Industrial espionage by TLA's

Charles Lindsey chl at
Tue Jan 28 19:57:45 GMT 2014

On Tue, 28 Jan 2014 10:16:54 -0000, Peter Fairbrother  
<zenadsl6186 at> wrote:

> I was wondering whether GCHQ did the same, and came to the conclusion  
> that they do - it is specifically allowed under RIPA.
> The Secretary of State (the Foreign Secretary in this case) can issue a  
> single certificated warrant to allow interception and examination of any  
> and all "external" [1] communications  "for the purpose of safeguarding  
> the economic well-being of the United Kingdom".
> See RIPA 8(4)(b)(ii) and 5(3)(c).

> [1] "external" communications are communications where either the sender  
> or the intended recipient, or both, are outside the UK.
> It is uncertain whether this applies to eg an email which is sent from a  
> person in the UK to another person in the UK, but which is sent via a  
> foreign country - a not uncommon happening, eg mail to and from all  
> Google mail, Gmail and Hotmail addresses will pass through servers in  
> the US.

But there the sender and (usually) the intended recipient will both be in  
the UK, so it is not an "external" communication. How they filter those  
out is their problem - somehow they have got to do it.

I suppose they might argue that Google is one of the "intended"  
recipients, since it is well-known that Google et al scan all messages to  
assist with directed advertising, but I doubt the courts would accept that  

Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own  
Tel: +44 161 436 6131                         Web:
Email: chl at      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU,  
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