return sd_bus_send(bus, m, NULL);
}
+_public_ int sd_bus_call_method_async(
+ sd_bus *bus,
+ sd_bus_slot **slot,
+ const char *destination,
+ const char *path,
+ const char *interface,
+ const char *member,
+ sd_bus_message_handler_t callback,
+ void *userdata,
+ const char *types, ...) {
+
+ _cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message *m = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
+ assert_return(!bus_pid_changed(bus), -ECHILD);
+
+ if (!BUS_IS_OPEN(bus->state))
+ return -ENOTCONN;
+
+ r = sd_bus_message_new_method_call(bus, &m, destination, path, interface, member);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!isempty(types)) {
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, types);
+ r = bus_message_append_ap(m, types, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return sd_bus_call_async(bus, slot, m, callback, userdata, 0);
+}
+
_public_ int sd_bus_call_method(
sd_bus *bus,
const char *destination,
/* No data passed? Or not enough data passed to retrieve the missing bits? */
if (!c || !(c->mask & SD_BUS_CREDS_PID)) {
/* We couldn't read anything from the call, let's try
- * to get it from the sender or peer */
+ * to get it from the sender or peer. */
if (call->sender)
+ /* There's a sender, but the creds are
+ * missing. This means we are talking via
+ * dbus1, or are getting a message that was
+ * sent to us via kdbus, but was converted
+ * from a dbus1 message by the bus-proxy and
+ * thus also lacks the creds. */
return sd_bus_get_name_creds(call->bus, call->sender, mask, creds);
else
+ /* There's no sender, hence we are on a dbus1
+ * direct connection. For direct connections
+ * the credentials of the AF_UNIX peer matter,
+ * which may be queried via
+ * sd_bus_get_owner_creds(). */
return sd_bus_get_owner_creds(call->bus, mask, creds);
}
return -ENOTCONN;
if (capability >= 0) {
+
r = sd_bus_query_sender_creds(call, SD_BUS_CREDS_UID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS, &creds);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ /* We cannot use augmented caps for authorization,
+ * since then data is acquired raceful from
+ * /proc. This can never actually happen, but let's
+ * better be safe than sorry, and do an extra check
+ * here. */
+ assert_return((sd_bus_creds_get_augmented_mask(creds) & SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS) == 0, -EPERM);
+
/* Note that not even on kdbus we might have the caps
* field, due to faked identities, or namespace
* translation issues. */
if (our_uid != 0 || !know_caps || capability < 0) {
uid_t sender_uid;
+ /* We cannot use augmented uid/euid for authorization,
+ * since then data is acquired raceful from
+ * /proc. This can never actually happen, but let's
+ * better be safe than sorry, and do an extra check
+ * here. */
+ assert_return((sd_bus_creds_get_augmented_mask(creds) & (SD_BUS_CREDS_UID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID)) == 0, -EPERM);
+
/* Try to use the EUID, if we have it. */
r = sd_bus_creds_get_euid(creds, &sender_uid);
if (r < 0)