https - hopefully not too stupid a question

Peter Fairbrother zenadsl6186 at
Mon Jun 18 19:59:53 BST 2012

Francis Davey wrote:
> 2012/6/18 Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at>:

>> But there's more, and perhaps worse. 1(4) of the draft Act, which says
>> "Nothing in this Part authorises any conduct consisting in the interception
>> of communications .." only covers part 1 - and not part 2, where all the
>> filtering stuff is.
> Ah, here I don't think you have it right.

Okay. slightly wrong emphasis there.
> All the disclosures from telecommunications operators and providers to
> the authorities go via authorisations. Clause 9(5) restricts an
> authorisation so that it "may not authorise any conduct consisting in
> the interception of communications in the course of their transmission
> by means of a telecommunication system".

But if they are only looking for ("secondary") traffic data, then they 
can paw through all the entire nation's web traffic without it being 
interception, as defined in RIPA 2(5).

And as that's what they said they wanted to do, and I'm pretty sure it's 
what the draft Bill allows then to do, I can't see them not doing it if 
the bill passes as-is.

As to who does the pawing through, it might be the ISPs under some 
arrangement where the filtering software or preferences were provided by 
some filtering organisation - or it might be some as-yet-not-named 
filtering organisation, possibly GCHQ, which does the actual filtering,

And afaics, the ISPs could not refuse to copy ALL their traffic to such 
an organisation, if demanded.

-- Peter Fairbrothert

> Unlike the Part II RIPA scheme where the designated senior officer
> gave a notice to the operator, under clause 9 it is authorised
> officers who give notice *under* a pre-existing authorisation, so they
> have no power to obtain data contrary to 9(5).
> As to the filtering, I don't believe that there are any substantive
> powers to obtain data in the filtering arrangements. "All" they do is
> permit the secretary of state to do things. As I said in my analysis,
> I think this is about making sure the minister doesn't act ultra
> vires, rather than giving them additional powers. Its not entirely
> clear, but I would expect a power to obtain data or force ISP's to run
> monitoring devices to be very clearly given.
> So, it seems to me that the minister's powers to obtain the data
> necessary to carry out the filtering are all in clause 1, which is
> limited as you describe.

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