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Yes, it is 2 years for s 1 CMA - I didn't have full access either
to the 'net or my own files when I posted this morning. <br>
<br>
s 2 CMA is unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate
commission of futher offences
(<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/section/2">http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/section/2</a>) but
identifying the "further offence" in the NOTW situation might be
difficult.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 16/01/2011 13:56, Matthew Pemble wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:AANLkTinSNvvgER=mG+0CTjXn5WYH6ek=sE_zbXXtcXOA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">On 16 January 2011 08:34, Peter Sommer <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:peter@pmsommer.com">peter@pmsommer.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid
rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left:
1ex;">
<br>
So the prosecution route is via s 1 CMA 1990 - maximum
punishment (I am pretty sure): 5 years.<br>
<font color="#888888">
<br>
</font></blockquote>
<div><br>
Now, if illegal interception was punishable by at least 5
years (max is actually 2 on indictment, or a fine on summary),
we'd finally have a use for s2 CMA!<br>
<br>
s1 CMA, unless I've missed something vital, is also a max of 2
years on indictment (raised from 6 months by PCJA 2006)?<br>
<br>
M. <br>
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<br>
-- <br>
Matthew Pemble<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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