From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Wed May  6 17:41:20 2015
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 17:41:20 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>

My apologies if this is a stupid question, but someone might be able to
give me some perspective.

If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy. It
complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also that
the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am interpreting
correctly). The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of
the site.

If I then click on the log in button I am sent to securebank.cahoot.com for
which Chrome has other (but slightly different) complaints. Also: in the
process a window very briefly appears and then vanishes again (which is
always unsettling).

Is it safe for me to go forward and enter my security details to access my
account, or should I contact the bank and ask them to fix it (or rather to
wait in their customer service queue to be told "no" after much
incomprehension I suspect).

Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.

-- 
Francis Davey
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From amidgley at gmail.com  Wed May  6 20:36:38 2015
From: amidgley at gmail.com (Adrian Midgley)
Date: Wed, 06 May 2015 19:36:38 +0000
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAN2jWyjw=JVFhuDg4tz_J04AmQLOKtf0oKB0HKcBQV3N34TFFQ@mail.gmail.com>

TLS 1.0 is a bit obsolete and breakable I think.

It isn't any riskier than last month, but is more risky than the year
before last, is how I read it.  The pictures don't really need encrypting,
I think, but the bank should upgrade its secure layer.

On Wed, 6 May 2015 at 17:42 Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> wrote:

> My apologies if this is a stupid question, but someone might be able to
> give me some perspective.
>
> If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy. It
> complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also that
> the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am interpreting
> correctly). The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of
> the site.
>
> If I then click on the log in button I am sent to securebank.cahoot.com
> for which Chrome has other (but slightly different) complaints. Also: in
> the process a window very briefly appears and then vanishes again (which is
> always unsettling).
>
> Is it safe for me to go forward and enter my security details to access my
> account, or should I contact the bank and ask them to fix it (or rather to
> wait in their customer service queue to be told "no" after much
> incomprehension I suspect).
>
> Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.
>
>
> --
> Francis Davey
>
>
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From mozolevsky at gmail.com  Wed May  6 17:59:08 2015
From: mozolevsky at gmail.com (Igor Mozolevsky)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 17:59:08 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CADWvR2gEdWzm_-ER7sRsxWeKOEktvyO8qWv+FqVi=W2+vpfWRg@mail.gmail.com>

Francis,


On 6 May 2015 at 17:41, Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> wrote:

If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy. It
> complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also that
> the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am interpreting
> correctly). The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of
> the site.
>

www.cahoot.com:443 sends:


depth=2 /O=Entrust.net/OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits
liab.)/OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited/CN=Entrust.net Certification
Authority (2048)
verify error:num=19:self signed certificate in certificate chain
verify return:0
---
Certificate chain
 0 s:/C=ES/ST=Santander/L=Santander/O=GRUPO SANTANDER/OU=DIVISION UK/CN=
www.cahoot.com
   i:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=www.entrust.net/rpa is incorporated by
reference/OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc./CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1C
 1 s:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=www.entrust.net/rpa is incorporated by
reference/OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc./CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1C
   i:/O=Entrust.net/OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits
liab.)/OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited/CN=Entrust.net Certification
Authority (2048)
 2 s:/O=Entrust.net/OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits
liab.)/OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited/CN=Entrust.net Certification
Authority (2048)
   i:/O=Entrust.net/OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits
liab.)/OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited/CN=Entrust.net Certification
Authority (2048)
---
Server certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
subject=/C=ES/ST=Santander/L=Santander/O=GRUPO SANTANDER/OU=DIVISION UK/CN=
www.cahoot.com
issuer=/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=www.entrust.net/rpa is incorporated by
reference/OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc./CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1C
---
No client certificate CA names sent
---
SSL handshake has read 3814 bytes and written 440 bytes
---
New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is RC4-MD5
Server public key is 2048 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
    Protocol  : TLSv1
    Cipher    : RC4-MD5
    Session-ID:
6F25ED1BBB26096C29E4E76A281B5799033ADF5B75B4B6540D27979740C8D434
    Session-ID-ctx:
    Master-Key:
EEFB43D5A0340356DAA0EBA78E8BE2730D047FF9AA64ECDF8717363DA8646207AE0F5B7674CD0F70BBAA0807A0B13A52
    Key-Arg   : None
    Start Time: 1430930711
    Timeout   : 300 (sec)
    Verify return code: 0 (ok)
---


I suspect the complaint is about the use of RC4-MD5; in contrast, NatWest
use AES128-SHA (just checked). FYI, Cisco downgraded RC4 to "avoid" some
time toward the end of 2013 [1].


1. http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/nextgen_crypto.html


-- 
Igor M.
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From ben at links.org  Wed May  6 21:50:03 2015
From: ben at links.org (Ben Laurie)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 21:50:03 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAG5KPzzOK9QfPQLtW36tW4ha-nxzZYvxO2QP7fKkTgDJ+Yo16A@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 May 2015 at 17:41, Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> wrote:
> My apologies if this is a stupid question, but someone might be able to give
> me some perspective.
>
> If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy. It
> complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also that
> the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am interpreting
> correctly). The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of
> the site.
>
> If I then click on the log in button I am sent to securebank.cahoot.com for
> which Chrome has other (but slightly different) complaints. Also: in the
> process a window very briefly appears and then vanishes again (which is
> always unsettling).
>
> Is it safe for me to go forward and enter my security details to access my
> account, or should I contact the bank and ask them to fix it (or rather to
> wait in their customer service queue to be told "no" after much
> incomprehension I suspect).
>
> Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.

Clearly the question is not stupid: why present information that is
not useful to you.

The most obvious problem with that site is they're using MD5, which
everyone agrees is past its sell-by. But obviously end users are
completely oblivious to.

There may be other problems, the warning is less than clear. And I
know what I'm talking about, mostly!


From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Wed May  6 19:42:37 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 19:42:37 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150506184237.GA5474@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 05:41:20PM +0100, Francis Davey wrote:
>    My apologies if this is a stupid question, but someone might be able to
>    give me some perspective.
>    If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy.
>    It complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also
>    that the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am
>    interpreting correctly).

It does have a public key certificate (otherwise there would be no
padlock icon at all), they are saying it doesn't use the extended
validation that some sites use to provide a verified organisation
name as well as just a verified site address.

>    The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of the site.
>    If I then click on the log in button I am sent to securebank.cahoot.com
>    for which Chrome has other (but slightly different) complaints. Also: in
>    the process a window very briefly appears and then vanishes again (which
>    is always unsettling).
>    Is it safe for me to go forward and enter my security details to access my
>    account, or should I contact the bank and ask them to fix it (or rather to
>    wait in their customer service queue to be told "no" after much
>    incomprehension I suspect).
>    Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.

The Chrome alert is because the certificate is using an SHA1 hash,
and as of fairly recently, Chrome has started to complain mildly about
this because it is considered weak but it is not completely broken.

However, there appear to be various other things about the SSL
configuration for securebank.cahoot.com that give cause for concern.
It may be completely insecure if your connection can be intercepted:

  https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=securebank.cahoot.com

I would recommend not accessing the bank except via a trusted
network connection, i.e. your home broadband or suchlike, not
public wifi hotspots. You may wish to also contact them and see
what they say (they won't say anything of course except "we use
the latest encryption technologies to keep you safe").


From ukcrypto at absent-minded.com  Wed May  6 22:02:16 2015
From: ukcrypto at absent-minded.com (Mark Lomas)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 22:02:16 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CACAki+vMtwwGkW9Z4Ubds72UsCF24znW1MuGnB82ePg0vontZA@mail.gmail.com>

Francis,

The site appears to be vulnerable to several possible attacks.

You may be interested in what Qualys thinks of that site.
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cahoot.com

I wouldn't use that site at present.

I suspect that part of the problem is that if they fixed the major problem
they would break compatibility with older browsers.

Mark

On 6 May 2015 at 17:41, Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> wrote:

> My apologies if this is a stupid question, but someone might be able to
> give me some perspective.
>
> If I navigate to https://www.cahoot.com, Chrome seems less than happy. It
> complains about the cryptographic technology being obsolete and also that
> the site does not possess a public key certificate (if I am interpreting
> correctly). The icon it displays suggests a fairly qualified acceptance of
> the site.
>
> If I then click on the log in button I am sent to securebank.cahoot.com
> for which Chrome has other (but slightly different) complaints. Also: in
> the process a window very briefly appears and then vanishes again (which is
> always unsettling).
>
> Is it safe for me to go forward and enter my security details to access my
> account, or should I contact the bank and ask them to fix it (or rather to
> wait in their customer service queue to be told "no" after much
> incomprehension I suspect).
>
> Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.
>
> --
> Francis Davey
>
>
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From brian at thejohnsons.co.uk  Wed May  6 23:02:38 2015
From: brian at thejohnsons.co.uk (Brian L Johnson)
Date: Wed, 06 May 2015 23:02:38 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <op.xx8h6ocsc3r7hz@thedell>

On Wed, 06 May 2015 17:41:20 +0100, Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> wrote:

> Thoughts? I am keen not to have my bank account hacked.

Apart from using weak crypto, the main issue appears to be that some  
elements of the page are insecure.

In Chrome's words:

"Your connection to the site is encrypted, but Google Chrome has detected  
mixed content on the page. Be careful if you're entering information on  
this page. Mixed content can provide a loophole for someone to manipulate  
the page. This content could be third- party images or ads embedded on the  
page."

So, if someone inserts an ad which is designed to look like the box where  
you enter your username and password...

-- 
brianlj


From mel at herald.co.uk  Wed May  6 23:48:06 2015
From: mel at herald.co.uk (Melanie Dymond Harper)
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 23:48:06 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Message-ID: <20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>

> From: Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk>
> The Chrome alert is because the certificate is using an SHA1 hash,
> and as of fairly recently, Chrome has started to complain mildly about
> this because it is considered weak but it is not completely broken.

For once Chrome isn't complaining about this aspect, because while it is 
an SHA-1 cert, it expires in 2015 and thus isn't covered by Chrome's 
complaints about such certs -- they are distrusting SHA-1 certs (or 
certs involving a SHA-1 intermediate in their chain) which expire on or 
after 1/1/2016. This time it's complaining about something 
algorithm/cipher related, and I really wish they would be more explicit 
about exactly the problem was in each case; I have spent a significant 
amount of support time dealing with this sort of question lately...

Cheers

Mel



From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Thu May  7 09:29:30 2015
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Thu, 7 May 2015 09:29:30 +0100
Subject: Cahoot
In-Reply-To: <op.xx8h6ocsc3r7hz@thedell>
References: <CAEWR3kuw84Wy20Y_t6djFAs7B4iiMigY846sJLDSjdG5mFgqKg@mail.gmail.com>
	<op.xx8h6ocsc3r7hz@thedell>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kv_c7LwciKGcJ0pvWmSRG1oCJitjqoT426CSLNeneBAKg@mail.gmail.com>

2015-05-06 23:02 GMT+01:00 Brian L Johnson <brian at thejohnsons.co.uk>:
>
>
> Apart from using weak crypto, the main issue appears to be that some
> elements of the page are insecure.
>
> In Chrome's words:
>
> "Your connection to the site is encrypted, but Google Chrome has detected
> mixed content on the page. Be careful if you're entering information on
> this page. Mixed content can provide a loophole for someone to manipulate
> the page. This content could be third- party images or ads embedded on the
> page."
>
> So, if someone inserts an ad which is designed to look like the box where
> you enter your username and password...


Thanks for all the responses (including this one). They all make perfect
sense. I'll try and send something to my bank about it but my guess is that
I'll have the expected canned response.

In the longer run, maybe I should switch banks.

-- 
Francis Davey
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From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Thu May  7 11:37:22 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Thu, 7 May 2015 11:37:22 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
Message-ID: <20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 11:48:06PM +0100, Melanie Dymond Harper wrote:
> > From: Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk>
> > The Chrome alert is because the certificate is using an SHA1 hash,
> > and as of fairly recently, Chrome has started to complain mildly about
> > this because it is considered weak but it is not completely broken.
> 
> For once Chrome isn't complaining about this aspect, because while it is 
> an SHA-1 cert, it expires in 2015 and thus isn't covered by Chrome's 
> complaints about such certs -- they are distrusting SHA-1 certs (or 
> certs involving a SHA-1 intermediate in their chain) which expire on or 
> after 1/1/2016. This time it's complaining about something 
> algorithm/cipher related, and I really wish they would be more explicit 
> about exactly the problem was in each case; I have spent a significant 
> amount of support time dealing with this sort of question lately...

For securebank.cahoot.com, the certificate expires 14th May 2016 so
SHA1 *is* what Chrome is complaining about. For www.cahoot.com, the
cryptography is particularly rubbish given that it's using MD5 and
RC4, but as you say the expiry is in 2015 and what Chrome is actually
complaining about is that the page mixes content from http and https
sources.


From amidgley at gmail.com  Thu May  7 13:10:43 2015
From: amidgley at gmail.com (Adrian Midgley)
Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 12:10:43 +0000
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>

TLS 1

On Thu, 7 May 2015 11:37 Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> wrote:

> On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 11:48:06PM +0100, Melanie Dymond Harper wrote:
> > > From: Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk>
> > > The Chrome alert is because the certificate is using an SHA1 hash,
> > > and as of fairly recently, Chrome has started to complain mildly about
> > > this because it is considered weak but it is not completely broken.
> >
> > For once Chrome isn't complaining about this aspect, because while it is
> > an SHA-1 cert, it expires in 2015 and thus isn't covered by Chrome's
> > complaints about such certs -- they are distrusting SHA-1 certs (or
> > certs involving a SHA-1 intermediate in their chain) which expire on or
> > after 1/1/2016. This time it's complaining about something
> > algorithm/cipher related, and I really wish they would be more explicit
> > about exactly the problem was in each case; I have spent a significant
> > amount of support time dealing with this sort of question lately...
>
> For securebank.cahoot.com, the certificate expires 14th May 2016 so
> SHA1 *is* what Chrome is complaining about. For www.cahoot.com, the
> cryptography is particularly rubbish given that it's using MD5 and
> RC4, but as you say the expiry is in 2015 and what Chrome is actually
> complaining about is that the page mixes content from http and https
> sources.
>
>
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From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Thu May  7 13:38:01 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Thu, 7 May 2015 13:38:01 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150507123801.GB2027@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 12:10:43PM +0000, Adrian Midgley wrote:
>    TLS 1

An appropriately cryptic message for a crypto mailing list, but
unfortunately you have provided far too little ciphertext to even
begin to attempt a decryption.


From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Thu May  7 14:49:25 2015
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Thu, 7 May 2015 14:49:25 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150507144925.00006c3a@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>

On Thu, 07 May 2015 12:10:43 +0000
Adrian Midgley wrote:

> TLS 1

Currently acceptable but not preferred:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/07/ietf_updates_tlsssl_best_practice/

-- 

Brian Morrison


From amidgley at gmail.com  Thu May  7 20:03:27 2015
From: amidgley at gmail.com (Adrian Midgley)
Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 19:03:27 +0000
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <20150507144925.00006c3a@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<20150507144925.00006c3a@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
Message-ID: <CAN2jWyiEGpm90WK=FtAPiz-f2Swxrmi0G82wOBz4Zb+EMv=_FA@mail.gmail.com>

As remarked by Chrome in the page in question.

On Thu, 7 May 2015 19:25 Brian Morrison <bdm at fenrir.org.uk> wrote:

> On Thu, 07 May 2015 12:10:43 +0000
> Adrian Midgley wrote:
>
> > TLS 1
>
> Currently acceptable but not preferred:
>
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/07/ietf_updates_tlsssl_best_practice/
>
> --
>
> Brian Morrison
>
>
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From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Fri May  8 01:17:11 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 01:17:11 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <CAN2jWyiEGpm90WK=FtAPiz-f2Swxrmi0G82wOBz4Zb+EMv=_FA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<20150507144925.00006c3a@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
	<CAN2jWyiEGpm90WK=FtAPiz-f2Swxrmi0G82wOBz4Zb+EMv=_FA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150508001710.GC2027@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 07:03:27PM +0000, Adrian Midgley wrote:
>    As remarked by Chrome in the page in question.

No, Chrome does not complain about use of TLS 1.0.


From bakeryworms at gmail.com  Fri May  8 09:28:24 2015
From: bakeryworms at gmail.com (bakeryworms at gmail.com)
Date: Fri, 08 May 2015 09:28:24 +0100
Subject: Cahoot's cert
In-Reply-To: <20150508001710.GC2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <mailman.1195.1430950952.19229.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
	<20150506224806.GC31136@localhost.localdomain>
	<20150507103722.GA2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAN2jWyg-z7b=vN6Wu3s_7y1OxtE=khqCpL1_Loo9QQ4B1LgPjQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<20150507144925.00006c3a@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
	<CAN2jWyiEGpm90WK=FtAPiz-f2Swxrmi0G82wOBz4Zb+EMv=_FA@mail.gmail.com>
	<20150508001710.GC2027@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20150508082824.5701711.23803.341@gmail.com>

One thing this episode shows is how difficult it is for Joe Public to understand the crypto/certificate errors and warnings from browsers. And which are safe to ignore and which are important to heed.?

It undermines the security of TLS/SSL.?

KRS
Mark

? Original Message ?
From: Jon Ribbens
Sent: Friday, 8 May 2015 01:17
To: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
Reply To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
Subject: Re: Cahoot's cert

On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 07:03:27PM +0000, Adrian Midgley wrote:
> As remarked by Chrome in the page in question.

No, Chrome does not complain about use of TLS 1.0.



From otcbn at callnetuk.com  Sat May  9 14:58:35 2015
From: otcbn at callnetuk.com (Peter Mitchell)
Date: Sat, 09 May 2015 14:58:35 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
Message-ID: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>

?A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping up to date as people communicate with communications data. We were prevented from bringing in that legislation into the last government because of the coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to bring that through because we believe that is necessary to maintain the capabilities of our law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do the excellent job day in day out of keeping us safe and secure?




From ajmartin297 at gmail.com  Sat May  9 17:04:45 2015
From: ajmartin297 at gmail.com (A. Martin)
Date: Sat, 9 May 2015 17:04:45 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
In-Reply-To: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
Message-ID: <CAD23QJvRLm8ApurQOt=dZc9QCiTENsa4=3RCB+dtQe6W8Fpaeg@mail.gmail.com>

There's always the possibility that with only a 12-seat majority a
backbench rebellion [1] could prevent this passing, but if it's put through
before Labour have a new leader, one who would hopefully [2] enforce a
three-line whip against the Draft Communications Data Bill, then opposition
MPs such as Hazel Blears (& the DUP) could vote for it, as such support has
been forthcoming on previous legislation

There has been some talk of *extremely* minute limitations on the
mass-deployment of DPI probes already [3], but it's hard to see any light
at the end of this tunnel, if you'll excuse the unintentional pun. I think
legislation like this really only provides some form of legal framework to
cover the scale of collection, and ultimately, much like the ridiculous
blustering about backdoors, it is too much a distraction from the real
issue which affects communications security from any given global "passive"
adversary: end-point vulnerabilities.

[1] David Davis has consistently opposed the draft legislation.
[2] A political analyst might suggest this may be only out of a desire to
simply bloody the government's nose, rather than any commitment to
supporting evidence-based policy.
[3]
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/11/communcations_data_bill_joint_committee/

On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 2:58 PM, Peter Mitchell <otcbn at callnetuk.com> wrote:

> ?A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law
> enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping up
> to date as people communicate with communications data. We were prevented
> from bringing in that legislation into the last government because of the
> coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to bring that through
> because we believe that is necessary to maintain the capabilities of our
> law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do the excellent job day
> in day out of keeping us safe and secure?
>
>
>
>
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From colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk  Sat May  9 18:43:22 2015
From: colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk (Tom Thomson)
Date: Sat, 9 May 2015 18:43:22 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
In-Reply-To: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
Message-ID: <000001d08a7f$a50014b0$ef003e10$@o2.co.uk>



Yes, it's pretty horrifying.   Almost as if we had Labour and Blunkett back again.

I guess the only way to stop the slide into police-statehood would be to elect a LibDem government (but I'm not sure that even that would be much good).
.... Peter Mitchell <otcbn at callnetuk.com> wrote:-
> ?A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law
> enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping
> up to date as people communicate with communications data. We were
> prevented from bringing in that legislation into the last government because
> of the coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to bring that
> through because we believe that is necessary to maintain the capabilities of
> our law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do the excellent job
> day in day out of keeping us safe and secure?
 




From peter at pmsommer.com  Sat May  9 19:36:03 2015
From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer)
Date: Sat, 09 May 2015 19:36:03 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
In-Reply-To: <CAD23QJvRLm8ApurQOt=dZc9QCiTENsa4=3RCB+dtQe6W8Fpaeg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
	<CAD23QJvRLm8ApurQOt=dZc9QCiTENsa4=3RCB+dtQe6W8Fpaeg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <554E5393.5050806@pmsommer.com>

On 09/05/2015 17:04, A. Martin wrote:
> opposition MPs such as Hazel Blears 
  Hazel Blears stood down as an MP at the election.  If she had stayed 
on she would have been a candidate for Chair of the ISC


Peter Sommer


---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
http://www.avast.com



From ajmartin297 at gmail.com  Sat May  9 21:29:55 2015
From: ajmartin297 at gmail.com (A. Martin)
Date: Sat, 9 May 2015 21:29:55 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
In-Reply-To: <554E5393.5050806@pmsommer.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
	<CAD23QJvRLm8ApurQOt=dZc9QCiTENsa4=3RCB+dtQe6W8Fpaeg@mail.gmail.com>
	<554E5393.5050806@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <CAD23QJsG9dxifJuMAYYTHkYP_Hbx1_EPnGmMvqCd6M2Qe2NxpQ@mail.gmail.com>

That had slipped my mind, thank you Peter.

On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Peter Sommer <peter at pmsommer.com> wrote:

> On 09/05/2015 17:04, A. Martin wrote:
>
>> opposition MPs such as Hazel Blears
>>
>  Hazel Blears stood down as an MP at the election.  If she had stayed on
> she would have been a candidate for Chair of the ISC
>
>
> Peter Sommer
>
>
> ---
> This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
> http://www.avast.com
>
>
>
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From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Sun May 10 12:10:42 2015
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Sun, 10 May 2015 12:10:42 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
In-Reply-To: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
Message-ID: <554F3CB2.1080403@zen.co.uk>

On 09/05/15 14:58, Peter Mitchell wrote:
> ?A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law
> enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping
> up to date as people communicate with communications data. We were
> prevented from bringing in that legislation into the last government
> because of the coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to
> bring that through because we believe that is necessary to maintain the
> capabilities of our law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do
> the excellent job day in day out of keeping us safe and secure?

I don't think "people communicate with communications data"; that aside, 
I don't get Theresa May either, she already seems madder than Mad Maggie 
at her maddest.

Unchained?? Ouch.

Maybe Cameron is keeping his enemies closer ..


But will it work? Afaics the Police and/or spooks are telling her:

1] "we are losing access to content because people are using encryption"

2] "we are losing access to comms data because people are using facebook 
(and perhaps the ECtJ ruling)"

and

3] "we need lots of data to datamine for terrorists" - they may be 
telling the Foreign Secretary as well as Theresa.


Back to ISPs storing straight comms data? I suppose it could be worse.


Comms data for people communicating via Facebook, online games, etc?

Mass "black box" Facebook comms data can't be collected unless the black 
box decrypts everything, and there is probably too much data there 
anyway. I don't think it's realistically possible to collect mass 
Facebook-type data with black boxes, though perhaps targeted data could 
be collected.

However, as targeted Facebook-type comms data could be collected by the 
ISP, with some sort of "comms data only" warrant or authorisation, I 
don't think black boxes are a suitable means for collecting targeted 
FB-type comms data.

Even then, something would have to be done about encryption for FB-type 
comms data collection.


Banning encryption, mandatory backdoors? At least this list will be 
getting busier. But it won't work, and it most certainly isn't going to 
be cost-effective - the cost of banning TLS would be astronomical.

Even if it did work, all it can produce is either targeted data (which 
can be obtained in other ways, in most cases at lower cost) or mass 
data, which is useless for catching people.






Wrote this for something else, but it seems relevant here:

Mass data can help once someone is caught, eg there are tales of 
supporting evidence found in people's comms data after they were 
arrested - but it can't catch people in the first place.

But datamining for terrorists doesn't work, the baseline problem (aka 
base rate fallacy) rules it out.

http://www.badscience.net/2009/02/datamining-would-be-lovely-if-it-worked/

https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/03/why_data_mining_wont.html


When you look at a population the size of the UK, depending how you look 
there are either too many potential suspects, so it doesn't help, or too 
few. almost all of whom are false positives - so you don't actually 
catch the bad guys.

This is especially true of the real bad guys, who try not to be caught, 
and who don't post their murders on facebook or the like.

In the US there are no known cases where datamining of mass interception 
product or comms data has initially identified someone as a person of 
interest, who was subsequently investigated as a result of that 
identification and convicted.

All the NSA's vaunted mass data collection? - datamining it has never 
initially identified a single terrorist. Not one.

[There aren't any known cases in the UK either, but as evidence of 
interception wouldn't be allowed in Court that doesn't say much, so I 
use the US example instead.]


-- Peter Fairbrother



From richard at lamont.me.uk  Sun May 10 15:40:57 2015
From: richard at lamont.me.uk (Richard Lamont)
Date: Sun, 10 May 2015 15:40:57 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Michael Gove [was: Theresa May]
In-Reply-To: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com>
Message-ID: <554F6DF9.5030106@lamont.me.uk>

On 09/05/15 14:58, Peter Mitchell wrote:
> ?A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law
> enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping
> up to date as people communicate with communications data. We were
> prevented from bringing in that legislation into the last government
> because of the coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to
> bring that through because we believe that is necessary to maintain the
> capabilities of our law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do
> the excellent job day in day out of keeping us safe and secure?

According to a report on Radio 4's The World This Weekend, the snoopers'
charter will now be the responsibility of Michael Gove, the
newly-appointed Minister of Justice, and not the Home Secretary.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05tbst1

The relevant bit of audio starts at 07:48 in.


-- 
Richard Lamont
<richard at lamont.me.uk>


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 11 16:04:43 2015
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:04:43 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Michael Gove [was: Theresa May]
In-Reply-To: <554F6DF9.5030106@lamont.me.uk>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com> <554F6DF9.5030106@lamont.me.uk>
Message-ID: <JyKdGWDLUMUVFA8$@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>

In article <554F6DF9.5030106 at lamont.me.uk>, Richard Lamont 
<richard at lamont.me.uk> writes
>According to a report on Radio 4's The World This Weekend, the snoopers'
>charter will now be the responsibility of Michael Gove, the
>newly-appointed Minister of Justice, and not the Home Secretary.

That makes a certain amount of sense given that Data Protection is an 
MoJ matter, rather Home Office.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ajmartin297 at gmail.com  Mon May 11 19:12:05 2015
From: ajmartin297 at gmail.com (A. Martin)
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 19:12:05 +0100
Subject: Policy under an unchained Michael Gove [was: Theresa May]
In-Reply-To: <JyKdGWDLUMUVFA8$@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <554E128B.7090601@callnetuk.com> <554F6DF9.5030106@lamont.me.uk>
	<JyKdGWDLUMUVFA8$@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAD23QJvL1v+UZe6TpTc2RfVwD0=+DAshYLuGKG3C5n21maDQVQ@mail.gmail.com>

The report was mistaken. I spoke to The MoJ this morning. It's still a Home
Office lead.

On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 4:04 PM, Roland Perry <
lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:

> In article <554F6DF9.5030106 at lamont.me.uk>, Richard Lamont <
> richard at lamont.me.uk> writes
>
>> According to a report on Radio 4's The World This Weekend, the snoopers'
>> charter will now be the responsibility of Michael Gove, the
>> newly-appointed Minister of Justice, and not the Home Secretary.
>>
>
> That makes a certain amount of sense given that Data Protection is an MoJ
> matter, rather Home Office.
> --
> Roland Perry
>
>
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From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Tue May 12 21:02:47 2015
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 21:02:47 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
Message-ID: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>

Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have gone 
wrong, or what's amiss in 'my setup'?

"An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server 
uses key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be 
constructed that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be 
overridden. (Error code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)

     The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
     authenticity of the received data could not be verified.

     Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."
-- 
Roland Perry


From peter at pmsommer.com  Wed May 13 07:25:53 2015
From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 07:25:53 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <5552EE71.9040304@pmsommer.com>

 From the Mozilla wiki:

Public Key Pinning is a mechanism for sites to specify which certificate 
authorities have issued valid certs for that site, and for user-agents 
to reject TLS connections to those sites if the certificate is not 
issued by a known-good CA. Public key pinning prevents man-in-the-middle 
attacks due to rogue CAs not on the site's list (see the Diginotar 
attack which Chrome detected and we did not:

The feature binds a set of hashes public keys to a domain name such that 
when connecting to a site using TLS the browser ensures that there is an 
intersection between the public keys in the computed trust chain and the 
set of fingerprints associated with that domain. This check is done 
during the certificate verification phase of the connection, before any 
data is sent or processed by the browser. In particular we are pinning 
the sha256 digest of the der encoded subject public key info. In order 
to reduce rejections, Firefox computes all potential trust chains before 
deciding that are no valid pins.

https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning

But it's interesting that this affects Facebook....

Peter Sommer



On 12/05/2015 21:02, Roland Perry wrote:
> Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have gone 
> wrong, or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>
> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server 
> uses key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be 
> constructed that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be 
> overridden. (Error code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>
>     The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>     authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>
>     Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."



---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
http://www.avast.com



From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Wed May 13 13:31:03 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 13:31:03 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 09:02:47PM +0100, Roland Perry wrote:
> Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have gone wrong,
> or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
> 
> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server uses
> key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be constructed
> that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be overridden. (Error
> code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
> 
>     The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>     authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
> 
>     Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."

Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root
certificate installed by the IT department? The error message
means that the 'wrong' certificate was seen by your browser.
I assume if the certificate didn't verify at all then a more
usual error message would appear.


From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed May 13 15:43:24 2015
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 14:43:24 +0000
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
Message-ID: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73AB01DA4C@uxcn10-tdc05.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>

Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> writes:

>Can anyone tell me what this really means,

The plain-English translation is, approximately "massa make big magic, Gunga
Din, and protect you from bad spirits".

Firefox (I assume, from the Mozilla name), was expecting to find one of a
particular set of certificates associated with the site, didn't find it, and
so won't continue.  In the long-standing tradition of PKI error messages, this
issue is conveyed to the user as incomprehensible gibberish.

Peter.


From tim at night-shade.org.uk  Wed May 13 17:26:19 2015
From: tim at night-shade.org.uk (Tim Fletcher)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 17:26:19 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>

On 13/05/15 13:31, Jon Ribbens wrote:
> On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 09:02:47PM +0100, Roland Perry wrote:
>> Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have
>> gone wrong, or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>> 
>> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The
>> server uses key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain
>> could be constructed that matches the pinset. Key pinning
>> violations cannot be overridden. (Error code:
>> mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>> 
>> The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the 
>> authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>> 
>> Please contact the website owners to inform them of this
>> problem."
> 
> Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root 
> certificate installed by the IT department? The error message means
> that the 'wrong' certificate was seen by your browser. I assume if
> the certificate didn't verify at all then a more usual error
> message would appear.

It's not just the installation of a root cert on a corporate computer
but MitM on the SSL traffic. This is normally so that filtering can
take place, basically a server decrypts, filters and then encrypts
using it's own SSL cert the traffic which doesn't match the pin set.

-- 
Tim Fletcher <tim at night-shade.org.uk>


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed May 13 22:27:10 2015
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 22:27:10 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>

In article <20150513123103.GA25424 at unequivocal.co.uk>, Jon Ribbens 
<jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> writes
>> or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>>
>> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server uses
>> key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be constructed
>> that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be overridden. (Error
>> code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>>
>>     The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>>     authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>>
>>     Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."
>
>Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root
>certificate installed by the IT department?

No, it's my five year old laptop where only I am the administrator.

Not sure if it matters but about three months ago I wiped the 
Win7-upgraded-to-Win8 installation and did in effect a "factory reset" 
back to Vista.

I use Facebook multiple time most days (for years), and have never 
before seen any error message like this.
-- 
Roland Perry


From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Wed May 13 23:10:18 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 23:10:18 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>
Message-ID: <20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 05:26:19PM +0100, Tim Fletcher wrote:
> On 13/05/15 13:31, Jon Ribbens wrote:
> > Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root 
> > certificate installed by the IT department? The error message means
> > that the 'wrong' certificate was seen by your browser. I assume if
> > the certificate didn't verify at all then a more usual error
> > message would appear.
> 
> It's not just the installation of a root cert on a corporate computer
> but MitM on the SSL traffic. This is normally so that filtering can
> take place, basically a server decrypts, filters and then encrypts
> using it's own SSL cert the traffic which doesn't match the pin set.

Well, yes, that's why you might see the 'wrong' cert, hence my
question. Although, now I think about it, I seem to recall that
this kind of certificate pinning tends to have a deliberate exception
in it for locally-added certificates.


From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Wed May 13 23:17:47 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 23:17:47 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20150513221747.GC25424@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:27:10PM +0100, Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <20150513123103.GA25424 at unequivocal.co.uk>, Jon Ribbens
> <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> writes
> >Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root
> >certificate installed by the IT department?
> 
> No, it's my five year old laptop where only I am the administrator.
> 
> Not sure if it matters but about three months ago I wiped the
> Win7-upgraded-to-Win8 installation and did in effect a "factory reset" back
> to Vista.
> 
> I use Facebook multiple time most days (for years), and have never before
> seen any error message like this.

It does seem very peculiar. Also, as far as I can see, Facebook does
not use certificate pinning. Something strange happened. It could be
a bug in Firefox I suppose.


From brian at thejohnsons.co.uk  Thu May 14 07:36:54 2015
From: brian at thejohnsons.co.uk (Brian Johnson)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 07:36:54 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <E1Ysmlp-00008a-43@smtpauth1.array1.smtp.34sp.com>

I also use Facebook multiple times every day and have never seen that message. I use a Chromium-based browser (Vivaldi or Opera) run on Vista32.

Perhaps Facebook were doing something to their certs at just the time you happened along?

Does Google (or whoever) show that anyone else noticed?

Brian

-----Original Message-----
From: "Roland Perry" <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>
Sent: ?13/?05/?2015 22:27
To: "ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk" <ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Geekspeak I don't understand

In article <20150513123103.GA25424 at unequivocal.co.uk>, Jon Ribbens 
<jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> writes
>> or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>>
>> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server uses
>> key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be constructed
>> that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be overridden. (Error
>> code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>>
>>     The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>>     authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>>
>>     Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."
>
>Is it a corporate computer or similar that might have a root
>certificate installed by the IT department?

No, it's my five year old laptop where only I am the administrator.

Not sure if it matters but about three months ago I wiped the 
Win7-upgraded-to-Win8 installation and did in effect a "factory reset" 
back to Vista.

I use Facebook multiple time most days (for years), and have never 
before seen any error message like this.
-- 
Roland Perry

-------------- next part --------------
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From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Thu May 14 10:30:36 2015
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 10:30:36 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<gdTnd48uG8UVFA7B@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20150514103036.00006b8c@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>

On Wed, 13 May 2015 22:27:10 +0100
Roland Perry wrote:

> I use Facebook multiple time most days (for years), and have never 
> before seen any error message like this.

There has been a recent update to FF38, perhaps this has made the
difference?

-- 

Brian Morrison


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Thu May 14 13:57:06 2015
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 13:57:06 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <55549BA2.6000103@zen.co.uk>

On 12/05/15 21:02, Roland Perry wrote:
> Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have gone
> wrong, or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>
> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server
> uses key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be
> constructed that matches the pinset.





There are two main forms of key pinning. In the first the browser does 
all the work, eg Chrome pins all the www.google.com sites to Google CAs, 
in later Windows installations IE pins www.microsoft-update.com sites to 
a Microsoft CA.

It's all a bit incestuous, but it probably works fairly well, and a 
fatal error block is justified here when pinning fails.

Firefox started doing this last September, and afaik there haven't been 
any significant problems.





Another form involves the first visit to a HTTPS site which claims to 
use cert pinning. The first visit is supposed to be especially trusted, 
though I can't imagine why.

Thereafter the browser is supposed to trust only the certificate 
authority (or reportedly, ouch, the certificate) mentioned in the first 
visit. This may or may not apply to all subdomains as well as the main 
domain.

I think this latter form may be what has bitten you, though afaik 
Facebook doesn't use hpkp. Maybe some thing else on the page, from 
another source, does?

Firefox started doing this second type of pinning very recently.



> Key pinning violations cannot be
> overridden. (Error code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>
>      The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>      authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>
>      Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."




The RFC says you must refuse a connection if pinning fails, but this is 
just plain stupid. I am a great fan of blocking connections when it is 
100% correct to do so, as many will know - but here someone can MITM a 
page, give out a false cert for the first visit, and cause you a 
permanent DOS.

There are other holes too, eg you can block access to a site which has 
been legitimately set up by MITM-ing a wrong cert. Firewalls and proxies 
can cause trouble too. What happens if you want to delete a CA in the 
browser list of CAs, and a pinning relies on it? What happens when a 
site wants to change CA?


Privacy? I don't want someone who inspects my computer to know I have 
visited kinkyporn.com. I don't want that kept in a list of pinnings.

The second form of key pinning is pretty rubbish, security-wise. They 
haven't done anything like a proper security cost-benefit analysis.

A warning, yes that is appropriate. A report, even more so. Block it?

No.

You haven't the authority of correctness to do that. It would be like 
hanging someone when you not only didn't know for sure he did the crime, 
but were not even sure that a crime had been committed.

You are sacrificing availability for supposed integrity and/or 
confidentiality; but availability is often, usually, and in general, 
more important than confidentiality or integrity.

Another disadvantage of blocking is that you can't get a secure 
connection through hostile partial MITMing.



As the whole point of HPKP is to prevent MITM cryptographic attacks, we 
must assume the ability to MITM traffic is available in any case which 
HPKP might actually be useful.


Until April nss did not actually block sites in Linux for 
Firefox/Chrome, but they changed it then. I don't know about Windows, OSX.





Ben Laurie was/is doing some stuff along these lines, and would know 
more. Ben? You there?



-- Peter Fairbrother


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Thu May 14 17:45:03 2015
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 17:45:03 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <5554D10F.6020000@zen.co.uk>

On 12/05/15 21:02, Roland Perry wrote:
> Can anyone tell me what this really means, and what might have gone
> wrong, or what's amiss in 'my setup'?
>
> "An error occurred during a connection to www.facebook.com. The server
> uses key pinning (HPKP) but no trusted certificate chain could be
> constructed that matches the pinset. Key pinning violations cannot be
> overridden. (Error code: mozilla_pkix_error_key_pinning_failure)
>
>      The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
>      authenticity of the received data could not be verified.
>
>      Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem."

BTW, to turn pinning off in Firefox, if it's a continuing problem:

Type about:config in the browser address bar.

Click OK on the warning.

Set the preference security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level to 0.

-- Peter F



From alan.braggins at gmail.com  Thu May 14 18:23:42 2015
From: alan.braggins at gmail.com (Alan Braggins)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 18:23:42 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>
	<20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 May 2015 at 23:10, Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> wrote:
> Although, now I think about it, I seem to recall that
> this kind of certificate pinning tends to have a deliberate exception
> in it for locally-added certificates.

Certainly Chrome has - I haven't checked Firefox
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/http/transport_security_state.cc&l=135

-- 
alan.braggins at gmail.com
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~armb/


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Thu May 14 22:01:03 2015
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 22:01:03 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>	<55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>	<20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55550D0F.2050802@zen.co.uk>

On 14/05/15 18:23, Alan Braggins wrote:
> On 13 May 2015 at 23:10, Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> wrote:
>> Although, now I think about it, I seem to recall that
>> this kind of certificate pinning tends to have a deliberate exception
>> in it for locally-added certificates.
>
> Certainly Chrome has - I haven't checked Firefox
> https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/http/transport_security_state.cc&l=135

Yes, Firefox too - in Firefox the default value of 1 for the preference 
security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level allows locally-added certificates.

https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning

There is a list of pinnings which are on by default - they come with the 
browser. They typically include TOR, Twitter, Google, Microsoft, some 
Mozilla and Firefox sites- but not Facebook. So far this seems to work 
well enough.

Pinnings can include more than one CA, which is good.



The problems start when pinnings for new sites are dynamically added to 
the list.

Quote from 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning/Implementation_Details 
:

"Something is Broken, and we Think it's Pinning"

-- Peter F




From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Fri May 15 00:23:42 2015
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 00:23:42 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>
	<20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150514232342.GA1782@unequivocal.co.uk>

On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 06:23:42PM +0100, Alan Braggins wrote:
> On 13 May 2015 at 23:10, Jon Ribbens <jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> wrote:
> > Although, now I think about it, I seem to recall that
> > this kind of certificate pinning tends to have a deliberate exception
> > in it for locally-added certificates.
> 
> Certainly Chrome has - I haven't checked Firefox
> https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/http/transport_security_state.cc&l=135

Now I think about it more, perhaps the most likely explanation is that
Roland mistyped 'facebook' in his browser ;-)


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Fri May 15 21:30:44 2015
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 21:30:44 +0100
Subject: Geekspeak I don't understand
In-Reply-To: <20150514232342.GA1782@unequivocal.co.uk>
References: <+TxA+cinxlUVFAJR@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>
	<20150513123103.GA25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<55537B2B.9010108@night-shade.org.uk>
	<20150513221018.GB25424@unequivocal.co.uk>
	<CAEtFwH7jtvey06On3hD_D4XxJS+zS-0hdFBPYhsw4W22QBUz3Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<20150514232342.GA1782@unequivocal.co.uk>
Message-ID: <$rkAgpA0dlVVFACU@cf-f8.perry.co.uk>

In article <20150514232342.GA1782 at unequivocal.co.uk>, Jon Ribbens 
<jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> writes
>Now I think about it more, perhaps the most likely explanation is that
>Roland mistyped 'facebook' in his browser ;-)

I haven't typed it in for years. It's one of the (often the top) saved 
websites on my Firefox home page.

Just checked, today it's the 4th after:

Realtime trains
ulm moderation
National Rail enquiries

Closely followed by:

Google
Twitter
VirginEastCoast
eBay &
Panoramio
-- 
Roland Perry