From igb at batten.eu.org  Fri Sep  3 09:16:16 2010
From: igb at batten.eu.org (Ian Batten)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2010 09:16:16 +0100
Subject: Keith Batey has died
Message-ID: <DDC71A2C-A906-4206-91A5-8A7DB18350F6@batten.eu.org>

> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/special-forces-obituaries/7978325/Keith-Batey.html

Slowly, the Enigma effort is disappearing into the past tense.

I'm going to a secure infrastructure summer school at Royal Holloway  
next week, and one of the items is a half-day visit to Bletchley  
Park.  Hopefully with a group like that there'll be some interesting  
insights.

ian

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From k.brown at bbk.ac.uk  Fri Sep  3 13:38:36 2010
From: k.brown at bbk.ac.uk (ken)
Date: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 13:38:36 +0100
Subject: Keith Batey has died
In-Reply-To: <DDC71A2C-A906-4206-91A5-8A7DB18350F6@batten.eu.org>
References: <DDC71A2C-A906-4206-91A5-8A7DB18350F6@batten.eu.org>
Message-ID: <4C80EC4C.8070308@bbk.ac.uk>

On 03/09/2010 09:16, Ian Batten wrote:
>> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/special-forces-obituaries/7978325/Keith-Batey.html
>>
>
> Slowly, the Enigma effort is disappearing into the past tense.
>

One wonders whatt the phrase "He was transferred to several 
other Civil Service departments" in the obituary conceals


From tharg at gmx.net  Sun Sep  5 11:06:12 2010
From: tharg at gmx.net (Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail))
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 12:06:12 +0200
Subject: Gareth Williams case
Message-ID: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>

Latest swirl in this macabre story...
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1309150/Was-body-MI6-spy-submerged-m
ystery-fluid-speed-decay.html?ito=feeds-newsxml 

...But the disclosure that he was also covered by liquid - not thought to be
blood or water - has raised fears that a substance was used to accelerate
decay and complicate toxicology tests.

The revelation came as new details emerged of the highly sensitive nature of
Mr Williams's work. A source said he had the highest security clearance
available to an intelligence officer and was part of a secretive 'cell' that
created devices that can steal data from mobiles and laptops...



From matthew at pemble.net  Sun Sep  5 14:09:42 2010
From: matthew at pemble.net (Matthew Pemble)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 14:09:42 +0100
Subject: Gareth Williams case
In-Reply-To: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
References: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 September 2010 11:06, Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail)
<tharg at gmx.net> wrote:
> Latest swirl in this macabre story...

In days of yore, anybody working on <smirks> "very sensitive projects,
known as codeword protected" who rented a flat from a company called
"New Rodina" would be having an "interview without coffee" with the
Establishment Security Officer. And as this seems to have been a
service rented flat ...

The boggle minds!

M


-- 
Matthew Pemble


From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Sun Sep  5 16:42:17 2010
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 16:42:17 +0100
Subject: Gareth Williams case
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>
References: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
	<AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100905164217.703aa428@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>

On Sun, 5 Sep 2010 14:09:42 +0100
Matthew Pemble <matthew at pemble.net> wrote:

> On 5 September 2010 11:06, Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail)
> <tharg at gmx.net> wrote:
> > Latest swirl in this macabre story...
> 
> In days of yore, anybody working on <smirks> "very sensitive projects,
> known as codeword protected" who rented a flat from a company called
> "New Rodina" would be having an "interview without coffee" with the
> Establishment Security Officer. And as this seems to have been a
> service rented flat ...
> 
> The boggle minds!

Yes, I read this earlier, and was obviously having a slow-brain day. I
didn't remember the meaning of Rodina until you made you comment above.

I suppose that the Cold War really *is* a long time ago now.

-- 

Brian Morrison

bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk

   "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud;
    after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is enjoying it."
    
GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html
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From tugwilson at gmail.com  Sun Sep  5 17:25:50 2010
From: tugwilson at gmail.com (John Wilson)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 17:25:50 +0100
Subject: Gareth Williams case
In-Reply-To: <20100905164217.703aa428@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>
References: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
	<AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>
	<20100905164217.703aa428@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>
Message-ID: <AANLkTi=Tr7Fo_BL70RXoPtXZHgiigkuTSQsNca7BBMLd@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 September 2010 16:42, Brian Morrison <bdm at fenrir.org.uk> wrote:
> Yes, I read this earlier, and was obviously having a slow-brain day. I
> didn't remember the meaning of Rodina until you made you comment above.


The Guardian covered the name in their report on the 25th August

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/25/suspected-spy-foreign-office-worker


John Wilson


From bdm at fenrir.org.uk  Sun Sep  5 17:31:16 2010
From: bdm at fenrir.org.uk (Brian Morrison)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 17:31:16 +0100
Subject: Gareth Williams case
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTi=Tr7Fo_BL70RXoPtXZHgiigkuTSQsNca7BBMLd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
	<AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>
	<20100905164217.703aa428@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>
	<AANLkTi=Tr7Fo_BL70RXoPtXZHgiigkuTSQsNca7BBMLd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100905173116.4d12826f@peterson.fenrir.org.uk>

On Sun, 5 Sep 2010 17:25:50 +0100
John Wilson <tugwilson at gmail.com> wrote:

> On 5 September 2010 16:42, Brian Morrison <bdm at fenrir.org.uk> wrote:
> > Yes, I read this earlier, and was obviously having a slow-brain day. I
> > didn't remember the meaning of Rodina until you made you comment above.
> 
> 
> The Guardian covered the name in their report on the 25th August
> 
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/25/suspected-spy-foreign-office-worker

Perhaps, but I rarely read the Grauniad, or indeed any other newspaper
these days....

-- 

Brian Morrison

bdm at fenrir dot org dot uk

   "Arguing with an engineer is like wrestling with a pig in the mud;
    after a while you realize you are muddy and the pig is enjoying it."
    
GnuPG key ID DE32E5C5 - http://wwwkeys.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/wwwkeys.html
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From cryptome at earthlink.net  Sun Sep  5 17:48:47 2010
From: cryptome at earthlink.net (John Young)
Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 12:48:47 -0400
Subject: Gareth Williams case
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.c
 om>
References: <000001cb4ce1$fb75b920$f2612b60$@gmx.net>
	<AANLkTinhOu0FC_4CRBdSKwOFt_GyG8S0x3L2pJVAFVDf@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <E1OsIOe-0000Lq-00@pop03.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

Is it no longer forbidden to not read newspapers compulsively?

If so, how did this moral degeneracy come about? Was it done
in secret?

Is it being suggested that Gareth Williams had a hand in this?

This is to be reported somewhere most important. Pray.



From tharg at gmx.net  Wed Sep  8 02:26:02 2010
From: tharg at gmx.net (Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail))
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 03:26:02 +0200
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
Message-ID: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>

Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int
erception
.Addressing the home affairs select committee today John Yates, the
assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated earlier claims by
police that cases of hacking into voicemails could only be prosecuted if the
victim had not yet listened to their messages.
"That is nonsense, and a recurring problem with this police position in this
case," said Simon McKay, author of Covert Policing Law & Practice. "The
police are getting confused about a number of things relating to the
evidential status of a voicemail.
"The law is that in the nanosecond between someone's voice being converted
into an electromagnetic system and being transmitted to the recipient who
listens to the voicemail, that's the course of transmission. At some point
between these two points the hacker has been diverting a copy for his own
use, and that is an offence."

Experts say that although the law under the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (Ripa), which governs the interception of phone
communications, is complex, draft government guidelines clarify the
illegality of hacking into voicemails.
Those guidelines on the use of the act states that it is illegal to
intercept communications "at any time when the communication is being stored
on the communication system in such a way as to enable the intended
recipient to have access to it", which experts say includes voicemails.

"I don't know where the police are getting this interpretation from," a
senior lawyer close to the case said. "It's well known that Ripa is not the
clearest piece of legislation, but these guidelines seem pretty clear."

The Crown Prosecution Service said that it stood by its interpretation of
the law, which it gave during evidence to the culture, media and sport
select committee in July 2009.

"We stand by what we said to the committee and do not wish to add to it
except to say that in bringing the prosecution we interpreted the relevant
law following careful consideration and advice from very experienced
counsel," a CPS spokesperson said.



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 04:38:04 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 04:38:04 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>

Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
> 
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int
>  erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
> messages.
> 
> "That is nonsense, and a recurring problem with this police position
> in this case," said Simon McKay, author of Covert Policing Law &
> Practice. "The police are getting confused about a number of things
> relating to the evidential status of a voicemail. "The law is that in
> the nanosecond between someone's voice being converted into an
> electromagnetic system and being transmitted to the recipient who 
> listens to the voicemail, that's the course of transmission. At some
> point between these two points the hacker has been diverting a copy
> for his own use, and that is an offence."
> 
> Experts say that although the law under the Regulation of
> Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Ripa), which governs the interception
> of phone communications, is complex, draft government guidelines
> clarify the illegality of hacking into voicemails. Those guidelines
> on the use of the act states that it is illegal to intercept
> communications "at any time when the communication is being stored on
> the communication system in such a way as to enable the intended 
> recipient to have access to it", which experts say includes
> voicemails.

That last paragraph sounds right - although it's straightforward law, 
not guidelines.

RIPA section 2(2) says that an interception can only be of a 
communication "while being transmitted". Section 2(7) says:

" For the purposes of this section the times while a communication is 
being transmitted by means of a telecommunication system shall be taken 
to include any time when the system by means of which the communication 
is being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a manner 
that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have 
access to it. "

Clearly when a voicemail is stored in eg BT's system it is being stored 
so that the recipient can have access to it. It is therefore in 
transmission.

Whether the recipient has collected it, or listened to it, is irrelevant 
- it is still being stored so that the recipient can have access to it.





I don't know the detailed grounds behind the Police's attitude, they 
ain't saying, but afaict it would have to directly contradict the above 
somehow, and I cannot see any way the above could be incorrect.



An apparent difficulty may arise when the storage device is eg an 
answering machine in the recipient's house, which is not obviously and 
unambiguously part of the system as defined. However the difficulty is 
only apparent, not real.

At some point the answering machine was used to transmit the message, 
and thus was undoubtedly part of some telecommunications system at that 
time. The question arises, is it still part of the system "by means of 
which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted".

Even if it's only part of a system by which the communication "has been" 
transmitted, if it's being used to store the communication so that the 
recipient can access it then the communications it contains are to be 
considered as being "in transmission" as far as section 2 of RIPA are 
concerned.


RIPA makes no mention whatsoever of whether a communication has been 
received or read as having anything to do with whether or not it is in 
transmission.

So lets extend this a bit, to messages and texts in a mobile phone - 
they are "in transmission". Also, emails in seized computers - again, 
whether they have been read or not is irrelevant, and as long as they 
are in eg the inbox they are to be considered to be in transmission.

As the Police regularly look at texts when they seize mobiles, and 
emails when they seize computers, they aren't too keen on the correct 
interpretation of the law - properly, they need a PACE warrant to look 
at them.


> "I don't know where the police are getting this interpretation from,"
> a senior lawyer close to the case said. "It's well known that Ripa is
> not the clearest piece of legislation, but these guidelines seem
> pretty clear."


For a guide to Parliament's intentions, and possibly the guidelines 
referred to, see this from the HO's explanatory notes, at

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/en/00064x--.htm

[...] where an existing statutory power is used in order to obtain 
stored communications. In the latter case, this covers circumstances 
such as where a person has been arrested in possession of a pager, and 
the police have reason to believe that the messages sent previously to 
that pager may be of assistance in the case. In this case they would be 
able to apply to seek from a circuit judge an order under Schedule 1 to 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for the stored data to be 
produced.

The section being discussed removes acts which would otherwise be 
interception from the scope of the definition in s.2 if they are covered 
by existing powers to access stored communications.

The example given is of a seized pager - the section provides that 
looking at the messages on it is not interception because of the 
section, and we must conclude that looking at messages would in fact be 
interception absent the section - else why include the section?

>
> The Crown Prosecution Service said that it stood by its
> interpretation of the law, which it gave during evidence to the
> culture, media and sport select committee in July 2009.
> 
> "We stand by what we said to the committee and do not wish to add to
> it except to say that in bringing the prosecution we interpreted the
> relevant law following careful consideration and advice from very
> experienced counsel," a CPS spokesperson said.

Very experienced at spin, and making up law to suit themself/their 
clients - like the Watkin memo - I suspect. I'd like to read that 
guidance ..


The following threads here from Jan and Feb have some more detail, but 
the above is basically it:

"Google Toolbar caught tracking users when 'disabled'",

"Lord Bassam's Doormat - was Re: Google Toolbar caught tracking	users 
when 'disabled'" and

"Reading already read messages to become interception"

I don't know how to provide links to the archives, sorry.




-- Peter Fairbrother


From peter at pmsommer.com  Wed Sep  8 07:25:14 2010
From: peter at pmsommer.com (Peter Sommer)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 07:25:14 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com>

On 08/09/2010 04:38, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
>> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>>
>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int 
>>
>> erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
>> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
>> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
>> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
>> messages.
The offence that would work in these circumstances is s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990:  "unauthorised access to a computer".

Here is the CPS guidance:
The CMA does not provide a definition of a computer; this is because it was feared that any definition would soon become out of date due to the rapid with which technology develops. Definition is therefore left to the Courts who are expected to adopt the contemporary meaning
of the word. In DPP v McKeown, DPP v Jones ([1997] 2Cr App R, 155, HL at page 163) Lord Hoffman defined a computer as ?a device for storing, processing and retrieving information?.

In this instance the "computer" is, if it is a cellphone facility that is being breached,  the machine maintained by the cellphone company for that purpose, or, if it is the victim's own home answerphone attached to his/her landline, that machine.

Peter Sommer



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed Sep  8 08:19:59 2010
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 08:19:59 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>

In article <4C87051C.1080704 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>So lets extend this a bit, to messages and texts in a mobile phone - 
>they are "in transmission".

Be a bit careful... voicemail tends to be on a server somewhere, while 
texts are stored in the handset. The latter have been delivered, the law 
cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether someone has 
bothered to read them or not.

> Also, emails in seized computers - again, whether they have been read 
>or not is irrelevant, and as long as they are in eg the inbox they are 
>to be considered to be in transmission.

You are extrapolating way beyond the meaning of the Act. But even if 
reading someone's email off their computer is interception[1], it's not 
a criminal offence because it's not a public telecoms system.

[1] I doubt it, because the computer in question isn't part of any 
telecomms system (neither public nor private) once it's been seized.
-- 
Roland Perry


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed Sep  8 08:20:32 2010
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 08:20:32 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk>

In article <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>, "Caspar Bowden 
(travelling private e-mail)" <tharg at gmx.net> writes
>Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>
>http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int
>erception
>.Addressing the home affairs select committee today John Yates, the
>assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated earlier claims by
>police that cases of hacking into voicemails

There's a lot of confusion about what the journalists actually did. My 
impression was that they simply accessed the target's voicemail, in the 
same way the user would have done. Indeed, one of the press reports last 
week said that some targets had their suspicions raised when messages 
turned up in the "saved" box, when they hadn't heard them the first 
time.

>could only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their 
>messages.

Given the way most mobile phone voicemail works, if you abandon 
listening part-way through it reverts to "unread", but if you get to the 
end all you can do is choose to "save" it. Not sure what happens if you 
decline to do *anything* with it, at that stage - does it revert to 
unread, or is it discarded?

In any case, this means that while you can clearly decide that a "saved" 
message has been previously listened to, it's probably impossible to 
tell (without contacting the phone company, who may not keep records of 
this) whether unread (sic) voicemail has been listened to previously.

>"That is nonsense, and a recurring problem with this police position in this
>case,"

Whatever the wording that appears to be on the face of the Act (which 
may well need reading through the lens of the Parliamentary 
draughtsman), my recollection is the intention was that voicemail 
(although at the time people only really discussed email) would only be 
still "in the course of transmission", while it was being "stored for 
FIRST collection". There would be other issues with SUBSEQUENTLY 
accessing 'read' voicemails/SMS/emails, but it would not be 
interception.

On another point, raised by Peter, in the case of mobile phone voicemail 
the interception is on a public telecoms system, and therefore a 
criminal offence. However, I suspect that an answerphone on someone's 
premises would be regarded as on a private telecoms system (because it's 
beyond the white BT box).

>Experts say that although the law under the Regulation of Investigatory
>Powers Act 2000 (Ripa), which governs the interception of phone
>communications, is complex, draft government guidelines clarify the
>illegality of hacking into voicemails.
>Those guidelines on the use of the act states that it is illegal to
>intercept communications "at any time when the communication is being stored
>on the communication system in such a way as to enable the intended
>recipient to have access to it", which experts say includes voicemails.

It's true to observe (the obvious) that it includes voicemails, but 
that's a red herring. What matters is the concept of FIRST vs SUBSEQUENT 
collection.

-- 
Roland Perry


From clive at davros.org  Wed Sep  8 08:47:41 2010
From: clive at davros.org (Clive D.W. Feather)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 08:47:41 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20100908074741.GY753@davros.org>

Roland Perry said:
> On another point, raised by Peter, in the case of mobile phone voicemail 
> the interception is on a public telecoms system, and therefore a 
> criminal offence. However, I suspect that an answerphone on someone's 
> premises would be regarded as on a private telecoms system (because it's 
> beyond the white BT box).

Still the same offence if not done by or with the authority of the owner.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather          | If you lie to the compiler,
Email: clive at davros.org     | it will get its revenge.
Web: http://www.davros.org  |   - Henry Spencer
Mobile: +44 7973 377646


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Wed Sep  8 09:47:08 2010
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 09:47:08 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <20100908074741.GY753@davros.org>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk> <20100908074741.GY753@davros.org>
Message-ID: <rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk>

In article <20100908074741.GY753 at davros.org>, Clive D.W. Feather 
<clive at davros.org> writes
>> On another point, raised by Peter, in the case of mobile phone voicemail
>> the interception is on a public telecoms system, and therefore a
>> criminal offence. However, I suspect that an answerphone on someone's
>> premises would be regarded as on a private telecoms system (because it's
>> beyond the white BT box).
>
>Still the same offence if not done by or with the authority of the owner.

It's not the same RIPA offence, and we still seem to be in the situation 
that TPTB appear reluctant to use CMA for this kind of thing (perhaps 
for fear of opening a Pandora's box of things they would need to 
investigate and prosecute as a result, but I'm just guessing).
-- 
Roland Perry


From roger at hayter.org  Wed Sep  8 08:29:12 2010
From: roger at hayter.org (Roger Hayter)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 08:29:12 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <eMbhvcBItzhMFAhs@kalahari.uninhabited.net>

In message <4C872C4A.3030805 at pmsommer.com>, Peter Sommer 
<peter at pmsommer.com> writes
>On 08/09/2010 04:38, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>> Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
>>> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>>>
>>> 
>>>http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-l
>>>aw-int
>>> erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
>>> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
>>> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
>>> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
>>> messages.
>The offence that would work in these circumstances is s1 Computer 
>Misuse Act 1990:  "unauthorised access to a computer".
>
>Here is the CPS guidance:
>The CMA does not provide a definition of a computer; this is because it 
>was feared that any definition would soon become out of date due to the 
>rapid with which technology develops. Definition is therefore left to 
>the Courts who are expected to adopt the contemporary meaning
>of the word. In DPP v McKeown, DPP v Jones ([1997] 2Cr App R, 155, HL 
>at page 163) Lord Hoffman defined a computer as ?a device for 
>storing, processing and retrieving information?.
>
>In this instance the "computer" is, if it is a cellphone facility that 
>is being breached,  the machine maintained by the cellphone company for 
>that purpose, or, if it is the victim's own home answerphone attached 
>to his/her landline, that machine.
>
Though it would not be the cheapest implementation nowadays, it is 
entirely possible to make an answerphone which has no computer-like 
features, just a few relays, an analogue signal detector and a tape 
deck.

-- 

Roger Hayter


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 13:00:04 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
	<egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>

Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <4C87051C.1080704 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>> So lets extend this a bit, to messages and texts in a mobile phone - 
>> they are "in transmission".
> 
> Be a bit careful... 

I am.

> voicemail tends to be on a server somewhere, while 
> texts are stored in the handset. 

Yes - I did make that distinction, if you read the post carefully. Or 
even just skim through it.

> The latter have been delivered, 

Perhaps they have - but they are still in transmission even if they have 
been delivered.

It's quite possible, and common, for a message to both have been 
transmitted and still be in transmission. This is true in practice as 
well as in RIPA - a message is sent, and the sending server keeps a copy 
until it gets a receipt, then it deletes the copy.

As for RIPA: "the times while a communication is being transmitted by 
means of a telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time 
when the system by means of which the communication is being, or has 
been, transmitted.."

Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.


> the law 
> cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether someone has 
> bothered to read them or not.

It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.

If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which has 
been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access them, then 
they are "in transmission". It makes no difference whether the recipient 
has already accessed them or not.

The answering machine is perhaps part of the public system when it's 
actually receiving messages, but it's also a private system by itself. 
And it has been used for the transmission of a message - whether 
received or not - and the message is in storage so the recipient can 
access it.


>> Also, emails in seized computers - again, whether they have been read 
>> or not is irrelevant, and as long as they are in eg the inbox they are 
>> to be considered to be in transmission.
> 
> You are extrapolating way beyond the meaning of the Act. 

Nope. Nor am I going beyond the intention and understanding of 
Parliament, or the Home Office when they drafted the Act - see the 
guidance I quoted. If messages in a pager, whether read or not, are "in 
transmission" then so are mobile messages, and email in computers.

RIPA nowhere makes any distinction as to whether a message has been 
"read" or not, in fact with "is being, or has been, transmitted" it says 
that that doesn't matter when considering whether it is to be considered 
to be in transmission.


> But even if 
> reading someone's email off their computer is interception[1], it's not 
> a criminal offence because it's not a public telecoms system.

Eh? Of course it is a RIPA offence. See 1(2).

-- Peter Fairbrother



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 13:05:31 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:05:31 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>	<MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk>
	<20100908074741.GY753@davros.org> <rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C877C0B.2010103@zen.co.uk>

Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <20100908074741.GY753 at davros.org>, Clive D.W. Feather 
> <clive at davros.org> writes
>>> On another point, raised by Peter, in the case of mobile phone voicemail
>>> the interception is on a public telecoms system, and therefore a
>>> criminal offence. However, I suspect that an answerphone on someone's
>>> premises would be regarded as on a private telecoms system (because it's
>>> beyond the white BT box).
>>
>> Still the same offence if not done by or with the authority of the owner.
> 
> It's not the same RIPA offence, 

Sure it is, except insofar as it may be under 1(2) rather then 1(1).

Why do you think it's not? Private system?

-- Peter Fairbrother



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 13:17:33 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:17:33 +0100
Subject: Security theater?
Message-ID: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>

Just had a new Lloyds credit card delivered, it had a sticker saying I 
have to call a number to activate it. I call, it's an automated system.

It asks for the card number, fair enough. It asks for the expiry date, 
well maybe, It asks for my DOB, the only information that isn't actually 
on the card, but no big secret. And then it asks for the 
three-digit-security-code-on-the-back, well wtf?

AIUI, and I may be wrong, the purpose of activation is to prevent 
lost-in-the-post theft/fraud - so what do they need details which a 
thief who has the card in his hot sweaty hand already knows for?

And especially details like the three-digit-security-code-on-the-back 
which can be used to help defraud?

I don't get it, unless it's just bad security theatre.

-- Peter Fairbrother



From Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk  Wed Sep  8 13:27:24 2010
From: Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk (Ray Bellis)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 12:27:24 +0000
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <2AF31E42-2051-418C-AE45-86FED103579C@nominet.org.uk>


On 8 Sep 2010, at 13:17, Peter Fairbrother wrote:

>  bad security theatre.

Isn't that an oxymoron?

Ray



From matthew at pemble.net  Wed Sep  8 13:34:20 2010
From: matthew at pemble.net (Matthew Pemble)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 13:34:20 +0100
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <2AF31E42-2051-418C-AE45-86FED103579C@nominet.org.uk>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
	<2AF31E42-2051-418C-AE45-86FED103579C@nominet.org.uk>
Message-ID: <AANLkTimudTOjTvpgR_0w121jyfZ9Rv78hw=K-Mtf6PMO@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 September 2010 13:27, Ray Bellis <Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk> wrote:
>
> On 8 Sep 2010, at 13:17, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>
>> ?bad security theatre.
>
> Isn't that an oxymoron?

Nope, a tautology.

M.

-- 
Matthew Pemble


From Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk  Wed Sep  8 13:57:14 2010
From: Ray.Bellis at nominet.org.uk (Ray Bellis)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 12:57:14 +0000
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimudTOjTvpgR_0w121jyfZ9Rv78hw=K-Mtf6PMO@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
	<2AF31E42-2051-418C-AE45-86FED103579C@nominet.org.uk>
	<AANLkTimudTOjTvpgR_0w121jyfZ9Rv78hw=K-Mtf6PMO@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <67F621CC-8BE5-466A-814C-8B878DAD50EF@nominet.org.uk>


On 8 Sep 2010, at 13:34, Matthew Pemble wrote:

> Nope, a tautology.

Oops - you are of course correct :)

Ray



From clive at davros.org  Wed Sep  8 14:27:17 2010
From: clive at davros.org (Clive D.W. Feather)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 14:27:17 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk> <20100908074741.GY753@davros.org>
	<rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20100908132717.GA54173@davros.org>

Roland Perry said:
>>>However, I suspect that an answerphone on someone's
>>>premises would be regarded as on a private telecoms system (because it's
>>>beyond the white BT box).
>> Still the same offence if not done by or with the authority of the owner.
> It's not the same RIPA offence,

Huh?

Public network: offence defined by s.1(1), definition in s.1(5), penalty in
s.1(7), paperwork in s.1(8), more definitions in s.2 et.seq.
Private network: offence defined by s.1(2), definition in s.1(5), special
case in s.1(6), penalty in s.1(7), paperwork in s.1(8), more definitions in
s.2 et.seq.

They are both illegal interception under the same basic rules with the same
penalty. I bet an indictment just says "contrary to s.1 RIPA 2000".

In what way are they not the same offence? (Other than the trivia of
whether the network is public or private?)

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather          | If you lie to the compiler,
Email: clive at davros.org     | it will get its revenge.
Web: http://www.davros.org  |   - Henry Spencer
Mobile: +44 7973 377646


From fjmd1a at gmail.com  Wed Sep  8 14:51:34 2010
From: fjmd1a at gmail.com (Francis Davey)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 14:51:34 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <20100908132717.GA54173@davros.org>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<MQhatTFAlzhMFAj0@perry.co.uk> <20100908074741.GY753@davros.org>
	<rUSTcDKM20hMFA2W@perry.co.uk> <20100908132717.GA54173@davros.org>
Message-ID: <AANLkTimp8zKGsMbAFs4HTe7vyJeJVZz7bjfJiFs-5OaR@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 September 2010 14:27, Clive D.W. Feather <clive at davros.org> wrote:
>
> Huh?
>
> Public network: offence defined by s.1(1), definition in s.1(5), penalty in
> s.1(7), paperwork in s.1(8), more definitions in s.2 et.seq.
> Private network: offence defined by s.1(2), definition in s.1(5), special
> case in s.1(6), penalty in s.1(7), paperwork in s.1(8), more definitions in
> s.2 et.seq.
>
> They are both illegal interception under the same basic rules with the same
> penalty. I bet an indictment just says "contrary to s.1 RIPA 2000".

Informations and indictments can be like that. In my profession we
tend to categorise each mode of commission as a separate offence
(because the elements will be different and so what needs to be proved
in court differs which is what is important to us), whether that is
"correct" is probably not worth arguing over.

It does mean that it is eternally frustrating to read an information
or indictment that *doesn't* specify which (sub-)offence is alleged.
Sometimes there can be a considerable difference between them.

-- 
Francis Davey


From richard at highwayman.com  Wed Sep  8 12:04:19 2010
From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 12:04:19 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com>
Message-ID: <BhWjeuEz22hMFAQR@highwayman.com>

In article <4C872C4A.3030805 at pmsommer.com>, Peter Sommer
<peter at pmsommer.com> writes

>On 08/09/2010 04:38, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>> Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
>>> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>>>
>>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int 
>>>
>>> erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
>>> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
>>> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
>>> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
>>> messages.

This isn't a surprise at all -- it's been the general view for some time
(and AIUI, is regularly applied to SMS messages -- which the telco often
keeps a copy of....)  It is also consistent with the view taken in the
NTL v Ispwich case [yes I know, that was unfortunate as well] as to what
"transmission" meant.

I think it is also consistent with the US approach to the matter (there,
they have a quirk that after 6 months of storage, whether read or not,
the emails are available to Law Enforcement!  there are presently moves
over there to change this, as being inconsistent with modern approaches
to keeping your mailbox "in the cloud")

>The offence that would work in these circumstances is s1 Computer Misuse Act 
>1990:  "unauthorised access to a computer".

I very much agree, pretty much whatever the method of access, they will
have been communicating with a computer and would have known that they
were not authorised.

Comments at the time this last came up suggested that the journalists
were using default passwords to access the voicemail (most people don't
change those). I think possibly the people who were commenting were
under the impression that some sort of surreptitious 3-way call was
being established, which would of course be interception.

-- 
richard                                                   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 16:54:47 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 16:54:47 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <BhWjeuEz22hMFAQR@highwayman.com>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
	<4C872C4A.3030805@pmsommer.com> <BhWjeuEz22hMFAQR@highwayman.com>
Message-ID: <4C87B1C7.2090002@zen.co.uk>

Richard Clayton wrote:
> In article <4C872C4A.3030805 at pmsommer.com>, Peter Sommer
> <peter at pmsommer.com> writes
> 
>> On 08/09/2010 04:38, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>>> Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
>>>> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>>>>
>>>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int 
>>>>
>>>> erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
>>>> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
>>>> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
>>>> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
>>>> messages.
> 
> This isn't a surprise at all -- it's been the general view for some time
> (and AIUI, is regularly applied to SMS messages -- which the telco often
> keeps a copy of....)  

Yes, the police like that view - but they are about the only ones who 
do, and it's obviously incorrect.

> It is also consistent with the view taken in the
> NTL v Ispwich case [yes I know, that was unfortunate as well] as to what
> "transmission" meant.

The idea that messages can be in transmission after receipt is equally 
consistent with that judgement. The Judge in NTL v Ipswich did say:

"Subsection (7) has the effect of extending the time of communication 
until the intended recipient has collected it."

This is correct as it stands, *as long as you do not assume that it 
means that once it has been collected it is no longer in transmission*. 
Which is something the Judge did not say. The Judge did not address that 
issue. He went on:

"It is essential on the evidence in this case that if NTL are to 
preserve the material, they take action before the intended recipient 
has collected the e-mail. Subsection (7) means that we are here 
concerned with what happens in the course of transmission."

and found that it was (of course) in transmission, but it was lawful for 
NTL to preserve it under PACE.

-- Peter Fairbrother


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 18:17:16 2010
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 18:17:16 +0100
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C87C51C.4050801@iosis.co.uk>

Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Just had a new Lloyds credit card delivered, it had a sticker saying I 
> have to call a number to activate it. I call, it's an automated system.
>
> It asks for the card number, fair enough. It asks for the expiry date, 
> well maybe, It asks for my DOB, the only information that isn't 
> actually on the card, but no big secret. And then it asks for the 
> three-digit-security-code-on-the-back, well wtf?
>
> AIUI, and I may be wrong, the purpose of activation is to prevent 
> lost-in-the-post theft/fraud - so what do they need details which a 
> thief who has the card in his hot sweaty hand already knows for?
>
> And especially details like the three-digit-security-code-on-the-back 
> which can be used to help defraud?
>
> I don't get it, unless it's just bad security theatre.
>
> -- Peter Fairbrother
Automated by getting you to key in numbers, I assume - which means they 
cannot use voice analysis software to (attempt to) detect the equivalent 
of sweaty palms from the stress of being an imposter.

This reminds me that there was a period when all the customers of my 
bank (in this city I suspect, perhaps not everywhere) had to go and 
collect credit cards at a nominated branch of the bank - and they didn't 
really check ID there, either. I assume 'all' because there was no 
obvious reason, such as my card being lost, why I should have to do that.

Bring on eID tokens: Kable and The Reg reported that "UK.gov fishes for 
ID ideas. Turns to IT suppliers, says 'Er, what do you think?' ":

"Directgov has asked IT suppliers to come up with new thinking on 
identity verification.

The team, which is now within the Cabinet Office, has issued a 
pre-tender notice published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union, saying that it wants feedback on potential requirements for the 
public sector on all aspects of identity verification and 
authentication. This is particularly relevant to online and telephone 
channels, and the notice says the services include the provision of 
related software and computer services."

See http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/02/directgov_id/

So why do they want to buy something, when there is another way to do 
it: in late June the USA asked the whole country to look at this: "Draft 
Plan for National Online ID". The person who sent that on to me wrote 
"Rather than presenting a detailed plan, the proposed National Strategy 
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace is painted in broad brush strokes.  
The proposal involves having consumers use secure identifiers, such as 
smart identity cards or digital certificates, to authenticate their 
identities before online transactions are conducted.  The plan would be 
voluntary and would allow consumers to choose their identifiers from a 
range of public and private services.  The White House is seeking 
comments on the proposal." (And wanted those comments very quickly.)

See:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/25/national-strategy-trusted-identities-cyberspace
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ns_tic.pdf

However, I have not yet followed up the progress of the discussion in 
the USA.

Peter



From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Wed Sep  8 20:08:09 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2010 20:08:09 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C87DF19.8000901@zen.co.uk>

Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Caspar Bowden (travelling private e-mail) wrote:
>> Doormat-ologists' opinion please of:
>>
>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/07/phone-hacking-voicemails-law-int 
>>
>>  erception .Addressing the home affairs select committee today John
>> Yates, the assistant Metropolitan police commissioner, repeated
>> earlier claims by police that cases of hacking into voicemails could
>> only be prosecuted if the victim had not yet listened to their
>> messages.
>>
>> "That is nonsense, and a recurring problem with this police position
>> in this case," said Simon McKay, author of Covert Policing Law &
>> Practice. "The police are getting confused about a number of things
>> relating to the evidential status of a voicemail. "The law is that in
>> the nanosecond between someone's voice being converted into an
>> electromagnetic system and being transmitted to the recipient who 
>> listens to the voicemail, that's the course of transmission. At some
>> point between these two points the hacker has been diverting a copy
>> for his own use, and that is an offence."
>>
>> Experts say that although the law under the Regulation of
>> Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Ripa), which governs the interception
>> of phone communications, is complex, draft government guidelines
>> clarify the illegality of hacking into voicemails. Those guidelines
>> on the use of the act states that it is illegal to intercept
>> communications "at any time when the communication is being stored on
>> the communication system in such a way as to enable the intended 
>> recipient to have access to it", which experts say includes
>> voicemails.
> 
> That last paragraph sounds right - although it's straightforward law, 
> not guidelines.
> 
> RIPA section 2(2) says that an interception can only be of a 
> communication "while being transmitted". Section 2(7) says:
> 
> " For the purposes of this section the times while a communication is 
> being transmitted by means of a telecommunication system shall be taken 
> to include any time when the system by means of which the communication 
> is being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a manner 
> that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have 
> access to it. "
> 
> Clearly when a voicemail is stored in eg BT's system it is being stored 
> so that the recipient can have access to it. It is therefore in 
> transmission.
> 
> Whether the recipient has collected it, or listened to it, is irrelevant 
> - it is still being stored so that the recipient can have access to it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't know the detailed grounds behind the Police's attitude, they 
> ain't saying, but afaict it would have to directly contradict the above 
> somehow, and I cannot see any way the above could be incorrect.
> 
> 
> 
> An apparent difficulty may arise when the storage device is eg an 
> answering machine in the recipient's house, which is not obviously and 
> unambiguously part of the system as defined. However the difficulty is 
> only apparent, not real.
> 
> At some point the answering machine was used to transmit the message, 
> and thus was undoubtedly part of some telecommunications system at that 
> time. The question arises, is it still part of the system "by means of 
> which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted".
> 
> Even if it's only part of a system by which the communication "has been" 
> transmitted, if it's being used to store the communication so that the 
> recipient can access it then the communications it contains are to be 
> considered as being "in transmission" as far as section 2 of RIPA are 
> concerned.
> 
> 
> RIPA makes no mention whatsoever of whether a communication has been 
> received or read as having anything to do with whether or not it is in 
> transmission.
> 
> So lets extend this a bit, to messages and texts in a mobile phone - 
> they are "in transmission". Also, emails in seized computers - again, 
> whether they have been read or not is irrelevant, and as long as they 
> are in eg the inbox they are to be considered to be in transmission.
> 
> As the Police regularly look at texts when they seize mobiles, and 
> emails when they seize computers, they aren't too keen on the correct 
> interpretation of the law - properly, they need a PACE warrant to look 
> at them.
> 
> 
>> "I don't know where the police are getting this interpretation from,"
>> a senior lawyer close to the case said. "It's well known that Ripa is
>> not the clearest piece of legislation, but these guidelines seem
>> pretty clear."
> 
> 
> For a guide to Parliament's intentions, and possibly the guidelines 
> referred to, see this from the HO's explanatory notes, at
> 
> http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/064/en/00064x--.htm 
> 
> 
> [...] where an existing statutory power is used in order to obtain 
> stored communications. In the latter case, this covers circumstances 
> such as where a person has been arrested in possession of a pager, and 
> the police have reason to believe that the messages sent previously to 
> that pager may be of assistance in the case. In this case they would be 
> able to apply to seek from a circuit judge an order under Schedule 1 to 
> the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for the stored data to be 
> produced.
> 
> The section being discussed removes acts which would otherwise be 
> interception from the scope of the definition in s.2 if they are covered 
> by existing powers to access stored communications.

ooops, had a niggle about that, and had to look it up. To be accurate, 
the section in question (s.5(3)) makes looking at pager messages lawful, 
under RIPA and eg PACE, rather than making it not an interception under 
RIPA.

So looking at pager messages is interception, it's just not illegal if 
done under eg a PACE warrant. nothing I have seen suggests that whether 
they have been read or not makes any difference.

-- pf


> 
> The example given is of a seized pager - the section provides that 
> looking at the messages on it is not interception because of the 
> section, and we must conclude that looking at messages would in fact be 
> interception absent the section - else why include the section?
> 
>>
>> The Crown Prosecution Service said that it stood by its
>> interpretation of the law, which it gave during evidence to the
>> culture, media and sport select committee in July 2009.
>>
>> "We stand by what we said to the committee and do not wish to add to
>> it except to say that in bringing the prosecution we interpreted the
>> relevant law following careful consideration and advice from very
>> experienced counsel," a CPS spokesperson said.
> 
> Very experienced at spin, and making up law to suit themself/their 
> clients - like the Watkin memo - I suspect. I'd like to read that 
> guidance ..
> 
> 
> The following threads here from Jan and Feb have some more detail, but 
> the above is basically it:
> 
> "Google Toolbar caught tracking users when 'disabled'",
> 
> "Lord Bassam's Doormat - was Re: Google Toolbar caught tracking    users 
> when 'disabled'" and
> 
> "Reading already read messages to become interception"
> 
> I don't know how to provide links to the archives, sorry.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- Peter Fairbrother
> 
> 



From David_Biggins at usermgmt.com  Thu Sep  9 15:52:30 2010
From: David_Biggins at usermgmt.com (David Biggins)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2010 15:52:30 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD493623392516@home.usermgmt.local>


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ukcrypto-bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk [mailto:ukcrypto-
> bounces at chiark.greenend.org.uk] On Behalf Of Peter Fairbrother
> Sent: 08 September 2010 04:38
> To: cb at qualia.co.uk; UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Group
> Subject: Re: Doormat-ologist needed
> 
> RIPA section 2(2) says that an interception can only be of a
> communication "while being transmitted". Section 2(7) says:

All true.  

But BT's voicemail system is not simple tape - it is a computer system.

Which surely brings into play the CMA:

1.  Unauthorised access to computer material.- 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure
access to any program or data held in any computer [F2 , or to enable
any such access to be secured] ;
(b)the access he intends to secure [F3 , or to enable to be secured,] is
unauthorised; and
(c)he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the
function that that is the case.

Further, reading the recordings changes the "marked as read" state,
meaning that the intended recipient is likely not to actually receive
them, so:

3.  Unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to
impairing, operation of computer, etc.
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer;
(b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised;
and
(c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies.
(2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act-
(a)to impair the operation of any computer;
(b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any
computer;
(c)to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any
such data; or
(d)to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above
to be done.
(3) This subsection applies if the person is reckless as to whether the
act will do any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of
subsection (2) above.

So whether or not "interception" took place, certainly unauthorised
access, and possibly reckless impairment took place.

Possibly worth a prosecution, I'd have thought.

D.


From David_Biggins at usermgmt.com  Thu Sep  9 15:53:31 2010
From: David_Biggins at usermgmt.com (David Biggins)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2010 15:53:31 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <C6F343320DAC194BA010FD66AD493623392517@home.usermgmt.local>

I should have read the thread first, shouldn't I.

My apologies.

D.



From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Thu Sep  9 16:28:43 2010
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2010 16:28:43 +0100
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <4C87C51C.4050801@iosis.co.uk>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk> <4C87C51C.4050801@iosis.co.uk>
Message-ID: <bZYP$JRr0PiMFAY4@perry.co.uk>

In article <4C87C51C.4050801 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson 
<pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>Bring on eID tokens: Kable and The Reg reported that "UK.gov fishes for 
>ID ideas.

I already have two, I really don't want one for every "online account" I 
have with anyone.

 >"Directgov has asked IT suppliers to come up with new thinking on 
 >identity verification.
 >
 >The team, which is now within the Cabinet Office

That's where it was 10 years ago, where did it drift off to in the mean 
time?
-- 
Roland Perry


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Thu Sep  9 17:02:59 2010
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Thu, 09 Sep 2010 17:02:59 +0100
Subject: Security theater?
In-Reply-To: <bZYP$JRr0PiMFAY4@perry.co.uk>
References: <4C877EDD.8070905@zen.co.uk> <4C87C51C.4050801@iosis.co.uk>
	<bZYP$JRr0PiMFAY4@perry.co.uk>
Message-ID: <4C890533.2070101@iosis.co.uk>

Roland Perry wrote:
> In article <4C87C51C.4050801 at iosis.co.uk>, Peter Tomlinson 
> <pwt at iosis.co.uk> writes
>> Bring on eID tokens: Kable and The Reg reported that "UK.gov fishes 
>> for ID ideas.
> I already have two, I really don't want one for every "online account" 
> I have with anyone.
I suspect that the Cabinet Office idea is that all the public eServices 
that will cluster under DirectGov will accept your one token. But that's 
old hat centralist govt thinking [1], while the USA thinking is much 
more open.
>
> >"Directgov has asked IT suppliers to come up with new thinking on 
> >identity verification.
> >
> >The team, which is now within the Cabinet Office
>
> That's where it was 10 years ago, where did it drift off to in the 
> mean time?
True. It got lost at the end of 2004, but was going nowhere up until 
then [2].

I can see that in a USA style scheme we could have numerous issuers of 
the token, and you could get your single token for use with public 
sector services from any one of them providing that that provider is 
govt approved (including having an online verification.authentication 
service for the benefit of eService providers). Or you could have 
several tokens. And the USA govt would also encourage you to use, from 
an approved provider, a token or tokens for use online to private services.

And I think that in a USA style environment it would not be necessary to 
federate the token providers.

Peter

[1] And not much use for local govt either

[2] 1999 Framework for Smart Cards in Government

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/govtalk/archive/policy_documents_2_of_2/smart_cards_policy_framework.aspx

"Still in force." So nobody did better than my technical edit of that 
document (a sensible civil servant who was one of the Information Age 
Government Champions got me that contract - he recently retired, also 
thinking that we have not moved on).



From chl at clerew.man.ac.uk  Fri Sep 10 20:30:42 2010
From: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2010 20:30:42 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>

On Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:

> Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.
>
>
>> the law cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether  
>> someone has bothered to read them or not.
>
> It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.
>
> If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which has  
> been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access them, then  
> they are "in transmission". It makes no difference whether the recipient  
> has already accessed them or not.

I think not. If the "doormat" doctrine has any validity at all (and I  
believe it does), then once the message has reached its intended  
destination (e.g. a computer or an answering machine), then it has been  
"delivered", and is no longer in transmission.

If only one copy of the message exists, then that is the end of the  
matter. But if a second copy has been retained on the public side of the  
doormat (has not been deleted from the POP3 mailbox), then that copy is  
still "in transmission" (from the bits of the act that you quoted),  
because the recipient can still request it. If he then deletes it (whether  
or not the telcom actually deletes it or simply marks it for deletion  
later), then it is no longer "available" to the recipient.

RIPA allows warranted interception of stuff still "in transmission". If  
they want something already "delivered", then they need a PACE warrant.

-- 
Charles?H.?Lindsey?---------At?Home,?doing?my?own?thing------------------------
Tel:?+44?161?436?6131?                      
???Web:?http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email:?chl at clerew.man.ac.uk??????Snail:?5?Clerewood?Ave,?CHEADLE,?SK8?3JU,?U.K.
PGP:?2C15F1A9??????Fingerprint:?73?6D?C2?51?93?A0?01?E7?65?E8?64?7E?14?A4?AB?A5


From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Sat Sep 11 02:00:20 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 2010 02:00:20 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
	<egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>
	<op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>

Charles Lindsey wrote:
> On Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100, Peter Fairbrother 
> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
> 
>> Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.
>>
>>
>>> the law cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether 
>>> someone has bothered to read them or not.
>>
>> It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.
>>
>> If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which has 
>> been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access them, 
>> then they are "in transmission". It makes no difference whether the 
>> recipient has already accessed them or not.
> 
> I think not. If the "doormat" doctrine has any validity at all (and I 
> believe it does), 

So do I.

> then once the message has reached its intended 
> destination (e.g. a computer or an answering machine), then it has been 
> "delivered", and is no longer in transmission.

A message's destination, or rather it's intended recipient, is always a 
legal person - though the legal person might be a machine rather than a 
human.

The destination cannot ever be a system used to transmit it though, by 
the simple definition of "transmit".

Once a copy has reached that person, that copy is no longer in the 
systems used to transmit it. It has passed the doormat.

That's where the doormat lies - when it has passed out of all the 
systems used to transmit it.

******
Nothing you can do to that copy can then be interception - because it's 
no longer in the systems used to transmit it.

You can only intercept by doing things (modification, monitoring etc) to 
those systems.
******


However if there are any copies which are stored in any of the systems 
used to deliver it so that the intended recipient can do something with 
them (collect or otherwise access them), then the communication is still 
in transmission for the purposes of section 2.


Incidentally, that includes both a copy in the system and a copy which 
is out of it. Both copies are "the communication". Both copies are in 
transit for s.2 purposes.

The copy in the systems can be intercepted, and that would perhaps be 
illegal as well.

But you can do what you like with the "outside" copy, without it being 
interception, even though it is a copy of a communication which is still 
in transmission.

You aren't doing anything *to the systems*, so it can't be interception.



> If only one copy of the message exists, then that is the end of the 
> matter. But if a second copy has been retained on the public side of the 
> doormat (has not been deleted from the POP3 mailbox), then that copy is 
> still "in transmission" (from the bits of the act that you quoted), 
> because the recipient can still request it. 


I think we are mostly in agreement, except for exactly where the doormat 
is. (and maybe the small switcheroo I just pulled above <grin>)

It's not "has this copy passed out of the public system?", it's:

"Has every available copy passed out of every one of the systems used to 
transmit it?".

Until that happens the communication is still in transmission.

Iirc, that's what Lord Bassam actually said: and it's also what RIPA 
clearly says.



In the case of texts on mobiles or emails, one of the systems used to 
transmit them is the mobile handset itself, or as much of the 
recipient's computer as was used for that purpose, ie to transmit them - 
the TCP stack, the email program etc.

These are undoubtedly private telecommunications systems as defined in 
RIPA, are sometimes attached to a public telecommunications system, and 
they are being and/or have been used to transmit the message.

So if a copy is kept in the mobile or computer (so as to be available to 
the recipient), it is undoubtedly still "in transit" according to 
section 2(7).

And it's in the system which has been used to transmit it, so eg 
monitoring or copying it would be doing something in s.2(2) to a system, 
and would be interception.



> If he then deletes it 
> (whether or not the telcom actually deletes it or simply marks it for 
> deletion later), then it is no longer "available" to the recipient.

Interesting point. But yes, if it isn't available then it doesn't affect 
the transmission status of the communication (only available copies do).


> RIPA allows warranted interception of stuff still "in transmission".  If
> they want something already "delivered", then they need a PACE warrant.

RIPA also allows the Police etc to intercept stuff in transit which is 
also a stored communication under a PACE warrant, not an interception 
warrant.

This would apply to texts in seized mobiles, emails in seized computers, 
ansaphone messages etc. Whether read or not, the Police can look at them 
with a PACE warrant - and perhaps they don't even need a warrant to look 
at them, under PACE, but I'm not sure about that.


It probably shouldn't extend to the Police intercepting unread email and 
texts in the public systems, and almost certainly it wasn't intended to 
- but on the face of it RIPA allows PACE to be used for this (if PACE 
allows it).

Whether PACE itself allows it is another matter. The judge in the NTL v 
Ipswich case thought PACE did - I disagree, but I don't know enough 
about PACE to be sure.


BTW, does anyone have a link to an updated copy of PACE? I have the 
original, but when people quote it it seems different.

-- Peter Fairbrother


From lists at internetpolicyagency.com  Sat Sep 11 13:15:38 2010
From: lists at internetpolicyagency.com (Roland Perry)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 2010 13:15:38 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk> <op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <l14A0NBqL3iMFA8w@perry.co.uk>

In article <4C8AD4A4.400 at zen.co.uk>, Peter Fairbrother 
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> writes
>Whether PACE itself allows it is another matter. The judge in the NTL v 
>Ipswich case thought PACE did - I disagree, but I don't know enough 
>about PACE to be sure.

Mindful that the NTL v Ipswich case was about data preservation, rather 
than disclosure.

-- 
Roland Perry


From chl at clerew.man.ac.uk  Mon Sep 13 12:42:08 2010
From: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:42:08 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>
	<op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk> <4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <op.viyysiif6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>

On Sat, 11 Sep 2010 02:00:20 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:

> Charles Lindsey wrote:
>> On Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.
>>>
>>>
>>>> the law cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether  
>>>> someone has bothered to read them or not.
>>>
>>> It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.
>>>
>>> If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which has  
>>> been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access them,  
>>> then they are "in transmission". It makes no difference whether the  
>>> recipient has already accessed them or not.
>>  I think not. If the "doormat" doctrine has any validity at all (and I  
>> believe it does),
>
> So do I.

Then is is clear your understanding of the word "doormat" differs from  
mine (and from Lord Bassam's, too).

By definition, the "doormat" is the first entity encountered by the  
message after is arrives at the intended "address".

>
>> then once the message has reached its intended destination (e.g. a  
>> computer or an answering machine), then it has been "delivered", and is  
>> no longer in transmission.
>
> A message's destination, or rather it's intended recipient, is always a  
> legal person - though the legal person might be a machine rather than a  
> human.

If it lies on Lord Basam's doormat, then it is not yet in the possession  
of Lord Bassam, who is the intended recipient. Perhaps it is picked up by  
Lord Basam's buttler, placed upon a silver salver, carried to Lord  
Bassam's study and placed in his IN Tray. It has still not reached Lord  
Bassam.

Now, when Lord Basam finally takes it in his hand from the IN Tray, then  
he has finally got it.

But the whole point of Lord Bassam's remark was that he considered it to  
have been "delivered" as soon as it lay on his doormat.

Clearly, there are electronic equivalents to the "doormat", "butler" and  
"in tray", which may well amount to a private telecommunications system.  
But that does not affect the primary "doormat" doctrine.

>
> The destination cannot ever be a system used to transmit it though, by  
> the simple definition of "transmit".

The destination of a message is essentially the "address" to which it was  
directed, and the doormat is "just inside" that address.

> However if there are any copies which are stored in any of the systems  
> used to deliver it so that the intended recipient can do something with  
> them (collect or otherwise access them), then the communication is still  
> in transmission for the purposes of section 2.
>
>
> Incidentally, that includes both a copy in the system and a copy which  
> is out of it. Both copies are "the communication". Both copies are in  
> transit for s.2 purposes.

This is where the Act does not cover all the possible scenarios. I think a  
Court would be bound to recognise that different copies of the message  
were in a different status of "being in transmission", since I can see no  
other way in which the Act can make any sort of sense. With that  
interpreation, it immediately becomes clear when you need a Secretary of  
State's warrant and when you need a PACE warrant.

-- 
Charles?H.?Lindsey?---------At?Home,?doing?my?own?thing------------------------
Tel:?+44?161?436?6131?                      
???Web:?http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email:?chl at clerew.man.ac.uk??????Snail:?5?Clerewood?Ave,?CHEADLE,?SK8?3JU,?U.K.
PGP:?2C15F1A9??????Fingerprint:?73?6D?C2?51?93?A0?01?E7?65?E8?64?7E?14?A4?AB?A5


From james2 at jfirth.net  Mon Sep 13 12:49:23 2010
From: james2 at jfirth.net (James Firth)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 12:49:23 +0100
Subject: More on Doormat : RIPA, Hacking and how Gmail *could* be legal
Message-ID: <002f01cb5339$b64e09c0$22ea1d40$@net>

El Reg has reposted this from Amberhawk:

Police legal advice gives spam RIPA protection
- None for your read messages though
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/13/ripa_email_advice/

I don't know if anyone's been following my input on here and elsewhere on
how services such as Gmail could be operated legally from the UK but this
opinion is pretty much in line with my non-legal interpretation.

Obviously from the Doormatologist thread all this is just opinion still to
be tested.

I have no direct knowledge of how Gmail actually works, but I've previously
argued a hypothetical service using Javascript running in the subscriber's
browser could read and interpret incoming email as soon as the subscriber
has clicked "read".


From bogus@does.not.exist.com  Fri Sep  3 00:05:41 2010
From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ()
Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2010 23:05:41 -0000
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.0.1284378573.16928.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>

could
then serve an advert based on the contents, all pretty much in the same
instant to the eye of the user but legally it's crucial that the service
only scans the email after the owner has read it.

It's analogous to a surveillance camera placed in one's hallway to read
letters as one opens and reads them oneself.=A0 Covered by data =
protection but
not RIPA.

Like many on here I was surprised to read legal opinion extend this to =
data
that's still stored by the service provider.=A0 This pretty much opens =
the
door to a Gmail-like service scanning an email server-side the instant
*after* it's been read, alleviating the need for Javascript - all =
untested,
of course.

James Firth




From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Mon Sep 13 16:15:49 2010
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2010 16:15:49 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <op.viyysiif6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk>
	<egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>	<op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
	<4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk> <op.viyysiif6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <4C8E4025.1030008@zen.co.uk>

Charles Lindsey wrote:
> On Sat, 11 Sep 2010 02:00:20 +0100, Peter Fairbrother 
> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
> 
>> Charles Lindsey wrote:
>>> On Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100, Peter Fairbrother 
>>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> the law cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether 
>>>>> someone has bothered to read them or not.
>>>>
>>>> It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.
>>>>
>>>> If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which 
>>>> has been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access 
>>>> them, then they are "in transmission". It makes no difference 
>>>> whether the recipient has already accessed them or not.
>>>  I think not. If the "doormat" doctrine has any validity at all (and 
>>> I believe it does),
>>
>> So do I.
> 
> Then is is clear your understanding of the word "doormat" differs from 
> mine (and from Lord Bassam's, too).


Here's what Lord Bassam had to say about doormats. A few minutes before, 
he had said that the possible "means" included private telecomms systems:

     The definition of "interception" is limited to interception
     of a communication in the course of its transmission by certain
     means. To take one example, a letter which has been delivered
     through a letterbox and is lying on a doormat is no longer in the
     course of its transmission -- it has, after all, arrived -- because
     it is no longer being delivered by the public postal service into
     whose care it was entrusted.


Afaict the comment above is the only time he used the word doormat in 
the debate.

> By definition, the "doormat" is the first entity encountered by the 
> message after is arrives at the intended "address".

Not by definition it isn't! Suppose the dog grabbed it on the way down ...

[...]

>> Incidentally, that includes both a copy in the system and a copy which 
>> is out of it. Both copies are "the communication". Both copies are in 
>> transit for s.2 purposes.
> 
> This is where the Act does not cover all the possible scenarios. 

Can you suggest a scenario which it doesn't cover?

> I think 
> a Court would be bound to recognise that different copies of the message 
> were in a different status of "being in transmission", 

But the Act doesn't talk about messages, or copies, it talks about 
communications.

A letter can be a communication, and it obeys the everyday laws of 
physical objects - for instance it can only be in one place at once.

For electronic messages though, the latter doesn't apply - there can 
(and often will) be many copies of the message around. To say that only 
one of them  is the communication would be to deny that the others are.

And it's not the status of a copy which matters for section 2(7) - it's 
the status of the communication.

> since I can see 
> no other way in which the Act can make any sort of sense. 

Hope that has made it clearer.

People can have problems with these sorts of concepts, they make 
traditional everyday assumptions like "a communication is in only one 
place or state at a time", or "once it has been delivered it cannot 
still be in transmission" - but afaics the writers of RIPA didn't have 
those problems.

For example, s2(7) talks about communications which have been delivered 
still being in transmission. A traditional letter can't do that - but an 
electronic communication can.


-- Peter Fairbrother


From chl at clerew.man.ac.uk  Tue Sep 14 22:53:27 2010
From: chl at clerew.man.ac.uk (Charles Lindsey)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2010 22:53:27 +0100
Subject: Doormat-ologist needed
In-Reply-To: <4C8E4025.1030008@zen.co.uk>
References: <000301cb4ef4$cd72ca30$68585e90$@gmx.net>
	<4C87051C.1080704@zen.co.uk> <egGeReEfkzhMFADd@perry.co.uk>
	<4C877AC4.2050700@zen.co.uk>
	<op.vit0hgah6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk> <4C8AD4A4.400@zen.co.uk>
	<op.viyysiif6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk> <4C8E4025.1030008@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <op.vi1lrdju6hl8nm@clerew.man.ac.uk>

On Mon, 13 Sep 2010 16:15:49 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
<zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:

> Charles Lindsey wrote:
>> On Sat, 11 Sep 2010 02:00:20 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> Charles Lindsey wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 08 Sep 2010 13:00:04 +0100, Peter Fairbrother  
>>>> <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Both "in transmission", and having "been transmitted", Clear as day.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> the law cannot be intending to make a distinction between whether  
>>>>>> someone has bothered to read them or not.
>>>>>
>>>>> It *doesn't* make any such distinction. That's the point.
>>>>>
>>>>> If they are stored in a system - whether public or private - which  
>>>>> has been used to transmit them, so that the recipient can access  
>>>>> them, then they are "in transmission". It makes no difference  
>>>>> whether the recipient has already accessed them or not.
>>>>  I think not. If the "doormat" doctrine has any validity at all (and  
>>>> I believe it does),
>>>
>>> So do I.
>>  Then is is clear your understanding of the word "doormat" differs from  
>> mine (and from Lord Bassam's, too).
>
>
> Here's what Lord Bassam had to say about doormats. A few minutes before,  
> he had said that the possible "means" included private telecomms systems:
>
>      The definition of "interception" is limited to interception
>      of a communication in the course of its transmission by certain
>      means. To take one example, a letter which has been delivered
>      through a letterbox and is lying on a doormat is no longer in the
>      course of its transmission -- it has, after all, arrived -- because
>      it is no longer being delivered by the public postal service into
>      whose care it was entrusted.

If the message is addressed to some separately addressable entity within  
the private telecommunication system, then that might affect the point of  
delivery.

But if the message is addressed to bassam at bassam.org, then the electronic  
equivalents of the butler are merely forwarding agents within Lord  
Bassam's computer setup. The doormat is reached as soon as it arrives at  
the entry port to his system.

>
>>> Incidentally, that includes both a copy in the system and a copy which  
>>> is out of it. Both copies are "the communication". Both copies are in  
>>> transit for s.2 purposes.
>>  This is where the Act does not cover all the possible scenarios.
>
> Can you suggest a scenario which it doesn't cover?

The one where some copies have been delivered, and even read, whilst other  
copies are still in the POP3 mailbox whence the recipient can subsequently  
retrieve them (again); and where, in that scenario, you have to decide  
whether a SOS's warrant or a PACE warrant is needed to access some  
particular copy.
>
>> I think a Court would be bound to recognise that different copies of  
>> the message were in a different status of "being in transmission",
>
> But the Act doesn't talk about messages, or copies, it talks about  
> communications.
>
> A letter can be a communication, and it obeys the everyday laws of  
> physical objects - for instance it can only be in one place at once.

And why not the same with electronic communications? A copy of a  
communication, even if made electronically, is no different from a  
photocopier immediately behind Lord Bassams letterbox which makes multiple  
(but exact) copies of each letter. They are all physical objects like you  
say, and they are therefore separate communications, and may be disposed  
of differently.

Even electronic copies are different physical objects, because they are  
composed of different charges/areas-of-magnetisation/whatever. It is even  
possible for them to be different due to harware failure, or to Received  
headers and the like added in transit to record the route taken by that  
particular copy. Lord Bassam's analogy can apply just as well.
>
> For electronic messages though, the latter doesn't apply - there can  
> (and often will) be many copies of the message around. To say that only  
> one of them  is the communication would be to deny that the others are.

But I deny that there is such a thing as THE communication. They are all  
communications.

-- 
Charles?H.?Lindsey?---------At?Home,?doing?my?own?thing------------------------
Tel:?+44?161?436?6131?                      
???Web:?http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email:?chl at clerew.man.ac.uk??????Snail:?5?Clerewood?Ave,?CHEADLE,?SK8?3JU,?U.K.
PGP:?2C15F1A9??????Fingerprint:?73?6D?C2?51?93?A0?01?E7?65?E8?64?7E?14?A4?AB?A5


From z.kwecka at gmail.com  Thu Sep 16 06:58:30 2010
From: z.kwecka at gmail.com (Zbigniew Kwecka)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2010 06:58:30 +0100
Subject: Future Data Acquisition Techniques
Message-ID: <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn@mail.gmail.com>

Dear colleagues


As a PhD student at Edinburgh Napier University I research the future
investigative data acquisition techniques for use by public authorities.
Investigators often use traffic data obtained from ISPs under RIPA and other
information available to selected public authorities under the voluntary
disclosure mechanism of the Data Protection Act, but the current techniques
for gathering data from third-parties (Internet Service Providers,
employers, etc.) are slow and lack privacy measures. I have set-up an
on-line questionnaire which aims to evaluate different approaches that
police and other public authorities could use to gather data faster while
respecting privacy. I would be grateful if you could spend few minutes and
use this survey to let me know your opinion on the subject. (If you are
unable to answer the whole thing, you can always answer just a couple of
questions and press 'Submit')


Link to the questionnaire:
www.evidence-acquisition.org/survey.aspx?q=ukcrypto

Many thanks for your help.

Kind regards

Zbigniew Kwecka
PhD Research Student
Edinburgh Napier University

z.kwecka at gmail.com

z.kwecka at napier.ac.uk
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From richard at highwayman.com  Thu Sep 16 10:52:47 2010
From: richard at highwayman.com (Richard Clayton)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2010 10:52:47 +0100
Subject: Future Data Acquisition Techniques
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn@mail.gmail.com>
References: <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <MAEw2OhvjekMFAb3@highwayman.com>

In article <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn at mail.gmail.com
>, Zbigniew Kwecka <z.kwecka at gmail.com> writes

>    As a PhD student at Edinburgh Napier University I research the 
>    future investigative data acquisition techniques for use by public 
>    authorities. Investigators often use traffic data obtained from 
>    ISPs under RIPA 

seldom, they mainly do "reverse directory lookup" to establish a real-
world link for a cyberspace identifier

>    and other information available to selected public 
>    authorities under the voluntary disclosure mechanism of the Data 
>    Protection Act, 

seldom -- and the Home Office encourages ISPs to tell them when they are
asked for data under the DPA, so that the asker can be re-educated!

>    but the current techniques for gathering data from 
>    third-parties?(Internet Service Providers, employers, etc.)?are 
>    slow 

varies -- some of the automated systems at the large ISPs are very fast;
and the manual systems at the small ISPs can also be fast because the
enquiry is unusual and is therefore promptly dealt with.

My own impression is that it's the run-of-the-mill stuff at mid-range
ISPs (and of course telcos) that tends to be slow, because queues build
up.

>    and lack privacy measures. 

the automated systems are unlikely to be routinely checked by any humans

>    I have set-up an on-line 
>    questionnaire which aims to evaluate different approaches that 
>    police and other public authorities could use to gather data faster 
>    while respecting privacy. 

hmmm... unless I went through it too fast, it suggested just two
approaches. One was the high-cost, high-risk data warehousing approach
that the government has floated from time to time; and a second vaguely
described method which sounded like one of the information theoretic
privacy preserving database access systems...  a triumph of carbon
emissions over common sense :(

    BTW: you might usefully discuss the retrieval system here, or point
    at papers -- since there's still a lot of people here with relevant
    knowledge of such mechanisms.

However, I'm not at all sure that a questionnaire, even on such an
erudite list as this one, will assist very much -- albeit it may help
identify which issues might usefully be researched. Perhaps, since you
haven't just used Survey Monkey like everyone else, you're actually a
psychology PhD and the topic is merely an excuse for testing out
questionnaire designs :)

-- 
richard                                                   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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From z.kwecka at gmail.com  Sat Sep 18 22:02:58 2010
From: z.kwecka at gmail.com (Zbigniew Kwecka)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2010 22:02:58 +0100
Subject: Future Data Acquisition Techniques
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn@mail.gmail.com>
References: <AANLkTinT0y1tm-1-1Udpj0m7aoYgBJ26GxRue=29FKZn@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <AANLkTinjxwr2dFJs3Sf_BiD5JpOQBZh3oawJfLWCbgne@mail.gmail.com>

Richard, thank you for the response. Also, many thanks to everybody who has
taken part in the survey.

>>    and other information available to selected public
>>    authorities under the voluntary disclosure mechanism of the Data
>>    Protection Act,

>seldom -- and the Home Office encourages ISPs to tell them when they are
>asked for data under the DPA, so that the asker can be re-educated!

My apologies for making the introduction a little bit confusing. I wanted it
to be ?catchy? and short so I mainly mentioned ISPs, however, the same
applies to other Communication Service Providers that are covered under
RIPA. According to senior police officers the forces routinely use location
data from mobile communication providers during their investigations. I have
also mentioned DPA since the system can be used for data acquisition from
any 3rd party,  CSPs, but also employers, banks, etc.


>>    but the current techniques for gathering data from
>>    third-parties (Internet Service Providers, employers, etc.) are
>>    slow

>varies -- some of the automated systems at the large ISPs are very fast;
>and the manual systems at the small ISPs can also be fast because the
>enquiry is unusual and is therefore promptly dealt with.


From bogus@does.not.exist.com  Fri Sep  3 00:05:41 2010
From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ()
Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2010 23:05:41 -0000
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.1.1284843787.16928.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>

the bottle-neck in this process. The last time I=92ve checked (April 2009) =
the
slowest bit in the process was getting all the required paperwork and
approvals, the time waiting for the human operator to gather the data and t=
o
respond. In cases where somebody=92s life was endangered an investigator wo=
uld
sill have to wait minimum of 30min to get location data. While the process
is well defined, and all the approvals are necessary, it could benefit from
automation. As far as I am aware the police have automated access to
subscriber data only, while all other data needs to be requested by the
Single Point of Contact.


>>    I have set-up an on-line
>>    questionnaire which aims to evaluate different approaches that
>>   police and other public authorities could use to gather data faster
>>    while respecting privacy.

>hmmm... unless I went through it too fast, it suggested just two
>approaches. One was the high-cost, high-risk data warehousing approach
>that the government has floated from time to time; and a second vaguely
>described method which sounded like one of the information theoretic
>privacy preserving database access systems...  a triumph of carbon
>emissions over common sense :(

You are right these are two main approaches discussed. If somebody would
like to propose another alternative I would be happy to discuss. I am not
one of the conspiracy theorists and I think that the current system works
well, but could be faster. However, the government is about to change the
process that works towards a more intrusive approach. This is my motivation
for seeking an alternative. I agree that an ordinary information theoretic
privacy preserving approach is a triumph of carbon emission over common
sense, for this reason I suggest hiding identity of the suspect not among
the whole population, but in a group of a thousand or so identities.

For example:

The list of telephone numbers owned by any given telephony provider is
public. This is required for the call routing to work properly.
Consequently, the investigators could request from a given CSP a list of al=
l
active telephone numbers. Wanting to request traffic data for a given numbe=
r
the investigators (or the SPoC) could randomly choose 999 other telephone
numbers from the list, and this way request a thousand records to be
included in a round of a given private information retrieval protocol. As
you have said the ISP=92s systems are very efficient and a query requesting=
 a
thousand records would most likely take just a fraction more time than a
query requesting one record. Then processing of these records by a
privacy-preserving protocol would most likely take just a minute or two.
Investigators frequently use data from CSPs and other 3rd parties, however,
from the perspective of computing these requests are seldom. Thus, in my
opinion few request per week that are going to take two minutes more to
process are not a large price to pay in order to increase privacy of all th=
e
parties involved.


>   BTW: you might usefully discuss the retrieval system here, or point
 >  at papers -- since there's still a lot of people here with relevant
 >  knowledge of such mechanisms.

Here is a link to a paper I am currently working on:

http://www.evidence-acquisition.org/surveyitems/Minimising_Collateral_Damag=
e.doc

It is not yet finalised but so I would be grateful for any feedback.


As a response to a question asked by one of the respondents I would like to
reassure members of the group that this is purely academic research and I a=
m
not intending to sell the solution described. All previous work that I base
my research at, as well as my work is in the public domain.


Many thanks,


Zbigniew Kwecka

--0016363b9a58fed52a04908f0010
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">Richard, thank you for the resp=
onse. Also,
many thanks to everybody who has taken part in the survey.<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0and other information available to selected public<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0authorities under the voluntary disclosure mechanism of
the Data<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0Protection Act,<br>
<br>
&gt;seldom -- and the Home Office encourages ISPs to tell them when they ar=
e<br>
&gt;asked for data under the DPA, so that the asker can be re-educated!<br>
<br>
My apologies for making the introduction a little bit confusing. I wanted i=
t to
be =93catchy=94 and short so I mainly mentioned ISPs, however, the same app=
lies to
other Communication Service Providers that are covered under RIPA. Accordin=
g to
senior police officers the forces routinely use location data from mobile c=
ommunication
providers during their investigations. I have also mentioned DPA since the
system can be used for data acquisition from any 3rd party, <span style=3D"=
mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>CSPs, but also employers, banks, etc.</span></p=
>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0but the current techniques for gathering data from<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0third-parties=A0(Internet Service Providers,
employers, etc.)=A0are<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0slow<br>
<br>
&gt;varies -- some of the automated systems at the large ISPs are very fast=
;<br>
&gt;and the manual systems at the small ISPs can also be fast because the<b=
r>
&gt;enquiry is unusual and is therefore promptly dealt with.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">From my talks to police it look=
s that the electronic
system of ISPs are not the bottle-neck in this process. The last time I=92v=
e checked
(April 2009) the slowest bit in the process was getting all the required
paperwork and approvals, the time waiting for the human operator to gather =
the data
and to respond. In cases where somebody=92s life was endangered an investig=
ator would
sill have to wait minimum of 30min to get location data. While the process =
is
well defined, and all the approvals are necessary, it could benefit from
automation. As far as I am aware the police have automated access to subscr=
iber
data only, while all other data needs to be requested by the Single Point o=
f
Contact. </span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0I have set-up an on-line<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0questionnaire which aims to evaluate different approaches
that<br>
&gt;&gt;=A0 =A0police and other public authorities could use to gather
data faster<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0while respecting privacy.<br>
<br>
&gt;hmmm... unless I went through it too fast, it suggested just two<br>
&gt;approaches. One was the high-cost, high-risk data warehousing approach<=
br>
&gt;that the government has floated from time to time; and a second vaguely=
<br>
&gt;described method which sounded like one of the information theoretic<br=
>
&gt;privacy preserving database access systems... =A0a triumph of carbon<br=
>
&gt;emissions over common sense :(<br>
<br>
You are right these are two main approaches discussed. If somebody would li=
ke
to propose another alternative I would be happy to discuss. I am not one of=
 the
conspiracy theorists and I think that the current system works well, but co=
uld
be faster. However, the government is about to change the process that work=
s towards
a more intrusive approach. This is my motivation for seeking an alternative=
. I
agree that an ordinary information theoretic privacy preserving approach is=
 a
triumph of carbon emission over common sense, for this reason I suggest hid=
ing identity
of the suspect not among the whole population, but in a group of a thousand=
 or
so identities. </span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">For example:</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">The list of telephone numbers o=
wned by any
given telephony provider is public. This is required for the call routing t=
o
work properly. Consequently, the investigators could request from a given C=
SP a
list of all active telephone numbers. Wanting to request traffic data for a
given number the investigators (or the SPoC) could randomly choose 999 othe=
r
telephone numbers from the list, and this way request a thousand records to=
 be included
in a round of a given private information retrieval protocol. As you have s=
aid
the ISP=92s systems are very efficient and a query requesting a thousand re=
cords
would most likely take just a fraction more time than a query requesting on=
e
record. Then processing of these records by a privacy-preserving protocol w=
ould
most likely take just a minute or two. Investigators frequently use data fr=
om
CSPs and other 3rd parties, however, from the perspective of computing thes=
e
requests are seldom. Thus, in my opinion few request per week that are goin=
g to
take two minutes more to process are not a large price to pay in order to
increase privacy of all the parties involved.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
&gt;=A0 =A0BTW: you might usefully discuss the retrieval system here, or
point<br>
=A0&gt; =A0at papers -- since there&#39;s still a lot of people here with
relevant<br>
=A0&gt; =A0knowledge of such mechanisms.<br>
<br>
Here is a link to a paper I am currently working on:</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><a href=3D"http://www.evidence-=
acquisition.org/surveyitems/Minimising_Collateral_Damage.doc">http://www.ev=
idence-acquisition.org/surveyitems/Minimising_Collateral_Damage.doc</a></sp=
an></p>


<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">It
is not yet finalised but so I would be grateful for any feedback.</span></p=
>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">As a response to a question asked by one of
the respondents I would like to reassure members of the group that this is =
purely
academic research and I am not intending to sell the solution described. Al=
l
previous work that I base my research at, as well as my work is in the publ=
ic
domain.=A0</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br></span=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">Many thanks,</span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-GB"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span lang=3D"EN-GB">Zbigniew Kwecka</span></p>

--0016363b9a58fed52a04908f0010--


From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Sat Sep 25 18:39:33 2010
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2010 18:39:33 +0100
Subject: Register of Electors by internet
Message-ID: <4C9E33D5.7020303@iosis.co.uk>

I have received my electoral registration form from my local Bristol 
City Council. It invites me to register by internet. To do this, I have 
to visit:

    www.registerbyinternet.com/Bristol/default.aspx

which immediately offers me:

    https://www.registerbyinternet.com/Bristol/default.aspx

and Kaspersky IS chokes on the digital certificate, because the issuer 
isn't included in its base set of trusted certificate providers.

I'm using Firefox v3.6.8 and Kaspersky IS 2009.

I started looking:

   Domain Name: REGISTERBYINTERNET.COM
   Registrar: EASYSPACE LTD.
   Whois Server: whois.easyspace.com
   Referral URL: http://www.easyspace.com
   Name Server: NS1.NAMECITY.COM
   Name Server: NS2.NAMECITY.COM
   Status: clientTransferProhibited
   Status: clientUpdateProhibited
   Updated Date: 28-feb-2010
   Creation Date: 30-mar-2004
   Expiration Date: 30-mar-2012

Name & Registered Office:
EASYSPACE LIMITED
GROUND FLOOR
11-21 PAUL STREET
LONDON
UNITED KINGDOM
EC2A 4JU
Company No. 03405586

Kaspersky reports the following about the certificate:

    The site attempts to identify itself with invalid information

    Certificate is not trusted, because it hasn't been verified by a 
recognised authority

    Organisation: Electoral Reform Services Ltd

    Issued by:
      Common Name: Kaspersky Anti-Virus personal root certificate
      Organisation: Kaspersky Lab

So there is another UK company involved:

ELECTORAL REFORM SERVICES LIMITED
THE ELECTION CENTRE
33 CLARENDON ROAD
HORNSEY
LONDON
N8 0NW
Company No. 02263092

I wonder if CESG has checked all this out...

Peter

PS Quite a few sites use this Kaspersky certificate - and not for the 
personal use that it appears to be provided for.



From pwt at iosis.co.uk  Sun Sep 26 10:22:16 2010
From: pwt at iosis.co.uk (Peter Tomlinson)
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 10:22:16 +0100
Subject: Register of Electors by internet - update
Message-ID: <4C9F10C8.2060200@iosis.co.uk>

"Kaspersky IS chokes on the digital certificate, because the issuer 
isn't included in its base set of trusted certificate providers."

That should be Firefox (v3.6.8) that chokes because it doesn't have the 
info in its list. Sorry.

Peter



From bogus@does.not.exist.com  Tue Sep 28 21:19:11 2010
From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ()
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2010 20:19:11 -0000
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.0.1285952216.11014.ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>

still held by the local authority, the ERS online systems just connect
to that. Of course they will still have a partial database.

David