Industrial espionage by TLA's
chl at clerew.man.ac.uk
Tue Jan 28 19:57:45 GMT 2014
On Tue, 28 Jan 2014 10:16:54 -0000, Peter Fairbrother
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
> I was wondering whether GCHQ did the same, and came to the conclusion
> that they do - it is specifically allowed under RIPA.
> The Secretary of State (the Foreign Secretary in this case) can issue a
> single certificated warrant to allow interception and examination of any
> and all "external"  communications "for the purpose of safeguarding
> the economic well-being of the United Kingdom".
> See RIPA 8(4)(b)(ii) and 5(3)(c).
>  "external" communications are communications where either the sender
> or the intended recipient, or both, are outside the UK.
> It is uncertain whether this applies to eg an email which is sent from a
> person in the UK to another person in the UK, but which is sent via a
> foreign country - a not uncommon happening, eg mail to and from all
> Google mail, Gmail and Hotmail addresses will pass through servers in
> the US.
But there the sender and (usually) the intended recipient will both be in
the UK, so it is not an "external" communication. How they filter those
out is their problem - somehow they have got to do it.
I suppose they might argue that Google is one of the "intended"
recipients, since it is well-known that Google et al scan all messages to
assist with directed advertising, but I doubt the courts would accept that
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own
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