Investigatory Powers Act - Government mandated backdoors

Peter Fairbrother zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk
Fri Dec 2 15:09:20 GMT 2016


Bad form to reply to oneself, but some corrections and thoughts:

On 02/12/16 11:03, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
[...]
> Behaviour which amounts to interception would not be lawful even if
> mandated under a Section 254 Technical capability notice (or under an
> even-more-creepy section 253 [1] National security notice).

Got that last bit wrong: 253 (8) Conduct required by a national security 
notice is to be treated as lawful for all purposes (to the extent that 
it would not otherwise be so treated).

Not quite sure what the bit in brackets does, but - scaaaary .


[..]
> Subsection 262 (11) ‚ÄúTelecommunications service‚ÄĚ means any service that
> consists in the provision of access to, *and* of facilities for making
> use of, any telecommunication system [..].
>
>
> So to be a "relevant operator" you have to both provide access to a
> telecomms system, and to provide facilities for making use of that system.
>
> Which would include ISPs, no doubt. But would it include Apple,
> Facebook, Twitter etc? Do they provide facilities for making use of a
> system, and also provide access to that system?
>
> This is not clear, but the system involved cannot be the internet itself.
>
> It could be Twitter's own systems, as Twitter provide access to them,

Aaah, but on reflection, do they? You can't access Twitter without an 
internet connection. Sure they let people use them, but is that 
providing access?

If not, then a lot of the criticism of the Bill is misplaced. Not that 
it's good or anything, but the criticism is wrong. Though we knew that 
anyway.


-- Peter Fairbrother





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