From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Wed May  1 15:43:26 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Wed, 01 May 2013 16:43:26 +0200
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
Message-ID: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

I recently revisited parts of the phone hacking coverage (mainly
related to the activities of NotW), and it seems that this was never
framed as a security failure at the mobile phone operators who ran the
network and provisioned the attacked services.

Is there any explanation for this?


From roger at hayter.org  Wed May  1 19:48:57 2013
From: roger at hayter.org (Roger Hayter)
Date: Wed, 1 May 2013 19:48:57 +0100
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
In-Reply-To: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
References: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>






On 1 May 2013, at 15:43, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:

> I recently revisited parts of the phone hacking coverage (mainly
> related to the activities of NotW), and it seems that this was never
> framed as a security failure at the mobile phone operators who ran the
> network and provisioned the attacked services.
> 
> Is there any explanation for this?
> 
> 

They told us we needed to set a PIN to make it secure.  They, probably correctly, calculated that more people would be annoyed by having to set (and forget) a PIN than would be annoyed lack of security.  So they didn't make it compulsory.   Probably the right commercial decision at the time. Would still be the right one for me.  DOI:  I have forgotten my PIN.




-- 

Roger Hayter

From c.r.ritson at newcastle.ac.uk  Thu May  2 11:19:44 2013
From: c.r.ritson at newcastle.ac.uk (C R Ritson)
Date: Thu, 2 May 2013 10:19:44 +0000
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
In-Reply-To: <C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
References: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
Message-ID: <D00BBDAB7ECC63469B186F002CC7DBC80AAE925B@EXMBCT01.campus.ncl.ac.uk>

Not long after this became public I got a text from my phone company to say that they had noted that my voice pin was still unset/default and asking me to set it. I did (and probably can't remember it).

Chris Ritson (Computing Officer and School Safety Officer)

Room 707, Claremont Tower,        EMAIL: C.R.Ritson at ncl.ac.uk
School of Computing Science,      PHONE: +44 191 222 8175
Newcastle University,             FAX  : +44 191 222 8232
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK NE1 7RU.  WEB  : http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/




>-----Original Message-----
>From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
>bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roger Hayter
>Sent: 01 May 2013 19:49
>To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
>Subject: Re: Phone hacking: the telco angle
>
>
>
>
>
>
>On 1 May 2013, at 15:43, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
>
>> I recently revisited parts of the phone hacking coverage (mainly
>> related to the activities of NotW), and it seems that this was never
>> framed as a security failure at the mobile phone operators who ran the
>> network and provisioned the attacked services.
>>
>> Is there any explanation for this?
>>
>>
>
>They told us we needed to set a PIN to make it secure.  They, probably
>correctly, calculated that more people would be annoyed by having to set
>(and forget) a PIN than would be annoyed lack of security.  So they didn't
>make it compulsory.   Probably the right commercial decision at the time.
>Would still be the right one for me.  DOI:  I have forgotten my PIN.
>
>
>
>
>--
>
>Roger Hayter


From chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org  Thu May  2 12:50:04 2013
From: chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org (Chris Edwards)
Date: Thu, 2 May 2013 12:50:04 +0100 (BST)
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
In-Reply-To: <C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
References: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
Message-ID: <E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE@skipnote.org>

On Wed, 1 May 2013, Roger Hayter wrote:

> They told us we needed to set a PIN to make it secure.  They, probably 
> correctly, calculated that more people would be annoyed by having to set

There's a difference between retrieving voicemail on the handset itself, 
versus being able to dial in and access it from any phone (which I gather 
is what the newspapers were abusing).

Back in the day, I recall Orange would only allow access from the handset, 
UNLESS a PIN was set, in which case access was allowed from anywhere. 

I imagine most of their customers never knew about the remote access 
option, never set a pin, yet weren't vulnerable.  



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu May  2 14:06:13 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 2 May 2013 14:06:13 +0100
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
In-Reply-To: <E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE@skipnote.org>
References: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
	<E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE@skipnote.org>
Message-ID: <K4K7sfeFTmgRFAMQ@perry.co.uk>

In article <E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE at skipnote.org>, Chris Edwards 
<chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org> writes
>> They told us we needed to set a PIN to make it secure.  They, probably
>> correctly, calculated that more people would be annoyed by having to set
>
>There's a difference between retrieving voicemail on the handset itself,
>versus being able to dial in and access it from any phone (which I gather
>is what the newspapers were abusing).
>
>Back in the day, I recall Orange would only allow access from the handset,
>UNLESS a PIN was set, in which case access was allowed from anywhere.
>
>I imagine most of their customers never knew about the remote access
>option, never set a pin, yet weren't vulnerable.

Most people probably found out about "remote" access when they went 
abroad - I don't think any of the networks trusted (and some probably 
didn't get, at least in the early days) CLI delivered to them. The sort 
of people whose PIN might be hacked are very likely to have gone abroad 
at some stage.
-- 
Roland Perry


From james at cloud9.co.uk  Thu May  2 11:19:15 2013
From: james at cloud9.co.uk (James Fidell)
Date: Thu, 02 May 2013 11:19:15 +0100
Subject: Best practice for federated authentication and authorisation?
Message-ID: <51823DA3.2020707@cloud9.co.uk>

I'm currently looking for some sort of definition of best practice for
implementing federated authentication and authorisation systems, but
struggling to find much.

What I'm looking at is an application that uses Gmail/Facebook/Twitter
etc. for authentication via a bespoke intermediate ("cloud-based")
registration service and then does access control by verifying claims
with another bespoke cloud-based system.

Can anyone point me to any documents that discuss best practice for
implementation of such a system?  I'm thinking that handling all
transactions over HTTPS really isn't sufficient for this and that they
should all be at least time-stamped, digitally signed and use both
client and server certificates for HTTPS, but if I'm being overly
paranoid, or not paranoid enough, it would be useful to know :)

Thanks,
James


From roger at hayter.org  Thu May  2 15:46:58 2013
From: roger at hayter.org (Roger Hayter)
Date: Thu, 2 May 2013 15:46:58 +0100
Subject: Phone hacking: the telco angle
In-Reply-To: <E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE@skipnote.org>
References: <87r4hq69rl.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<C2959087-5218-4D75-A883-C9C1967FE986@hayter.org>
	<E1UXs1U-0002Jn-PE@skipnote.org>
Message-ID: <9FA9C983-6B19-4CA5-90F7-1FEEBD5FBB16@hayter.org>



On 2 May 2013, at 12:50, Chris Edwards <chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org> wrote:

> On Wed, 1 May 2013, Roger Hayter wrote:
> 
>> They told us we needed to set a PIN to make it secure.  They, probably 
>> correctly, calculated that more people would be annoyed by having to set
> 
> There's a difference between retrieving voicemail on the handset itself, 
> versus being able to dial in and access it from any phone (which I gather 
> is what the newspapers were abusing).
> 
> Back in the day, I recall Orange would only allow access from the handset, 
> UNLESS a PIN was set, in which case access was allowed from anywhere. 
> 
> I imagine most of their customers never knew about the remote access 
> option, never set a pin, yet weren't vulnerable.  
> 

Well, on O2 I was given remote access enabled by default 10+ years ago, with a default PIN of 0000. And I got the email saying they were going to disable remote access unless I set a new PIN a couple of years back when the scandal became more intense.

-- 

Roger Hayter

From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Tue May  7 10:43:42 2013
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Tue, 7 May 2013 10:43:42 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
Message-ID: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>

Dear List,

Is there an FAQ anywhere on the state of UK law as it relates to the
development of cryptography and software that uses cryptography?

I've read the Crypto Law Survey:

http://www.cryptolaw.org

and the rules surrounding domestic use are very clear.

What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
website count as "export"? What about providing support for such software?
 Unlike the Americans, who seem to have specific regulations for Open
Source Software, I can't see anything comparable in UK law.  There was a
flurry of activity around this in the late 1990s, and things seem to have
cooled down since, but clarity still seems to be lacking!

Nicholas
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130507/8464b883/attachment.html>

From clive at davros.org  Tue May  7 11:29:55 2013
From: clive at davros.org (Clive D.W. Feather)
Date: Tue, 7 May 2013 11:29:55 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>

Nicholas Cole said:
> What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
> hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
> website count as "export"? What about providing support for such software?

The European Court, in case C-101/01 ("Lindqvist") decided that 

    there is no 'transfer [of data] to a third country' within the meaning
    of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State
    loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his
    hosting provider which is established in that State or in another
    Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who
    connects to the internet, including people in a third country. 

In other words, putting material on a web site is not exporting it as far
as the Data Protection Act is concerned. Whether this would be accepted as
precedence by a UK court on an export control matter is another question. 

(Yes, I am an academic laywer. No, this is not legal advice.)

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather          | If you lie to the compiler,
Email: clive at davros.org     | it will get its revenge.
Web: http://www.davros.org  |   - Henry Spencer
Mobile: +44 7973 377646


From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Tue May  7 14:56:50 2013
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Tue, 7 May 2013 14:56:50 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3ku-8H+1QtQac7pSojkK47kNT+Nb_q2ucvf9mr5trjhBkw@mail.gmail.com>

2013/5/7 Clive D.W. Feather <clive at davros.org>

>
> The European Court, in case C-101/01 ("Lindqvist") decided that
>
>     there is no 'transfer [of data] to a third country' within the meaning
>     of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State
>     loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his
>     hosting provider which is established in that State or in another
>     Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who
>     connects to the internet, including people in a third country.
>
> In other words, putting material on a web site is not exporting it as far
> as the Data Protection Act is concerned. Whether this would be accepted as
> precedence by a UK court on an export control matter is another question.


I'm sceptical as to whether Lindqvist has any relevance. The case concerned
whether there had been a "transfer" of personal data by Bodil Lindqvist
within the meaning of  Article 25 of the data protection directive. I can
immediately think of two reasons why it does not help us:

[1] It concerns two different readings "transfer" v "export" that appear in
very different legal frameworks. I suspect that interpretation of one does
not help with the other.

[2] A close reading of Lindqvist suggests it is not as helpful as one might
think at first sight. The CJEU seems to think that because she did not
herself carry out the transfer - it was done by the web hosting service she
was using - that was OK. I suspect a court (mindful that Bodil Lindqvist
faced criminal charges for blogging that someone she knew at church had a
sprained ankle inter alia) wanted to make sure the web was legally possible
by making a much nicer distinction than most of us would be happy to live
with.

There's a little bit of help in the underlying EU export control
legislation. Article 2(b) of Council Regulation 1334/2000 says:

"export" shall mean:

...

(iii) transmission of software or technology by electronic media, fax or
telephone to a destination outside the Community; this applies to oral
transmission of technology by telephone only where the technology is
contained in a document the relevant part of which is read out over the
telephone, or is described over the telephone in such a way as to achieve
substantially the same result;

So, it would appear that hosting export controlled software would be an
export if it were downloaded outside the jurisdiction. I cannot see how
offering support could be.

But, I'm not a specialist software export lawyer. Although this is roughly
my field, I haven't researched the point, so this is just how it appears to
me off the top of my head.

-- 
Francis Davey
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130507/f23f56b8/attachment.html>

From lists at CasparBowden.net  Tue May  7 14:57:20 2013
From: lists at CasparBowden.net (Caspar Bowden (lists))
Date: Tue, 07 May 2013 14:57:20 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
Message-ID: <51890840.9000601@CasparBowden.net>

On 07/05/13 11:29, Clive D.W. Feather wrote:
> Nicholas Cole said:
>> What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
>> hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
>> website count as "export"? What about providing support for such software?
> The European Court, in case C-101/01 ("Lindqvist") decided that
>
>      there is no 'transfer [of data] to a third country' within the meaning
>      of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State
>      loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his
>      hosting provider which is established in that State or in another
>      Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who
>      connects to the internet, including people in a third country.
>
> In other words, putting material on a web site is not exporting it as far
> as the Data Protection Act is concerned. Whether this would be accepted as
> precedence by a UK court on an export control matter is another question.
>
> (Yes, I am an academic laywer. No, this is not legal advice.)

(Hi Clive)

(/pace/ original question wasn't about personal data & DP but crypto 
export control)

that's not the ICO's interpretation 
<http://www.ico.org.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/international_transfers_legal_guidance_v2.0_300606.pdf>

1.3.4 In the case of Bodil Lindqvist v Kammaraklagaren (2003) (Case 
C-101/01), the European Court of Justice held that there was no transfer 
of personal data to a third country where an individual loaded personal 
data onto an internet page in a Member State using a internet hosting 
provider in that Member State, even though the page was accessible via 
the internet by people based in a third country. Instead, a transfer was 
only deemed to have taken place *where the internet page was actually 
accessed* by a person located in a third country. In practice, data are 
often loaded onto the internet with the intention that the data be 
accessed in a third country, and, as this will usually lead to a 
transfer, the principle in the Lindqvist case will not apply in such 
circumstances. However, in situations where there is no intention to 
transfer the data to a third country and no transfer is deemed to have 
taken place as the information has not been accessed in a third country 
(ie. the eighth principle does not apply), data controllers will still 
need to ensure that the processing complies with all of the other 
principles. In particular, data controllers must consider the 
requirement in the first data protection principle that the processing 
must be fair which may be contravened by making the data so widely 
accessible.

(IANAL and this is not legal advice)

In other words ICO is saying that even though ECJ was out-to-lunch on 
this aspect, they will get you on "fairness" principle if you try to 
take p!$$

CB
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130507/8a7927b0/attachment.html>

From lists at casparbowden.net  Tue May  7 15:10:59 2013
From: lists at casparbowden.net (Caspar Bowden (lists))
Date: Tue, 07 May 2013 15:10:59 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<20130507102955.GA81557@davros.org>
Message-ID: <51890B73.9070604@casparbowden.net>

(sorry if duplicate - didn't see list echo)

On 07/05/13 11:29, Clive D.W. Feather wrote:
> Nicholas Cole said:
>> What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
>> hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
>> website count as "export"? What about providing support for such software?
> The European Court, in case C-101/01 ("Lindqvist") decided that
>
>      there is no 'transfer [of data] to a third country' within the meaning
>      of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State
>      loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his
>      hosting provider which is established in that State or in another
>      Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who
>      connects to the internet, including people in a third country.
>
> In other words, putting material on a web site is not exporting it as far
> as the Data Protection Act is concerned. Whether this would be accepted as
> precedence by a UK court on an export control matter is another question.
>
> (Yes, I am an academic laywer. No, this is not legal advice.)

(Hi Clive)

(/pace/ original question wasn't about personal data & DP but crypto 
export control)

that's not the ICO's interpretation 
<http://www.ico.org.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/international_transfers_legal_guidance_v2.0_300606.pdf>

1.3.4 In the case of Bodil Lindqvist v Kammaraklagaren (2003) (Case 
C-101/01), the European Court of Justice held that there was no transfer 
of personal data to a third country where an individual loaded personal 
data onto an internet page in a Member State using a internet hosting 
provider in that Member State, even though the page was accessible via 
the internet by people based in a third country. Instead, a transfer was 
only deemed to have taken place *where the internet page was actually 
accessed* by a person located in a third country. In practice, data are 
often loaded onto the internet with the intention that the data be 
accessed in a third country, and, as this will usually lead to a 
transfer, the principle in the Lindqvist case will not apply in such 
circumstances. However, in situations where there is no intention to 
transfer the data to a third country and no transfer is deemed to have 
taken place as the information has not been accessed in a third country 
(ie. the eighth principle does not apply), data controllers will still 
need to ensure that the processing complies with all of the other 
principles. In particular, data controllers must consider the 
requirement in the first data protection principle that the processing 
must be fair which may be contravened by making the data so widely 
accessible.

(IANAL and this is not legal advice)

In other words ICO is saying that even though ECJ was out-to-lunch on 
this aspect, they will get you on "fairness" principle if you try to 
take p!$$

CB
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130507/0cb60b65/attachment-0001.html>

From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Tue May  7 20:02:39 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Tue, 07 May 2013 20:02:39 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <51894FCF.6040701@zen.co.uk>

On 07/05/13 10:43, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> Is there an FAQ anywhere on the state of UK law as it relates to the
> development of cryptography and software that uses cryptography?
>
> I've read the Crypto Law Survey:
>
> http://www.cryptolaw.org
>
> and the rules surrounding domestic use are very clear.
>
> What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
> hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
> website count as "export"?

I don't know, technically (see Lindqvist) but I suspect "they" could 
make it so if they really wanted to. IANAL though.

However there is the GSN exception (as amended) in the Dual-use 
Regulations Schedules for software "in the public domain", so even if it 
is export, hosting open-source code goes is lawful.

Note that "in the public domain" has nothing to do with copyright or IP 
law here:.

""In the public domain", as it applies herein, means "technology" or 
"software" which has been made available without restrictions upon its 
further dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" 
or "software" from being "in the public domain")."


> What about providing support for such software?


Again I don't know, technically, whether it counts as export - but I 
think the GTN (as amended) would allow it:

{ GENERAL TECHNOLOGY NOTE (GTN)
(To be read in conjunction with section E of Categories 1 to 9.)
The export of "technology" which is "required" for the "development", 
"production" or "use" of goods controlled in Categories 1 to 9, is 
controlled according to the provisions of Categories 1 to 9.

"Technology" "required" for the "development", "production" or "use" of 
goods under control remains under control even when applicable to 
non-controlled goods.

Controls do not apply to that "technology" which is the minimum 
necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance (checking) and 
repair of those goods which are not controlled or whose export
has been authorised.

N.B.:     This does not release such "technology" specified in 1E002.e., 
1E002.f., 8E002.a. and
           8E002.b.

[ that's stealth radar absorbers, some high-tech alloys and ceramics, 
submarine noise reduction technology ]

Controls on "technology" transfer do not apply to information "in the 
public domain", to "basic scientific research" or to the minimum 
necessary information for patent applications. }



However even if the GTN doesn't cover providing support I doubt you are 
likely to get done for it unless you are helping Al Quaida, when "they" 
would probably bring terrorist offence charges anyway.


> Unlike the Americans, who seem to have specific regulations
> for Open Source Software, I can't see anything comparable in UK law.


The US does not fully implement the GTN and GTN parts of the Wassenaar, 
specifically the "in the public domain" part.

Cryptography software is covered by the Cryptography Note, Supplement 
No. 1 to part 774, Category 5, part 2, Note 3. For open-source stuff you 
are, in theory, required to inform BIS before export, but I don't think 
many people actually do.

I don't know anything about US law regarding providing support for 
open-source crypto, sorry.


>   There was a flurry of activity around this in the late 1990s, and
> things seem to have cooled down since, but clarity still seems to be
> lacking!

Yes (if you include RIPA in 2000), not much has actually happened since 
then. There have been a some subtle changes though, it's hard to keep 
up. Wassenaar rev. 2008 made a few changes, eg key lengths for some 
commercial crypto, electronic export became specifically included 
whereas it wasn't clearly included before, but didn't change the "public 
domain" exemptions.


-- Peter Fairbrother


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Wed May  8 10:56:36 2013
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 10:56:36 +0100
Subject: practical homomorphic encryption (allegedly)
Message-ID: <518A2154.4070004@iosis.co.uk>

Have received a link to the following article:

IBM takes a big new step in cryptography: practical homomorphic encryption

http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/05/05/ibm-takes-big-new-step-in-cryptography/

by Paul Ducklin on May 5, 2013

IBM just released an open source software package called HELib.

The HE stands for homomorphic encryption.

Although it doesn't sound terribly sexy or impressive, HELib is actually 
an interesting and important milestone in cryptography.

HE is also a surprisingly relevant topic right now, with our 
ever-increasing attraction to cloud computing.

<more in the article>

Peter



From igb at batten.eu.org  Wed May  8 13:42:56 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Wed, 8 May 2013 13:42:56 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
Message-ID: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>


http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22449209

You have to wonder at the people the BBC talks to:

> "The problem stems from the way that the fixed internet has been designed," said Prof Rahim Tafazolli, director of Surrey University's Centre for Communications Systems Research.
> 
> "Many people can share a single IP address and the IP address may be dynamic - meaning there's a new address issued each time they log on - while a communication traverses across different networks. It can be difficult to link all these addresses and trace them back to the origin.
> 
> "One possible solution would be to find a way to associate a person's internet use with a fixed and unique number such as their mobile number or a device's MAC [media access control] address.
> 
> "But that would require changes in the way addresses are allocated on the internet and changes would need to be adopted internationally because we couldn't just change it in the UK."
> 
Yeah.  You mean "IPv6 would be a good idea", I think.

ian

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130508/648ca912/attachment.html>

From lists at casparbowden.net  Wed May  8 14:45:01 2013
From: lists at casparbowden.net (Caspar Bowden (lists))
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 14:45:01 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>

On 05/08/13 13:42, Ian Batten wrote:
>
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22449209
>
> You have to wonder at the people the BBC talks to:
>
>> "The problem stems from the way that the fixed internet has been 
>> designed," said Prof Rahim Tafazolli, director of Surrey University's 
>> Centre for Communications Systems Research.
>>
>> "Many people can share a single IP address and the IP address may be 
>> dynamic - meaning there's a new address issued each time they log on 
>> - while a communication traverses across different networks. It can 
>> be difficult to link all these addresses and trace them back to the 
>> origin.
>>

Moreover it is not a bug, it *is* a feature...
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3022
"Traditional NAT can be viewed as providing a privacy mechanism..."

>> "One possible solution would be to find a way to associate a person's 
>> internet use with a fixed and unique number such as their mobile 
>> number or a device's MAC [media access control] address.
>>
>> "But that would require changes in the way addresses are allocated on 
>> the internet and changes would need to be adopted internationally 
>> because we couldn't just change it in the UK."
>>
> Yeah.  You mean "IPv6 would be a good idea", I think.

Somebody should tell Surrey about http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4941

For next few hours you can see the most appalling load of biased tosh 
towards end of
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b01sfxqc/Daily_Politics_07_05_2013/

Would be good if BBC got some complaints 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006mjxb/faq> that viewers left 
clueless of:
- substance of IP issue,
- that EU DRD made-in-Britain,
- preservation/retention dichotomy
- ISC refuses hear evidence from outside govt. (unlike Aus, Can, US 
counterparts)

Absence of above context makes charge of LibDem irresponsibility a 
Charter-breaching issue of political bias

Caspar
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130508/4291ce75/attachment.html>

From jj.gray at shc.qinetiq-tim.com  Wed May  8 14:03:52 2013
From: jj.gray at shc.qinetiq-tim.com (JJ Gray)
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 14:03:52 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <518A4D38.2040103@shc.qinetiq-tim.com>

On 08/05/2013 13:42, Ian Batten wrote:
> 
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22449209
> 
> You have to wonder at the people the BBC talks to:

>> "One possible solution would be to find a way to associate a person's internet use with a fixed and unique number such as their mobile number or a device's MAC [media access control] address.

People who redefine the term "fixed and unique"?

JJ




From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Wed May  8 16:42:15 2013
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Wed, 8 May 2013 16:42:15 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <51894FCF.6040701@zen.co.uk>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<51894FCF.6040701@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAAu18hfJH91cF6v4YHekMB_ekJF4bJvOvApQTQjvyDHpF_UJCg@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, May 7, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk>wrote:

> On 07/05/13 10:43, Nicholas Cole wrote:
>
>> Dear List,
>>
>> Is there an FAQ anywhere on the state of UK law as it relates to the
>> development of cryptography and software that uses cryptography?
>>
>> I've read the Crypto Law Survey:
>>
>> http://www.cryptolaw.org
>>
>> and the rules surrounding domestic use are very clear.
>>
>> What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for example,
>> hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
>> website count as "export"?
>>
>
> I don't know, technically (see Lindqvist) but I suspect "they" could make
> it so if they really wanted to. IANAL though.
>
> However there is the GSN exception (as amended) in the Dual-use
> Regulations Schedules for software "in the public domain", so even if it is
> export, hosting open-source code goes is lawful.
>
>

All I can find is this:

https://www.gov.uk/export-of-cryptographic-items

which doesn't mention Open Source at all, but does list some restrictions
that would make it all too easy to be in contravention of the guidance,
since all four need to apply.  Am I missing some other document?

N.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130508/a69ab0de/attachment.html>

From peter at pmsommer.com  Wed May  8 13:49:35 2013
From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer)
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 13:49:35 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <518A49DF.7080109@pmsommer.com>

Well, they did talk to me, as I am cited in the "Analysis" section, and 
I am quite happy with how they were represented my view.  But I agree 
that that the main article is a rather a mess.


Peter Sommer


On 08/05/2013 13:42, Ian Batten wrote:
>
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22449209
>
> You have to wonder at the people the BBC talks to:
>
>> "The problem stems from the way that the fixed internet has been 
>> designed," said Prof Rahim Tafazolli, director of Surrey University's 
>> Centre for Communications Systems Research.
>>
>> "Many people can share a single IP address and the IP address may be 
>> dynamic - meaning there's a new address issued each time they log on 
>> - while a communication traverses across different networks. It can 
>> be difficult to link all these addresses and trace them back to the 
>> origin.
>>
>> "One possible solution would be to find a way to associate a person's 
>> internet use with a fixed and unique number such as their mobile 
>> number or a device's MAC [media access control] address.
>>
>> "But that would require changes in the way addresses are allocated on 
>> the internet and changes would need to be adopted internationally 
>> because we couldn't just change it in the UK."
>>
> Yeah.  You mean "IPv6 would be a good idea", I think.
>
> ian
>

-

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130508/43bf9d95/attachment-0001.html>

From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed May  8 23:53:51 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 May 2013 23:53:51 +0100
Subject: FAQ on UK law
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hfJH91cF6v4YHekMB_ekJF4bJvOvApQTQjvyDHpF_UJCg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18he7HW0RJLZMrc=JZFE83f2josr7HeEUb6Ur69NoCKqq0Q@mail.gmail.com>	<51894FCF.6040701@zen.co.uk>
	<CAAu18hfJH91cF6v4YHekMB_ekJF4bJvOvApQTQjvyDHpF_UJCg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <518AD77F.5060007@zen.co.uk>

On 08/05/13 16:42, Nicholas Cole wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 7, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk
> <mailto:zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk>> wrote:
>
>     On 07/05/13 10:43, Nicholas Cole wrote:
>
>         Dear List,
>
>         Is there an FAQ anywhere on the state of UK law as it relates to the
>         development of cryptography and software that uses cryptography?
>
>         I've read the Crypto Law Survey:
>
>         http://www.cryptolaw.org
>
>         and the rules surrounding domestic use are very clear.
>
>         What is much less clear is the question of "export".  Does, for
>         example,
>         hosting a piece of software like PuTTY or ssh or gnupg on a UK-based
>         website count as "export"?
>
>
>     I don't know, technically (see Lindqvist) but I suspect "they" could
>     make it so if they really wanted to. IANAL though.
>
>     However there is the GSN exception (as amended) in the Dual-use
>     Regulations Schedules for software "in the public domain", so even
>     if it is export, hosting open-source code goes is lawful.
>
>
>
> All I can find is this:
>
> https://www.gov.uk/export-of-cryptographic-items
>
> which doesn't mention Open Source at all, but does list some
> restrictions that would make it all too easy to be in contravention of
> the guidance, since all four need to apply.  Am I missing some other
> document?

The GSN, or General Software Note.

Export control law comes from many places and covers many things - eg 
torture equipment, drugs which could be used for lethal injection, 
military goods, radioactive materials, high-tech stuff, cryptographic 
software, hardware and knowledge, WMD stuff, and more.

Crypto export comes under the EU Dual-use Regulation, part of which is 
the EU Dual-Use List which unsurprisingly lists stuff which is export 
controlled under the EU Dual-Use Regulation.

The EU Dual-use Regulation was originally transposed into UK law as a 
Schedule to an Order under the Export Control Act - but the EU 
Regulation acts directly now.

For our convenience the gubbmint prepare an updated combined list of 
everything which is export controlled (except some WMD stuff):

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184049/strategic-export-control-consolidated20130320.pdf 


The GSN appears on page 45, in the EU Dual-use part.


GENERAL SOFTWARE NOTE (GSN)
(This note overrides any control within section D of Categories 0 to 9.)

Categories 0 to 9 of this list do not control "software" which is either:
          a.       Generally available to the public by being:
                   1.         Sold from stock at retail selling points, 
without restriction, by means of:
                              a.       Over-the-counter transactions;
                              b.       Mail order transactions;
                              c.       Electronic transactions; or
                              d.       Telephone order transactions; and
                   2.         Designed for installation by the user 
without further substantial support by the supplier; or

                   N.B.       Entry a. of the General Software Note does 
not release "software" specified in Category 5 - Part 2 ("Information 
Security").
          b.       "In the public domain".



You will note that entry a does not apply to crypto software, in 
relation to which it is replaced by the Cryptography note you mentioned 
above (which is part of the EU Dual-Use Regulation, and appears on page 
191 of the combined lists).


However entry b., software which is "In the public domain". _does_ apply 
to crypto software, specifically open-source software.

"In the public domain" has a different meaning here to it's meaning in 
IP law - here it is defined to mean ""technology" or "software" which 
has been made available without restrictions upon its further 
dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or 
"software" from being "in the public domain")."


IANAL.

-- Peter Fairbrother


From igb at batten.eu.org  Thu May  9 14:30:48 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Thu, 9 May 2013 14:30:48 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
Message-ID: <6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>


On 8 May 2013, at 14:45, Caspar Bowden (lists) <lists at CasparBowden.net> wrote:
>> Yeah.  You mean "IPv6 would be a good idea", I think.
> 
> Somebody should tell Surrey about http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4941

[[ I see, by the way, that BT are experimenting with NAT for their "Option 1" low-spend customers.  Cats and pigeons. ]]

RFC4941 doesn't completely remove the advantages of IPv6.

Suppose, arguendo, that you think it's a good idea for people hosting webcontent to maintain logs such that it can later be determined who accessed that content (I don't, but as I say, arguendo).

There are two problems that NAT causes that, plus a problem of composition.  NAT boundaries often don't log the inside/outside translation.  Endpoints very rarely log source ports, so the extra bits that NAT is using to extend the available address space are discarded in the log.  And even if you have a complete trace of the NAT translation history and by some miracle you have a complete set of logs from the endpoint including source port numbers, you need to be able to correlate the two, which relies on both systems having accurate clocks.

In the case of IPv6, you remove all those problems.  There's no NAT, the source addresses will be logged complete, and you don't have anything left to correlate.

An endpoint using RFC4941 won't present any problems if they're using a home broadband connection: the high-order 64 bits are unique to the location, so you get the same amount of information you would get if the broadband connection were using NAT.

An endpoint using RFC4941 won't present any problems if they're mobile: the network will probably issue /64s associated with each SIM, and therefore messing about with the low-order bits (even if it doesn't result in the connection dropping) still provides a 1:1 mapping between SIMs and logs.

So even with 4941, IPv6 networks would provide law enforcement with the same information that they would be able to get today if the mobile networks implemented perfectly logged NAT and the endpoints all logged port numbers.

Where RFC4941 does provide privacy is if you're taking your laptop from IETF meeting to IETF meeting, oh, sorry, from Starbucks to Starbucks, it prevents correlation of the low-order bits to link users together. But current IPv4 spying doesn't address that issue either.

So IPv6 would maintain spook capability, even if 4941 were deployed widely (and it is: Windows and OSX both use it on mobile devices, although it appears iOS and Android don't).

ian
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130509/da80906b/attachment.html>

From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Fri May 10 09:29:58 2013
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 09:29:58 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org><518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>


On 09/05/2013 14:30, Ian Batten wrote:
> [[ I see, by the way, that BT are experimenting with NAT for their 
> "Option 1" low-spend customers.  Cats and pigeons. ]]
>
>
Report about that on Out-Law:

http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/may/individuals-can-be-identified-despite-ip-address-sharing-bt-says/

Individuals can be identified despite IP address sharing, BT says

The use of Internet Protocol (IP) address sharing technology will not 
prevent individuals from being identified as the perpetrators of illegal 
online activity, BT has claimed.09 May 2013

The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently 
piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation 
(CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the same 
IP address.

BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient use of 
existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running out", 
before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will enable 
fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.

Data protection law specialist Kathryn Wynn of Pinsent Masons, the law 
firm behind Out-Law.com, said that there were privacy implications to IP 
address sharing that BT, and other ISPs that want to conduct similar 
trials, would have to consider.

(more if you follow the link)

Peter



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Fri May 10 11:42:19 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 11:42:19 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
Message-ID: <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>

In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson 
<pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently 
>piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation 
>(CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the 
>same IP address.

Mobile networks use carrier-grade NAT as well, so the technique is well 
understood.

>BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient use 
>of existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running out", 
>before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will enable 
>fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.

God forbid they roll out IPv6 instead :(
-- 
Roland Perry


From igb at batten.eu.org  Fri May 10 15:03:54 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 15:03:54 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>


On 10 May 2013, at 11:42, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:

> In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson <pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>> The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation (CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the same IP address.
> 
> Mobile networks use carrier-grade NAT as well, so the technique is well understood.
> 
>> BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient use of existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running out", before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will enable fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.
> 
> God forbid they roll out IPv6 instead :(

Of course, they'd need a CGNAT (I've never really understood how that differs from plain NAT) solution there, because most of the Intertubes aren't accessible with pure IPv6.

ian



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Fri May 10 15:32:07 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 15:32:07 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>

In article <240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670 at batten.eu.org>, Ian 
Batten <igb at batten.eu.org> writes
>>> BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient use of existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running
>>>out", before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will enable fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.
>>
>> God forbid they roll out IPv6 instead :(
>
>Of course, they'd need a CGNAT (I've never really understood how that
>differs from plain NAT)

It doesn't differ, other than being "industrial grade". And obviously 
being in the carrier's network rather than beyond their end-point and in 
the user's network. But these are trivial differences.

>solution there, because most of the Intertubes aren't accessible with
>pure IPv6.

That's an entirely separate matter, and one addressed by other kludgy 
technologies disjoint from NAT such as Teredo.

Although one of them (not very popular I think) is called NAT-TP.

Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not 
making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that 
only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would 
relate to.

As ZDNet reported in 2010: "I can't do better than to quote, Leslie 
Daigle, Chief Internet Technology Officer for the Internet Society, who 
admitted at a June 2009 meeting that "IPv6's lack of real backwards 
compatibility for IPv4 was [its] single critical failure."

One of the reasons I like Leslie is that she tells things the way they 
are.
-- 
Roland Perry


From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net  Fri May 10 13:49:57 2013
From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 12:49:57 +0000
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBB9D1@EXC001>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry
> Sent: 10 May 2013 11:42
> To: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
> Subject: Re: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
> 
> In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson
> <pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
> >The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently
> >piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation
> >(CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the
> >same IP address.
> 
> Mobile networks use carrier-grade NAT as well, so the technique is well
> understood.

And the static mappings between port ranges and customers might arguably be covered by the current Data Retention Regs? And anyway represent only a similar volume of logs to current DHCP. That might explain the "may not need legislation" comment?

As opposed to some of the v6 variants, and traditional, non-CG, NAT, where you might have to log a lot more dynamic mappings from address/port to user; potentially as many as one for every TCP connection. Lots more logs, lots more hardware, and synchronised times even more critical :(

Andrew

> >BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient use
> >of existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running
> out",
> >before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will
> enable
> >fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.
> 
> God forbid they roll out IPv6 instead :(
> --
> Roland Perry



From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net  Fri May 10 17:49:16 2013
From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 16:49:16 +0000
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBC26F@EXC001>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten
> Sent: 10 May 2013 15:04
> To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
> Subject: Re: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
> 
> 
> On 10 May 2013, at 11:42, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson
> <pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
> >> The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is
> currently piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address
> Translation (CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers
> share the same IP address.
> >
> > Mobile networks use carrier-grade NAT as well, so the technique is
> well understood.
> >
> >> BT said it is trialling CGNAT in a bid to make the most efficient
> use of existing "IPv4 internet address", which are currently "running
> out", before new "IPv6 addresses become widely adopted". Doing so will
> enable fixed-line internet customers to stay connected, it said.
> >
> > God forbid they roll out IPv6 instead :(
> 
> Of course, they'd need a CGNAT (I've never really understood how that
> differs from plain NAT) solution there, because most of the Intertubes
> aren't accessible with pure IPv6.
> 
> ian

My colleague explained it as CG means better management etc. as well as more robust performance. It's also supposed to incorporate features that make it likely the world will keep working if there are multiple NATs in a chain or if applications make unjustified (but usually correct in an end-to-end world) assumptions about the allocation of addresses and ports. See draft RFC4787 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-lsn-requirements-10), for example.

It seems you may also end up using different algorithms for allocating ports: e.g. the BT system seems to do *static* allocation of a few thousand ports to each user so, for example 127.0.0.1:1-5000 will always be Andrew whereas 127.0.0.1:5001-10000 will always be Ian. Matching a connection to a user is therefore trivial, with almost no logs :-) Whereas on the consumer/business NATs I've had to deal with the addresses and ports may be allocated dynamically on demand as each TCP connection comes in, so you have massive logs and a big time-sync problem (ah, see REQ14 of the RFC draft!)

I *think* the static approach also means that Ian can run out of port mappings without affecting Andrew, whereas on a dynamic NAT once we all together approach 65536 mappings, we all together start failing. I guess that's also a nice feature if you're a service provider.

Nice to be sent off to read RFCs and discover I can still understand them, BTW ;-)

Andrew



From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Fri May 10 16:09:58 2013
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Fri, 10 May 2013 16:09:58 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20130510160958.38ee1700@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>

On Fri, 10 May 2013 15:32:07 +0100
Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:

> As ZDNet reported in 2010: "I can't do better than to quote, Leslie 
> Daigle, Chief Internet Technology Officer for the Internet Society, who 
> admitted at a June 2009 meeting that "IPv6's lack of real backwards 
> compatibility for IPv4 was [its] single critical failure."
> 
> One of the reasons I like Leslie is that she tells things the way they 
> are.

It is surprising that the original design choices didn't get this
right, but I suppose that IPv4 address exhaustion was just a future
possibility when this was being done.

-- 

Brian Morrison




From igb at batten.eu.org  Sat May 11 15:48:21 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 15:48:21 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>

> 
> That's an entirely separate matter, and one addressed by other kludgy technologies disjoint from NAT such as Teredo.
> 
> Although one of them (not very popular I think) is called NAT-TP.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6146 looks more promising.

> 
> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would relate to.

It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would look like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address spaces, one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the two (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space larger).

ian



From igb at batten.eu.org  Sat May 11 15:49:30 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 15:49:30 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBB9D1@EXC001>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBB9D1@EXC001>
Message-ID: <C93D2FF0-A31E-4868-BBF5-DA10DF4904EF@batten.eu.org>


On 10 May 2013, at 13:49, Andrew Cormack <Andrew.Cormack at ja.net> wrote:

> 
> And the static mappings between port ranges and customers might arguably be covered by the current Data Retention Regs? And anyway represent only a similar volume of logs to current DHCP. That might explain the "may not need legislation" comment?

But surely the problem would be that the actual services don't log source port numbers, and therefore even if you have the NAT mappings, you don't know which of the users who happened to be on a particular IP number was the user in question without the source port?

ian



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 11 17:24:11 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 17:24:11 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <20130510160958.38ee1700@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<20130510160958.38ee1700@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>
Message-ID: <AVipnxvrCnjRFAmU@perry.co.uk>

In article <20130510160958.38ee1700 at peterson.fenrir.org.uk>, Brian 
Morrison <bdm at fenrir.org.uk> writes
>> As ZDNet reported in 2010: "I can't do better than to quote, Leslie
>> Daigle, Chief Internet Technology Officer for the Internet Society, who
>> admitted at a June 2009 meeting that "IPv6's lack of real backwards
>> compatibility for IPv4 was [its] single critical failure."
>>
>> One of the reasons I like Leslie is that she tells things the way they
>> are.
>
>It is surprising that the original design choices didn't get this
>right, but I suppose that IPv4 address exhaustion was just a future
>possibility when this was being done.

I think they were aiming for a "big bang" change from IPv4 to IPv6, 
rather than the gradual transition which was inevitable.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 11 17:26:11 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 17:26:11 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>

In article <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478 at batten.eu.org>, Ian 
Batten <igb at batten.eu.org> writes
>> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that
>>only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would relate to.
>
>It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would look like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address spaces,
>one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the two (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space
>larger).

All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of IPv6 
map onto the old IPv4 space.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ben at links.org  Sat May 11 19:06:42 2013
From: ben at links.org (Ben Laurie)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 19:06:42 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>

On 11 May 2013 17:26, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:
> In article <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478 at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten
> <igb at batten.eu.org> writes
>
>>> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not
>>> making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that
>>> only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would
>>> relate to.
>>
>>
>> It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would look
>> like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address spaces,
>> one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the two
>> (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space
>> larger).
>
>
> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of IPv6 map
> onto the old IPv4 space.

Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 11 20:06:31 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 20:06:31 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>

In article 
<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A at mail.gmail.com>, 
Ben Laurie <ben at links.org> writes

>> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of IPv6 map
>> onto the old IPv4 space.
>
>Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?

They wouldn't, but all IPv6 subscribers would intrinsically be able to 
see all the existing IPv4 space.

If people wanted to see IPv6 space as well, they'd have the incentive to 
upgrade.
-- 
Roland Perry


From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net  Sat May 11 17:21:28 2013
From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 16:21:28 +0000
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <C93D2FF0-A31E-4868-BBF5-DA10DF4904EF@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBB9D1@EXC001>
	<C93D2FF0-A31E-4868-BBF5-DA10DF4904EF@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBD2B4@EXC001>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten
> Sent: 11 May 2013 15:50
> To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
> Subject: Re: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
> 
> 
> On 10 May 2013, at 13:49, Andrew Cormack <Andrew.Cormack at ja.net> wrote:
> 
> >
> > And the static mappings between port ranges and customers might
> arguably be covered by the current Data Retention Regs? And anyway
> represent only a similar volume of logs to current DHCP. That might
> explain the "may not need legislation" comment?
> 
> But surely the problem would be that the actual services don't log
> source port numbers, and therefore even if you have the NAT mappings,
> you don't know which of the users who happened to be on a particular IP
> number was the user in question without the source port?
> 
> ian
> 

Errr. Good point :-(

Andrew


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Sat May 11 22:03:42 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 22:03:42 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <518EB22E.8090907@zen.co.uk>

On 11/05/13 19:06, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 11 May 2013 17:26, Roland Perry<lists at internetpolicyagency.com>  wrote:
>> In article<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478 at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten
>> <igb at batten.eu.org>  writes
>>
>>>> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not
>>>> making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that
>>>> only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would
>>>> relate to.
>>>
>>>
>>> It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would look
>>> like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address spaces,
>>> one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the two
>>> (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space
>>> larger).
>>
>>
>> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of IPv6 map
>> onto the old IPv4 space.
>
> Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?
>
>

Reserve say two bytes of IPv4 space for IPv6 - so eg 
144.134.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x is an IPv6 address, and anything which does not 
begin 144.134 is an IPv4 space.

Getting an IPv4 machine to address the extra space is forward 
compatibility, not backward compatibility, and it wasn't built into IPv4 
software or RFCs.

But then, no other mechanism for forward compatibility, necessary to 
address a larger space, was.


-- Peter Fairbrother








From chl at clerew.man.ac.uk  Sun May 12 09:25:16 2013
From: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 09:25:16 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>

On Sat, 11 May 2013 20:06:31 +0100, Roland Perry  
<lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:

> In article  
> <CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A at mail.gmail.com>,  
> Ben Laurie <ben at links.org> writes
>
>>> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of  
>>> IPv6 map
>>> onto the old IPv4 space.
>>
>> Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?

But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into the  
IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).

-- 
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own  
thing------------------------
Tel: +44 161 436 6131                         Web:  
http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU,  
U.K.
PGP: 2C15F1A9      Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4  
AB A5


From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Sun May 12 10:07:04 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 11:07:04 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk> (Charles Lindsey's message
	of "Sun, 12 May 2013 09:25:16 +0100")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Charles Lindsey:

> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into
> the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).

There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for mapping
IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix, these
mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address architecture and its
requirements on the structure of global unicast addresses, so their
use on the IPv6 Internet is not permitted.


From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Sun May 12 10:12:21 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 11:12:21 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <C93D2FF0-A31E-4868-BBF5-DA10DF4904EF@batten.eu.org> (Ian
	Batten's message of "Sat, 11 May 2013 15:49:30 +0100")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBB9D1@EXC001>
	<C93D2FF0-A31E-4868-BBF5-DA10DF4904EF@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <87k3n436kq.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Ian Batten:

> But surely the problem would be that the actual services don't log
> source port numbers, and therefore even if you have the NAT
> mappings, you don't know which of the users who happened to be on a
> particular IP number was the user in question without the source
> port?

Most folks who actually need to track requests back to originating
devices started logging source port numbers in, uhm, 2000 or so.

Actually, if you don't log source IP addresses but not source ports,
it's a strong indicator that you have no business justification for
logging the source IP addresses, which makes the whole exercise
questionable from a data protection POV.


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Sun May 12 15:39:42 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 15:39:42 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
	<op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>

On 12/05/13 10:07, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Charles Lindsey:
>
>> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into
>> the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).
>
> There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for mapping
> IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix, these
> mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address architecture and its
> requirements on the structure of global unicast addresses, so their
> use on the IPv6 Internet is not permitted.

I thought the 64:ff9b prefix was routable in IPv6?

Mind, I think IPv6 is a horrible kludge with no advantages (apart from 
the larger address space, which could easily be done with a small 
extension to IPv4) over IPv4, and should be aborted.

Of course IPv4 is a bit of a kludge too, especially nowadays as the 
original model has been distorted because of the lack of address space - 
NT is not natural, and assigning port ranges to subscribers breaks 
something, if only the notional "ip address is for a machine, port is a 
process on that machine" model - but at least it works.




Is the IPv4 240./8 range still reserved? Just start all IPv4e (IPv4 
extended) addresses with that and make them 10 bytes long, it won't 
break much.




Hmmm, is 64 (or more realistically 48) bits enough for the routing prefix?

-- Peter Fairbrother


From chl at clerew.man.ac.uk  Sun May 12 17:22:36 2013
From: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 17:22:36 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <op.wwzbryvv6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>

On Sun, 12 May 2013 10:07:04 +0100, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de>  
wrote:

> * Charles Lindsey:
>
>> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into
>> the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).
>
> There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for mapping
> IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix, these
> mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address architecture and its
> requirements on the structure of global unicast addresses, so their
> use on the IPv6 Internet is not permitted.
>

That looks like a total shambles. How have they managed to reserve space  
in the IPv6 range, and at the same time not made it legal? And is there no  
way such a facility could be added at this late stage?

-- 
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own  
thing------------------------
Tel: +44 161 436 6131                         Web:  
http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk      Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU,  
U.K.
PGP: 2C15F1A9      Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4  
AB A5


From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Sun May 12 20:15:06 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 21:15:06 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <op.wwzbryvv6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk> (Charles Lindsey's message
	of "Sun, 12 May 2013 17:22:36 +0100")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<op.wwzbryvv6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <87obcgnh6t.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Charles Lindsey:

> On Sun, 12 May 2013 10:07:04 +0100, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de>
> wrote:
>
>> * Charles Lindsey:
>>
>>> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into
>>> the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).
>>
>> There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for mapping
>> IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix, these
>> mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address architecture and its
>> requirements on the structure of global unicast addresses, so their
>> use on the IPv6 Internet is not permitted.

> That looks like a total shambles. How have they managed to reserve
> space in the IPv6 range, and at the same time not made it legal?

It seems I was mistaken.  As Peter pointed out, valid global unicast
addresses can be formed from the 64:ff9b::/96 prefix.  The ::ffff/96
prefix would work for that, too.

It's still bad that there are three different prefixes to choose from.
There's also a /48 prefix under 2002::/16 for every IPv4 address, but
that's a different transition mechanism which goes into the opposite
direction (sort of).

All this is quite confusing, smells like potential firewall evasion,
and generally encourages broad packet filtering.

> And is there no way such a facility could be added at this late
> stage?

You cannot improve IPv6 by adding new features, you have to remove
existing ones.  That's the only way to get a useful protocol out of
it.


From igb at batten.eu.org  Sun May 12 23:30:38 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Sun, 12 May 2013 23:30:38 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>


On 11 May 2013, at 17:26, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:

> In article <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478 at batten.eu.org>, Ian Batten <igb at batten.eu.org> writes
>>> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in not making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses, that
>>> only geeks who understand products, but not product management, would relate to.
>> 
>> It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would look like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address spaces,
>> one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the two (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space
>> larger).
> 
> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of IPv6 map onto the old IPv4 space.

If only someone had thought to insert a paragraph into RFC 2373, fifteen years ago, defining an IPv6 address whose first 80 bits is zero, following by 16 bits of one, as being an IPv4 address mapping into the IPv6 space, and thought to call them, oh, I don't know, an "IPv4-mapped IPv6 address".  They could have inserted it between sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.5, perhaps, and made things much easier.

ian



From igb at batten.eu.org  Mon May 13 08:46:37 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 08:46:37 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
	<op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>


On 12 May 2013, at 15:39, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:

> On 12/05/13 10:07, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Charles Lindsey:
>> 
>>> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would map into
>>> the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6 range).
>> 
>> There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for mapping
>> IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix, these
>> mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address architecture and its
>> requirements on the structure of global unicast addresses, so their
>> use on the IPv6 Internet is not permitted.
> 
> I thought the 64:ff9b prefix was routable in IPv6?

Isn't the idea that you use IPv4 embedded in IPv6 until you reach a dual-stack machine, and switch out to IPv4 at that point?  There's going to have to be some sort of NAT at that stage whatever happens, in order for the return packet to get back.

> Mind, I think IPv6 is a horrible kludge with no advantages (apart from the larger address space, which could easily be done with a small extension to IPv4) over IPv4, and should be aborted.

I simply don't understand this argument.  What is IPv6, if not IPv4 with a small extension for a larger address space (and you say that as though it's not terribly important)?  TCP and UDP go over IPv6 unchanged, for example.  Why would introducing an extension to IPv4 which would be entirely incompatible (it would require a different sized packet header, for example) by any easier than introducing IPv6?  What's the sticking point in IPv6 which makes it harder?
> 
> Is the IPv4 240./8 range still reserved? Just start all IPv4e (IPv4 extended) addresses with that and make them 10 bytes long, it won't break much.

Aside from every single IPv4 application, router, software stack and analyser.  How do you propose, for example, dealing with every piece of code that uses sockaddr_in, every router that assumes the size of the IP header and every routing table everywhere?

ian



From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net  Mon May 13 10:09:51 2013
From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 09:09:51 +0000
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>




> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ian Batten
> Sent: 12 May 2013 23:31
> To: UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
> Subject: Re: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
> 
> 
> On 11 May 2013, at 17:26, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > In article <EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478 at batten.eu.org>, Ian
> Batten <igb at batten.eu.org> writes
> >>> Basically, the people who specified IPv6 screwed up, big time, in
> not making it backwards compatible. They've got all sorts of excuses,
> that
> >>> only geeks who understand products, but not product management,
> would relate to.
> >>
> >> It would be interesting to understand what such a protocol would
> look like.  The basic problem surely is that if you have two address
> spaces,
> >> one larger than the other, you can't have a 1:1 mapping between the
> two (and to do so would defeat the object of making the address space
> >> larger).
> >
> > All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of
> IPv6 map onto the old IPv4 space.
> 
> If only someone had thought to insert a paragraph into RFC 2373,
> fifteen years ago, defining an IPv6 address whose first 80 bits is
> zero, following by 16 bits of one, as being an IPv4 address mapping
> into the IPv6 space, and thought to call them, oh, I don't know, an
> "IPv4-mapped IPv6 address".  They could have inserted it between
> sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.5, perhaps, and made things much easier.
> 
> ian

If I remember correctly (and it was a *very* long time ago) one of the aims of v6 was to reduce the size of routing tables by bringing a bit of structure to address allocations. Doesn't mapping v4 addresses into part of the v6 space mean that the v6 table has to be at least as big as the v4 one from day one?

That may be less of an issue nowadays (the v6 designers presumably had in mind the memory limits/costs of routers twenty years ago) but it may be one reason why they chose a clean break.

Andrew

--
Andrew Cormack
Chief Regulatory Adviser, Janet
t: +44 1235 822302
b: https://community.ja.net/blogs/regulatory-developments
Janet(UK) is a trading name of Jisc Collections and Janet Limited, a not-for-profit company which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and whose Registered Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell Oxford, Didcot, Oxfordshire, OX11 0SG. VAT No. 614944238


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 13 15:42:56 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 15:42:56 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>
Message-ID: <xPzFxBmwvPkRFA5R@perry.co.uk>

In article <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B at EXC001>, Andrew 
Cormack <Andrew.Cormack at ja.net> writes
>If I remember correctly (and it was a *very* long time ago) one of the 
>aims of v6 was to reduce the size of routing tables by bringing a bit 
>of structure to address allocations. Doesn't mapping v4 addresses into 
>part of the v6 space mean that the v6 table has to be at least as big 
>as the v4 one from day one?

But if you are routing v4 and v6 at the same time (who will be the first 
to be brave enough to turn off their v4 capability altogether), then you 
have to have both routing tables on hand anyway.

-- 
Roland Perry


From igb at batten.eu.org  Mon May 13 16:01:26 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 16:01:26 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>
Message-ID: <EDBFA9B4-205D-449C-B8DA-6682F438DC8E@batten.eu.org>


On 13 May 2013, at 10:09, Andrew Cormack <Andrew.Cormack at ja.net> wrote:

>  Doesn't mapping v4 addresses into part of the v6 space mean that the v6 table has to be at least as big as the v4 one from day one?

Well, for some value of "at least as big".  If, for example, you have an IPv4 default route, then ::ffff/96 only has one route.  If you have a sparse set of routing tables for IPv4, then ::ffff/96 will have exactly as many routing entries as there are v4 routes.

And in any event, a fully populated IPv4 routing table with a separate forwarding entry for every /32 --- which is much, much denser than reality --- only requires 16GB of RAM.  In the context of core routers, that's neither here nor there, and becoming less here and less there with every passing day.  

ian



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Mon May 13 16:35:11 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 16:35:11 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>	<+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>	<op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <5191082F.9060209@zen.co.uk>

On 13/05/13 08:46, Ian Batten wrote:
>
> On 12 May 2013, at 15:39, Peter Fairbrother<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk>
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/05/13 10:07, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>> * Charles Lindsey:
>>>
>>>> But I thought IPv6 did reserve a batch of numbers that would
>>>> map into the IPv4 space (but not at the "bottom" of the IPv6
>>>> range).
>>>
>>> There are at least three different reserved /96 prefixes for
>>> mapping IPv4 addresses.  Except for the deprecated ::/96 prefix,
>>> these mappings are incompatible with the IPv6 address
>>> architecture and its requirements on the structure of global
>>> unicast addresses, so their use on the IPv6 Internet is not
>>> permitted.
>>
>> I thought the 64:ff9b prefix was routable in IPv6?
>
> Isn't the idea that you use IPv4 embedded in IPv6 until you reach a
> dual-stack machine, and switch out to IPv4 at that point?  There's
> going to have to be some sort of NAT at that stage whatever happens,
> in order for the return packet to get back.

It's not my idea, it's part of IPv6 (which I am complaining about).

>> Mind, I think IPv6 is a horrible kludge with no advantages (apart
>> from the larger address space, which could easily be done with a
>> small extension to IPv4) over IPv4, and should be aborted.
>
> I simply don't understand this argument.  What is IPv6, if not IPv4
> with a small extension for a larger address space (and you say that
> as though it's not terribly important)?

This is of course essential - but is IPv6 the best way to get it? I 
don't think so.

Does IPv6 have any other benefits? I don't think so. There were to be 
some routing benefits, but time has pretty much erased those. Universal 
encryption? Not happening. I can't think of anything else?

> TCP and UDP go over IPv6
> unchanged, for example.  Why would introducing an extension to IPv4
> which would be entirely incompatible (it would require a different
> sized packet header, for example)

IPv4 packet headers are not fixed size - there is a "header length" 
field. It is trivial to add the extra probably 8 or 16 bytes.

> by any easier than introducing
> IPv6?  What's the sticking point in IPv6 which makes it harder?
>>
>> Is the IPv4 240./8 range still reserved? Just start all IPv4e (IPv4
>> extended) addresses with that and make them 10 bytes long, it won't
>> break much.
>
> Aside from every single IPv4 application, router, software stack and
> analyser.  How do you propose, for example, dealing with every piece
> of code that uses sockaddr_in,

Use the 8 normally zero bytes at the end?

Of course, no matter what you do, you will have to make some changes in 
order to get a bigger address space. There is no way around that. It's 
just that with something like IPv4e the total changes are smaller, and 
it's backwards compatible.

> every router that assumes the size of the IP header

I didn't think they were allowed, but I don't know much about backbone 
hardware.

> and every routing table everywhere?

The router looks at the first byte of the "to" address, if it's 240 then 
it uses the new, more logical addition to the table.

(more logical in that eg major hosting companies, ISPs, and other major 
backbone destinations get a single block of IPv4e address beginning with 
240.a.b.c.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x. The abc bytes are assigned by ICANN or 
someone, the remaining 8 x bytes by the major destination)


I don't claim to know much about internet backbone, or that IPv4e is a 
fully-baked idea - but I don't have any respect for IPv6.

Or HTML5, or RFCs for that matter.

-- Peter Fairbrother


>
> ian
>
>
>



From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Mon May 13 18:45:08 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 19:45:08 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org> (Ian
	Batten's message of "Mon, 13 May 2013 08:46:37 +0100")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Ian Batten:

> I simply don't understand this argument.  What is IPv6, if not IPv4
> with a small extension for a larger address space (and you say that
> as though it's not terribly important)?

If you look at typical IPv6 textbooks, they give you a long list of
advantages:

* larger address space
* simplified address structure
* universal reachability of all end devices
* protocol header optimized for efficient forwarding
* more flexibility due to scoped addresses
* improved security through IPsec
* smaller routing tables due to aggregation
* stateless auto-configuration
* automatic renumbering between different provider aggregates
* no broadcasts
* improved multicast
* built-in mobility
* better for QoS with flow labels

A lot of that turned out to be totally undesirable, often for security
reasons.  For example, if the network is stateless, it cannot prevent
source address spoofing?it cannot keep state that tells it which
network port is associated with which address or set of addresses.
Similarly, I don't think we want our fridges to be reachable from the
public Internet at large, just because it happens to have an IPv4
address for our own (personal) use.

> TCP and UDP go over IPv6 unchanged, for example.

Stateless, RFC-compliant UDP servers are rather difficult to build
with IPv6.  (We didn't get that right with IPv4 first, either.)

Getting to the TCP/UDP header is quite different, too.  It can even be
in a completely different packet.


From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Mon May 13 20:41:16 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 21:41:16 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001> (Andrew
	Cormack's message of "Mon, 13 May 2013 09:09:51 +0000")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<C3DEE5D4-86E1-4F04-B5B6-D4A4662ECC3C@batten.eu.org>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FBE29B@EXC001>
Message-ID: <87wqr2k6qr.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Andrew Cormack:

> If I remember correctly (and it was a *very* long time ago) one of
> the aims of v6 was to reduce the size of routing tables by bringing
> a bit of structure to address allocations. Doesn't mapping v4
> addresses into part of the v6 space mean that the v6 table has to be
> at least as big as the v4 one from day one?

Uhm, correct.

> That may be less of an issue nowadays (the v6 designers presumably
> had in mind the memory limits/costs of routers twenty years ago) but
> it may be one reason why they chose a clean break.

These days, you'd probably extract the IPv4 address and look it up
using the IPv4 forwarding engine because most IPv6 routers have that
as well.  But that's entirely hypothetical.

(IPv6 routing table sizes with hundreds of thousands of prefixes is
still a bit tricky if you want to forward hundreds of millions of
packets per second on a single router.)


From colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk  Mon May 13 19:24:08 2013
From: colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk (Tom Thomson)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 19:24:08 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <000a01ce5007$0fe71a40$2fb54ec0$@o2.co.uk>

While anyone whose income depends on all their customers being able to get
to them, and has the man in the street as his customer, has a massive
incentive not to upgrade until all the ISPs have upgraded because the man in
the street uses whatever his ISP sticks him with.

M.

Roland Perry wrote:-

 In article
<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A at mail.gmail.com>,
Ben Laurie <ben at links.org> writes

>> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of 
>> IPv6 map onto the old IPv4 space.
>
>Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?

They wouldn't, but all IPv6 subscribers would intrinsically be able to see
all the existing IPv4 space.

If people wanted to see IPv6 space as well, they'd have the incentive to
upgrade.
--
Roland Perry




From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 13 21:17:17 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 21:17:17 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <5191082F.9060209@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<5191082F.9060209@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <JH8LD6pNpUkRFAOL@perry.co.uk>

In article <5191082F.9060209 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>(more logical in that eg major hosting companies, ISPs, and other major 
>backbone destinations get a single block of IPv4e address beginning 
>with 240.a.b.c.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x. The abc bytes are assigned by ICANN or 
>someone,

That would be one of the Regional Internet Registries.

>the remaining 8 x bytes by the major destination)

-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 13 21:21:08 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 21:21:08 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <000a01ce5007$0fe71a40$2fb54ec0$@o2.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk>
	<000a01ce5007$0fe71a40$2fb54ec0$@o2.co.uk>
Message-ID: <jXSBnFr0sUkRFArI@perry.co.uk>

In article <000a01ce5007$0fe71a40$2fb54ec0$@o2.co.uk>, Tom Thomson 
<colinthomson1 at o2.co.uk> writes
>While anyone whose income depends on all their customers being able to get
>to them, and has the man in the street as his customer, has a massive
>incentive not to upgrade until all the ISPs have upgraded because the man in
>the street uses whatever his ISP sticks him with.

You are several years behind the curve, when it comes to provisioning 
large sites (with many men in the street as customers) to be IPv6 
enabled.

ps Please don't top-post.

>Roland Perry wrote:-
>
> In article
><CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A at mail.gmail.com>,
>Ben Laurie <ben at links.org> writes
>
>>> All that was necessary was making the bottom 0.1% (or whatever) of
>>> IPv6 map onto the old IPv4 space.
>>
>>Oh yeah? So how would an IPv4 machine address the remaining space?
>
>They wouldn't, but all IPv6 subscribers would intrinsically be able to see
>all the existing IPv4 space.
>
>If people wanted to see IPv6 space as well, they'd have the incentive to
>upgrade.
>--
>Roland Perry
>
>
>

-- 
Roland Perry


From igb at batten.eu.org  Mon May 13 22:30:01 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 22:30:01 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <B0363AD1-0DA6-4A9C-924E-F97F444BF967@batten.eu.org>


On 13 May 2013, at 18:45, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
> 
> Similarly, I don't think we want our fridges to be reachable from the
> public Internet at large, just because it happens to have an IPv4
> address for our own (personal) use.

I don't buy that argument.  It's trivially easy for routers to have a default-block firewall rule with outbound state tracking, which mimics the security semantics of NAT.

> pass out quick on ip.tun1 from any to any keep state
> block in quick on ip.tun1 from any to any

That does, however, permit those of us that do want access to our internal machines to do so as well.  NAT and firewalling are different, and using the one as a hacky way of doing the other is assuming that everyone's requirement for both run in lockstep.

ian






From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Tue May 14 20:38:31 2013
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 21:38:31 +0200
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <B0363AD1-0DA6-4A9C-924E-F97F444BF967@batten.eu.org> (Ian
	Batten's message of "Mon, 13 May 2013 22:30:01 +0100")
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<B0363AD1-0DA6-4A9C-924E-F97F444BF967@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <87txm5cpxk.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>

* Ian Batten:

> On 13 May 2013, at 18:45, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
>> 
>> Similarly, I don't think we want our fridges to be reachable from the
>> public Internet at large, just because it happens to have an IPv4
>> address for our own (personal) use.
>
> I don't buy that argument.  It's trivially easy for routers to have
> a default-block firewall rule with outbound state tracking, which
> mimics the security semantics of NAT.

And with such filtering, end-to-end reachability between arbitrary
devices who haven't got a previous relationship is just not possible.

>> pass out quick on ip.tun1 from any to any keep state
>> block in quick on ip.tun1 from any to any
>
> That does, however, permit those of us that do want access to our
> internal machines to do so as well.

True, but applications still have to work around filters.  IPv6, when
eventually deployed, will not provide much simplification (except for
protocols which are actively hostile towards NAT, but upgrading them
to IPv6 will often be difficult, due to embedded addresses etc.).


From igb at batten.eu.org  Wed May 15 16:13:25 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Wed, 15 May 2013 16:13:25 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <87txm5cpxk.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<B0363AD1-0DA6-4A9C-924E-F97F444BF967@batten.eu.org>
	<87txm5cpxk.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <9289AE42-B208-467C-B032-418E8C1DD1B9@batten.eu.org>


On 14 May 2013, at 20:38, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:

> * Ian Batten:
> 
>> On 13 May 2013, at 18:45, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Similarly, I don't think we want our fridges to be reachable from the
>>> public Internet at large, just because it happens to have an IPv4
>>> address for our own (personal) use.
>> 
>> I don't buy that argument.  It's trivially easy for routers to have
>> a default-block firewall rule with outbound state tracking, which
>> mimics the security semantics of NAT.
> 
> And with such filtering, end-to-end reachability between arbitrary
> devices who haven't got a previous relationship is just not possible.

Sorry, could you explain that?  How does NAT differ from stateful firewalling?

ian

From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 18 11:34:55 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 18 May 2013 11:34:55 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
Message-ID: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>

        "Some Marks and Spencer customers have told the BBC of cases
        where the chain's contactless payment terminals have taken money
        from cards other than the ones intended for payment.

        "Card are supposed to be within about 4cm of the front of the
        contactless terminal to work.

        "But some customers say payments have been taken from cards
        while in purses and wallets at much greater distances.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22545804
-- 
Roland Perry


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Sat May 18 14:03:51 2013
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Sat, 18 May 2013 14:03:51 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>

Well, it all depends...

... on how much power the card needs to function

... on how much power the terminal actually radiates (sic, its a 
magnetic field thing).

I'm copying this to Chris Stanford who runs the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC17/WG8 UK 
Panel for Contactless cards.

Peter

Peter Tomlinson

On 18/05/2013 11:34, Roland Perry wrote:
>          "Some Marks and Spencer customers have told the BBC of cases
>          where the chain's contactless payment terminals have taken money
>          from cards other than the ones intended for payment.
>
>          "Card are supposed to be within about 4cm of the front of the
>          contactless terminal to work.
>
>          "But some customers say payments have been taken from cards
>          while in purses and wallets at much greater distances.
>
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22545804



From dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org  Sun May 19 19:04:53 2013
From: dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org (Derek Fawcus)
Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 11:04:53 -0700
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>

On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 02:03:51pm +0100, Peter Tomlinson wrote:
> (sic, its a magnetic field thing).

So,  does that mean we now need to have mu-metal lined wallets?


From david at jellybaby.net  Sun May 19 22:39:28 2013
From: david at jellybaby.net (David Walters)
Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 22:39:28 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
Message-ID: <CAOOZfCWA0SX4k+cRYF+y6anc5rX5aTU5=HHweNY99ypq+NKqeg@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 7:04 PM, Derek Fawcus
<dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org> wrote:
> On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 02:03:51pm +0100, Peter Tomlinson wrote:
>> (sic, its a magnetic field thing).
>
> So,  does that mean we now need to have mu-metal lined wallets?

That or tin foil it seems - http://rfidiot.org/#RFID_Blocking


From fearghas at gmail.com  Sun May 19 23:00:59 2013
From: fearghas at gmail.com (Fearghas McKay)
Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 23:00:59 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
Message-ID: <57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>


On 19 May 2013, at 19:04, Derek Fawcus <dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org> wrote:

> So,  does that mean we now need to have mu-metal lined wallets?

Like your passport holder :-) that probably has room for cards already?

	f

From David_Biggins at usermgmt.com  Sun May 19 20:49:29 2013
From: David_Biggins at usermgmt.com (David Biggins)
Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 20:49:29 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD49362351C3FA@home.usermgmt.local>

I've seen reports that Marks & Spencer have seen cases of payment being
simultaneously taken from a normal C&P card and a nearby swipe.

To the extent that they have raised refunds for the duplicate
payments...

Pret a Manger have apparently seen similar issues.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/10066187/Marks-and-Sp
encer-customer-fears-over-contactless-payments.html 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2326793/M-amp-S-customers-pay-tw
ice-contactless-payment-cards--despite-standing-foot-till.html 

Dave.   (Long time no see).

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry
> Sent: 18 May 2013 11:35 AM
> To: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
> Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
> 
>         "Some Marks and Spencer customers have told the BBC of cases
>         where the chain's contactless payment terminals have taken
money
>         from cards other than the ones intended for payment.
> 
>         "Card are supposed to be within about 4cm of the front of the
>         contactless terminal to work.
> 
>         "But some customers say payments have been taken from cards
>         while in purses and wallets at much greater distances.
> 
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22545804
> --
> Roland Perry
> 



From David_Biggins at usermgmt.com  Sun May 19 20:50:53 2013
From: David_Biggins at usermgmt.com (David Biggins)
Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 20:50:53 +0100
Subject: Apologies for the previous top post.
Message-ID: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD49362351C3FB@home.usermgmt.local>

D.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130519/db406ec4/attachment.html>

From igb at batten.eu.org  Mon May 20 09:09:56 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 09:09:56 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD49362351C3FA@home.usermgmt.local>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
	<C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD49362351C3FA@home.usermgmt.local>
Message-ID: <EBBBCA8E-AA58-4E6E-97C0-3B02D4C0B896@batten.eu.org>


On 19 May 2013, at 20:49, "David Biggins" <David_Biggins at usermgmt.com> wrote:

> I've seen reports that Marks & Spencer have seen cases of payment being
> simultaneously taken from a normal C&P card and a nearby swipe.

Aside from problems with the hardware, that's also a problem with the PoS software.  Surely it never makes sense to take payment twice?

ian



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 20 10:36:50 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 10:36:50 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk>

In article <57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98 at gmail.com>, Fearghas 
McKay <fearghas at gmail.com> writes
>> So,  does that mean we now need to have mu-metal lined wallets?
>
>Like your passport holder :-) that probably has room for cards already

I wonder if it helps (to avoid these false transactions) if you have 
more than one contactless card in your wallet. Or does the system then 
simply charge both of them?

What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or ITSO 
card in your wallet?
-- 
Roland Perry


From chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org  Mon May 20 10:49:44 2013
From: chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org (Chris Edwards)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 10:49:44 +0100 (BST)
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>

On Mon, 20 May 2013, Roland Perry wrote:

> What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or ITSO card in
> your wallet?

$workplace uses a mifare card based entry system (wave your wallet 
containing card at door reader).  Last year, I started frequently having 
problems opening doors.  Then I realised this was due to my bank having 
issued a new visa card, which has the "pay-by-wave" logo (looks a bit like 
a WiFi symbol).  Removing this visa card from my wallet reinstated by 
ability to open doors.

I had some idea the protocols specifically catered for multiple cards, and 
that the door card reader would be able to "select" the card it wants to 
talk to.  But if so, this doesn't seem to work very well (for me).



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 20 13:34:51 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 13:34:51 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
Message-ID: <aYH$0UArhhmRFAMW@perry.co.uk>

In article <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ at skipnote.org>, Chris Edwards 
<chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org> writes
>> What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or ITSO card in
>> your wallet?
>
>$workplace uses a mifare card based entry system (wave your wallet
>containing card at door reader).  Last year, I started frequently having
>problems opening doors.  Then I realised this was due to my bank having
>issued a new visa card, which has the "pay-by-wave" logo (looks a bit like
>a WiFi symbol).  Removing this visa card from my wallet reinstated by
>ability to open doors.
>
>I had some idea the protocols specifically catered for multiple cards, and
>that the door card reader would be able to "select" the card it wants to
>talk to.  But if so, this doesn't seem to work very well (for me).

It's never worked for me (in either direction) trying to unscramble an 
Oyster with something else.

I suspect a field trip is in order... (and while I'm at it I can see if 
LRT buses accept my Paywave Paypal debit card or not - from the 
publicity material it's ambiguous).
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk  Mon May 20 14:07:23 2013
From: ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 14:07:23 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
Message-ID: <7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>


On May 20, 2013, at 10:49 AM, Chris Edwards wrote:

> On Mon, 20 May 2013, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>> What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or  
>> ITSO card in
>> your wallet?
>
> $workplace uses a mifare card based entry system (wave your wallet
> containing card at door reader).  Last year, I started frequently  
> having
> problems opening doors.  Then I realised this was due to my bank  
> having
> issued a new visa card, which has the "pay-by-wave" logo (looks a  
> bit like
> a WiFi symbol).  Removing this visa card from my wallet reinstated by
> ability to open doors.
>
> I had some idea the protocols specifically catered for multiple  
> cards, and
> that the door card reader would be able to "select" the card it  
> wants to
> talk to.  But if so, this doesn't seem to work very well (for me).
>
>

There are several collision avoidance mechanisms for RFID cards. The  
commonest uses a tree walk strategy where the reader gradually  
enumerates the possible serial number space by repeatedly transmitting  
a request for cards with a defined serial number prefix to reply and  
lengthening the prefix at every attempt. It would look something like  
this:

Reader Tx:	Any cards there?
Reader Rx:	<collision>
Reader Tx:	Any cards with a serial number starting '0' there?
Reader Rx:	<silence>
Reader Tx:	Any cards with a serial number starting '1' there?
Reader Rx:	<collision>
Reader Tx:	Any cards with a serial number starting '10' there?
Reader Rx:	<silence>
Reader Tx:	Any cards with a serial number starting '11' there?
Reader Rx:	<collision>
Reader Tx:	Any cards with a serial number starting '110' there?
Reader Rx:	This is card 11011001...

  This method has the undesirable property that it leaks all but the  
last bit of the serial number of the card it is reading. This being  
leaked by the reader (which will have a much higher transmit power  
than the card) it can be read at much greater distances than replies  
from cards. Using it implies that for a system to be even trivially  
secure, the systems security must not rely on the cards serial number  
being secret. This might seem obvious, but I've seen smart card  
systems that do rely on serial number secrecy.

An alternative collision mechanism is good old ALOHA and slotted  
ALOHA, as used in ethernet's great granddaddy at the University of  
Hawaii. This is a classic backoff and retransmit protocol and has all  
the problems of those style protocols in high traffic/crowded airspace  
situations.

I don't know which mechanism contactless payment cards use. Using  
either one there is still a race for cards to reply and a possibility  
that for implementations that stop trying once they have received a  
single complete reply that a particular card may always be singled  
out, either by serial number priority or differing choices (or  
accuracy) of retransmission timers.

Note that both protocols make it possible to enumerate all cards in  
range and then it would be an application flaw, as opposed to a reader  
flaw, that allowed two cards to be charged for the same transaction.  
It seems obvious to me that a POS system that detected two or more  
cards ought to ask for human intervention to resolve which card to  
choose but perhaps it wasn't obvious to the designers of these  
particular systems.

Ian


From clive at davros.org  Mon May 20 15:40:13 2013
From: clive at davros.org (Clive D.W. Feather)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 15:40:13 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20130520144013.GB48009@davros.org>

Ian Mason said:
> There are several collision avoidance mechanisms for RFID cards.

Cambridgeshire Libraries has an automated checkout system that uses some
kind of RFID tags in the book. I've tried putting a stack of 6 books on the
reader and it found all of them.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather          | If you lie to the compiler,
Email: clive at davros.org     | it will get its revenge.
Web: http://www.davros.org  |   - Henry Spencer
Mobile: +44 7973 377646


From igb at batten.eu.org  Mon May 20 15:51:16 2013
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 15:51:16 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
Message-ID: <6ADEBBD9-F7B5-4825-90EB-29AA642B0FB0@batten.eu.org>


On 20 May 2013, at 14:07, Ian Mason <ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk> wrote:

> 
> On May 20, 2013, at 10:49 AM, Chris Edwards wrote:
> 
>> On Mon, 20 May 2013, Roland Perry wrote:
>> 
>>> What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or ITSO card in
>>> your wallet?
>> 
>> $workplace uses a mifare card based entry system (wave your wallet
>> containing card at door reader).  Last year, I started frequently having
>> problems opening doors.  Then I realised this was due to my bank having
>> issued a new visa card, which has the "pay-by-wave" logo (looks a bit like
>> a WiFi symbol).  Removing this visa card from my wallet reinstated by
>> ability to open doors.
>> 
>> I had some idea the protocols specifically catered for multiple cards, and
>> that the door card reader would be able to "select" the card it wants to
>> talk to.  But if so, this doesn't seem to work very well (for me).
>> 
>> 
> 
> There are several collision avoidance mechanisms for RFID cards. The commonest uses a tree walk strategy where the reader gradually enumerates the possible serial number space by repeatedly transmitting a request for cards with a defined serial number prefix to reply and lengthening the prefix at every attempt.
[...]

> This method has the undesirable property that it leaks all but the last bit of the serial number of the card it is reading. 

Surely it only leaks the common initial substring?  Yes, in the limit that is, as you say, n-1 bits of an n bit serial, but on average it will be substantially less than that, depending on how the serial numbers are allocated.

ian



From dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org  Mon May 20 15:51:54 2013
From: dfawcus+lists-ukcrypto at employees.org (Derek Fawcus)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 07:51:54 -0700
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <CAOOZfCWA0SX4k+cRYF+y6anc5rX5aTU5=HHweNY99ypq+NKqeg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<CAOOZfCWA0SX4k+cRYF+y6anc5rX5aTU5=HHweNY99ypq+NKqeg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20130520145154.GA78125@banjo.employees.org>

On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 10:39:28pm +0100, David Walters wrote:
> That or tin foil it seems - http://rfidiot.org/#RFID_Blocking

I took a simpler,  although slower approach,
after 3 sets of instructions,  I finally received
a new NatWest Debit/ATM card without that 'wireless' logo.


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Mon May 20 16:01:48 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 16:01:48 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <20130520144013.GB48009@davros.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<20130520144013.GB48009@davros.org>
Message-ID: <9o62ojKcrjmRFAq8@perry.co.uk>

In article <20130520144013.GB48009 at davros.org>, Clive D.W. Feather 
<clive at davros.org> writes
>> There are several collision avoidance mechanisms for RFID cards.
>
>Cambridgeshire Libraries has an automated checkout system that uses some
>kind of RFID tags in the book. I've tried putting a stack of 6 books on the
>reader and it found all of them.

I'd expect collision detection to work well for RFID chips of the kind 
used in products, but the ones in transaction cards do seem to interfere 
with each other. They also have a very short time to complete the 
transaction.
-- 
Roland Perry


From david at jellybaby.net  Mon May 20 15:42:39 2013
From: david at jellybaby.net (David Walters)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 15:42:39 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <20130520144013.GB48009@davros.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<20130520144013.GB48009@davros.org>
Message-ID: <CAOOZfCVwv5izkXq3vgqQ--sr17YReQ_sZPWYRnbxuRYoRDqsKA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 3:40 PM, Clive D.W. Feather <clive at davros.org> wrote:
> Cambridgeshire Libraries has an automated checkout system that uses some
> kind of RFID tags in the book. I've tried putting a stack of 6 books on the
> reader and it found all of them.

If it is anything like the system used by Barnet libraries then it
needs a minimum separation between books so doesn't work very well
with children's picture books.


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Mon May 20 16:14:06 2013
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 16:14:06 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk>
	<51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk><20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org><57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com><e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk>
	<E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519A3DBE.1090207@iosis.co.uk>

(1) I agree that charging the customer twice **for the same 
transaction** is an application flaw in the POS device - and it smacks 
of a major error in POS device certification (may also be a breach of 
the Merchant Agreement if it really happened - but that it did happen 
might be an urban myth). But maybe it was actually something different 
(see point (3) below).

(2) One (and its an obvious one) difficulty with collision avoidance by 
interrogating the cards is the time that it takes - a major point about 
contactless EMV payment is transaction speed. A less obvious difficulty 
is that the terminals don't (as far as I know) have any way for the 
customer to be asked which card should be used, so assistance would have 
to be sent for when a collision is detected - and no store trying to 
speed things up (customer proposition) and keep costs down (merchant 
proposition) will want that to happen..

(3) If another report is true (that a customer with no intention of 
paying for anything gets charged just because he/she is nearby), then 
there will have to be (a) reduction of the strength of the terminal's RF 
field, (b) adjustment of the shape of the terminal's RF field (which is 
generated by a coil), and (c) adjustment to the layout of the point of 
sale area so that those who don't want to pay are kept away until its 
their turn. One of the worse cases will be if customer A is at the 
terminal and customer B waiting in line to pay gets charged for customer 
A's purchase while customer A walks away without paying (because the 
terminal says the transaction is complete). Reminds me of passport 
control where you wait to be called forward...

I'm expecting a forthcoming debit card renewal to result in my getting a 
card with contactless technology as well as contact. Must line my wallet 
with kitchen foil (no tin foil to hand)...

Peter

On 20/05/2013 14:07, Ian Mason wrote:
> There are several collision avoidance mechanisms for RFID cards. The 
> commonest uses a tree walk strategy where the reader gradually 
> enumerates the possible serial number space by repeatedly transmitting 
> a request for cards with a defined serial number prefix to reply and 
> lengthening the prefix at every attempt. It would look something like 
> this:
>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards there?
> Reader Rx:    <collision>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards with a serial number starting '0' there?
> Reader Rx:    <silence>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards with a serial number starting '1' there?
> Reader Rx:    <collision>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards with a serial number starting '10' there?
> Reader Rx:    <silence>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards with a serial number starting '11' there?
> Reader Rx:    <collision>
> Reader Tx:    Any cards with a serial number starting '110' there?
> Reader Rx:    This is card 11011001...
>
>  This method has the undesirable property that it leaks all but the 
> last bit of the serial number of the card it is reading. This being 
> leaked by the reader (which will have a much higher transmit power 
> than the card) it can be read at much greater distances than replies 
> from cards. Using it implies that for a system to be even trivially 
> secure, the systems security must not rely on the cards serial number 
> being secret. This might seem obvious, but I've seen smart card 
> systems that do rely on serial number secrecy.
>
> An alternative collision mechanism is good old ALOHA and slotted 
> ALOHA, as used in ethernet's great granddaddy at the University of 
> Hawaii. This is a classic backoff and retransmit protocol and has all 
> the problems of those style protocols in high traffic/crowded airspace 
> situations.
>
> I don't know which mechanism contactless payment cards use. Using 
> either one there is still a race for cards to reply and a possibility 
> that for implementations that stop trying once they have received a 
> single complete reply that a particular card may always be singled 
> out, either by serial number priority or differing choices (or 
> accuracy) of retransmission timers.
>
> Note that both protocols make it possible to enumerate all cards in 
> range and then it would be an application flaw, as opposed to a reader 
> flaw, that allowed two cards to be charged for the same transaction. 
> It seems obvious to me that a POS system that detected two or more 
> cards ought to ask for human intervention to resolve which card to 
> choose but perhaps it wasn't obvious to the designers of these 
> particular systems.
>
> Ian
>
>



From tony.naggs at googlemail.com  Mon May 20 15:44:03 2013
From: tony.naggs at googlemail.com (Tony Naggs)
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 15:44:03 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <51977C37.30104@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130519180453.GA16759@banjo.employees.org>
	<57621A3A-56C8-4517-B41E-6DFEB0314A98@gmail.com>
	<e5Bucp5y6emRFAeb@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
Message-ID: <CAK0b=2f3i1=1RSMD-wt32rTveetagiXmoNOcFjbTsNRKwEyJHw@mail.gmail.com>

On 20 May 2013 10:49, Chris Edwards <chris-ukcrypto at lists.skipnote.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 20 May 2013, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>> What if the contactless credit card is adjacent to an Oyster or ITSO card in
>> your wallet?
>
> $workplace uses a mifare card based entry system (wave your wallet
> containing card at door reader).  Last year, I started frequently having
> problems opening doors.  Then I realised this was due to my bank having
> issued a new visa card, which has the "pay-by-wave" logo (looks a bit like
> a WiFi symbol).  Removing this visa card from my wallet reinstated by
> ability to open doors.
>
> I had some idea the protocols specifically catered for multiple cards, and
> that the door card reader would be able to "select" the card it wants to
> talk to.  But if so, this doesn't seem to work very well (for me).


Many door locks simply try to read the unique Id (UID) of a card, &
search for it in an access rights table. The ones I've encountered are
unable to cope with multiple cards presented together.

Credit & debit cards may have random or fixed Ids, and the card
function is identified by further information on the card. If there
are multiple cards a terminal could simply charge the card it
identifies with credit/debit functionality - this may still not be the
expected behaviour.

--
Tony


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Tue May 21 08:15:09 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 08:15:09 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
Message-ID: <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>

In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson 
<pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>Report about that on Out-Law:
>
>http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/may/individuals-can-be-identifie
>d-despite-ip-address-sharing-bt-says/
>
>Individuals can be identified despite IP address sharing, BT says
>
>The use of Internet Protocol (IP) address sharing technology will not 
>prevent individuals from being identified as the perpetrators of 
>illegal online activity, BT has claimed.09 May 2013
>
>The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently 
>piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation 
>(CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the 
>same IP address.

And an article looking more deeply into the technical details of CGNs, 
in this context:

http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2013-05/cgns.html
-- 
Roland Perry


From k.brown at bbk.ac.uk  Tue May 21 15:52:21 2013
From: k.brown at bbk.ac.uk (k.brown at bbk.ac.uk)
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 15:52:21 +0100
Subject: Fwd: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAJ0hfoucCxb7mUFHFADO0VwStD=gVqGH1nrAFKDFe4kymYSO4A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<CAJ0hfoucCxb7mUFHFADO0VwStD=gVqGH1nrAFKDFe4kymYSO4A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAJ0hfotvuxk1zV1ipj4scutwLFnCnc4xsM4Jd3KKi-jiKWTvEw@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 May 2013 18:45, Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:


> If you look at typical IPv6 textbooks, they give you a long list of
> advantages:
>
> * larger address space
> * simplified address structure
> * universal reachability of all end devices
> * protocol header optimized for efficient forwarding
> * more flexibility due to scoped addresses
> * improved security through IPsec
> * smaller routing tables due to aggregation
> * stateless auto-configuration
> * automatic renumbering between different provider aggregates
> * no broadcasts
> * improved multicast
> * built-in mobility
> * better for QoS with flow labels
>
> A lot of that turned out to be totally undesirable...

And those that were desirable were really only problems for people who
write software for routers. Not for end users. Or even people who run
computers for end users. Or even people who configure networkds for
people who run computers for end users.  And they have pretty much
been solved in the last twenty years by those people who write
software for routers.

And "simplified address structure" is only true if you are writing
software for routers.  To everybody else IPv4 looks simpler because
its just about possible for the average person to remember four
decimal numbers in a row, most people can't hold eight 4-digit hex
numbers in their head, which means they can't *read* them, which
means they are basically machine-readable-only for the average punter.

Basic nerdview mistake. Describing things from the point of view of an
insider,  so making it harder for anyone without the rignt background
to follow. (Other classic bits of nerdview in this field might include eduroam,
Freeradius and Shibboleth installation documentation - you can only
understand them if you already know how to do it; and everybody who
does know how to do it can't see why its so hard for everyone else to
follow ;-)

OK. some things are fine described from an insider point of view. I
used to do IOgens for IBM mainframes (about 25 years ago). It didn't
matter that none of it made sense to anyone who didn't have at least
about three years of system programming experience, a good idea of how
channel io worked, knew their way round a control block or twenty, and
ideally was pretty good at JCL, JES2/3, dump reading, and 370
assembler as well. Because no-one who didn't fit that description was
likely to ever get near an IOgen.

But IP addresses have escaped. They are out of the box.  They aren't
quite general knowledge (though I'd guess that at least a quarter of
the people who drink in my local have at least some idea of what they
are) but they have certainly got out into the world of PC support and
help desks and cable TV.  And IPv6, unless it is *completely*
invisible, will make a lot of people's lives harder at that sort of
level.

So we hang on untill it is completely invisible. The time to decide to
convert end-user PC networks and domestic WiFi to IPv6 is the day you
find its already been done for you and you didn't notice.


-- 
Ken Brown


From jim at openrightsgroup.org  Tue May 21 16:05:16 2013
From: jim at openrightsgroup.org (Jim Killock)
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 16:05:16 +0100
Subject: ORGCon 2013 June 8 London
Message-ID: <5C3FE521-D90C-4FAC-A429-43C41E8B612E@openrightsgroup.org>

Hi all,

Hopefully you know about ORGCon 2013

http://orgcon.openrightsgroup.org/

- but in case you don't it has a lot to offer you all. Hope to see some of you there!

Jim

A sample:

http://orgcon.openrightsgroup.org/2013/programme

Snoopers' Charter: What's the situation now?
 -Jim Killock, ORG Executive Director
- Peter Sommer
- Others TBC

Digital Arms Trade
-Hauke Gierow, Reporters without Borders
-Eric King, Privacy International

Regulating Code
- Ian Brown and Chris Marsden on their book and its conclusions

How to wiretap the Cloud (without anybody noticing)
-Caspar Bowden, independant privacy expert
Speaking on the threat of the US FISAA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ammendments Act)
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 495 bytes
Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130521/2c00ff75/attachment.pgp>

From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Tue May 21 21:22:09 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 21:22:09 +0100
Subject: Fwd: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAJ0hfotvuxk1zV1ipj4scutwLFnCnc4xsM4Jd3KKi-jiKWTvEw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <+3KGvzLL8MjRFASR@perry.co.uk>
	<240765A6-2F22-424A-869E-0A8A22977670@batten.eu.org>
	<EthoZlSnTQjRFA13@perry.co.uk>
	<EADEBDCB-9FBA-4EAA-ADC8-444B93CAD478@batten.eu.org>
	<$SQWGVwjEnjRFAgJ@perry.co.uk>
	<CAG5KPzxMZADeqO+av0HyoQn5+vYa9-Y3rtuaDAYrJ3k5r9Dx2A@mail.gmail.com>
	<BQ15WUC3apjRFAGh@perry.co.uk> <op.wwypoek16hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<87ppww36tj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <518FA9AE.5070106@zen.co.uk>
	<A466624A-19C7-4441-AD1D-AD580417A673@batten.eu.org>
	<87d2suu63f.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
	<CAJ0hfoucCxb7mUFHFADO0VwStD=gVqGH1nrAFKDFe4kymYSO4A@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAJ0hfotvuxk1zV1ipj4scutwLFnCnc4xsM4Jd3KKi-jiKWTvEw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <tsxyZ5gxd9mRFAIZ@perry.co.uk>

In article 
<CAJ0hfotvuxk1zV1ipj4scutwLFnCnc4xsM4Jd3KKi-jiKWTvEw at mail.gmail.com>, 
"k.brown at bbk.ac.uk" <k.brown at bbk.ac.uk> writes

>IP addresses have escaped. They are out of the box.

And in the recent Queen's Speech!
-- 
Roland Perry


From jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk  Tue May 21 18:09:23 2013
From: jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk (Jon Ribbens)
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 18:09:23 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <519A3DBE.1090207@iosis.co.uk>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519A3DBE.1090207@iosis.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20130521170923.GD20185@snowy.squish.net>

On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 04:14:06PM +0100, Peter Tomlinson wrote:
> (1) I agree that charging the customer twice **for the same  
> transaction** is an application flaw in the POS device - and it smacks  
> of a major error in POS device certification (may also be a breach of  
> the Merchant Agreement if it really happened - but that it did happen  
> might be an urban myth).

I've personally seen a POS machine print me a "declined" receipt
for a transaction that was actually approved.


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed May 22 00:03:09 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 00:03:09 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>

On 21/05/13 08:15, Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <518CB006.8000604 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson
> <pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>> Report about that on Out-Law:
>>
>> http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/may/individuals-can-be-identifie
>> d-despite-ip-address-sharing-bt-says/
>>
>> Individuals can be identified despite IP address sharing, BT says
>>
>> The use of Internet Protocol (IP) address sharing technology will not
>> prevent individuals from being identified as the perpetrators of
>> illegal online activity, BT has claimed.09 May 2013
>>
>> The internet service provider (ISP) has announced that it is currently
>> piloting technology called Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation
>> (CGNAT) that will see as many as nine different customers share the
>> same IP address.
>
> And an article looking more deeply into the technical details of CGNs,
> in this context:
>
> http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2013-05/cgns.html

Hmmm - suppose I download a game which takes an hour (or a day) to play, 
and want to see the result. Will the ISP keep the 5-tuple NAT active?


Of course throwaway dongles, unsecured WIFI, free public wifi, TOR, and 
so on need no mention here. But I wonder if Her Majesty knows about them?



Does anyone know the history of how and why telephone logs became fair 
game for Plod?

I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much unrestricted 
access to comms data logs anyway.

Even then there is a big difference between telephone logs and internet 
logs, which are much more revealing.




-- Peter Fairbrother


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed May 22 09:26:34 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 09:26:34 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>

In article <519BFD2D.5070102 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>Of course throwaway dongles, unsecured WIFI, free public wifi, TOR, and 
>so on need no mention here. But I wonder if Her Majesty knows about 
>them?

Her government does. But it's never a good argument that you should give 
up picking the low-hanging fruit, just because there's some harder to 
reach fruit elsewhere.

>Does anyone know the history of how and why telephone logs became fair 
>game for Plod?

I could write a book about it.

Did you watch 'Endeavour' (the 'Morse' prequel). I've not seen the whole 
series yet, but they've done reverse-DQ phone numbers in two of the 
plots so far.

>I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much unrestricted 
>access to comms data logs anyway.

There's two elements to this. One is whether the access is required at 
all (and checking who a suspect has been in contact with is normally 
regarded as a legitimate investigative technique), the other is to what 
extent it's "pretty much unrstricted".

I won't re-run the RIPA [vs DPA 29(3)] debate for the nth time.

>Even then there is a big difference between telephone logs and internet 
>logs, which are much more revealing.

Which is why there's the tailpiece in RIPA s2(9)

-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed May 22 09:28:42 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 09:28:42 +0100
Subject: BBC Moneybox - contactless hiccups
In-Reply-To: <20130521170923.GD20185@snowy.squish.net>
References: <NA96SaxPl1lRFAWP@perry.co.uk> <E1UeMiu-0002DJ-VZ@skipnote.org>
	<7C9B2A54-C019-4870-AB2D-733233690DB2@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519A3DBE.1090207@iosis.co.uk>
	<20130521170923.GD20185@snowy.squish.net>
Message-ID: <4iiXqBM6GInRFAyC@perry.co.uk>

In article <20130521170923.GD20185 at snowy.squish.net>, Jon Ribbens 
<jon+ukcrypto at unequivocal.co.uk> writes
>> (1) I agree that charging the customer twice **for the same
>> transaction** is an application flaw in the POS device - and it smacks
>> of a major error in POS device certification (may also be a breach of
>> the Merchant Agreement if it really happened - but that it did happen
>> might be an urban myth).
>
>I've personally seen a POS machine print me a "declined" receipt
>for a transaction that was actually approved.

And last week I had a Debit Card transaction "declined", when what they 
meant was "we can't seem to contact your bank at the moment, so hard 
luck".

But I suppose they'd say it was the POS machine declining to take the 
card, not the bank declining to authorise the funds. They really should 
have two different expressions for that.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk  Wed May 22 18:24:52 2013
From: ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 18:24:52 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>


On May 22, 2013, at 9:26 AM, Roland Perry wrote:

> In article <519BFD2D.5070102 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk 
> > writes
>> Of course throwaway dongles, unsecured WIFI, free public wifi, TOR,  
>> and so on need no mention here. But I wonder if Her Majesty knows  
>> about them?
>
> Her government does. But it's never a good argument that you should  
> give up picking the low-hanging fruit, just because there's some  
> harder to reach fruit elsewhere.
>
>> Does anyone know the history of how and why telephone logs became  
>> fair game for Plod?
>
> I could write a book about it.
>
> Did you watch 'Endeavour' (the 'Morse' prequel). I've not seen the  
> whole series yet, but they've done reverse-DQ phone numbers in two  
> of the plots so far.
>
>> I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much  
>> unrestricted access to comms data logs anyway.
>
> There's two elements to this. One is whether the access is required  
> at all (and checking who a suspect has been in contact with is  
> normally regarded as a legitimate investigative technique), the  
> other is to what extent it's "pretty much unrstricted".

I can state from personal direct knowledge that in the early 90's that  
one non-metropolitan police force had unfettered online access access  
to BT's reverse-DQ and unlisted number databases. In the instance I  
directly observed no procedure or justification was required - just  
physical access to the terminal connected to BT (which in this case  
was situated in a suite of offices normally used as a major incident  
room alongside a PNC terminal and one connected to a database of all  
electoral rolls - both with similar lack of access controls or  
procedures).


>
> I won't re-run the RIPA [vs DPA 29(3)] debate for the nth time.
>
>> Even then there is a big difference between telephone logs and  
>> internet logs, which are much more revealing.
>
> Which is why there's the tailpiece in RIPA s2(9)
>
> -- 
> Roland Perry
>



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed May 22 22:42:17 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 22:42:17 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>
	<OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519D3BB9.3060403@zen.co.uk>

On 22/05/13 09:26, Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <519BFD2D.5070102 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>> Of course throwaway dongles, unsecured WIFI, free public wifi, TOR,
>> and so on need no mention here. But I wonder if Her Majesty knows
>> about them?
>
> Her government does. But it's never a good argument that you should give
> up picking the low-hanging fruit, just because there's some harder to
> reach fruit elsewhere.

That's true enough, but if they use the end of catching the 
harder-to-reach fruit in order to justify the means, but those means 
will not let them reach that fruit ...

>> Does anyone know the history of how and why telephone logs became fair
>> game for Plod?
>
> I could write a book about it.

I'd read it.

> Did you watch 'Endeavour' (the 'Morse' prequel). I've not seen the whole
> series yet, but they've done reverse-DQ phone numbers in two of the
> plots so far.

I don't have a TV.

(people think that's strange - it was my birthday yesterday, and my 
sister asked if I wanted a TV for a present, as she has every year for 
the last ten years - but I don't want one in the house, I'd just sit and 
watch it and get nothing done).

>> I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much
>> unrestricted access to comms data logs anyway.
>
> There's two elements to this. One is whether the access is required at
> all (and checking who a suspect has been in contact with is normally
> regarded as a legitimate investigative technique),

A legitimate investigative technique, most likely - but that does not 
mean we must make it possible, especially at any cost.


-- Peter Fairbrother

> the other is to what  extent it's "pretty much unrstricted".
>
> I won't re-run the RIPA [vs DPA 29(3)] debate for the nth time.
>
>> Even then there is a big difference between telephone logs and
>> internet logs, which are much more revealing.
>
> Which is why there's the tailpiece in RIPA s2(9)
>



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed May 22 23:12:44 2013
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 23:12:44 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>
	<OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk>

On 22/05/13 18:24, Ian Mason wrote:
>
> On May 22, 2013, at 9:26 AM, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>> In article <519BFD2D.5070102 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes

>> Did you watch 'Endeavour' (the 'Morse' prequel). I've not seen the
>> whole series yet, but they've done reverse-DQ phone numbers in two of
>> the plots so far.
>>
>>> I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much
>>> unrestricted access to comms data logs anyway.
>>
>> There's two elements to this. One is whether the access is required at
>> all (and checking who a suspect has been in contact with is normally
>> regarded as a legitimate investigative technique), the other is to
>> what extent it's "pretty much unrstricted".
>
> I can state from personal direct knowledge that in the early 90's that
> one non-metropolitan police force had unfettered online access access to
> BT's reverse-DQ and unlisted number databases. In the instance I
> directly observed no procedure or justification was required - just
> physical access to the terminal connected to BT (which in this case was
> situated in a suite of offices normally used as a major incident room
> alongside a PNC terminal and one connected to a database of all
> electoral rolls - both with similar lack of access controls or procedures).

That's good and bad security - good because access would be broadly 
limited to policemen who could enter the room, bad because there would 
be no logging of who asked. For the "bad old days", it's not that bad.

Limiting access to policemen, preferably at least sergeant level, and 
logging of who asked, and why (with occasional for-real checkups) is 
probably all that is needed for RDQs and electoral roll enquiries. They 
are not really very intrusive.

It's when they get into more intrusive matters. like phone and internet 
logs, that more severe restrictions are warranted. The intrusion is 
different, and more severe - so why not more severe restrictions? Like a 
Court-issued warrant?

That would cos for the Court time, but it would be balanced by not 
needing to go through a SPOC for most enquiries.

Might even end up cheaper - suppose Plod get a warrant, costs ?800,  and 
get a list of 50 people the suspect called. If a SPOC RDQ enquiry costs 
?20, a non-SPOC RDQ enquiry costs ?2, and a SPOC log enquiry costs ?100, 
that's a saving of ?200 overall (I have no idea of the actual costs, but 
I hope the point is made).


IMO, conflating RDQs and accesses to usage logs was one of the worst 
aspects of RIPA (after enforced key reveals).

Or maybe it was done to hide an enormous number of access log requests.


(Hmm - a while ago I called 999 about a fire, and the operator asked if 
I was calling from <my address>, which I had not told her - do they pay 
for that RDQ service? Is it different from investigative RDQs? I can't 
imagine there is a SPOC involved for a 999 call.)

-- Peter Fairbrother


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu May 23 15:22:52 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 15:22:52 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519D3BB9.3060403@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<519D3BB9.3060403@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <zrTF4VB8YinRFASb@perry.co.uk>

In article <519D3BB9.3060403 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>>> Of course throwaway dongles, unsecured WIFI, free public wifi, TOR,
>>> and so on need no mention here. But I wonder if Her Majesty knows
>>> about them?
>>
>> Her government does. But it's never a good argument that you should give
>> up picking the low-hanging fruit, just because there's some harder to
>> reach fruit elsewhere.
>
>That's true enough, but if they use the end of catching the 
>harder-to-reach fruit in order to justify the means, but those means 
>will not let them reach that fruit ...

Perhaps you are making the mistake of thinking that the worst crimes are 
committed by the cleverest people? April Jones and Tia Sharp might 
disagree (to quote only two recent examples).

>> Did you watch 'Endeavour' (the 'Morse' prequel). I've not seen the whole
>> series yet, but they've done reverse-DQ phone numbers in two of the
>> plots so far.
>
>I don't have a TV.

For Morse there are the books to read. Or use the "catch-up" services on 
the Interweb.

 >I don't want one in the house, I'd just sit and watch it and get 
 >nothing done

The more that things can be viewed later, the less I watch. Getting a 
VCR (in the early 80's) cut my viewing considerably. In the last month 
(and despite having the biggest and best TV ever) all I've managed to 
watch regularly are Endeavour and Dr Who.

>>> I mean. it's not obvious that Plod should have pretty much
>>> unrestricted access to comms data logs anyway.
>>
>> There's two elements to this. One is whether the access is required at
>> all (and checking who a suspect has been in contact with is normally
>> regarded as a legitimate investigative technique),
>
>A legitimate investigative technique, most likely - but that does not 
>mean we must make it possible, especially at any cost.

I think we must make it possible when it's necessary. Cue RIPA debate, 
cont'd p94.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu May 23 15:31:14 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 15:31:14 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>

In article <519D42DC.5080800 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>It's when they get into more intrusive matters. like phone and internet 
>logs, that more severe restrictions are warranted. The intrusion is 
>different, and more severe - so why not more severe restrictions? Like 
>a Court-issued warrant?
>
>That would cos for the Court time, but it would be balanced by not 
>needing to go through a SPOC for most enquiries.
>
>Might even end up cheaper - suppose Plod get a warrant, costs ?800, and 
>get a list of 50 people the suspect called. If a SPOC RDQ enquiry costs 
>?20, a non-SPOC RDQ enquiry costs ?2, and a SPOC log enquiry costs 
>?100, that's a saving of ?200 overall (I have no idea of the actual 
>costs, but I hope the point is made).

Briefly, the issue is that when it's really important (for example an 
estranged father rings his ex-wife to say he's committing suicide and 
taking the children with him, now) then court orders are too slow.

And if every request required the police and the telco to physically 
attend court (which is likely to be some distance from the telco's HQ) 
and then be required to respond to a non-urgent request in a week rather 
than a month, then the costs would spiral out of control (for all 
parties involved).

>(Hmm - a while ago I called 999 about a fire, and the operator asked if 
>I was calling from <my address>, which I had not told her - do they pay 
>for that RDQ service? Is it different from investigative RDQs? I can't 
>imagine there is a SPOC involved for a 999 call.)

The emergency services are allowed to know where people are calling from 
(including mobiles, which is why so many these days have GPS because 
that's a USA requirement). Perhaps you'd rather wait for them to get a 
court order??
-- 
Roland Perry


From ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk  Thu May 23 18:50:34 2013
From: ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 18:50:34 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk>
	<7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk>
	<OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <3547A7DF-53AF-444F-B042-C6C05385142E@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>


On May 22, 2013, at 11:12 PM, Peter Fairbrother wrote:

> On 22/05/13 18:24, Ian Mason wrote:
>>
>> On May 22, 2013, at 9:26 AM, Roland Perry wrote:
>>
>>> In article <519BFD2D.5070102 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother
>>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>
>

[snip]

> That's good and bad security - good because access would be broadly  
> limited to policemen who could enter the room, bad because there  
> would be no logging of who asked. For the "bad old days", it's not  
> that bad.

I'm not convinced that the 'bad old days' have gone away. I find  
little difference in the actual attitudes of coppers that I talk to  
socially nowadays to the ones I used to share curry and beer with back  
then.

>
> Limiting access to policemen, preferably at least sergeant level,  
> and logging of who asked, and why (with occasional for-real  
> checkups) is probably all that is needed for RDQs and electoral roll  
> enquiries. They are not really very intrusive.

The heaviest users of these will be enquiry officers - usually DCs and  
PCs. Bear in mind that nowadays there are many civilian staff inside  
police stations - largely invisible to the general public. These are  
not limited to obviously clerical roles (e.g. I've come across at  
least one civilian evidence/exhibits 'officer'). In the case in point  
I was present as a non-police civilian and had free access to the  
incident room in question for several weeks - often outside office  
hours when it was not in operational use.

Interestingly, the actual cases I have heard of where staff were  
disciplined/prosecuted for improper use of police records have often,  
possibly even primarily, been civilian staff and have often been to  
exactly the kinds of records we're discussing. They may be less  
intrusive but they are the ones that often have the most value outside  
of legitimate police work - i.e. are most likely to be abused for non- 
policing reasons.

>
> It's when they get into more intrusive matters. like phone and  
> internet logs, that more severe restrictions are warranted. The  
> intrusion is different, and more severe - so why not more severe  
> restrictions? Like a Court-issued warrant?
>
> That would cos for the Court time, but it would be balanced by not  
> needing to go through a SPOC for most enquiries.
>
> Might even end up cheaper - suppose Plod get a warrant, costs ?800,   
> and get a list of 50 people the suspect called. If a SPOC RDQ  
> enquiry costs ?20, a non-SPOC RDQ enquiry costs ?2, and a SPOC log  
> enquiry costs ?100, that's a saving of ?200 overall (I have no idea  
> of the actual costs, but I hope the point is made).
>
>
> IMO, conflating RDQs and accesses to usage logs was one of the worst  
> aspects of RIPA (after enforced key reveals).
>
> Or maybe it was done to hide an enormous number of access log  
> requests.
>
>
> (Hmm - a while ago I called 999 about a fire, and the operator asked  
> if I was calling from <my address>, which I had not told her - do  
> they pay for that RDQ service? Is it different from investigative  
> RDQs? I can't imagine there is a SPOC involved for a 999 call.)
>


This has been SOP for quite a while now. There are no separate charges  
for this, they are bundled into the charges made to the emergency  
services for the basic provision of 999 services and charges made to  
telcos that don't run their own 999 operators. It's very different  
from investigative RDQs, the database of addresses is supplied to the  
999 operators and is automatically linked to any incoming call. The  
address is automatically passed to the emergency services with the  
call hand-off. I've only been involved at the very periphery of this -  
providing addresses for a database that was being passed up the line -  
so I can't comment on the access control arrangements at the 999  
operator end.

Investigative RDQs are explicit enquiries (one off and bulk) and are  
supposed to meet a minimum level of necessity before being made. I  
can't remember the exact wording used for the level of necessity and  
am too lazy to go and look it up. I can say, from experience, that  
what ought to be assessed on necessity often turns into an assessment  
of expedience once in the hands of the police. In marginal cases the  
assessment won't be 'is this necessary' but 'can we get away with it'.

This might seem a jaundiced view, but it's based on my personal  
observations of real police officers, on real operations that used  
exactly the kind of widespread surveillance and access to records that  
regularly concern us here. Make no mistake, the operations were  
necessary and legitimate but some of the individual things I saw  
happen weren't necessary or legitimate and some were even driven by  
idle curiosity - the latter meaning that I can tell you that the  
armoured car the prime minister is driven around in has the Ministry  
of Transport as its registered keeper. The fact that the prime  
minister's car's registration plate was within eyeball range of  
someone with access to a PNC terminal will suggest that I'm highly  
limited in telling you any specifics of the particular operation in  
question.

> -- Peter Fairbrother



From ben at liddicott.com  Thu May 23 20:26:46 2013
From: ben at liddicott.com (Ben Liddicott)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 20:26:46 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>


On 23/05/2013 15:31, Roland Perry wrote:
>
> Briefly, the issue is that when it's really important (for example an 
> estranged father rings his ex-wife to say he's committing suicide and 
> taking the children with him, now) then court orders are too slow.
>
> And if every request required the police and the telco to physically 
> attend court (which is likely to be some distance from the telco's HQ) 
> and then be required to respond to a non-urgent request in a week 
> rather than a month, then the costs would spiral out of control (for 
> all parties involved).
>

Well, that's a good summary of the argument, but not actually a good 
reason, and it's not actually what happens.

It's not what happens because the vast majority of such requests are for 
things which could perfectly well have waited to the next working day 
and been dealt with in bulk.

It's not a good reason firstly because there is no technical reason why 
a court order has to be slow. IANAL, but AFAIK a court order or warrant 
can be given by telephone, fax or email if need be - I don't believe 
there is any legal requirement for the judge to be in the same room as 
the petitioner - and if there is, why not just change that rule for 
emergencies?

Even if it was the case that court orders are too slow, there is no 
reason not to have a post-request review requirement like the US Federal 
FISA courts.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the reason for removing 
review altogether (as opposed to having an emergency procedure plus a 
post-request review) is because the authorities intend to vastly expand 
the volume of such requests they make.


>> (Hmm - a while ago I called 999 about a fire, and the operator asked 
>> if I was calling from <my address>, which I had not told her - do 
>> they pay for that RDQ service? Is it different from investigative 
>> RDQs? I can't imagine there is a SPOC involved for a 999 call.)
>
> The emergency services are allowed to know where people are calling 
> from (including mobiles, which is why so many these days have GPS 
> because that's a USA requirement). Perhaps you'd rather wait for them 
> to get a court order??
Well the EU have recently mandated that from (2014 I think or maybe 
2016?) all new cars sold in the EU must have both GPS and mobile network 
connectivity so that in the event of an accident they can automatically 
summon the emergency services, just in case the occupants are unable to.

Of course to make a difference all of the following would have to be true:
a) the occupants are so badly injured that they are unable to summon help.
b) they are in too remote an area to encounter passers-by who can summon 
help
c) yet paradoxically they close enough to urban centres that the 
emergency services can arrive before they die of their injuries.

It is obvious that while this could happen, it will occur a most few 
times in any given year in the entire EU, and shave a fraction of a 
percentage point off the road accident death rate. And for this benefit 
we are about to give the authorities the ability to access to a complete 
history of every journey we make, as soon as they decide that we need a 
firmware upgrade to, e.g. "better plan the transport system" or 
"implement a personal carbon ration", or whatever excuse they think they 
can slide past us. (c.f. access to NHS data sicut nunc).

If it saves a single life it /isn't /worth it.

If the police are able to persuade the telco that it is an emergency, 
then there is an exception in the DPA for that, and the telco will no 
doubt want to follow up as to the end result as part of their ISO27001 
controls. If they cannot persuade the telco, then *Yes* they should get 
a court order. If it is so urgent, then it is urgent enough to wake up a 
judge.

Cheers!
Ben
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130523/f132da65/attachment.html>

From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Thu May 23 20:32:52 2013
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 20:32:52 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kuwvBk6Efcp5fo_pKzg4iJED4UGhdJL+W4rTOa2WtEyMg@mail.gmail.com>

2013/5/23 Ben Liddicott <ben at liddicott.com>

>
> Well, that's a good summary of the argument, but not actually a good
> reason, and it's not actually what happens.
>
> It's not what happens because the vast majority of such requests are for
> things which could perfectly well have waited to the next working day and
> been dealt with in bulk.
>
> It's not a good reason firstly because there is no technical reason why a
> court order has to be slow. IANAL, but AFAIK a court order or warrant can
> be given by telephone, fax or email if need be - I don't believe there is
> any legal requirement for the judge to be in the same room as the
> petitioner - and if there is, why not just change that rule for emergencies?
>

You can get an order over the telephone. There's a 24/7 "duty judge" system
that means you can always get a judge (possibly out of bed) for an urgent
order. Clearly you have to have a pretty good reason to do that but the
system is there.

If this was going to happen a lot then I am sure the court service could
(if it was told to) set up a system that made this work.

-- 
Francis Davey
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130523/81865020/attachment-0001.html>

From ben at liddicott.com  Thu May 23 22:32:32 2013
From: ben at liddicott.com (Ben Liddicott)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 22:32:32 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuwvBk6Efcp5fo_pKzg4iJED4UGhdJL+W4rTOa2WtEyMg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
	<CAEWR3kuwvBk6Efcp5fo_pKzg4iJED4UGhdJL+W4rTOa2WtEyMg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <519E8AF0.7060605@liddicott.com>


On 23/05/2013 20:32, Francis Davey wrote:
> 2013/5/23 Ben Liddicott <ben at liddicott.com <mailto:ben at liddicott.com>>
>
>
>     Well, that's a good summary of the argument, but not actually a
>     good reason, and it's not actually what happens.
>
>     It's not what happens because the vast majority of such requests
>     are for things which could perfectly well have waited to the next
>     working day and been dealt with in bulk.
>
>     It's not a good reason firstly because there is no technical
>     reason why a court order has to be slow. IANAL, but AFAIK a court
>     order or warrant can be given by telephone, fax or email if need
>     be - I don't believe there is any legal requirement for the judge
>     to be in the same room as the petitioner - and if there is, why
>     not just change that rule for emergencies?
>
>
> You can get an order over the telephone. There's a 24/7 "duty judge" 
> system that means you can always get a judge (possibly out of bed) for 
> an urgent order. Clearly you have to have a pretty good reason to do 
> that but the system is there.
>
> If this was going to happen a lot then I am sure the court service 
> could (if it was told to) set up a system that made this work.
>
So the reality is if you have an emergency, you have two officers on the 
phone:

Officer 1 gets on to the ISP and says "I need some info urgently, court 
order is on it's way. Can you look it up and have it ready to give as 
soon as the order comes through?" The chap at the ISP does so, looks up 
the info and has it ready.
Officer 2 gets on to the Judge and says " I need a court order for 
this...".  As soon as the order is given, the word is passed to officer 
1 along with (presumably) some reference number. ISP chap hands over info.

This happens in parallel, and in reality the court order plus request 
takes barely longer than the request alone.

If that's the case, what is the real reason these new abilities are 
being asked for? Are the people who insist they are necessary lying or 
merely ignorant? Why aren't they being called on it?

Hmm... Cheers, anyway.

Ben

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130523/c4a10fee/attachment.html>

From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu May 23 22:43:59 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 22:43:59 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
Message-ID: <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>

In article <519E6D76.8060203 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott 
<ben at liddicott.com> writes
 >>And if every request required the police and the telco to physically 
 >>attend court (which is likely to be some distance from the telco's HQ) 
 >>and then be required to respond to a non-urgent request in a week 
 >>rather than a month, then the costs would spiral out of control (for 
 >>all parties involved).
>
>Well, that's a good summary of the argument, but not actually a good 
>reason, and it's not actually what happens.
>
>It's not what happens because the vast majority of such requests are 
>for things which could perfectly well have waited to the next working 
>day and been dealt with in bulk.

Of course the vast majority can wait until the next day (or even the 
next week), but the other aspects remain. Unless you think it's a good 
idea for these court orders to be issued without any comment from the 
telcos about the practicality, and any more than a rubber stamp from the 
judge regarding the necessity.

>It's not a good reason firstly because there is no technical reason why 
>a court order has to be slow. IANAL, but AFAIK a court order or warrant 
>can be given by telephone, fax or email if need be - I don't believe 
>there is any legal requirement for the judge to be in the same room as 
>the petitioner - and if there is, why not just change that rule for 
>emergencies?

You seem to be wanting a special "telecoms court" to deal with these 
things both quickly and by remote participation. The volume of enquiries 
(which are overwhelmingly reverse-DQ) would be challenging to 
accommodate.

>If the police are able to persuade the telco that it is an emergency, 
>then there is an exception in the DPA for that

There's no DPA 1998 exemption for "life at risk/preventing injury", 
whereas DPA 1984 had 34(8). It was also initially overlooked in RIPA (I 
think it was amended fairly recently), because the police were only able 
to get information if investigating a crime, and being in danger isn't a 
crime.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu May 23 23:02:01 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 23:02:01 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519E8AF0.7060605@liddicott.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
	<CAEWR3kuwvBk6Efcp5fo_pKzg4iJED4UGhdJL+W4rTOa2WtEyMg@mail.gmail.com>
	<519E8AF0.7060605@liddicott.com>
Message-ID: <Q1qtvnWZHpnRFAGN@perry.co.uk>

In article <519E8AF0.7060605 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott 
<ben at liddicott.com> writes
>So the reality is if you have an emergency, you have two officers on 
>the phone:
>
>Officer 1 gets on to the ISP and says "I need some info urgently, court 
>order is on it's way. Can you look it up and have it ready to give as 
>soon as the order comes through?" The chap at the ISP does so, looks up 
>the info and has it ready.
>Officer 2 gets on to the Judge and says " I need a court order for 
>this...".? As soon as the order is given, the word is passed to officer 
>1 along with (presumably) some reference number. ISP chap hands over 
>info.
>
>This happens in parallel, and in reality the court order plus request 
>takes barely longer than the request alone.
>
>If that's the case, what is the real reason these new abilities are 
>being asked for?

What "new abilities" are these? [1]

The system which was decided upon (and known as RIPA) isn't that much 
different from the above, and involves verbal authorisations, followed 
by paperwork as soon as you get a Superintendent out of bed.

A question for the lawyers here: In practice, can someone in the force 
control room really ring up a judge themselves (no other intermediaries) 
in the middle of the night? What sort of standard of proof would the 
judge want that the request was genuine and necessary?

[1] The BBC is talking about new forms of data being logged
    (specifically de-anonymising carrier grade NAT), not new routes to
     obtain disclosure.

     It seems to me unrealistic to expect BT's broadband customers, who
     are about to be stuck behind CGNAT, to become untraceable overnight;
     and while BT could log the mappings on their own accord I suspect
     they want a change in the law (or at least some kind of official
     'notice') to give regulatory certainty and to keep their
     shareholders happy that they aren't spending money unnecessarily.
-- 
Roland Perry


From ben at liddicott.com  Thu May 23 23:52:38 2013
From: ben at liddicott.com (Ben Liddicott)
Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 23:52:38 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com>


On 23/05/2013 22:43, Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <519E6D76.8060203 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott 
> <ben at liddicott.com> writes
> >>And if every request required the police and the telco to physically 
> >>attend court (which is likely to be some distance from the telco's 
> HQ) >>and then be required to respond to a non-urgent request in a 
> week >>rather than a month, then the costs would spiral out of control 
> (for >>all parties involved).
>>
>> Well, that's a good summary of the argument, but not actually a good 
>> reason, and it's not actually what happens.
>>
>> It's not what happens because the vast majority of such requests are 
>> for things which could perfectly well have waited to the next working 
>> day and been dealt with in bulk.
>
> Of course the vast majority can wait until the next day (or even the 
> next week), but the other aspects remain. Unless you think it's a good 
> idea for these court orders to be issued without any comment from the 
> telcos about the practicality, and any more than a rubber stamp from 
> the judge regarding the necessity.

I am really not sure what your point about "practicality" is here. I am 
sure a court order can be given in terms such as "as far as reasonably 
practicable". In any case the judges who give the orders, and the people 
who ask for them, will be well versed in what is practical. This is a 
nothing-nothing objection.

As to the rubber stamp objection: The fact that the request is seen by a 
person means that person can make enquiries either before or after 
granting the request - which makes all the difference. Who knows when a 
judge or Magistrate will suddenly decide to ask a lot of questions? They 
sometimes do, presumably just as a spot-check. Judicial review will find 
few abusive requests because abusive requests which might be made, will 
simply not be made. Even post-hoc reviews like the FISA courts will have 
that effect. But if the request will be fulfilled automatically and 
reviewed by no-one at all, ever, why not put in unnecessary, marginally 
necessary, fishing-trip, or purely abusive requests? Why not look up 
your ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend's internet habits?

Again, if it is so damn important, then it is worthwhile spending a 
twenty minutes justifying it: If there isn't time before, justify it 
afterwards. But if the request doesn't justify twenty minutes of a 
coppers' wages, why does it justify abolishing the privacy of the entire 
nation?

>> It's not a good reason firstly because there is no technical reason 
>> why a court order has to be slow. IANAL, but AFAIK a court order or 
>> warrant can be given by telephone, fax or email if need be - I don't 
>> believe there is any legal requirement for the judge to be in the 
>> same room as the petitioner - and if there is, why not just change 
>> that rule for emergencies?
>
> You seem to be wanting a special "telecoms court" to deal with these 
> things both quickly and by remote participation. The volume of 
> enquiries (which are overwhelmingly reverse-DQ) would be challenging 
> to accommodate.

It would be valuable to have an independent party see the requests - 
either before, or afterwards - and determine how many of them were 
actually justified. I suspect rather less than all of them.

> There's no DPA 1998 exemption for "life at risk/preventing injury", 
> whereas DPA 1984 had 34(8). It was also initially overlooked in RIPA 
> (I think it was amended fairly recently), because the police were only 
> able to get information if investigating a crime, and being in danger 
> isn't a crime.

Killing one's children is a crime, and that was your example.

Outside your example, suicide is no longer a crime, but I have no doubt 
whatsoever that the common-law defence of necessity would apply. I am 
not a lawyer so if you are and disagree professionally with that 
assessment please say so.





From Andrew.Cormack at ja.net  Fri May 24 11:27:37 2013
From: Andrew.Cormack at ja.net (Andrew Cormack)
Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 10:27:37 +0000
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FD32E3@EXC001>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Roland Perry
> Sent: 23 May 2013 22:44
> To: ukcrypto at chiark.greenend.org.uk
> Subject: Re: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
> 
> >If the police are able to persuade the telco that it is an emergency,
> >then there is an exception in the DPA for that
> 
> There's no DPA 1998 exemption for "life at risk/preventing injury",
> whereas DPA 1984 had 34(8). It was also initially overlooked in RIPA (I
> think it was amended fairly recently), because the police were only
> able
> to get information if investigating a crime, and being in danger isn't
> a
> crime.
> --
> Roland Perry

I think the amendment is The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Additional Functions and Amendment) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1878) or The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) Order 2010 (SI 2010/480). The latter says:

2.  The following additional purposes are specified for the purposes of section 22(2) of the Act (to the extent that they do not fall within paragraphs (a) to (g) of that provision)-
(a)to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice;
(b)where a person ("P") has died or is unable to identify themselves because of a physical or mental condition-
(i)to assist in identifying P, or
(ii)to obtain information about P's next of kin or other persons connected with P or about the reason for P's death or condition.

[http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/480/article/2/made]

Andrew
--
Andrew Cormack
Chief Regulatory Adviser, Janet
t: +44 1235 822302
b: https://community.ja.net/blogs/regulatory-developments
Janet(UK) is a trading name of Jisc Collections and Janet Limited, a not-for-profit company which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and whose Registered Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell Oxford, Didcot, Oxfordshire, OX11 0SG. VAT No. 614944238



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Fri May 24 13:48:47 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 13:48:47 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FD32E3@EXC001>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FD32E3@EXC001>
Message-ID: <WHHMz4ivG2nRFAU4@perry.co.uk>

In article <61E52F3A5532BE43B0211254F13883AE97FD32E3 at EXC001>, Andrew 
Cormack <Andrew.Cormack at ja.net> writes
>> There's no DPA 1998 exemption for "life at risk/preventing injury", 
>>whereas DPA 1984 had 34(8). It was also initially overlooked in RIPA 
>>(I  think it was amended fairly recently), because the police were 
>>only  able  to get information if investigating a crime, and being in 
>>danger isn't  a  crime.
>
>I think the amendment is The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Additional Functions and Amendment) Order 2006 (SI
>2006/1878) or The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) Order 2010 (SI 2010/480). The latter says:
>
>2.  The following additional purposes are specified for the purposes of section 22(2) of the Act (to the extent that they do not fall within
>paragraphs (a) to (g) of that provision)-
>(a)to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice;
>(b)where a person ("P") has died or is unable to identify themselves because of a physical or mental condition-
>(i)to assist in identifying P, or
>(ii)to obtain information about P's next of kin or other persons connected with P or about the reason for P's death or condition.
>
>[http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/480/article/2/made]

As long ago as 2002 the police were complaining that they couldn't 
identify bodies by doing reverse-DQ on the mobile found on the body, 
because "being dead wasn't a crime".

I don't see them making much progress on the "life at risk" element.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 25 16:28:28 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 25 May 2013 16:28:28 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com>
Message-ID: <ZA0$CUQciNoRFAca@perry.co.uk>

In article <519E6D76.8060203 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott 
<ben at liddicott.com> writes

>Well the EU have recently mandated that from (2014 I think or maybe 
>2016?) all new cars sold in the EU must have both GPS and mobile 
>network connectivity so that in the event of an accident they can 
>automatically summon the emergency services, just in case the occupants 
>are unable to.
>
>Of course to make a difference all of the following would have to be 
>true:
>a) the occupants are so badly injured that they are unable to summon 
>help.

Or they don't have a working phone within reach.

>b) they are in too remote an area to encounter

Or the incident could have happened in an urban area at 3am with no-one 
else about...

>passers-by who can summon help

(...Not all passers-by have phones, can see into that ditch after dark, 
or even want to get involved, sadly.)

>c) yet paradoxically they close enough to urban centres that the 
>emergency services can arrive before they die of their injuries.

... or on a rural road that was still close enough to emergency services 
(I believe the Ambulance target of 19 minutes for life-threatening calls 
is "irrespective of location").

There are reasons why this may not be the best of proposals (can you say 
which draft Directive it's in, and who is lobbying against it from civil 
society?) but your list above is far too easily dismissed.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat May 25 16:42:36 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 25 May 2013 16:42:36 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com>
Message-ID: <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>

In article <519E9DB6.2080907 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott 
<ben at liddicott.com> writes
>> Of course the vast majority can wait until the next day (or even the 
>>next week), but the other aspects remain. Unless you think it's a good 
>>idea for these court orders to be issued without any comment from the 
>>telcos about the practicality, and any more than a rubber stamp from 
>>the judge regarding the necessity.
>
>I am really not sure what your point about "practicality" is here. I am 
>sure a court order can be given in terms such as "as far as reasonably 
>practicable".

That's leaving too much to the discretion of the telco. They well decide 
it's not practicable to pay for a taxi and some overtime on a bank 
holiday weekend, for example.

>In any case the judges who give the orders, and the people who ask for 
>them, will be well versed in what is practical.

I doubt that. The current system of SPoCs works reasonably well, but 
they've been specially trained in this one aspect of police work, and do 
it all the time. Are we going to put judges on the same course?

>As to the rubber stamp objection: The fact that the request is seen by 
>a person means that person can make enquiries either before or after 
>granting the request - which makes all the difference.

I'm sure it does, but only after you've got the people who might answer 
the questions into the loop.

>Who knows when a judge or Magistrate will suddenly decide to ask a lot 
>of questions?

The police are quite capable of framing requests in such as way that 
they are very hard to turn down, unless there's some input from another 
party (eg the telco). They are also well known for asking for impossible 
things, which is why the SPoC scheme exists. I don't blame the police 
for that, life and telecoms is complicated these days and you can't 
expect them to be up to speed, especially when there's no technology 
basic training at all.

>They sometimes do, presumably just as a spot-check. Judicial review 
>will find few abusive requests because abusive requests which might be 
>made, will simply not be made. Even post-hoc reviews like the FISA 
>courts will have that effect. But if the request will be fulfilled 
>automatically and reviewed by no-one at all, ever, why not put in 
>unnecessary, marginally necessary, fishing-trip, or purely abusive 
>requests? Why not look up your ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend's internet 
>habits?

Those checks exist in the current system.

>> There's no DPA 1998 exemption for "life at risk/preventing injury", 
>>whereas DPA 1984 had 34(8). It was also initially overlooked in RIPA 
>>(I think it was amended fairly recently), because the police were only 
>>able to get information if investigating a crime, and being in danger 
>>isn't a crime.
>
>Killing one's children is a crime, and that was your example.

Is threatening to kill your children a crime? If you do it twice it's 
probably harassment, and I'm not aware that men who threaten to kill 
their wives in a domestic violence situation are prosecuted for 
"conspiracy to murder", or whatever it would be.

>Outside your example, suicide is no longer a crime, but I have no doubt 
>whatsoever that the common-law defence of necessity would apply. I am 
>not a lawyer so if you are and disagree professionally with that 
>assessment please say so.

That's not a DPA defence I've ever heard anyone trying to use. If it was 
that easy a loophole I'm sure it would have cropped up in the lengthy 
discussions on the subject of [comms data] disclosure.
-- 
Roland Perry


From k.brown at bbk.ac.uk  Tue May 28 13:53:55 2013
From: k.brown at bbk.ac.uk (k.brown at bbk.ac.uk)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 13:53:55 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>

On 25 May 2013 16:42, Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com> wrote:
> In article <519E9DB6.2080907 at liddicott.com>, Ben Liddicott
> <ben at liddicott.com> writes
>> Who knows when a judge or Magistrate will suddenly decide to ask a lot of
>> questions?


> Is threatening to kill your children a crime? If you do it twice it's
> probably harassment, and I'm not aware that men who threaten to kill their
> wives in a domestic violence situation are prosecuted for "conspiracy to
> murder", or whatever it would be.

Threatening to kill anybody is a crime, though I imagine it would have
to be a credible threat before a court woudl take notice, and not just
 "I wish you were dead" mutterings. It woudl be moew than just
harrassment. Putting someone in fear for their life would have been an
assault under the old common law I think even if you didn't physically
attack them at all. I'm sure there are plenty of fancy new statutes to
cover the same ground. (Not conspiracy though. Conspiracy needs more
than one person).


-- 
Ken Brown


From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Tue May 28 14:02:08 2013
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 14:02:08 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>

2013/5/28 k.brown at bbk.ac.uk <k.brown at bbk.ac.uk>

Threatening to kill anybody is a crime, though I imagine it would have
>

Contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/section/16


> to be a credible threat before a court woudl take notice, and not just
>  "I wish you were dead" mutterings. It woudl be moew than just
>

Yes. You have to intend that the victim fears the threat will be carried
out.


> harrassment. Putting someone in fear for their life would have been an
> assault under the old common law I think even if you didn't physically
>

What my old lecturer called a "psychic assault" (which always made me think
of D&D 1st ed psionic combat). Assault at common law still exists as an
offence.


> attack them at all. I'm sure there are plenty of fancy new statutes to
> cover the same ground. (Not conspiracy though. Conspiracy needs more
> than one person).


Indeed, see section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/45/section/1

You can't even attempt to conspire:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/47/section/1

-- 
Francis Davey
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130528/f7af5bdc/attachment.html>

From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Tue May 28 14:37:01 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 14:37:01 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>

In article 
<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g at mail.gmail.com>, 
Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> writes
>Threatening to kill anybody is a crime, though I imagine it would have
>
>Contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861
>
>http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/section/16
>?
>to be a credible threat before a court woudl take notice, and not just
>?"I wish you were dead" mutterings. It woudl be moew than just
>
>Yes. You have to intend that the victim fears the threat will be 
>carried out.

How does that work when the victim is your child that you haven't told 
you wish to kill (the only person who knows being the estranged wife).
-- 
Roland Perry


From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Tue May 28 14:42:43 2013
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 14:42:43 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>

2013/5/28 Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>

>
>>
> How does that work when the victim is your child that you haven't told you
> wish to kill (the only person who knows being the estranged wife).


Section 16 is *three* lines long and I linked to it. Why is it so hard for
people just to read the statutory material?

"*Threats to kill.*

A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending
that that other would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other or a
third person shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years"

The "victim" is the person to whom you make the threat. The threat is that
you will kill someone (either the victim or someone else). So if X says to
Y "I am going to kill Z" intending that Y will fear that X will indeed kill
Z then the offence is made out.

-- 
Francis Davey
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130528/a7bd3695/attachment.html>

From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Tue May 28 16:36:21 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 16:36:21 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>

In article 
<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw at mail.gmail.com>, 
Francis Davey <fjmd1a at gmail.com> writes
>
>How does that work when the victim is your child that you haven't told 
>you wish to kill (the only person who knows being the estranged wife).
>
>Section 16 is *three* lines long and I linked to it. Why is it so hard 
>for people just to read the statutory material?

Because we are corresponding by email, not the web.

>"Threats to kill.
>
>A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending 
>that that other would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other 
>or a third person shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
>conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
>years"?
>
>The "victim" is the person to whom you make the threat. The threat is 
>that you will kill someone (either the victim or someone else).

 >So if X says to Y "I am going to kill Z" intending that Y will fear
 >that X will indeed kill Z then the offence is made out.

Fair enough, but that wasn't clear from the earlier posting.

ps Why is this statute rarely used when husbands threaten to kill their 
ex-partners, with the police relying instead upon harassment law.
-- 
Roland Perry


From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Tue May 28 16:59:23 2013
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 16:59:23 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
	<STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>

2013/5/28 Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>
>
>
> Because we are corresponding by email, not the web.


Bah. I think in 2013 I can expect the notorious Roland Perry to be able to
look something up on the web. It is not as if the world wide web is rather
new to you. I see that on ukcrypto I will have to quote the relevant
statute rather than merely citing it.

Fair enough, but that wasn't clear from the earlier posting.
>

That's why I make a practice of citing sources, so that people who want to
know more can read more.


>
> ps Why is this statute rarely used when husbands threaten to kill their
> ex-partners, with the police relying instead upon harassment law.


I don't know. Ask the CPS.

I suspect because it is much harder to prove. The prosecution will have to
prove a specific intent that the victim fear that the threat will be
carried out (i.e. that someone will be killed). A defendant might argue
that he only meant the victim to fear they would be beaten to a pulp.

Specific intent is also hard because if someone is *drunk* they may not be
able to form a specific intent.

--
Francis Davey
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130528/eebe4036/attachment-0001.html>

From ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk  Tue May 28 17:21:41 2013
From: ukcrypto at sourcetagged.ian.co.uk (Ian Mason)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 17:21:41 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
	<STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <22D7768C-504E-40E0-B30D-7E04893CC43C@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>


On May 28, 2013, at 4:59 PM, Francis Davey wrote:

>
> 2013/5/28 Roland Perry <lists at internetpolicyagency.com>
>
> Because we are corresponding by email, not the web.
>
> Bah. I think in 2013 I can expect the notorious Roland Perry to be  
> able to look something up on the web. It is not as if the world wide  
> web is rather new to you. I see that on ukcrypto I will have to  
> quote the relevant statute rather than merely citing it.
>
> Fair enough, but that wasn't clear from the earlier posting.
>
> That's why I make a practice of citing sources, so that people who  
> want to know more can read more.
>
>
> ps Why is this statute rarely used when husbands threaten to kill  
> their ex-partners, with the police relying instead upon harassment  
> law.
>
> I don't know. Ask the CPS.
>
> I suspect because it is much harder to prove. The prosecution will  
> have to prove a specific intent that the victim fear that the threat  
> will be carried out (i.e. that someone will be killed). A defendant  
> might argue that he only meant the victim to fear they would be  
> beaten to a pulp.
>

Yup, the case in point requires proof of intent whereas harassment is  
a matter of fact (i.e. a strict liability offence), towhit:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/section/1

> Prohibition of harassment.
> (1)A person must not pursue a course of conduct?
> (a)which amounts to harassment of another, and
> (b)which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.
> (2)For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of  
> conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment  
> of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same  
> information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment  
> of the other.

>

2Offence of harassment.

(1)A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1 is  
guilty of an offence.




No mention of intent.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/pipermail/ukcrypto/attachments/20130528/2db56ef3/attachment.html>

From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Tue May 28 17:48:18 2013
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 17:48:18 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
	<STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20130528174818.00006dad@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>

On Tue, 28 May 2013 16:59:23 +0100
Francis Davey wrote:

> I think in 2013 I can expect the notorious Roland Perry to be able to
> look something up on the web.

Only where it advances his argument ;-)

-- 

Brian Morrison


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed May 29 10:43:29 2013
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 10:43:29 +0100
Subject: BBC News - 'Fresh proposals' planned over cyber-monitoring
In-Reply-To: <20130528174818.00006dad@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
References: <0FE7B584-58D3-401B-8BD6-E2D3AC61959A@batten.eu.org>
	<518A56DD.2050703@casparbowden.net>
	<6F128E16-D022-45C1-B25D-919FA9281FBF@batten.eu.org>
	<518CB006.8000604@iosis.co.uk> <7pSno5H97xmRFALz@perry.co.uk>
	<519BFD2D.5070102@zen.co.uk> <OjCKqRL6EInRFA1d@perry.co.uk>
	<7B505DAF-FF7B-4204-92FA-14B983861E56@sourcetagged.ian.co.uk>
	<519D42DC.5080800@zen.co.uk> <zLQFA1CyginRFAQv@perry.co.uk>
	<519E6D76.8060203@liddicott.com> <BU753nUf2onRFA23@perry.co.uk>
	<519E9DB6.2080907@liddicott.com> <LAY7CrRsvNoRFA$S@perry.co.uk>
	<CAJ0hfosqwvpkoMKnjyRXfiex0A=svnp9mcLYb-Cc37ZFcx791w@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAEWR3kuFW-zwGBtfe4bfrekBLUpKdkF2jNk0Z=AV2o-bDVoi9g@mail.gmail.com>
	<qXNDX+V9LLpRFASE@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kuM2k+ZDVWshDMSHf3aiLwX4QvHU5fad=Mvjrbx66m0tw@mail.gmail.com>
	<STPN2eZ17MpRFAll@perry.co.uk>
	<CAEWR3kvVpAHKg4hedtPLBuKXJGuDuefuwuMUTH=01UY1TOh=uw@mail.gmail.com>
	<20130528174818.00006dad@surtees.fenrir.org.uk>
Message-ID: <wFiljlDB3cpRFAhD@perry.co.uk>

In article <20130528174818.00006dad at surtees.fenrir.org.uk>, Brian Morrison
<bdm at fenrir.org.uk> writes
>> I think in 2013 I can expect the notorious Roland Perry to be able to
>> look something up on the web.
>
>Only where it advances his argument ;-)

It certainly does no harm to quote extracts of a document one is referencing,
if the extract supports one's case. It also helps guard against link-rot and
paywalls, let alone (going back to my reply to Francis) avoiding making the
assumption that everyone has always-on connectivity.

Like this, for example:

In the thread "Buckinghamshire CC ANPR cameras" someone asks:

>I'd like to see some evidence that the registration plates on cars
>driving past my house are personal data.  Whose?  And why?

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf

        "a person may be identified directly by name or indirectly by a
        telephone number, a car registration number, a social security
        number, a passport number or by a combination of significant
        criteria which allows him to be recognized by narrowing down the
        group to which he belongs (age, occupation, place of residence,
        etc.)".
-- 
Roland Perry