* realuid is not root, in order not to accidentally
* leak privileged information to the user that is
* logged by a privileged process that is part of an
- * unprivileged session.*/
+ * unprivileged session. */
journal_uid = owner;
else
journal_uid = 0;
* the SELinux people this will change and it
* will probably be identical to NAME_MAX. For
* now we use that, but this should be updated
- * one day when the final limit is known.*/
+ * one day when the final limit is known. */
uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) +
CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct timeval)) +
CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int)) + /* fd */
* don't rely on it. */
(void) ioctl(fd, SIOCINQ, &v);
- /* Fix it up, if it is too small. We use the same fixed value as auditd here. Awful!*/
+ /* Fix it up, if it is too small. We use the same fixed value as auditd here. Awful! */
m = PAGE_ALIGN(MAX3((size_t) v + 1,
(size_t) LINE_MAX,
ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)) + ALIGN((size_t) MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH)) + 1);
static int server_parse_config_file(Server *s) {
assert(s);
- return config_parse(NULL, "/etc/systemd/journald.conf", NULL,
- "Journal\0",
- config_item_perf_lookup, journald_gperf_lookup,
- false, false, true, s);
+ return config_parse_many("/etc/systemd/journald.conf",
+ CONF_DIRS_NULSTR("systemd/journald.conf"),
+ "Journal\0",
+ config_item_perf_lookup, journald_gperf_lookup,
+ false, s);
}
static int server_dispatch_sync(sd_event_source *es, usec_t t, void *userdata) {
s->audit_fd = fd;
- } else
- log_error("Unknown socket passed as file descriptor %d, ignoring.", fd);
+ } else {
+ log_warning("Unknown socket passed as file descriptor %d, ignoring.", fd);
+
+ /* Let's close the fd, better be safe than
+ sorry. The fd might reference some resource
+ that we really want to release if we don't
+ make use of it. */
+
+ safe_close(fd);
+ }
}
r = server_open_syslog_socket(s);