X-Git-Url: http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/ucgi/~ianmdlvl/git?a=blobdiff_plain;f=man%2Fsystemd.exec.xml;h=e1193d2d55c64288cf106209bb430218035e984b;hb=ab060556a9e1ebb2744719a29985e40919101a22;hp=291178679da85b533c35aca108e08edd52a26094;hpb=e06c73cc91e02a1a3dffdb0976fef754f1109e74;p=elogind.git diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 291178679..e1193d2d5 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ systemd.exec - systemd execution environment configuration + Execution environment configuration @@ -1091,6 +1091,54 @@ shell pipelines. + + NoNewPrivileges= + + Takes a boolean + argument. If true ensures that the + service process and all its children + can never gain new privileges. This + option is more powerful than the respective + secure bits flags (see above), as it + also prohibits UID changes of any + kind. This is the simplest, most + effective way to ensure that a process + and its children can never elevate + privileges again. + + + + SystemCallFilter= + + Takes a space + separated list of system call + names. If this setting is used all + system calls executed by the unit + process except for the listed ones + will result in immediate process + termination with the SIGSYS signal + (whitelisting). If the first character + of the list is ~ + the effect is inverted: only the + listed system calls will result in + immediate process termination + (blacklisting). If this option is used + NoNewPrivileges=yes + is implied. This feature makes use of + the Secure Computing Mode 2 interfaces + of the kernel ('seccomp filtering') + and is useful for enforcing a minimal + sandboxing environment. Note that the + execve, + rt_sigreturn, + sigreturn, + exit_group, + exit system calls + are implicitly whitelisted and don't + need to be listed + explicitly. + + @@ -1104,7 +1152,8 @@ systemd.service5, systemd.socket5, systemd.swap5, - systemd.mount5 + systemd.mount5, + systemd.kill5