X-Git-Url: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fcore%2Fexecute.c;h=63d295cf41f372a2b814edbb78715fc921bc5ed4;hb=d5243d628624038567c576e9b69c1d775eb05a05;hp=c19f613641c2952c8ce52104b087de07c951e1ca;hpb=56f64d95763a799ba4475daf44d8e9f72a1bd474;p=elogind.git diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index c19f61364..63d295cf4 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ #include "mkdir.h" #include "apparmor-util.h" #include "smack-util.h" -#include "bus-kernel.h" +#include "bus-endpoint.h" #include "label.h" +#include "cap-list.h" #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP #include "seccomp-util.h" @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) { fds[i] = nfd; /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then - * let's remember that and try again from here*/ + * let's remember that and try again from here */ if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) restart_from = i; } @@ -218,12 +219,52 @@ static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { return r; } -static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, int nfd) { - int fd, r; +static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { union sockaddr_union sa = { .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout", }; + uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; + int r; + + if (gid != GID_INVALID) { + oldgid = getgid(); + + r = setegid(gid); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (uid != UID_INVALID) { + olduid = getuid(); + + r = seteuid(uid); + if (r < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto restore_gid; + } + } + + r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path)); + if (r < 0) + r = -errno; + + /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely + fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */ + + if (uid != UID_INVALID) + (void) seteuid(olduid); + + restore_gid: + if (gid != GID_INVALID) + (void) setegid(oldgid); + + return r; +} + +static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, int nfd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + int fd, r; assert(context); assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); @@ -234,11 +275,9 @@ static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, cons if (fd < 0) return -errno; - r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path)); - if (r < 0) { - safe_close(fd); - return -errno; - } + r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) + return r; if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) { safe_close(fd); @@ -357,7 +396,7 @@ static int setup_input(const ExecContext *context, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty } } -static int setup_output(const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, bool apply_tty_stdin) { +static int setup_output(const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, bool apply_tty_stdin, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { ExecOutput o; ExecInput i; int r; @@ -424,10 +463,10 @@ static int setup_output(const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, c case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: - r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit_id, fileno); + r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit_id, fileno, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { log_unit_struct(unit_id, - LOG_CRIT, + LOG_ERR, LOG_MESSAGE("Failed to connect %s of %s to the journal socket: %s", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr", unit_id, strerror(-r)), @@ -758,7 +797,7 @@ static int setup_pam( * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ - if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_PRI(LOG_DEBUG)) + if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) flags |= PAM_SILENT; pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); @@ -1238,11 +1277,12 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, int *error) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; unsigned n_dont_close = 0; int dont_close[n_fds + 4]; - uid_t uid = (uid_t) -1; - gid_t gid = (gid_t) -1; + uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; int i, err; assert(command); @@ -1325,6 +1365,15 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, } } + if (context->user) { + username = context->user; + err = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_USER; + return err; + } + } + /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */ if (socket_fd >= 0) @@ -1336,20 +1385,20 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, return err; } - err = setup_output(context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin); + err = setup_output(context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid); if (err < 0) { *error = EXIT_STDOUT; return err; } - err = setup_output(context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin); + err = setup_output(context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->unit_id, params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid); if (err < 0) { *error = EXIT_STDERR; return err; } if (params->cgroup_path) { - err = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0); + err = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL); if (err < 0) { *error = EXIT_CGROUP; return err; @@ -1357,12 +1406,16 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, } if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { - char t[16]; + char t[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context->oom_score_adjust)]; - snprintf(t, sizeof(t), "%i", context->oom_score_adjust); - char_array_0(t); + /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then + * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces + * prohibit write access to this file, and we + * shouldn't trip up over that. */ - if (write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t) < 0) { + sprintf(t, "%i", context->oom_score_adjust); + err = write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t); + if (err < 0 && err != -EPERM) { *error = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; return -errno; } @@ -1417,26 +1470,17 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, if (context->utmp_id) utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path); - if (context->user) { - username = context->user; - err = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); + if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) { + err = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); if (err < 0) { - *error = EXIT_USER; + *error = EXIT_STDIN; return err; } - - if (is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) { - err = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); - if (err < 0) { - *error = EXIT_STDIN; - return err; - } - } } #ifdef ENABLE_KDBUS if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) { - uid_t ep_uid = (uid == (uid_t) -1) ? 0 : uid; + uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid; err = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint); if (err < 0) { @@ -1584,6 +1628,16 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, } } +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { + err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); + if (err < 0) { + *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return err; + } + } +#endif + /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd @@ -1683,24 +1737,10 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX if (mac_selinux_use()) { - if (context->selinux_context) { - err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context); - if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) { - *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return err; - } - } - - if (params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { - _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL; - - err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, &label); - if (err < 0) { - *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return err; - } + char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; - err = setexeccon(label); + if (exec_context) { + err = setexeccon(exec_context); if (err < 0) { *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; return err; @@ -1746,7 +1786,7 @@ static int exec_child(ExecCommand *command, final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env); - if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_PRI(LOG_DEBUG))) { + if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG)) { _cleanup_free_ char *line; line = exec_command_line(final_argv); @@ -1986,7 +2026,7 @@ int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_p /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be * sure this is gone when we start the service * next. */ - rm_rf_dangerous(p, false, true, false); + rm_rf(p, false, true, false); } return 0; @@ -2009,7 +2049,7 @@ void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, unsigned n) { exec_command_done(c+i); } -void exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { +ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { ExecCommand *i; while ((i = c)) { @@ -2017,15 +2057,26 @@ void exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { exec_command_done(i); free(i); } + + return NULL; } void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) { unsigned i; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - exec_command_free_list(c[i]); - c[i] = NULL; - } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]); +} + +typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { + const char *unit_id; + const char *path; +} InvalidEnvInfo; + +static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { + InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; + + log_unit_error(info->unit_id, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); } int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, char ***l) { @@ -2084,8 +2135,14 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(const ExecContext *c, const char *unit_id, cha return k; } /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ - if (p) - p = strv_env_clean_log(p, unit_id, pglob.gl_pathv[n]); + if (p) { + InvalidEnvInfo info = { + .unit_id = unit_id, + .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n] + }; + + p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); + } if (r == NULL) r = p; @@ -2299,13 +2356,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix); for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++) - if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l))) { - _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t; - - t = cap_to_name(l); - if (t) - fprintf(f, " %s", t); - } + if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l))) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l))); fputs("\n", f); }