chiark / gitweb /
bus-proxy: fix policy for expected/non-expected reply tags
[elogind.git] / src / bus-proxyd / bus-proxyd.c
index 6101a20ad8c4e567f6f286152b1e310795d5b066..3cbbab718bd139bed498e67ce2c5857e606d6998 100644 (file)
@@ -992,6 +992,22 @@ static int process_policy(sd_bus *from, sd_bus *to, sd_bus_message *m, Policy *p
         if (!policy)
                 return 0;
 
+        /*
+         * dbus-1 distinguishes expected and non-expected replies by tracking
+         * method-calls and timeouts. By default, DENY rules are *NEVER* applied
+         * on expected replies, unless explicitly specified. But we dont track
+         * method-calls, thus, we cannot know whether a reply is expected.
+         * Fortunately, the kdbus forbids non-expected replies, so we can safely
+         * ignore any policy on those and let the kernel deal with it.
+         *
+         * TODO: To be correct, we should only ignore policy-tags that are
+         * applied on non-expected replies. However, so far we don't parse those
+         * tags so we let everything pass. I haven't seen a DENY policy tag on
+         * expected-replies, ever, so don't bother..
+         */
+        if (m->reply_cookie > 0)
+                return 0;
+
         if (from->is_kernel) {
                 uid_t sender_uid = UID_INVALID;
                 gid_t sender_gid = GID_INVALID;
@@ -1008,6 +1024,24 @@ static int process_policy(sd_bus *from, sd_bus *to, sd_bus_message *m, Policy *p
                 (void) sd_bus_creds_get_uid(&m->creds, &sender_uid);
                 (void) sd_bus_creds_get_gid(&m->creds, &sender_gid);
 
+                if (sender_uid == UID_INVALID || sender_gid == GID_INVALID) {
+                        _cleanup_bus_creds_unref_ sd_bus_creds *sender_creds = NULL;
+
+                        /* If the message came from another legacy
+                         * client, then the message creds will be
+                         * missing, simply because on legacy clients
+                         * per-message creds were unknown. In this
+                         * case, query the creds of the peer
+                         * instead. */
+
+                        r = bus_get_name_creds_kdbus(from, m->sender, SD_BUS_CREDS_UID|SD_BUS_CREDS_GID, true, &sender_creds);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return handle_policy_error(m, r);
+
+                        (void) sd_bus_creds_get_uid(sender_creds, &sender_uid);
+                        (void) sd_bus_creds_get_gid(sender_creds, &sender_gid);
+                }
+
                 /* First check whether the sender can send the message to our name */
                 if (set_isempty(owned_names)) {
                         if (policy_check_send(policy, sender_uid, sender_gid, m->header->type, NULL, m->path, m->interface, m->member))