#include "af-list.h"
#include "mkdir.h"
#include "apparmor-util.h"
+#include "smack-util.h"
+#include "bus-kernel.h"
+#include "label.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
#include "seccomp-util.h"
case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE:
r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit_id, fileno);
if (r < 0) {
- log_struct_unit(LOG_CRIT, unit_id,
+ log_unit_struct(LOG_CRIT, unit_id,
"MESSAGE=Failed to connect std%s of %s to the journal socket: %s",
fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "out" : "err",
unit_id, strerror(-r),
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
-static int apply_seccomp(ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
uint32_t negative_action, action;
scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
Iterator i;
return r;
}
-static int apply_address_families(ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
Iterator i;
int r;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
- int dont_close[n_fds + 3];
+ int dont_close[n_fds + 4];
uid_t uid = (uid_t) -1;
gid_t gid = (gid_t) -1;
int i, err;
memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
n_dont_close += n_fds;
}
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
if (runtime) {
if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
}
}
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
- if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && context->pam_name) {
+#ifdef ENABLE_KDBUS
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) {
+ uid_t ep_uid = (uid == (uid_t) -1) ? 0 : uid;
+
+ err = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *error = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT;
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
+ * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
+ * user of the new process. */
+ if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) {
err = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid);
if (err < 0) {
*error = EXIT_CGROUP;
return err;
}
}
-#endif
if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) {
char **rt;
!strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs) ||
context->mount_flags != 0 ||
(context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) ||
+ params->bus_endpoint_path ||
context->private_devices ||
context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) {
context->inaccessible_dirs,
tmp,
var,
+ params->bus_endpoint_path,
context->private_devices,
context->protect_home,
context->protect_system,
context->mount_flags);
- if (err < 0) {
+
+ if (err == -EPERM)
+ log_unit_warning(params->unit_id, "Failed to set up file system namespace due to lack of privileges. Execution sandbox will not be in effect: %s", strerror(-err));
+ else if (err < 0) {
*error = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
return err;
}
/* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
* nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
* we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
- * and the netns fds we don#t need anymore. */
+ * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
+ * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
+ * now be closed as well. */
err = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds);
if (err >= 0)
err = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
}
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+ if (context->smack_process_label) {
+ err = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *error = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (context->user) {
err = enforce_user(context, uid);
if (err < 0) {
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- if (context->selinux_context && use_selinux()) {
- err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context);
- if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) {
- *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
- return err;
+ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ if (context->selinux_context) {
+ err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context);
+ if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) {
+ *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL;
+
+ err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, &label);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = setexeccon(label);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return err;
+ }
}
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
- if (context->apparmor_profile && use_apparmor()) {
+ if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
err = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
if (err < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
*error = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
- return err;
+ return -errno;
}
}
#endif
line = exec_command_line(final_argv);
if (line) {
log_open();
- log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG,
+ log_unit_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
params->unit_id,
"EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
"MESSAGE=Executing: %s", line,
n_fds = params->n_fds;
}
- err = exec_context_load_environment(context, &files_env);
+ err = exec_context_load_environment(context, params->unit_id, &files_env);
if (err < 0) {
- log_struct_unit(LOG_ERR,
+ log_unit_struct(LOG_ERR,
params->unit_id,
"MESSAGE=Failed to load environment files: %s", strerror(-err),
"ERRNO=%d", -err,
if (!line)
return log_oom();
- log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG,
+ log_unit_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
params->unit_id,
"EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
"MESSAGE=About to execute: %s", line,
_exit(r);
}
- log_struct_unit(LOG_DEBUG,
+ log_unit_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
params->unit_id,
"MESSAGE=Forked %s as "PID_FMT,
command->path, pid,
}
}
-int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
+int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, char ***l) {
char **i, **r = NULL;
assert(c);
}
/* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
if (p)
- p = strv_env_clean_log(p, pglob.gl_pathv[n]);
+ p = strv_env_clean_log(p, unit_id, pglob.gl_pathv[n]);
if (r == NULL)
r = p;
prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
}
+bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
+ * an unchanged UID or as root. */
+
+ if (!c->user)
+ return true;
+
+ if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0"))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) {
assert(s);
return 0;
}
+int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
+ va_list ap;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(path);
+
+ va_start(ap, path);
+ l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
if (*rt)
return r;
if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
- log_debug_unit(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
+ log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
else {
safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]);
(*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
return r;
if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
- log_debug_unit(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
+ log_unit_debug(u->id, "Failed to parse netns socket value %s", value);
else {
safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]);
(*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
~ianmdlvl / elogind.git / blobdiff