#include "smack-util.h"
#include "bus-kernel.h"
#include "label.h"
+#include "cap-list.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
#include "seccomp-util.h"
fds[i] = nfd;
/* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
- * let's remember that and try again from here*/
+ * let's remember that and try again from here */
if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0)
restart_from = i;
}
log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
err = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
} else {
- log_error("PAM failed: %m");
+ log_error_errno(errno, "PAM failed: %m");
err = -errno;
}
int *error) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
int dont_close[n_fds + 4];
- uid_t uid = (uid_t) -1;
- gid_t gid = (gid_t) -1;
+ uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
+ gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
int i, err;
assert(command);
}
if (params->cgroup_path) {
- err = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0);
+ err = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
*error = EXIT_CGROUP;
return err;
#ifdef ENABLE_KDBUS
if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) {
- uid_t ep_uid = (uid == (uid_t) -1) ? 0 : uid;
+ uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid;
err = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint);
if (err < 0) {
context->mount_flags);
if (err == -EPERM)
- log_unit_warning(params->unit_id, "Failed to set up file system namespace due to lack of privileges. Execution sandbox will not be in effect: %s", strerror(-err));
+ log_unit_warning_errno(params->unit_id, err, "Failed to set up file system namespace due to lack of privileges. Execution sandbox will not be in effect: %m");
else if (err < 0) {
*error = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
return err;
}
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
+ err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
* nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
* we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
if (mac_selinux_use()) {
- if (context->selinux_context) {
- err = setexeccon(context->selinux_context);
- if (err < 0 && !context->selinux_context_ignore) {
- *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
- return err;
- }
- }
-
- if (params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL;
+ char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
- err = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, &label);
- if (err < 0) {
- *error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
- return err;
- }
-
- err = setexeccon(label);
+ if (exec_context) {
+ err = setexeccon(exec_context);
if (err < 0) {
*error = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
return err;
fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
- if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l))) {
- _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t;
-
- t = cap_to_name(l);
- if (t)
- fprintf(f, " %s", t);
- }
+ if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l)))
+ fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
fputs("\n", f);
}