                /* Hmm, let's try via the audit uids, as fallback,
-                 * just in case */
-                journal_uid = loginuid;
         else
                 journal_uid = 0;