#include <limits.h>
#include <langinfo.h>
#include <locale.h>
+#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#undef basename
return s;
}
+int get_process_state(pid_t pid) {
+ const char *p;
+ char state;
+ int r;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+
+ assert(pid >= 0);
+
+ p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "stat");
+ r = read_one_line_file(p, &line);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ p = strrchr(line, ')');
+ if (!p)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ p++;
+
+ if (sscanf(p, " %c", &state) != 1)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return (unsigned char) state;
+}
+
int get_process_comm(pid_t pid, char **name) {
const char *p;
int r;
return strnappend(s, suffix, suffix ? strlen(suffix) : 0);
}
-int readlink_malloc(const char *p, char **r) {
+int readlink_malloc(const char *p, char **ret) {
size_t l = 100;
+ int r;
assert(p);
- assert(r);
+ assert(ret);
for (;;) {
char *c;
ssize_t n;
- if (!(c = new(char, l)))
+ c = new(char, l);
+ if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
- if ((n = readlink(p, c, l-1)) < 0) {
- int ret = -errno;
+ n = readlink(p, c, l-1);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
free(c);
- return ret;
+ return r;
}
if ((size_t) n < l-1) {
c[n] = 0;
- *r = c;
+ *ret = c;
return 0;
}
if (!saved_argv[i])
break;
- memset(saved_argv[i], 0, strlen(saved_argv[i]));
+ memzero(saved_argv[i], strlen(saved_argv[i]));
}
}
}
}
int get_ctty(pid_t pid, dev_t *_devnr, char **r) {
- int k;
- char fn[sizeof("/dev/char/")-1 + 2*DECIMAL_STR_MAX(unsigned) + 1 + 1], *s, *b, *p;
+ char fn[sizeof("/dev/char/")-1 + 2*DECIMAL_STR_MAX(unsigned) + 1 + 1], *b = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
+ const char *p;
dev_t devnr;
+ int k;
assert(r);
/* This is an ugly hack */
if (major(devnr) == 136) {
- if (asprintf(&b, "pts/%lu", (unsigned long) minor(devnr)) < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- *r = b;
- if (_devnr)
- *_devnr = devnr;
-
- return 0;
+ asprintf(&b, "pts/%lu", (unsigned long) minor(devnr));
+ goto finish;
}
/* Probably something like the ptys which have no
* vaguely useful. */
b = strdup(fn + 5);
- if (!b)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- *r = b;
- if (_devnr)
- *_devnr = devnr;
-
- return 0;
+ goto finish;
}
if (startswith(s, "/dev/"))
p = s;
b = strdup(p);
- free(s);
+finish:
if (!b)
return -ENOMEM;
return r;
}
-int status_welcome(void) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *pretty_name = NULL, *ansi_color = NULL;
- int r;
-
- r = parse_env_file("/etc/os-release", NEWLINE,
- "PRETTY_NAME", &pretty_name,
- "ANSI_COLOR", &ansi_color,
- NULL);
-
- if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
- log_warning("Failed to read /etc/os-release: %s", strerror(-r));
-
- return status_printf(NULL, false, false,
- "\nWelcome to \x1B[%sm%s\x1B[0m!\n",
- isempty(ansi_color) ? "1" : ansi_color,
- isempty(pretty_name) ? "Linux" : pretty_name);
-}
-
char *replace_env(const char *format, char **env) {
enum {
WORD,
assert(mode);
assert(_f);
- if (!path_strv_canonicalize_uniq(search))
+ if (!path_strv_canonicalize_absolute_uniq(search, NULL))
return -ENOMEM;
STRV_FOREACH(i, search) {
return NULL;
if (*allocated > prev)
- memset(&q[prev], 0, *allocated - prev);
+ memzero(&q[prev], *allocated - prev);
return q;
}
return true;
}
-void parse_user_at_host(char *arg, char **user, char **host) {
- assert(arg);
- assert(user);
- assert(host);
-
- *host = strchr(arg, '@');
- if (*host == NULL)
- *host = arg;
- else {
- *host[0]++ = '\0';
- *user = arg;
- }
-}
-
int split_pair(const char *s, const char *sep, char **l, char **r) {
char *x, *a, *b;
int r;
if (detect_container(NULL) > 0) {
- char *buf, *p;
+ char *buf = NULL, *p;
size_t sz = 0;
r = read_full_file("/proc/1/cmdline", &buf, &sz);
return 1;
}
+int parse_proc_cmdline(int (*parse_word)(const char *word)) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
+ char *w, *state;
+ size_t l;
+ int r;
+
+ r = proc_cmdline(&line);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning("Failed to read /proc/cmdline, ignoring: %s", strerror(-r));
+ if (r <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED(w, l, line, state) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *word;
+
+ word = strndup(w, l);
+ if (!word)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = parse_word(word);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error("Failed on cmdline argument %s: %s", word, strerror(-r));
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int container_get_leader(const char *machine, pid_t *pid) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *class = NULL;
const char *p;
return 0;
}
-bool pid_valid(pid_t pid) {
+bool pid_is_unwaited(pid_t pid) {
+ /* Checks whether a PID is still valid at all, including a zombie */
+
if (pid <= 0)
return false;
return errno != ESRCH;
}
+bool pid_is_alive(pid_t pid) {
+ int r;
+
+ /* Checks whether a PID is still valid and not a zombie */
+
+ if (pid <= 0)
+ return false;
+
+ r = get_process_state(pid);
+ if (r == -ENOENT || r == 'Z')
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
int getpeercred(int fd, struct ucred *ucred) {
socklen_t n = sizeof(struct ucred);
struct ucred u;
return 0;
}
-int writev_safe(int fd, const struct iovec *w, int j) {
- for (int i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- size_t written = 0;
-
- while (written < w[i].iov_len) {
- ssize_t r;
-
- r = write(fd, (char*) w[i].iov_base + written, w[i].iov_len - written);
- if (r < 0 && errno != -EINTR)
- return -errno;
-
- written += r;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
+/* This is much like like mkostemp() but is subject to umask(). */
int mkostemp_safe(char *pattern, int flags) {
- unsigned long tries = TMP_MAX;
- char *s;
- int r;
_cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
+ int fd;
assert(pattern);
u = umask(077);
- /* This is much like like mkostemp() but avoids using any
- * static variables, thus is async signal safe. Also, it's not
- * subject to umask(). */
-
- s = endswith(pattern, "XXXXXX");
- if (!s)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- while (tries--) {
- unsigned i;
- int fd;
-
- r = dev_urandom(s, 6);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- s[i] = ALPHANUMERICAL[(unsigned) s[i] % (sizeof(ALPHANUMERICAL)-1)];
-
- fd = open(pattern, flags|O_EXCL|O_CREAT|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
- if (fd >= 0)
- return fd;
- if (!IN_SET(errno, EEXIST, EINTR))
- return -errno;
- }
+ fd = mkostemp(pattern, flags);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
- return -EEXIST;
+ return fd;
}
int open_tmpfile(const char *path, int flags) {
unlink(p);
return fd;
}
+
+int fd_warn_permissions(const char *path, int fd) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (st.st_mode & 0111)
+ log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked executable. Please remove executable permission bits. Proceeding anyway.", path);
+
+ if (st.st_mode & 0002)
+ log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked world-writable. Please remove world writability permission bits. Proceeding anyway.", path);
+
+ if (getpid() == 1 && (st.st_mode & 0044) != 0044)
+ log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked world-inaccessible. This has no effect as configuration data is accessible via APIs without restrictions. Proceeding anyway.", path);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long personality_from_string(const char *p) {
+
+ /* Parse a personality specifier. We introduce our own
+ * identifiers that indicate specific ABIs, rather than just
+ * hints regarding the register size, since we want to keep
+ * things open for multiple locally supported ABIs for the
+ * same register size. We try to reuse the ABI identifiers
+ * used by libseccomp. */
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+
+ if (streq(p, "x86"))
+ return PER_LINUX32;
+
+ if (streq(p, "x86-64"))
+ return PER_LINUX;
+
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+
+ if (streq(p, "x86"))
+ return PER_LINUX;
+#endif
+
+ /* personality(7) documents that 0xffffffffUL is used for
+ * querying the current personality, hence let's use that here
+ * as error indicator. */
+ return 0xffffffffUL;
+}
+
+const char* personality_to_string(unsigned long p) {
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+
+ if (p == PER_LINUX32)
+ return "x86";
+
+ if (p == PER_LINUX)
+ return "x86-64";
+
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+
+ if (p == PER_LINUX)
+ return "x86";
+#endif
+
+ return NULL;
+}